Churchill's Spy Files

by Nigel West

  The group of pacifists and anarchists who backed War Commentary bought a printers, Express Printers, in 1942, but they were all under varying degrees of surveillance, and in November 1944 the homes of Richards’ wife Marie-Louise Berneri, John Hewetson and Philip Sansom were raided by Special Branch detectives investigating an attempt to ‘endeavour to seduce from their duty persons in His Majesty’s Service and to cause among such persons disaffection likely to lead to breaches of their duty’. Richards, Hewetson and Sansom were arrested in February 1945 and tried at the Old Bailey the following month.

  The prosecution, led by the attorney-general, was partly presented by an MI5 officer, John Maude, and became quite a cause célèbre, with evidence produced about literature seized from the kitbags of various soldiers, among them Privates Taylor, Pontin, McDonald, and Colin Ward. The three men were convicted of incitement, but Berneri was acquitted on the grounds that a wife legally cannot conspire with her husband, and she continued to edit War Commentary during his imprisonment.

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  19 FEBRUARY 1945

  The first MI5 monthly report for 1945, and seen by Churchill on 3 March, reflected the organisation’s satisfaction in laying out the evidence that the Germans, apparently content with their agents in England, and completely unaware that they were, without exception, under British control, were no longer interested in sending further spies but instead were concentrating on the development of stay-behind networks.

  JANUARY 1945

  SPIES EXPECTED.

  There is no evidence to show that the Germans have succeeded in sending any agents to this country, but it is known from Most Secret Sources that they are planning to despatch one who is probably intended to cross the lines on the Western Front and make his way to this country. Details available about his are meagre, but the Field has been warned to be on the watch for him.

  SPECIAL AGENTS.

  GARBO’s sub-agent in Canada has now been equipped with a wireless transmitter with which he has established direct communication with his masters in Madrid.

  TATE and ROVER have been successfully supplying misleading information about the fall of V-l and V-2, and there is some reason to believe that their messages are having an effect on the places where these missiles are falling. TATE has also been used at the Admiralty for Naval deception with great success.

  SABOTAGE.

  A case of sabotage aboard HM LST 368 was reported on the 30th January, and subsequently investigated by the Security Service. It was found that sand had been put into the gearbox. There was no clue whatsoever to indicate the guilty individual, but after extensive interrogation a confession was extracted from a stoker, Albert Bliss, that he had committed the act. The investigator’s suspicions were aroused by Bliss’s unsatisfactory answers under interrogation and were confirmed by an examination of the dirt under Bliss’s nails, which was found to contain particles of sand for which he could not account. Bliss has been tried by Court Martial and sentenced to twelve months with hard labour. His motive for doing this sabotage was that he was worried about his wife and wished to delay the sailing of the ship.

  SPECIAL INTERROGATION CENTRE.

  A survey of the activities at our special Interrogation Centre during the year 1944 shows a considerable change in the type of work performed. Before the invasion of the Continent the spies interrogated there were mainly people with espionage missions against this country, or agents picked up at the various control points throughout the Empire. Since D-Day, however, this type of arrival has become much rarer and the majority of cases studied have been agents detected in the Field and sent back for special and more detailed study by our interrogators. During the year 116 persons have been interrogated, of which 71 have been sent to us from SHAEF. Of the remaining 45 derived from other sources, only 14 were admitted after D-Day.

  During the whole year only 13 agents were taken into the camp who had missions directed against the United Kingdom, and these included one who was already under our control. This number is surprisingly small, for it was expected that before the invasion of the Continent the Germans would take every possible effort to send agents to this country. It is worth noticing, moreover, that of the 13 agents just mentioned only 3 had assignments directly connected with invasion preparations. In this second half of 1944 there is no known case of the enemy sending an agent with a mission to the United Kingdom.

  Several reasons may be suggested for this change in German methods. The most obvious is the fact that the Germans are now probably less interested in activities in this country than previously, and are concentrating more on espionage against the liberated countries. A second and perhaps equally important reason, however, is the satisfaction which the enemy appears to have felt about his espionage organisation in this country, which is in fact under our control. Two other factors probably also contributed. The first is the ban imposed early in 1944 on the travel to the United Kingdom of recruits for the Allied forces, which is known to have been one of the most profitable channels from the German point of view.

