Churchill's Spy Files
Page 17
LAKE
Miss L. PEPPERELL
LEE
Miss B.M.L HOWARD
LOWE
Miss D.I. PROWSE
PHILLIPS
Mrs. O.K. SHEEHAN
It is possible that the Party name JONES may be a second name for Mss Joan Murrell, who also passes under the party name of Haynes, You will note that ROSKIN is suggested as the Party name of Brian AMBROSE who is said to have joined the Navy in January l943. The following have not so far been identified:
BLAKE
McKAY
STEVENS
BROWN
MOORE
TRAYNER
CARR
PITT
WELBY
GRANT
SINCLAIR
MI5’s Edward Cussen interviewed Mrs Milne, who had been introduced to Springhall and Uren by Gresson, and she admitted that she had been aware of the further meetings held by Springhall with Uren, but insisted that she was quite unaware that Uren was passing secret information to Springhall. She had, nevertheless, acknowledged that she had drafted an assessment of Uren’s political and social background for Springhall:
MI5’s B2(b) summarised the case in these terms:
As a result of an enquiry based on notes in Springhall’s diary, it was revealed that Springhall had been in contact with a certain Mrs Helen Gresson, a member of the Communist Party and Scottish organiser for the Russia of Today society.
Her husband, Dr Gresson, was a Party number at the University of Edinburgh. Mrs Gresson had suggested to Springhall that it would be a good thing for him to meet a certain friend of hers, Ray Milne, who was engaged in secret work (who was in fact working in a secret Government department). Ray Milne was an adherent of what was known as the Middle Class Group of Communists in Edinburgh and had attended two short courses of Communist training. She was described by Mrs Gresson as being a ‘closed member’ of the Communist Party. When she was interviewed prior to being employed in a confidential post she stated that she was a Socialist but made no reference to her Communist sympathies.
Ray Milne met Springhall on one occasion in London, and he asked her about her work. On being told that it was secret he asked if she could tell him anything that would be of interest to him, to which she replied that if anything of political interest came her way she would let him know. (Under interrogation she stated that she had in fact no intention of doing this). Ray Milne stated that she had no further interviews with Springhall, but as the result of her contact with Springhall, which she had failed to report to the authorities, and the disclosure of her Communist sympathies, she was dismissed from the Government department in which she was employed.
At the same time Mrs Gresson put Springhall in touch with Ormond Uren, who she also described as being a ‘closed member’ of the Party. Uren stated that when he attended Edinburgh University as a student he had come in contact with people of Communist views, with which he sympathised, but did not become a member of the Party or take any active part in its work. In 1942, when he joined SOE, he was filled with admiration for the energy and enthusiasm of the Communist Party and openly expressed regret to Mrs Gresson that he could not do anything active to assist its work. Early in 1943 he had a liaison with a Gertrud Hupenbacker, a German refugee who moved in Communist circles.
Uren stated that he was under the impression that the information which he passed to Springhall would be discussed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In his first statement to the authorities Uren merely admitted to passing verbally to Springhall a certain amount of general information, but the next day he made a further statement in which he admitted to supplying this written information.
Springhall was questioned in prison as to what had happened to the document which Uren handed over to him, but refused to disclose anything. In his diary entries were found which clearly referred to meetings which were arranged with Uren.
Springhall, who consistently refused to cooperate with MI5, and declined to give evidence at his trial, served his sentence at Camp Hill on the Isle of Wight, where he attempted to spread political propaganda among the prisoners but, as was noted by the authorities, he never attempted to speak to another convicted Soviet spy, John King.4 In July 1946 he was transferred to Leyhill open prison in Gloucestershire and during his period there it was alleged that he had attempted to influence a dozen IRA prisoners, and organise the escape of Dr Alan Nunn May, who was promptly transferred to Wakefield prison.5
Uren was released from prison in September 1947 and in August 1948 attended the Sorbonne before returning to London in the autumn of 1949.
