Churchill's Spy Files

by Nigel West

  Ledebur was encouraged to defect by the news, conveyed personally by Dr John, that he and Hansen had been deeply involved in the plot to assassinate Hitler. Indeed, Hansen had actually handed the explosives to Count Klaus von Stauffenberg, having removed them from the Abwehr’s own stores. Apparently unaware of Hansen’s complicity, and his subsequent execution, Ledebur realised that he could not return, as ordered, to Berlin. Upon his arrival in Madrid on 27 July he had reported to the KO, where he had been handed a personal message requiring him to fly back immediately. In the circumstances, Ledebur opted to switch sides.

  The sheer drama of Ledebur’s dilemma is plain. He had been incriminated in a scheme that had gone terribly wrong, and suspects were being recalled. Some, like John, had fled the country, and in his case he had established a link with the British in Lisbon. Quite obviously, for Ledebur to obey orders would mean certain death, even though he had not been one of the plotters, yet he appeared hesitant about defection, even if his funds and choices were limited. However, Ledebur’s proposal alarmed GARBO’s case officer, Tommy Harris, who sent a minute to Tommy Robertson on 7 August:

  The Germans in Madrid have expressed concern to Berlin on discovering that Ledebur is contemplating going over to the British in case he is in the possession of information which might lead to the British discovering the network of the Special Agent, GARBO. In the event that this risk is non-existent they propose that they should pass mis-information to the British through him with the collaboration of a confidant of Ledebur who continues to remain loyal to the Germans. This presupposes that Ledebur is to remain in Madrid in touch with both the Germans and the British.

  Berlin’s replies are obscure. They appear to be making up their minds. They wish Madrid to stall. Meanwhile Madrid is to endeavour to discredit Ledebur in our eyes.

  It would seem, in wishing to discredit Ledebur that they do not know in Berlin how much he may know about the GARBO network; that they wish to stall for time may indicate that they are preparing a plan to have him kidnapped by the Gestapo.

  Should we, meanwhile, arrange for him to be facilitated in his escape from Spain we will, in all probability, be left in uncertainty as to whether or not the true activities of GARBO are in the process of being discovered by Berlin.

  We would then be open to two courses of action, either to close down the GARBO network or to continue as before. If we continue and they have reached the decision that Ledebur must have disclosed the GARBO organisation to us then they are left with no alternative other than to believe that GARBO has all along been a controlled agent. If we close down the GARBO case when, in German calculations Ledebur could not possibly have known anything about his case, they might arrive at the same conclusion.

  Since Otto John and Ledebur are friends and they each know the others story we can, for all purposes, consider that they must be treated alike.

  If the enemy is able to assess GARBO as having been controlled since he has been operating in the UK, the following would be the repercussion:

  (i) The cover plan for future operations would be blown.

  (ii) The Special Agents, BRUTUS and TATE, would be blown.

  (iii) The Germans would discover that our military operations are co-ordinated with operational deception plans backed by wireless cover and implemented by Special Agents.

  (iv) From the cover plan the enemy would learn the true nature of our operations now in progress.

  If, in these circumstances, it is considered essential to evacuate these two men on account of the danger of compromise to HM Embassy, Madrid and that if they were now abandoned by us a dangerous situation would be created, I would recommend that the following plan be put into operation in order to safeguard operations and the future running of Special Agents.