  The second is the liberation of Southern France which closed another channel, namely the Franco-Spanish frontier, over which the Germans habitually sent their agents.

  The Interrogation Centre has, however, continued to serve an important function in interrogating agents who have supplied us with extensive information about the organisation and activities of the German Secret Service, much of this should prove of value during the period of occupation.

  Of the cases reaching us from sources other than SHAEF, several have been of considerable interest. In the early Spring the American authorities in Iceland sent us 7 agents who had landed illegally there, and whose arrival suggested that the Germans were expecting an invasion launched from Iceland against Norway.1 It is quite clear that the American authorities would not have been able to obtain from those men the information extracted from them by our interrogators, who have a far more extensive background against which to work.

  AFHQ have also supplied certain agents, including one of particular importance, namely an Italian called Manfredi de Blasis. The AFHQ interrogators failed to extract from him the information which was, however, soon obtained when he underwent more experienced examination in this country.

  Of the cases received from the Western Front it is notable that by far the greater part come from 21st Army Group. This is due to the fact that the Belgian and Dutch authorities have little means of investigating cases and are prepared to hand over almost any agent to us, whereas the French have a well-trained body of interrogators and are somewhat jealous of their right to deal with spies on their own territory. We have, however, arranged for the French to ‘lend’ us for limited periods important agents arrested by them, when there is reason to think that we should be able to obtain more information from them than was got by their captors.

  19 February 1945

  * * *

  Petrie had drawn attention to the case of Baron Philippe Manfredi de Blasis, one of the war’s most unusual examples of espionage, who arrived at Prestwick from Marrakesh in January 1944.

  Manfredi de Blasis was recruited by the Sicherheitsdienst to operate behind the Allied lines in southern Italy in August 1943 and was compromised, even before his departure on a mission to Cerignola, by signals intelligence, together with some fifty other SD agents. However, after his arrest in Bari in October 1943 he was so convincing that both his SIS case officer and his CSDIC interrogator became persuaded of his innocence, to the point that the accuracy of the original source came into question, asserting that ‘it was psychologically impossible for this man to be a German spy’. Accordingly, under SIS’s sponsorship he was sent to Camp 020, where he shared a cell with Andrés Bonzo. After just three weeks in detention he admitted having been recruited by an embassy attaché, Koehler, to undertake an assignment for the SD that included sheltering at least one saboteur on the large agricultural estate he inherited from his mother.

  Born in Rome in 1906 to an aristocratic
landowning family, Manfredi de Blasis graduated from Rome University with a law degree and in 1937 married an older Finnish divorcee, Anna von Winter. She would later meet, and boast of her friendship with, Heinrich Himmler, whom she met early in 1943 in a Berchtesgaden hotel where she was undergoing medical treatment. She would later be exposed as a German spy, although her husband was unaware of her espionage role. He was released from Camp 020 and repatriated, with Alfredo Manna, in August 1945.

  * * *

  GARBO’s sub-agent in Canada was Agent FIVE, code-named MOONBEAM by MI5 and designated V-Mann 274 by the Abwehr, who was notionally based in Ottawa. According to GARBO, MOONBEAM was a Venezuelan named Carlos who had been living in Aberdeen, and brother of Agent THREE, code-named BENEDICT, supposedly a wealthy, recent graduate of Glasgow University named Pedro. Initially, MOONBEAM had intended to return to Venezuela, where he hoped to establish a U-boat refueling base near his home in Camana, on the Caribbean coast, a proposal that the Abwehr had not encouraged. GARBO had invented FIVE before his arrival in England in an attempt to discover if the Kriegsmarine possessed servicing facilities for submarines in the Caribbean. He tried the same ploy, probing about agents in Northern Ireland, before formally recruiting FIVE as a sub-agent in June 1942, under MI5’s sponsorship.