After his release in March 1948 Springhall lived in London, married an Australian and fellow Communist, Janet Watson, and in February 1950 moved to China. He died in Moscow of throat cancer in September 1963, aged fifty-two.
Apart from Sheehan, Uren and Milne, there were several other CPGB members who came under suspicion as being members of his spy ring, among them Hyman Berger, a long-standing CPGB member who had joined the army in 1940 but who was court-martialled in 1943 for copying classified documents. Another of his contacts was Peter Astbury, an atomic physicist who worked at Manchester University and a CPGB member. Also implicated was a Royal Navy officer, Lieutenant Sydney Dell, who was observed to visit King Street to offer plans of an anti-submarine device. Unresolved was information that Springhall had a source in the Admiralty code-named ROBIN, and another in the Bristol Aircraft Company.
Another loose end, which emerged in 1950, was the precise nature of the role played by Geraldine Peppin, the concert pianist married to an RAF officer, Wing Commander Fisher. She was closely connected both to Springhall and Dell, and was suspected of having acted as a courier between the spy ring and the Soviets, with whom she had strong links via the embassy sponsored by the CPGB’s cultural committee. MI5 conducted investigations into all these individuals but there were no further espionage prosecutions. However, in June 1950 Norman Himsworth of B5(b) had some criticisms to add to MI5’s official summary of the Springhall case, which had recently been circulated to various Allied security agencies across the globe, but had failed to mention the inconclusive molehunt for a Soviet spy code-named VIPER:
I have just read B2(b)’s very clear and detailed report on the Springhall case. Although we as a Section were not directly involved in the arrest and subsequent conviction of Springhall, we were interested in his activities just prior to his arrest, because of the VIPER case. I was, at first, surprised that no mention was made in the note of Springhall’s contact with Geraldine Peppin, of his work with the Party’s ARP Co-ordinating Committee, and particularly of his association with Servicemen who used the Peppin’s flat when on leave in London. On consulting our own files, however. I found that much of this material, which was obtained by us, was returned to us after it had been read by officers dealing with the VIPER case.
The telephone check on the Peppin’s flat at 9b Canonbury Square, Islington, showed quite clearly that Service personnel used the Peppin’s flat, and that Springhall had held clandestine meetings with Geraldine Peppin.
For example, on May 12th, 1943, a little over a month before his arrest. Springhall had a telephone conversation with Geraldine Peppin, during which Geraldine said that there was someone who wanted to see him ‘very badly’. The conversation continued in a light vein about Mary Peppin’s recent marriage to Wing Commander Fisher, and then Geraldine suggested that they should meet on the following Tuesday, May 18th, ‘at that funny little place where we met before’, Geraldine said that she would be with ‘odd people’.
We do know, of course, that the Peppin’s flat was used as a reporting centre between the Party’s agent VIPER and the Communist Party, and that the two leading characters involved in the case, Wing Commander Fisher (husband of Mary Peppin) and Squadron Leader Norman MacDonald occupied a flat in the same building, either above or below that of the Peppin’s.
B2(b)’s note also mentions a contact of Springhall called Sub-Lieutenant Sydn
ey Samuel Dell, who called at King Street with some plans concerning a submarine or anti-submarine devices, is a Naval Officer who was an intimate friend of Geraldine Peppin, and on May 9th, 1943, a man who was presumed to be Emile Burns telephoned Geraldine Peppin and asked her if she had had any news from Dell; she replied that she had not since April, and that he had been at sea and had had an appendicitis. Burns then asked for the man’s latest address, which she was able to give him. It is therefore probable that Geraldine Peppin was used either as a recruiting agent for Springhall or that she acted as courier between selected Service personnel and Springhall.