  I propose that immediately prior to the evacuation of the two men, GARBO, acting in his notional capacity of an employee in the Spanish Department of the Ministry of Information, should send over a message on the following lines:-

  ‘My chief called me urgently to the Ministry requesting that I submit earliest possible drafts for propaganda campaign against Spain to be put out on BBC Broadcasts within next 18 hours on following subject: Oil supplies were restored to Spain on condition that 200 German Secret Service agents listed in a note handed by British Embassy to Spanish Foreign Office were expelled. This has not been done and wolfram agreement has not been fulfilled by Spaniards. Now two German agents, one an Austrian who has worked for years for the German Secret Service, the other a member of the Lufthansa who was a prominent member of organisation who plotted assassination of the Führer, have offered to betray their countries to the British. They are both in Madrid and are shortly to be evacuated to Gibraltar. On arrival there they have promised to tell the truth about German organisation in Spain, how they work with the Spaniards, to give details about wolfram exports, and give information about the anti-Hitler party in Germany. British intend to make great propaganda of these traitors implying that this is further indication of Germany’s disintegration. If the Spanish information proves interesting it will be used as excuse to reimpose oil sanctions and bring pressure on Spain to expel Germans. It is essential to take immediate action before the escape of these traitors materialises and they reach British soil. At time of discussing the matter with me they were, according to my chief, both in Madrid.’

  On the arrival of Ledebur and John in Gibraltar it would then become necessary to broadcast on the Overseas Service the announcement that two German Intelligence Officers had escaped to British territory with valuable information for the Allies. The Broadcast would report this incident as a further indication of Germany’s disintegration.

  After a lapse of a few days during which time the two men will be interrogated, the Foreign Office should direct HM Ambassador in Madrid to present a note to the Spanish Foreign Office disclosing the names of the two Germans who had come over to the British. Evidence should be produced to show that the German spy master, Karl Kuhlenthal, had not been expelled from Madrid in accordance with the undertaking of the recent agreement in which his name appeared on the list of Germans which was supplied to the Spanish Government.

  A request should be made that in view of the fact that information had come to light through the interrogation of Ledebur, to show that Karl Kuhlenthal was controlling by wireless from Madrid an espionage W//T service in the UK run by an unidentified Jugoslav (this information was in fact given by Ledebur to SIS’s representative in Madrid). HM Government would request the Spanish Government that in view of this information which had come to light and the non-fulfilment of their part of the agreement, that Kuhlenthal should be interrogated by British authorities under Spanish supervision with regard to his hostile acts against this country whilst on Spanish territory. This prior to his deportation from Spain, which would also be requested.

  Meanwhile, GARBO would be in constant touch with the Ministry of Information learning developments. Discovering that this protest was about to be made he would notify his masters to warn Karl Kuhlenthal, unaware that they were one and the same person:

  There is abundant evidence to show that Kuhlenthal and his superiors in Berlin believe GARBO to be in a position to get hold of most secret information through the MoI. There is every possibility that this story will be believed and acted upon. Kuhlenthal would no doubt leave Spain on GARBO’s recommendation and continue to operate him from German soil. His removal from Madrid might be very advantageous at the present time when numerous deserters may be expected to approach us.

  There is every likelihood that we will see sufficient reaction on RSS if the above plan is put into operation to be able to measure the extent of the success or failure of the plan.

  Past experience has shown that whenever we have taken the initiative in the running of the GARBO case we have achieved a success and I consider that failure to do so at this critical juncture would, at the best, result in:

  (a) The notional arrest of GARBO.

  (b)
A wireless silence imposed on GARBO’s Agent No.3 on instructions from the Germans.

  After much discussion, and pressure from the ambassador, Sam Hoare, who was keen to be rid of a potential diplomatic embarrassment, Ledebur was delivered to Gibraltar when, on 21 November, he was flown to Hurn by a BOAC Constellation, carrying travel papers identifying him as a Mr Johnson:

  The main reason for bringing Ledebur to this country was on account of the anxiety which HM Ambassador there expressed at his continued presence in an Allied safe-house which was thought might become most embarrassing to Allied interests. Ledebur may, however, be a useful informant. It is known from the case of Hans Scharf that Ledebur has been in contact with the Abwehr over a considerable period and it is known from this and other sources that he has particular knowledge of the Bedaux mission which is of interest to B1(b). It is also possible that Ledebur may have more information than had been previously supposed regarding Abwehr activities and personalities generally.