  Having been trained by his brother who had formally enrolled him in June 1942, MOONBEAM successfully undertook missions as a full-time, paid agent to South Wales, and even to the closed military area of the Isle of Wight, an achievement considered very impressive that led to an offer to visit Northern Ireland, which was not pursued. Instead, in response to a questionnaire, he went to Brighton to report on the deployment of Canadian troops in the area.

  In the summer of 1943 MOONBEAM reached Montreal legitimately, or so the narrative went, and he began communicating in secret writing to a cover address in Scotland. Then he acquired a 350-watt radio transmitter and recruited his cousin CON, a resident of Buffalo, New York. In reality, his role was played by MI5’s liaison officer with the RCMP, Cyril Mills, while he supposedly found a job as a commercial traveller in Toronto.

  When Agent FOUR, code-named CHAMILUS, allegedly a Gibraltarian employed as a NAAFI waiter in a US Army canteen in Chislehurst, deserted in June 1944 he hid in a remote farmhouse in South Wales, but managed to flee the country in October 1944 when he travelled to Canada as a steward and became MOONBEAM’s radio operator, opening a direct link to Madrid in February 1945 with his 350-watt apparatus, which allegedly he had smuggled into Canada. His transatlantic passage had been facilitated by a seaman, Agent SEVEN, code-named Stanley, who provided him with papers that allowed him to be employed as a steward. SEVEN, known as Stanley, appeared in Madrid’s ISOS traffic as V-Mann 1245.

  FOUR, known as Fred, had been recruited by GARBO in May 1942 to report on military activity on England’s east coast but after three months had moved to Soho, where he had bought a wireless transmitter on the black market. When his lodgings were bombed out he moved to the Whitelands Hotel in Putney, which was being used as a refugee centre for Gibraltarians. In the ISOS traffic FOUR appeared as V-Mann 377.

  MI5’s brief summary of GARBO’s activities fell far short of explaining what happened to him later in 1944 when, in August, the Section V officer in Madrid, Jack Ivens, was approached by a Spaniard, Roberto Buenaga. He claimed to be a friend of Friedrich Knappe-Ratey, a senior member of Kuhlenthal’s staff at the Madrid embassy, with an offer to sell the name and address of the Abwehr’s star spy in London who, he alleged, communicated with Madrid by wireless. Ivens interviewed Buenaga and was persuaded that he probably could compromise GARBO, and immediately reported the crisis to London. Meanwhile, he stalled Buenaga by insisting he required instructions before proceeding to agree his terms.

  MI5’s ingenious solution was for GARBO to tell Kuhlenthal that his courier had learned of Buenaga’s treachery, and he was therefore disappearing to the Welsh hideout that previously had accommodated his sub-agent FOUR when he had gone on the run. In his absence Pedro would run the network from Glasgow, and MI5’s hope was that Buenaga would be silenced before he could make a return visit to Ivens. However, Kuhlenthal responded to GARBO with a reassurance that Buenaga knew nothing to endanger him.

  As it turned out, Kuhlenthal was wrong, and when Buenaga kept his appointment with Ivens he gave GARBO’s correct name and address, and even supplied Aracelli’s home address in Burgos. Accordingly, GARBO notionally moved to Wales, where he maintained contact with both the Abwehr and his network. Through this expedient Kuhlenthal retained his absolute confidence in GARBO, and MI5 gave every sign of being in pursuit of the fugitive Spaniard, including a formal protest by the Foreign Office in December addressed to the Spanish government about Knappe-Ratey’s undiplomatic behaviour, accompanied by a demand to interrogate him.

  * * *

  ROVER was a Polish naval officer who reached England in May 1944 after many adventures. Before the war he had been a professional boxer and a baker, and had worked on the railways, before joining the navy in early 1939. He had fought as an infantryman and, having been made a PoW, was sent to a forced labour camp where, in June 1942, he accepted an offer of recruitment from the Abwehr.

  When ROVER arrived in Madrid he revealed his mission, and surrendered his transmitter, code, secret ink and cover address, making him an excellent candidate for a double-agent. He also revealed that his mission was to gain a job in an aircraft factory and collect technical information about new designs. Indeed, the Germans had invested so much time in training ROVER that MI5 concluded that he was regarded as a valuable asset.

