Impossible: The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald (Volume One)

by Barry Krusch

  [I]n a drug prosecution a chain of custody for contraband seized from the defendant would typically be established in the following manner.

  The government might first call as a witness the arresting officer to testify that he found in defendant’s possession a bag containing a white powder. This witness would testify that he kept the bag and its contents in his possession and secure until he placed it into an evidence container and sealed that container in a way that would reveal if it had been opened. The officer then might testify that he gave the container to a police chemist.

  The chemist then might be called as a witness to confirm that, when he received the container, it had not been opened. The chemist might further testify that he opened the container, removed the contents, and conducted tests to establish the nature of those contents. Finally, the chemist would testify that he placed the contents back into the container, resealed it, brought it to court, and that the container shows no indication that it subsequently had been opened.

  This foundation is sufficient to authenticate the bag and its contents because the perceptions of the two witnesses, combined with the circumstantial evidence that the container had not been disturbed except by the chemist, would be sufficient to sustain a finding that the exhibit was the same item and in the same condition as the item found in defendant’s possession. Further, the chemist now would be permitted to testify as to the results of his analysis of the evidence since the chain of custody tying the evidence to the defendant establishes the relevance of that testimony.

  The standards in a murder case with a death penalty as a consequence, needless to say, can be no less rigorous.

  The bottom line: if the key evidence in The Case Against Oswald does not satisfy legal requirements that have been used to authenticate evidence, it is at the very least not admissible. And, in certain circumstances, a failure to meet these parameters may be seen as meta-evidence that the evidence has been manufactured, which would taint the credibility of all the other evidence in the case.

  ELEMENT TWO

  Lee Harvey Oswald, at the time of the assassination, was present at the window from which it was alleged that the shots were fired (the sixth floor of the southeast window of the Texas School Book Depository), and the weapon purported to be Oswald’s Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5 mm Italian rifle was in Oswald’s possession at the time it was fired.

  If the shots were fired from the southeast window of the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository, and Oswald was not even at that window, then obviously he did not fire the shots. Moreover, even if he was at the window, if he was not holding the rifle, then obviously he did not fire the shots. In either of these situations the proposition would be positively disproven.

  ELEMENT THREE

  A rifleman of Lee Harvey Oswald’s capabilities could plausibly have fired 3 separate shots using the Mannlicher-Carcano within the elapsed time of the shooting and with the requisite accuracy required.

  The assassin, or assassins, had a challenging shot. For a period of time, there was an oak tree between the sixth floor window and the President’s limousine, which was traveling at approximately eleven miles per hour. The final shot that hit the President was approximately 80 yards from the sixth-floor window, 20 yards shy of a football field away. In addition, the complete shot sequence from the first to the last shot took place anywhere from approximately 5.5 to 7 seconds, very close to the limits established by the Warren Commission regarding how fast the rifle could be fired.

  That’s not all: even if Oswald were the best shot in the world, the Mannlicher-Carcano had to be of a certain level of quality for the shot to be made. For example, the scope on the rifle should have been calibrated with its target (in other words, if you have a bull’s-eye in the crosshairs, and instead hit the outer ring of a target, not to mention missing it entirely, you do not have a properly-sighted scope!). The same reasoning would be true for the bolt and firing pin and any other rifle component.

  If Oswald cannot make the shot, he cannot be a gunman, lone or otherwise.

  ELEMENT FOUR

  Lee Harvey Oswald was not framed for the murder of President John F. Kennedy.

  Issues with the evidence against Lee Harvey Oswald may lead to an inference, if not an outright deduction, that Oswald was framed for murder. If that is the case, then we will be led on a path to gather evidence outside the official case that can be used to confirm and/or further develop this hypothesis. If we take that route, we may find an extraordinary amount of evidence not considered by the Warren Commission which demonstrates that very point. The more evidence that is found, the lower the confidence level for this element, which could easily drop below the threshold requirement.

  If this element is not established beyond a reasonable doubt, then there is a significant possibility, if not certainty, that Oswald was framed, and if that is the case, the only possible verdict that could be returned is “not guilty.”

  Conclusion

  So much for the analysis of the necessity of the elements of Propositions One and Two.

  We’ve come a long way. The essential background has been covered.

  Let us now look at the evidence underlying the first element of Proposition One, and apply what we’ve learned.

  Chapter 9

  Proposition One, Element One: Exactly 3 Shots Fired

  Initial Discussion

  Let’s analyze our first element:

  Exactly three shots were fired from the sixth-floor southeast window of the Texas School Book Depository at Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963 — no more, no less — and the three shells found on the floor of the Depository — in the possession of the Warren Commission — were fired from Lee Harvey Oswald’s rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world.

