Churchill's Spy Files

by Nigel West

  ‘Robin’

  This appears to be the Christian name of a Civil Servant in the Admiralty. This man may live in Prince of Wales Road, Battersea. He is normally for Party purposes in touch with Beattie Marks. On one occasion he told her that he had changed his job on Springhall’s instructions, but Springhall denied all knowledge of him. Robin’s contact with the Party does not seem to be very close, as they found great difficulty in sending a warning to him.

  Gregory

  This man is believed to be a scientist and Springhall asked that he should be warned. It has not been possible to discover his identity.

  Norman Henry

  Springhall’s last message asked that this man should be warned. We have no record of this man.

  Springhall sent a message out to say that he had no special organisation of his contacts. This seems natural from the manner in which he was working, since any organisation might have attracted the notice of the Party members responsible for Forces work and the Civil Service Groups. Pollitt was not prepared to believe the denials of those girls whom he interviewed, and he believed that Janet Watson knew far more than she was prepared to admit. It seems likely that Betty Matthews, Freddy Lambert, Val Walker and Geraldine Swingler provided useful contacts and may have acted as couriers. One of the first three probably introduced Astbury to Springhall. The other women referred to may have played a similar role, although there are indications that Ann David was perhaps more deeply in Springhall’s confidence. Berger, Dell and Astbury are all known to have worked for Springhall and it must be presumed that the last three names on the list were also working for him. There is also a contact at the Bristol Aeroplane Company, who has not yet been identified.

  While Green was at Brixton he was content to be interviewed in November 1942 by two MI5 officers, Hugh Shillito of F2(a) and Geoffrey Wethered, and was reasonably forthcoming:

  On the question of the agent who was able to give details of aircraft production, Green told us that this man was not in a factory himself but had access to figures from several factories. As a cross-check on the accuracy of his reports a fitter was recruited in one of the factories who sent in details of production. When these were found to tally with the particulars provided by the more important agent the latter’s accuracy was regarded as proved. Further details about this agent were not forthcoming.

  On the subject of wireless transmitters Green told us that the job of operator was one which put a great strain upon the nerves. He referred to one particular operator who had previously worked for the organisation in France. This man was married and his wife was much braver than he. She was taken into the secret, told what her husband was doing and when he got particularly jumpy was even instructed to teach herself morse so that she could take over her husband’s job if necessary. He was a wireless technician of great skill and made his own set. He kept the set in the garden inside a post which had been hollowed out. The set was not affected by the damp in any way. The valves were removed before it was concealed in the post. There were four of them stuck into the top of the set. The set was operated by six volt batteries recharged from the main. The reason why it was not operated on power was that if signals had been located by means of RDF in a particular area the electric power could be turned off in that area and if the signals immediately ceased this would form a check on the accuracy of the RDF.

  The operator went on the air usually about once a fortnight at a time of night when very few ordinary wireless owners would be listening in. His set was located close to an aerodrome. He began by operating from a semi-detached house. As the house was rather larger than a man of his importance might be expected to occupy an ‘uncle and aunt’ were provided to share it with him. These were real people, 58 and 61 years of age respectively. All the time there were difficulties with this wireless operator. On one occasion a car drew up outside the house late at night when he was going on the air and he was convinced that it was an RDF van, though in point of fact it contained a courting couple. He began to make difficulties about establishing contact with ‘the village’ (i.e. Moscow), saying that the set would not work properly. As a result, Green bought a new transmitting set of an American type. He had no idea how it got to this country but had no difficulty in buying it or any other wireless material since he had access to a black market in the neighbourhood of Fetter Lane. Green then broke an invariable rule and went himself to the operator’s house and stood by while contact was made with Moscow. After all this trouble had been taken, the operator was in a public bar when he heard a man saying that ‘he was doing work for the USSR’. He was so convinced that this would lead to Police enquiries that he insisted on a new house being found and a detached house in a cul-de-sac was found for him. At this period Green’s organisation had several transmitting sets so that the same set was not used too often. It was not quite clear whether each set was operated by a different operator though this seems probable. On the occasion when the nervous operator insisted on being found a new house his set was removed and concealed and, meanwhile, another set was used. When he was established in his new house his own set was later moved there. Each transmitter operated on two alternative wavelengths. The set used by the nervous operator was quite small, approximately 12” long, 6” high and 4” wide. Messages were transmitted by means of high speed morse. Unfortunately neither Green nor his interviewers had any knowledge of wireless, but he explained that the morse message which was encoded by the operator was recorded on a piece of perforated paper. The message was then sent out automatically at very high speed and recorded the other end. Certain additional apparatus was necessary for this purpose in addition to the set.

  This apparatus was purchased in London after the war [either Spanish Civil War or the Second World War]. It was not brought into the country in the Diplomatic Bag. Green told us that incoming messages were sent in the same way. This appears not to have been an invariable practice because Green said the operators got to know each others touch. He said this particularly applied to the nervous operator who recognised the touch of his Russian colleague in particular over letters in the English alphabet which are not found in the Russian, when he came to these letters the Russian operator would falter slightly. This appears to indicate:

  (a) That the Russian was transmitting in English.