Geraldine Peppin, as a concert pianist, was also closely associated with the Party’s cultural work. There is no mention in the note of how Springhall made contact with the Russians, but at that time the cultural leadership of the Party had direct and open contact with the Russian embassy. As Geraldine Peppin was a member of that cultural leadership it would not have been difficult for her to have acted as courier in this respect too.
Clearly Himsworth, who was deputy to MI5’s legendary agent-runner Max Knight, felt that the VIPER molehunt had been compromised by Springhall’s premature arrest.
6
SIXTH REPORT
Petrie’s sixth report opens with the success stories of Alfredo Manna and Waldemar Janowsky. Manna had operated in Portuguese Mozambique under journalistic cover, but was known to act as a subordinate of the local Italian consul, Umberto Campini. The activities of both men represented a serious threat to Allied shipping along the east coast of Africa so a plot was hatched, with the complicity of the deputy chief of police in Lourenço Marques, Ferreira, to lure Manna to visit Swaziland to see a casino dancer, Anna Levy. Once over the frontier Manna was abducted and then driven into South Africa, where MI5’s representative, Major Webster, handed him over to the police for interrogation. Finally, he was transferred to Camp 020, where he was persuaded to make a full statement detailing his past espionage. For his part, Ferreira, an SIS asset managed by Section V’s Malcolm Muggeridge, was rewarded with £100 and an MBE.
Janowsky’s adventures were rather more profitable, for he was enrolled as a double-agent, code-named WATCHDOG, an Abwehr agent who was landed with a 40-watt radio transmitter near New Carlisle, Quebec, by a U-boat in November 1942. He was run by MI5’s Cyril Mills while he was held in custody by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. A former French Foreign Legionnaire, he had been instructed to carry out a reconnaissance in Canada with a view to assisting six saboteurs who were to land in 1943. He was arrested wearing civilian clothes but under interrogation revealed that he was in fact a lieutenant in the Wehrmacht and had buried a naval uniform upon landing. He also revealed he had been given a code within his code that would indicate to his German controllers if he had fallen under enemy control. If so, he was to insert three ‘U’s into the fifth group of any message.
Janowsky had three cover addresses and proved entirely cooperative, producing identity documents taken from Canadian prisoners at Dieppe, altered to the name under which he was to live in Canada. He had previously lived in Canada between 1930 and 1933, and had married a Canadian woman still resident in Toronto. He carried $1,000 in US gold pieces, and $5,000 in Canadian notes. He was formerly in the Afrika Korps before being posted to Brussels to recruit agents for the Abwehr. Despite an indiscreet reference to his arrest by a member of the Quebec Parliament, and a report in French language papers in Canada, the WATCHDOG case was judged a success and radio contact was established with the Germans in December, after some delays. However, when it was established that no saboteurs were to be sent to Canada, he was transferred to Camp 020 for the remainder of the war.
* * *
SIXTH REPORT
A SPIES ARRESTED.
1 ALFREDO MANNA
This man is an Italian subject long resident in Lourenço Marques. In 1941 he was appointed to represent the Stefani Agency there, but this appointment was only a cover for his espionage activities for the Italian and German Consulates. Manna has confessed to controlling four agents who passed to him shipping information for the Italian Consul, Campini, and whom he paid out of funds provided by Campini. He has also admitted to the despatch of two agents to the Union, though neither of these expeditions bore any fruit. Manna has already provided such background of information of his organisation.
Manna fell into our hands with the connivance of a Portuguese police inspector, who arranged for him to be handed across the border to the Swaziland police. The same Portuguese policeman later produced an ‘inconclusive’ report of his official enquiries into the disappearance of Manna.
2 JANOWSKY
On 9 November 1942 Janowsky, a German national, was landed from a German submarine on the Gaspe Peninsula, Quebec. His mission was the collection of military, naval and economic information in Canada, and his means of communication with Germany were a wireless transmitter and secret writing on letters to cover addresses in neutral countries. His ignorance of local customs and his use of out of date Canadian currency soon landed him in the hands of the police. Until July 1943 he was used by the Canadians as a double-agent, but when it became clear that no further results were likely from this he was sent to this country for further interrogation.