  This element is a composite derived from three conclusions of the Warren Report, and a statement by FBI Firearms Identification Expert Robert Frazier in hearings before the Commission, first the conclusion 2 on p. 19 that three shots were fired,

  Next, conclusion 4 on p. 19 that Oswald fired the shots,

  Next, a statement by FBI agent Robert Frazier in hearings before the Warren Commission that the three shells in the possession of the Commission were fired from Oswald’s rifle and only Oswald’s rifle (3 H 416):

  And finally, the conclusion 11 on p. 22 that only Oswald fired the shots:

  The relationship of this last conclusion to the others is clear: if Oswald acted alone, then obviously no other shots were fired other than the three he was alleged to have fired.

  These conclusions above were based on evidence reported by the Warren Commission. In subsequent sections of their report, they provided the following types of evidence:

  Photographs of spent hulls and a live round (as above).

  Officer testimony regarding the number of empty shells found (three).

  Earwitness testimony regarding the number of shots fired (the majority of the witnesses interviewed by the Warren Commission reported hearing three shots).

  Forensic evidence related to the wounds of JFK/Connally, as well as certain ballistic evidence and evidence of bullet strikes.

  Naturally, we are going to take a much closer look at this evidence in this chapter, but for now let us assume that this is all the evidence (and therefore we met our requirement that the evidence be comprehensive), and that the Warren Commission is 100% credible. Let us also assume that we are confident that this evidence is sufficient, and since it all tells the same story, it obviously is consistent. Therefore, our four parameters based on these assumptions would be met.

  If that is the case, what would our confidence level be regarding this element? Very high, as follows:

  Take a good look at those numbers, the last time you’re going to see numbers that high . . . from now on, they are headed inexorably South.

  As you might have guessed by virtue of the fact that you have this book in your hand, at least one of the assumptions above is incorrect: we have not seen all the evidenc
e, not by a long shot. There are numerous pieces of the puzzle which the Warren Commission did not bother to share with their American audience when they first published the Report. As the months and years passed, and as more and more information was revealed, ultimately this extremely high confidence level began to sink into the quicksand created by these new revelations. When we analyze the evidence originally hidden from our view, we see that there is definitely another (seamy) side to the story.

  Consider the following screen captures from Commission Documents utilized by the Warren Commission but not released in the 27 Hearing and Exhibit Volumes. The following capture is from Page 1 of Commission Document 1, a Summary Report by the FBI provided to the Warren Commission of the evidence gathered, dated December 9, 1963, but only revealed to the public in May of 1966 (Accessories After the Fact, p. 148), over a year and a half after the publication of the Report on September 24, 1964: 1

  At first glance, this paragraph seems to indicate that of the three shots fired, 2 separate shots hit President Kennedy, and another shot wounded Governor Connally: three shots, three separate hits. However, there is an ambiguity in the sentence “Two bullets struck President Kennedy, and one wounded Governor Connally.” One possible interpretation of this sentence — in a departure from the plain meaning of the text — is that one of the bullets referenced as having struck President Kennedy could have passed through the President’s body to strike Governor Connally. Under that interpretation, there would still be three separate hits, but by two shots, not three.

  However, a complete refutation of this alternative interpretation was provided just seventeen pages later. According to Page 18 of Commission Document 1, the bullet that struck President Kennedy in the back — the only of the two bullets that could have passed through the body of President Kennedy to strike Governor Connally — did in fact not transit the President’s body: 2

  This statement, written before the autopsy report was delivered on December 23 (RH 457), was confirmed less than five weeks later in a Supplement to the December 9, 1963 FBI report. Because it was dated January 13, 1964, the Supplement post-dated the receipt of the autopsy report, and included the information contained within that autopsy report, confirming what had previously been “unofficial” reports: 3

  With the information provided by these latter two paragraphs, the shot sequence (read in conjunction with the Zapruder film which reveals three separate hits) is clearly established: Shot 1 strikes President Kennedy, entering his back, but only penetrating to a distance of less than a finger length; some time later, Shot 2 strikes Governor Connally (the bullet which struck President Kennedy in the back not exiting Kennedy’s body), and still later, Shot 3 strikes President Kennedy in the head. Three separate shots, three separate hits.