  Upon his arrival at Camp 020 on 30 November Ledebur gave a harrowing account of the circumstances of his defection, which was included in the standard interim report:

  On the following day Ledebur lunched with Otto John and Bernhard Rohe, and all three spoke of their uncertain situation and the possibility of going over to the British. John was still unwilling to commit himself openly in favour of such a decision. After Rohe retired to return to his work at the W/T station, Ledebur took John to a cafe and demanded of him what he knew about Hansen, for John had stated that he had flown to Berlin shortly before July 20th and had returned only a few days ago.

  John now broke down completely in tears. He confessed to Ledebur that Hansen was no longer alive; that Count Stauffenburg, to whom Hansen had personally handed the explosives to be used in the attempt on Hitler’s life, was also dead; also that he, John, had also been deeply implicated in the plot. The revelation stunned Ledeber, who suddenly realised how deeply he must himself be compromised through his close contact with Hansen (‘It is the only grudge that I have against Hansen; he never told me, and left me walking around with a noose around my neck of which I was not even conscious’).

  John refused Ledebur’s offer to be put in contact with the British, stating that he was already in touch with them, though he would not name any person. The same evening, on seeing his own British contact, Ledebur disclosed the information which he had obtained from John; and on another occasion he brought from Tertsch’s home the radio set which he was to have delivered to Rohe; it had been obtained through Major Podansky, Chef 1 Nachrichten, on orders from Hansen.

  As he wished still to save his friends in France, Lebedur told his contact that he intended to continue his ‘play’ with Berlin: he sent messages announcing, first his reluctance to leave, then his ‘decision’ to return to France around August 15th. The reaction was violent; he was ordered to come back at once, obtaining plane reservations through the Air Attaché, Major Schartz. Ledebur called on Schartz and urged him to make a reservation for August 7th.

  As he was now in daily touch with the Allied organisation, Ledebur tried to save his friends in France as long as possible: through Bastide he sent to Alexandra Ter Hart, through the French Resistance channel, a message warning her that OLIVIER [Ledebur] would not be returning, and asking her to destroy his files.

  He was still living at the home of Ekkehard Tersch [the assistant press secretary who lived at Calle Malaga 10], who was quite unaware of the crisis through which he was passing, when Kurt von Rohrscheid ’phoned one morning to enquire whether Ledebur had read the day’s papers, which announced the execution of Hansen for his share in the plot against Hitler. Ledebur replied that he had been very surprised to read it. Rohrscheid invited, rather than ordered, him to his office, and Ledebur agreed to call.

  He found Rohe first, and asked him to wait outside the III offices, promising to signal to him in the event of danger, for Rohe was now well aware of his double game and apparently a party to it.

  On his arrival Rohrscheid asked him directly whether he had been involved with Hansen in the plot. Ledebur replied truthfully that he had not. Rohrscheid turned away, scratched his head, and murmured that had he been in Berlin he would almost certainly have been ‘in it’. Reverting quickly to his official duties, he demanded to know what Ledebur proposed to do, was he going to return? Ledebur said that there was no reason why he should not do so; he had relatives in Germany and he would leave on the 7th.

  Satisfied with the reply, Rohrscheid called a secretary and dictated a radio message to Berlin stating that Ledebur had called on him on his own initiative; he had the impression that Ledebur was not involved in the plot, and that he would return to Germany on August 7th.

  Shortly after the encounter, Ledebur left Tertsch’s house and was taken by the British into hiding, when he learned that the Gestapo and the Spanish police were already on his track. After several weeks’ isolation in Madrid, Ledebur was finally transferred to the UK.

  Ledebur exceeded all expectations by demonstrating his impressive knowledge of the German intelligence apparatus and its personalities. In particular, he identified three of his own agents, and mentioned two spies in England, one code-named KILLIAN:

  In the autumn of 1942 Kapitan Erich Pfeiffer, at that, time Loiter III, Ast Paris, gave Ledebur a ‘otiminungsbericht’ to read; it dealt with general conditions in Britain, and asked Ledebur to give him an opinion as to its value. It covered the food shortages, shipping difficulties, and Kriegsmuedigkeit (war-weariness).