Janowsky’s career before the war included service in the Black Reichswehr, a period in Canada, five years in the Foreign Legion and a short spell in Dachau. In this war he was one of those who infiltrated into Holland dressed in a Dutch uniform shortly before the invasion of that country, and later served in North Africa and in the German espionage organisation in Brussels. He is thus able to provide information on many topics of operational and espionage importance.
B DOUBLE CROSS AGENTS.
1 TRICYCLE
TRICYCLE has just returned from three months visit to Lisbon, where he has been in contact with members of the German Secret Service. He gained the impression that they no longer hope to win the war and expect it to be over shortly. He learnt from his spy-master who is also a close personal friend that the latter believes in the existence of the rocket gun for shelling London. The spy-master added that the British raids on Germany had delayed the production of the gun by about two months, but that it should be in action by December and TRICYCLE would be well advised to leave London before then.
The Germans further told TRICYCLE that they are well-informed about the British Order of Battle. Their principal source is wireless interception and, although they are only able to decipher a small percentage of the messages interceded, they have been able by wireless intelligence to establish the positions of 50% of the formations in this country.
The Germans said that they had practically no agents in the USA but that they had ten or twelve in the UK (this corresponds to those under our control). They also told him the story of a major in the German Secret Service in Berlin who had suggested to his superiors that the agents in England were under British control but was sacked for this suggestion within 24 hours.
TRICYCLE brought back with him a large sum of money, a new type of secret ink, new cover addresses and a radio set, which was carried in a bogus Yugoslav diplomatic bag specially forged for him by the Germans.
He is to return to Lisbon soon to continue his original cover plan to which the Germans are now a party, namely to help Yugoslav refugees to come out of Occupied Territory to the UK. The Germans will assist him in this but will slip two of their own agents into the party. These two have in fact been introduced to the Germans by TRICYCLE’s brother in Yugoslavia, on the understanding that they will double-cross the Germans.
A difficult situation has, however, arisen over TRICYCLE, since his spy master has recently been in touch with the British Authorities in Madrid and has told them that he is under serious suspicion from the Germans and might have to ask for asylum in the UK. If this takes place, no less than five of our double-agents will be ‘blown’, including a recent arrival THE WORM (see below).
2 THE WORM
This double-cross agent arr
ived in the UK at the end of July. He is a Jugoslav and was recruited to work for the Germans by TRICYCLE’s brother. He has been handled by the same German Secret Service official who controls the TRICYCLE case. He has been provided with secret ink and is to communicate information of a military nature.
THE WORM makes an extremely good impression and should prove to be a very valuable agent. He has confirmed, among other things, a view which we have held for some time, that there are certain officials in the German Secret Service who would be prepared to sell out to the British because they realise that Germany cannot win the war.
3 FIDO
FIDO is a French Air Force officer who recently arrived from France. He voluntarily confessed that he had been sent over here by the Germans with the specific object of stealing a new aircraft and flying it back. He is now communicating with the Germans in secret ink about Air Force matters.
4 JOSEF
The Japanese have continued to show their interest in the double-agent JOSEF and the information supplied by him, which relates principally to naval construction and has been suitably doctored. They have sent him by his access courier £150 and promised to supply him with secret ink and possibly a wireless transmitter. He is returning to Lisbon to visit them again personally, and make arrangements for another channel of communication to be used if Portugal should declare war on Japan.
5 PLAN DREAM
A further installment of PLAN DREAM has been carried out with the result that £2,600 has been transferred to GARBO by the German Secret Service, to obtain which amount the Germans have paid over 250,000 pesetas.
C Supposed New Sources of German Intelligence from the UK.
Most Secret Sources have recently shown that the German Secret Service believe that they receive information from the UK through three sources of comparatively recent development. These are: