The Third World War - August 1985

by John Hackett

  The final major event of the war at sea, during the opening phase of the Warsaw Pact onslaught, was the declaration by the Soviet government on 9 August that the Western Approaches was a War Zone, into which shipping of any kind entered at its peril. The only neutral countries within the War Zone were Sweden and Finland. The Swedes were told that the inconvenience they would suffer would not last long and that the action had been forced upon the Warsaw Pact by the aggressive intentions of NATO. The Soviet objective of neutralizing the Federal German Republic would soon be achieved. The correlation of forces made this inevitable. As to Finland, it was hardly necessary to seek her compliance.

  The declaration of the War Zone was not regarded by the Soviet Union as sufficiently emphatic of itself. Certain of her submarines, which had been ordered to take up patrol positions and at all costs to remain undetected, were therefore ordered to attack with tactical missiles, after careful identification, certain important ships - oil tankers, container ships and dry cargo ships belonging to European NATO countries. Sailing weeks earlier from distant ports, along standard ocean routes, these ships had been ordered to continue at full speed, some towards the North Channel and some towards St George’s Channel, where they would be met and escorted into harbour. Ships which were more than five days’ steaming from Western Approaches coastal waters had been turned towards the nearest NATO friendly or neutral port or anchorage, to await further instructions.

  Late on 9 August reports reached JACWA that two large oil tankers, two container ships and two dry cargo ships had been attacked without warning with submarine-launched missiles. The positions given, four in the Bay of Biscay and two west of Ireland, could not immediately be reconciled with the plotted positions of any Soviet submarines, as deduced from the various anti-submarine detection or surveillance systems. If ever the gravity of the Soviet submarine threat to shipping had been doubted, such doubts were now speedily removed. Against nuclear-powered submarines, aided by satellite and aircraft reconnaissance, even the fastest merchant ships were sitting ducks.

  The first thing to do, having established that Commander Western Approaches South (COMWAS) was organizing the search for survivors and sending tugs to the damaged oil tankers (neither of them had yet sunk), was to order any other NATO merchant ships approaching the declared War Zone to turn back. The next was to consider, with SACLANT, the implications of these attacks. The situation which now faced the maritime commanders, in the Atlantic and the Western Approaches, was critical. It was quite obvious that unless SACEUR could be certain of being reinforced by fresh combat forces from the United States by 15 August, he could not throw in his final reserves on the Central Front within the next four or five days, and thus stand some chance of holding up the Warsaw Pact advance to the Rhine.

  A group of military convoys, with a speed of advance of twenty-three knots, had sailed from Halifax NS on 8 August. They could be disembarking troops and equipment in northern French ports by the 14th. But there were strong indications that a wave of Soviet submarines, which had sailed from the Kola Inlet on 4 August, was now crossing the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. Denial of the Faroes to a Soviet raiding force had fortunately helped to maintain NATO anti-submarine surveillance of the key area, and three more Soviet submarines were known to have been destroyed, two by NATO submarines operating independently and one by a combination of air and surface forces. On the other hand, at least one NATO submarine had failed to report on leaving her patrol off the North Cape. In two days’ time, it was estimated, there would be twenty-four Soviet nuclear-powered submarines in the North Atlantic.

  Had time permitted, at least some of the vital initial convoys could have been routed south of the Azores, where they would have been beyond the reach of Backfire maritime strike aircraft from Murmansk. The effective radius of these aircraft was about 4,000 kilometres. As things were, there was really no choice but to assemble the most powerful escort and support forces available, and fight the convoys through by the shortest route across the Atlantic. It was expected that NATO submarines operating to the north of the gap would further reduce the number of Soviet submarines reaching the convoys. Most important of all, US Strike Fleet Atlantic, supported by maritime aircraft based in Iceland and northern Scotland, would cover the whole operation. If Soviet Backfires could attack convoys in mid-Atlantic, the US Strike Fleet could pulverize the Soviet Northern Fleet base from a position in the Norwegian Sea. Its approach, plumb through the middle of the gap, could not of course be concealed from Soviet reconnaissance. Nor could it be ignored by the C-in-C Soviet Northern Fleet. The battle of the Gap would be quite unlike Jutland, or Midway. But battle there would be.

  Once again, the question of ‘to use or not to use’ nuclear weapons in the war at sea had to be faced. It was the opinion of the naval commanders that, on the ‘form’ so far, the use of nuclear depth charges or nuclear warheads or torpedoes would by no means show gains commensurate with the risk of escalation. As to nuclear strikes on the Soviet bases in the north, only if nuclear weapons had finally been resorted to on the Central Front would these be carried out.

  SACLANT had been under less pressure from minute-to-minute, hour-to-hour and day-to-day events since the war broke out in Europe on 4 August than his Western Approaches colleagues. The departure from Halifax NS four days before of the group of fast military convoys which formed part of Operation CAVALRY could not possibly have gone unobserved and unreported; and the route which the convoys took could not be varied much. It was not surprising that a fierce battle was taking place, the outcome of which would be critical for events on the Central Front. Operation CAVALRY had to succeed.