  When Ledebur enquired the author’s name, Pfeiffer told him that he had obtained it from Oberst Rudolf, and that it had come from Eins Luft. The agent, KILLIAN, belonged to Colonel Garthe, l/L, and was run by Major Kliemann. Pfieffer added that Eins Luft were ‘very proud of this bird, who occasionally gave a peep which was really worth reading’, though the present report was ‘journalistic nonsense’. Not long before KILLIAN had supplied a three line radio report about port movements in Plymouth which was worth very much more than this ten-page story, which had arrived in secret writing via Portugal.

  Pfeiffer could not, or would not, tell Ledebur the identity of KILLIAN. According to Ledebur he was the ‘show agent’ of Alst Frankreich and at that time they had no other agent in the UK reporting regularly by W/T.

  Ledebur heard later through Helge von Bülow, who helped him at the Bedaux office in Paris before re-joining Eins Luft, that KILLIAN was a Scandinavian who knew England well from before the war, and that he had been won over and trained by Major Kliemann, alias Kielburg. The latter had only managed to keep his job thanks to KILLIAN’s industry.

  He had sent no news since the spring of 1944, and it was believed at the Hotel Lutetia that he had been ‘turned around’ by the British. When D-Day arrived, adds Ledebur, Alst Frankreich had not a single W/T agent in the British Isles.

  Another spy in England he heard about was described as a Yugoslav diplomat, and was almost certainly TRICYCLE:

  Ledebur first heard of this agent at Zossen on 5th June 1944, when Colonel Karl-Heinz Engelhorn told him that the most valuable reports on England for the last six months had been received through Kuhlenthal of KO Spain, who had ‘a most valuable agent in the UK’.

  When Ledebur asked to see the latest reports, he was referred to von Bohlen IH/West. The latter refused to produce copies of the original reports or to commit himself beyond stating that the agent was Yugoslav with very good connections; but he declared that the Allied invasion must be imminent, as the reports from the agent during the last few weeks had stated that ‘the landing operations had reached a stage where one could already call them the prelude to the coming sea-invasion’.

  As jealousy plays a big part in the different sections, and he was curious to learn about the agent, Ledebur spoke to Kapitan Humpert, I/M Zossen, about the esteem and reputation which Kuhlenthal enjoyed with the High Chiefs owing to the success of his agent. Humpert burst out laughing and said that the source of Kuhlenthal’s information was much
contested; he could only say that the agent was an active diplomat of the Yugoslavian Government, working in London but going regularly each quarter of the year to Lisbon and Madrid; he was Kuhlenthal’s most expensive agent, costing £400 every month already for two years. (It was suggested by officers of the KO in Madrid, that Kuhlenthal was splitting the monthly allowance ‘between his and the diplomat’s pocket’).

  Humpert referred Ledebur to Kapitan Mueller, recently returned from an Abwehr post in Seville, for additional information. Mueller could add little, except to belittle Kuhlenthal’s activities in Spain; but he confirmed that the agent frequently visited Lisbon and stated that the reports were not exclusively transmitted by radio, but were more often sent in secret writing.

  Later, in Paris, Ledebur tried to find out more about the agent from Kapitan Call, but the latter also disliked Kuhlenthal and was not disposed to talk about the source of his information.

  Ledebur adds: ‘When I entered the KO in Madrid on 26th July, 1944 Kuhlenthal passed through the room where I was waiting for the money. I said hello and asked what his valuable friend in London was now saying, after the landing had happened. He blushed ostensibly and answered with embarrassment: “But nevertheless I was right with my landing prediction.” When I saw Colonel von Rohrscheidt he happened to mention that the latest reports received from London through H/1 were very interesting, about the damage in London through V-1.