  However, upon his arrival in London, when he followed his instructions to mail his readiness to begin transmitting, there was no reply to his signal and the decision was taken to return him to the Polish navy. Almost as soon as the arrangements were made, the Abwehr commenced transmitting, and on 1 October an RSS operator named Reason was substituted. Unfortunately, Reason fell ill and died, so a second operator was introduced with the claim that ROVER had been injured in a road accident and had been hospitalised, as an explanation for his change in style. This explanation was accepted, and ROVER’s transmitter remained active until the end of hostilities.

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  5 MARCH 1945

  At this late stage in the war MI5’s counter-espionage role was diminishing, and Petrie’s report reflected the necessity to screen released PoWs, investigate allegations of collaboration and build prosecution cases against renegades.

  FEBRUARY 1945

  1. TRIALS OF RENEGADES.

  The first two cases have occurred of renegades being brought to trial in this country. One was a civilian, Gerald Hewitt, the other a Private in the Gloucester Regiment, James Robert Styles.

  Hewitt was tried at the Central Criminal Court on March 5th and was sentenced to twelve years’ penal servitude under Defence Regulation 2 A. He had lived in Paris since 1931 and went to the South of France when that city was occupied by the enemy. From 1942 onwards he undertook propaganda work for the Germans in return for which he was allowed to go to Paris with his mother. He was paid at a rate of between 20,000 and 25,000 francs a month for writing propaganda articles and for broadcasting in French in the guise of ‘Mr Smith, an Englishman, interned in France, who has asked permission to come to the microphone’. His task was to inflame French opinion against the United Nations. When the liberation of Paris was near, Hewitt was taken by the Germans to Belfort en route for Germany, but he left them and took refuge in Switzerland. From there he was expelled, and was arrested by the FFI on arriving in France. The case was investigated in detail by the Security Service Liaison Section attached to SHAEF, and a report prepared which led to his trial and conviction.

  In passing sentence Mr. Justice Macnaghten said: ‘When you thought that your native land and your adopted country were bound to fall you treated with Germany. You sold yourself and the country of your adoption to the enemy. Then the scene changed. Paris was about to be liberated, and a liberated Paris was
no place for you, so you went away to Germany. I have no doubt you were genuine in distrusting the Germans, so you went to Switzerland, but Switzerland did not want you, and you chose to fall into the hands of the Allies rather than into the hands of the Germans. You have been assisting the cause of the enemy.

  ‘It is impossible to measure or even estimate what assistance you were to the enemy and what harm you did to your compatriots and friends. Public Justice requires that offences such as yours must be punished.’

  Styles was captured in France in 1940, and throughout the time that he was a prisoner of war in Germany, adverse reports on him were received by the Military Authorities. At the end of 1943 he reached Sweden and was ultimately brought to this country. Over 200 repatriated prisoners of war were interviewed by officers of the Security Service, and statements were taken from them which established beyond doubt that Styles had acted as a stool pigeon while prisoner of war. Some of the prisoners were able to give conclusive evidence that Styles had disclosed to the enemy the plans of men intending to escape from prisoner of war camps, and had thus frustrated their projects. Styles has been tried by General Court Martial and convicted of voluntarily aiding the enemy. For reasons of security the trial was held in camera. Sentence will be promulgated in due course.

  2. SABOTAGE.

  A further instance has occurred of malicious damage to a ship carried out by a man anxious to avoid leaving this country. The damage occurred in the engine room of HMS Harrier, a Fleet Mine Sweeper Flotilla tender, which was found flooded to a depth of three feet. The cause was the deliberate opening of the inlet and outlet valves of the starboard circulator. A board of enquiry was unsuccessful in tracing the culprit and a special officer was sent by the Security Service to investigate the cause. After lengthy enquiry and interrogation this officer obtained an admission from a member of the crew, Victor Cladingboel, a stoker, that he had flooded the engine room in an attempt to delay the sailing of the ship. Cladingboel stated that while rockets were falling on London, he was worried about his wife who was living alone with their young child. He was tried by Court Martial, sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, and dismissed the Service.