  This sequence of events was anticipated in a telephone conversation recorded at 1:40 pm between President Lyndon Johnson and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover on November 29, 1963: 4

  Over the next few weeks, media reports transmitted this information to the public at large. The New York Times started it off by indirectly confirming the three shots, three-hit scenario on December 18th, 1963, stating that the first bullet which hit President Kennedy did not pass through his body: 5

  This finding was echoed by the Times the next day: 6

  Five days after this article appeared, both the FBI and the Warren Commission received a copy of the official autopsy report on December 23, 1963 (Accessories After The Fact, p. 148). On January 4, 1964, the Journal of the American Medical Association (possibly utilizing this information) specifically verified the three shots, three-hit scenario transmitted by Director Hoover to President Johnson: 7

  As if to remove all possible doubt, The New York Times summarized and confirmed the foregoing (with far more than enough time to analyze the existing medical evidence), on January 19, 1964, nearly 2 months after the assassination! 8

  So, let’s sum this all up. According to FBI (through reports directly to the President and to the Warren Commission), and media sources as reputable as The New York Times and the Journal of the American Medical Association (based on the medical evidence gathered from the autopsy report and other sources), Shot 1 hit President Kennedy, Shot 2 hit President Connally, and Shot 3 hit President Kennedy. Once again, three shots, three hits. All of this evidence entirely consistent with an edited version of our element, “Exactly three shots were fired from . . . Lee Harvey Oswald’s rifle.”

  How surprising then, to come across this shocking headline on page 111 of the Warren Report:

  Uh oh!! What have we here? According to the element, only three shots were fired. And the conclusions provided by the FBI and media were consistent with that element. So what is this? A shot that missed?

  If in fact there was a shot that missed, that is an extra shot. And since 3 + 1 = 4, that means that four shots were fired, not three!

  Also, what it means is that if we are 100% confident in the judgments of the FBI provided to the Warren Commission and to President Johnson, and 100% confident in the judgments of the Warren Commission as provided in their Report vis a vis this headline, then we can be 100% confident that the element “Exactly three shots were fired from . . . Lee Harvey Oswald’s rifle.” is false, resulting in this modified confidence level regarding the element:

  If the above were truly the case, this would be a pretty short chapter. As it turns out, however, the Warren Report fudged on their headline just a few lines later, saying that it was only probable that there was a shot that missed (and therefore only likely that the element three bullets were fired was false, not certain). The Warren Report actually rejected the conclusions of the FBI based on their claimed analysis of the evidence, rejecting the “three shots, three hits” scenario in favor of a “two shots, three hits” scenario which has subsequently been referred to as the single bullet theory.

  With only two shots doing all the damage (according to the official version), that meant that one of the shots missed purely from a logical perspective, though the Commission could not identify which shot. As the Commission summarized (WR 111): 9

  Astute readers will note two transformations in the evidentiary findings here, with the FBI telling us that the President was shot in the back with a bullet that did not pass through his body, and the Commission completely ignoring this information and manufacturing a new reality, “reporting” that the President was shot in the neck with a bullet that did pass through his body, one of the many seismic changes in the factual landscape necessitated by the political desire (as we will shortly see) to promulgate a lone assassin theory.

  Unfortunately for the credibility of the Warren Commission, we can be almost certain that this reversal of judgment must be incorrect, based on the extraordinarily unlikely possibility that basic medical findings arrived at over a two-month period can plausibly be about-faced; in other words, that a team of medical professionals erroneously reported to the FBI that a bullet entered the back and did not transit the President’s body when in fact it really entered the neck and did transit the President’s body. A “mistake” — in this author’s and his wife’s and his father’s humble opinion — which would be essentially impossible for a medical professional to make (the author’s wife is a Physician’s Assistant with over thirty years experience, the author’s father is a retired podiatric surgeon with over forty-five years experience). Anyone who happens to disagree with this assessment is urged to consult with a forensic pathologist near them.

  Based on this revised finding, we can be absolutely certain that our previous potential hypothesis that we could have 100% confidence in the judgments of both the FBI and the Warren Commission was false, since they have transmitted information which is demonstrably incompatible. Someone, somewhere, is either grossly incompetent or is not telling the truth, if not both.

  Clearly, we have discovered even at this very early stage some confidence-rattling inconsistencies in what has been reported as “the” evidence, and it is in fact inconsistencies l
ike these which have rendered the Kennedy case very much a live issue. Obviously, 4 bullets would demonstrate a conspiracy, and the failure of the Warren Commission to admit to evidence clearly pointing to more bullets than 3 results from flaws in their analysis and investigation, flaws which were recognized by the House Select Committee On Assassinations in their 1979 report (HSCA Report 97): 10