  (b) That he was not operating in high speed morse, though the experts will no doubt be able to say whether touch can be detected in high speed as well as ordinary morse transmissions.

  On the subject of using Party members, Green referred to a particular agent in the Army who was a member and was instructed gradually to sever his connection with the Party. He did this too suddenly, turning over at once to The New Statesman and the Observer. Since this man was known to a Major who was friendly with the man’s Commanding Officer, also a Major, as a Party member it was decided that suspicion might be aroused and he was gradually dropped. There was another good reason for doing this which was that he showed signs of being over zealous.

  The method of dropping an agent was to show great concern about his safety and tell him that his welfare was the first consideration and that for the time being it was considered safer for him not to submit any further reports. A man was never told that he was being dropped, but was dropped gradually – ‘liquidation was never used’. Green referred to a suggestion made by Krivitsky in his book I Was Stalin’s Agent that unsatisfactory agents were liquidated by the Fourth Department. He said this was further evidence that Krivitsky was not a genuine Russian Secret Service agent.

  On the subject of over zealous agents, Green mentioned with great amusement the case of an agent he had in the mercantile marine. This man had keys made to the Captain’s cabin and safe and removed from there all the personal and secret documents he could lay hands on, arriving with his pockets bulging at the rendezvous with Green. Not only did his appearance give him away as a sailor, but he arrived carrying a cage containing a parrot!

  On the question of money, Green gave a fe
w further details. He said that he had been supplied with the sum of £500 in £1 notes as an emergency fund. This he had buried and it was still untouched. For ordinary day to day expenses he was supplied with £1 notes by his chief who had a banking account. Though Green himself had a banking account it was always a small one (as we know) and he never used it in connection with the payment of agents. He received the £1 notes and paid them over direct, taking a receipt. He had two receipts on him when arrested by the Police which he had to eat. At one period he discovered that he was being given new notes, straight from the bank, with consecutive serial numbers. He protested against this practice which was stopped. He said that he presumed that the banking account was under the name of ‘a trading organisation’. He agreed that a considerable sum of money went through his hands every week, but said that he never made a profit out of his work, on the contrary, he was generally the loser. Very few of the men who worked for him had any idea of making money though he mentioned that the nervous wireless operator was more interested in having the rent of his house paid than in using it for the job which he had agreed to do.

  On the subject of aliases Green said that all agents were given these and they were used in all communications with agents, e.g. receipts were signed under the alias. Green also said ‘it is, therefore, no use looking for somebody called Dent’. The name Dent appears on the top of the photographic extracts found in Green’s possession.

  As a safety precaution all agents of Green’s organisation would carry out at regular intervals a sort of test rendezvous. The agent would leave his home and, giving every opportunity to possible followers, go to a suitable cafe and have a meal. He would carefully note whether anybody followed him in or out of the café. If the agent suspected then or at any other time that he was under suspicion or being followed his instructions were to do nothing at all. He was to make no attempt to meet his colleague, but would destroy any material of which he was in possession and merely fail to keep his next rendezvous. If he thought it safe, he would go to the stock meeting, or he might think it necessary to avoid one or two stock meetings. He would only go to a rendezvous wearing a ‘danger signal’ if he discovered at the last moment that he was under suspicion. In order to save time, Green had an arrangement with his chief whereby they would both go to the same cafe where they would have coffee or a meal at different tables without showing signs of recognition. If either wished to see the other he would make some sort of signal, such as scratching his ear. By this means the long process of reaching and leaving a rendezvous could be avoided if it was unnecessary.

  Green said that another means of making a rendezvous was for one man to go to the bus terminus. He would then be able to get into the bus when it was empty and there was no danger of being followed. He would then choose a seat downstairs nearest to the door. The person he was to meet would be able to get on at any stop on the bus route and on getting on the bus would go upstairs. He would be the first to get off, followed by the man downstairs who would see him do so. There appear to be inherent difficulties in this method but it seems to be one that Green used if I understood him correctly.

  Green explained that it was not always necessary for persons to meet, they could on some occasions leave material to be picked up. On one occasion, when very pressed for time, he went into the Shooting Gallery in Tottenham Court Road with some photographic material in a newspaper. He put down the newspaper and his coat and hat by the side of the gallery and fired a few shots. Meanwhile, his ‘friend’ had come in and put down his own coat and hat and a newspaper beside Green’s. On coming out the friend removed Green’s newspaper. On other occasions he used the method described at my first interview with him when he said that he had hidden material in the hole of a tree. He said that perhaps three or four places were chosen either in a park or in open country. The places might be the trunk of a tree, some sandy soil or a suitable bush. These would be alternative hiding places and would be numbered. A poster would be agreed upon in the neighbourhood of the hiding places and on it the person hiding the material would mark one, two or three strokes indicating which hiding place he had chosen to the man who was to pick it.

  Green mentioned one instruction which was given to him as a last resort. He never made use of it because it was unnecessary and he regards it as rather a long shot though worth trying. If arrested by the Police in a town with material in his possession drop it on the pavement and make a great scene about picking it up, refusing to do so. This will attract bystanders. With any luck, the Police will pick up the material and force it into the agent’s hands. He will then be able to plead at his trial that he has been ‘framed’ by the Police.

  On the point of the number of agents one man can conveniently run, Green said that the most he ever saw in one month was 15, but he stressed the fact that his organisation was very fluid. There was no hard and fast rule that a particular man should only run particular agents.

  Green said that he accepted responsibility for the accuracy of the reports which he passed on to his chief. He would speak very severely to an agent whom he thought was exaggerating or reporting on hearsay evidence. The matter of educating agents and keeping their politics up-to-date was regarded as being of the greatest importance. One, a very stupid man, suggested during the period of the Russo-German pact that the information he was passing on might reach the Germans. Green had to jump on him. He reported the matter to his chief who gave him certain ‘inside information’ with the result that Green jumped still harder at his next meeting.

  Green said that he would like to mention one thing. When he was on trial at the Old Bailey on 4 February 1942 a man named Jackson, formerly in the RAF, was sentenced to 18 months for bigamy. After sentence he remarked to Green ‘That is all they have got on me except for a few cases of espionage and treason’. Green subsequently cultivated the acquaintance of Jackson in prison and says that he is convinced that Jackson is pro-Nazi and, although Green has no evidence, he says that Jackson was very likely engaged in some sort of espionage work for Germany. Green thinks that the Security Service will have records of Jackson.

  Green was rather upset by the manner in which the Police had conducted the search of his house. He did not think it nearly thorough enough, and even when the Detective Inspector had discovered a series of photographs, including photographs of guns, his suspicions remained unaroused. Also in the Dark Room, on an undeveloped film, were details of the organisation. Green watched the searchers while they opened the containers in which this film was contained, thereby rendering it valueless. Another thing which Green said he could not understand was why I had not visited him until he had been in prison for nearly six months. I dealt with these two rather difficult questions to the best of my ability.

  I mentioned to Green that it seemed a great risk to photograph a report and then, without developing the photograph, to destroy the original. If the photograph, when developed proved to be a failure the whole report would be lost. He said this was a risk which had to be taken and he invariably took two separate photographs of every report, keeping one himself until the other had safely reached its destination.

  After the interview I saw Green for a few moments alone and he said there were one or two things which he would like to mention. Firstly, he would like to make clear his motives for telling me as much as he had done. He wished to help me in the work on which I was engaged (which he believes to be espionage as well as counter-espionage) and he also wished to avoid innocent people, particularly his friends, coming under suspicion. He asked whether I would please omit his name from any report which I might make on the interviews with him as if knowledge of them reached the Russians his motives might be misunderstood. He particularly mentioned this as he had reason to believe that there was ‘someone in the War Office’. I asked whether he meant that there was an agent in the War Office proper. He replied ‘No, in the Security Side’. I asked what his reasons were for saying this and he said that he had always been told that if he or anybody else
in the organisation came under suspicion it would be known at once. He went on to say, without any prompting from me, that it was possible that this story had been told merely to keep up morale, but he thought it unlikely and he thought that in all probability it was a statement of fact.

  PS. When speaking of recruiting agents in the Army, Green agreed that the ordinary private soldiery was of little use. He said it was better to try and find someone like a Brigade Secretary. This is an interesting remark because Brigade Secretaries are a new institution. It was not until 21 February 1942 that an Order was promulgated under which the post was created. The Order was in the Press on 25 February 1942. At this time Green was already in Prison where he did not, in theory, have access to the papers, although the Prison Chaplain reads extracts of general interest to the prisoners. I should hardly have thought that this matter was one of general interest and the only other way in which Green could have got to know about it was through advance information acquired from one of his agents before his conviction.

  After his release from Brixton at the end of November 1942, having served fifteen months’ hard labour for forging petrol coupons, Green was under B6 surveillance and was seen to visit the CPGB headquarters in King Street, Covent Garden, where he discussed his experience, unaware that some of the rooms contained concealed MI5 microphones, and it was by this means that some of the membership of his spy ring had been traced.2

  During Green’s period in prison MI5 attempted to identify his agents, but only felt sure about Private A.M. Elliott, currently posted to the Intelligence Corps depot at Matlock as a member of No. 4 Field Security Section. A background check revealed that Elliott had served in the International Brigade in Spain with Green, was a CPGB member of long-standing, and had enjoyed access to the intelligence bulletins that had been leaked. The search for an informant inside the Security Service, though pursued by Shillito, simply ran into the sand, although in later years the allegation would be proved correct by the exposure of Anthony Blunt as a Soviet mole. Nor was MI5 able to identify Green’s Canadian radio operator, or his source inside the Ministry of Aircraft Production.