  SACLANT had been under no illusions about the losses which the Soviet submarines might inflict, with their horizon-range and stand-off missiles. Measures had been taken, therefore, to limit the effectiveness of the Soviet ocean surveillance satellites and air reconnaissance. Since the destruction of three of the Conakry-based reconnaissance Bears on the 4th - old models, but carrying a somewhat rudimentary and hitherto unsuspected air-to-air capability -three more Super-Bears had been removed. But indications of increased Soviet submarine movements had been reported by the four STASS ships on patrol. It looked as if the Soviet Submarine Commander had ordered his force to concentrate ahead of the CAVALRY convoys. Each of these consisted of twelve ships, stationed in three columns of four, with an escort group, including an escort carrier, disposed appropriately in the vicinity. Some distance away was a powerful ASW support group, consisting of a light aircraft carrier (with V/STOL fighter-strike-reconnaissance aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters embarked), two anti-missile cruisers and four ASW frigates. It had been intended that a second ASW support group should take station astern of the convoy formation, because submarines can attack with missiles from any direction - unlike in the days of torpedoes, when ‘limiting lines of approach’ for effective attack put a premium upon the submarine pelting ahead and then ‘lying in wait’ for his targets. But a submarine attack upon a support group, as it formed up in Hampton Roads, had seriously damaged the carrier and sunk a frigate. The remainder of the force had been told to ‘get that goddam’d submarine’ and were still hopefully and energetically pursuing one or two sonar surveillance system (SOSUS) reports which could have been the culprit.

  For the first two days of the transit, US and Canadian MR aircraft operating from Newfoundland would support the convoys. For the last two, RAF MR aircraft based in south-west England would take over. For the perilous two days in mid-Atlantic, the best that could be hoped for from the shore would be spasmodic cover from the already over-stretched US Navy Air Force Orion MR aircraft at Lajes in the Azores.

  The Commander Strike Fleet Atlantic, entering the Iceland-Faroes gap on 10 August, was extremely thankful to have had the protection, during this transit, of fighters from Newfoundland and Iceland. These were maintained by air-to-air refuelling, and operated with the AWACS aircraft in continuous attendance. There had been a strong westerly wind, and the
need to operate fixed-wing aircraft from the carriers would have slowed him down. As it was, he had made a speed of more than twenty knots. What worried him was the absence of submarine contacts. Several Soviet submarines had been plotted, according to STASS and shore-based intelligence reports, in the general area of his advance. He had hoped to detect at least some of these with his helicopter searches and bring them to action. How else could he carry out his mission of reducing the submarine threat to the convoys, now en route to Europe?

  But the Soviet submarines were under strict orders to concentrate on the troop convoys. They had no time to lose. There were in any case other forces waiting to engage the US Strike Fleet. By 11 August, therefore, no less than eleven Soviet submarines were within 150 kilometres of the CAVALRY convoys and disposed on their line of advance. Then came the first attack, with salvoes of horizon-range supersonic cruise missiles. Sixteen missiles arrived over the convoys, fired within twenty minutes by two Charlie-class nuclear-powered submarines. Eight of the missiles were decoyed away from targets. Of the other eight, two hit one of the transports and one hit another; two more hit one of the escort carriers, which blew up and sank at once; and three more each hit one of the frigates in the same escort group. The Soviet submarines which would be first to engage the convoy formation had orders to attack the escorts and support groups. Half an hour after the submarine attacks one of the leading support group’s helicopters was quickly joined by a second and, taking it in turns, the pair between them dropped four anti-submarine torpedoes, to be rewarded very quickly by an explosion in the sea beneath them. Just as this occurred a frigate at the far side of the formation was struck by a Soviet missile and lay dead in the water. The next attack took place four hours later. Once again sixteen missiles arrived in salvoes of four, within a few minutes of each other. Once again half of them found a target. Another transport and two frigates were hit, and badly damaged. It seemed that, owing to the very high speed of advance of the convoy, the screening helicopters with their dipping sonar could not give adequate coverage far enough from the main body of the convoys. The next two attacks, again each consisting of salvoes of four missiles, came within two hours. They were again directed at the support group and succeeded in putting the light carrier temporarily out of action and sinking one frigate. This ship had the misfortune to be struck by a missile which had been successfully decoyed from another target. It was satisfactory, however, from SACLANT’s point of view, that a number of missiles had been destroyed by the Aegis anti-missile system with which the entire support group was equipped. Furthermore, both the attacking submarines were being hunted, and one of them was soon sunk.

  The progress of the CAVALRY convoys across the Atlantic was of course being followed by C-in-C Soviet Northern Fleet, and by Soviet Naval Headquarters in Moscow. Although reports were incomplete, it was evident that heavy attrition of the NATO escort and support groups had been achieved. It was now time to launch the air strike, planned to coincide with the attacks of a third group of submarines, this time under orders to concentrate fire on the convoys themselves. Unfortunately for the Russians, the US Strike Fleet Atlantic was now approaching the Norwegian Sea. A Soviet surface striking force, together with its anti-submarine support group, which had sailed from the Kola Inlet on 10 August, would not be able to engage the US Strike Fleet for another twenty-four hours. By that time heavy air attacks could have been launched against the Soviet northern bases. C-in-C Northern Fleet therefore proposed to despatch an annihilating Backfire strike against the Strike Fleet. He was overruled by Moscow: ‘We do not expect Strike Fleet Atlantic to use nuclear weapons at this stage. Our primary aim is to destroy the CAVALRY convoys. Two-thirds of available Backfires are therefore to be launched against the NATO troop convoys. Our submarines in the Norwegian Sea must be concentrated against the Strike Fleet Atlantic, with diversionary air attacks only, until our surface striking force can come into action.’

  The forty Backfires consequently sent by C-in-C Northern Fleet to attack the CAVALRY convoys were routed individually to a rendezvous point midway between Newfoundland and the entrance to the English Channel. The approach of the Backfires to their targets was not detected in time for a fully effective air defence disposition to be taken up by the CAVALRY convoy escorts, several of which were busily engaged in prosecuting submarine contacts. The Backfire attacks, with AS-6 air-to-surface missiles, therefore caught the NATO force at something of a disadvantage. The Aegis-fitted support group was racing to position itself with the main body of the convoys. The casualties were heavy. Seven transports were hit, four of which sank quickly. The loss of life was appalling. Of the eighty AS-6 missiles launched by the Backfires, from ranges of 220 down to 160 kilometres, no less than thirty reached a target. The escorting warships suffered as well as the transports. Only the fact that in some cases two, or even three, missiles hit the same ship limited the number of escorts sunk or damaged to five. Fifteen Backfires were destroyed.

  Within two hours of the Backfire attack, the next submarine attack took place. This was less successful than the Russians had hoped. Owing to the timely arrival of a British support group, a drastic alteration of course by the convoys during the air strike, and harassment by maritime patrol aircraft, the Soviet submarines were unable to co-ordinate their attack either with each other or with the Backfires. During the next twelve-hour period three Soviet submarines were sunk, for the loss of only one more transport.

  The number of Soviet submarines now in position to attack the convoys was less, in fact, than either C-in-C Northern Fleet or SACLANT had expected. There were several reasons for this. First, four Soviet submarines in transit, at high speed, had been destroyed by ASW operations in the Greenland-UK gap, unknown as yet to the Soviet commander-in-chief. Second, signals to certain Soviet submarines, ordering them to take up new patrol positions, had not been received. This involved mainly the submarines which had been sent on anti-shipping patrol prior to the declaration of the War Zone. Third, two diversionary fast convoys had been sailed twenty-four hours before the CAVALRY convoys, one along a more northerly route and another along a more southerly one. Each had attracted a group of Soviet submarines towards intercepting positions. The diversionary convoys, being free to follow highly evasive courses, which were carefully judged, had succeeded in reducing by a quarter the number of submarines which could be brought into contact with the CAVALRY convoys, once the Soviet command had realized what was going on. Finally, the use of unusually high speeds by these submarines, under orders to intercept CAVALRY at all costs, had led to several of them being detected by various means and attacked by maritime aircraft from Iceland and the Azores.

  In addition to the most welcome reinforcement of the sadly depleted CAVALRY escort force by the British support group, of which the anti-submarine cruiser HMS Invincible formed part, two of JACWA’s escort groups, one with a British escort carrier, and a number of Dutch and German, as well as British frigates and destroyers, had joined the convoys by 12 August. It looked as if the worst part of the ocean transit was now over. CAVALRY would soon come under the umbrella of the United Kingdom Air Defence Region.

  In the Norwegian Sea, Strike Fleet Atlantic had succeeded in destroying five of the Backfire bombers returning from their attack on CAVALRY. NATO submarines had successfully attacked the Soviet surface strike force off the North Cape and sunk a Kiev -class light aircraft carrier and a Kara-class cruiser. Early on 12 August, within twenty-four hours of the combined air and submarine attacks on the CAVALRY convoys, US Strike Fleet Atlantic began to pound the Soviet naval bases and airfields in the Kola Inlet. C-in-C Soviet Navy, Admiral Starsky, in order to justify his decision to use the main Backfire force to attack the troop convoys, rather than concentrating on neutralizing the US Strike Fleet, accepted with alacrity the reports he received of the ‘annihilation’ of the CAVALRY convoys by air and submarine attack. He therefore ordered C-in-C Northern Fleet to send his available Backfires to attack Strike Fleet Atlantic. In fact,
having lost only one more transport and two escorts to submarine attack, the convoys were now, on 13 August, under air cover from the UK and France. One hazard remained to be overcome. The Le Havre mine counter-measures force, working round the clock to keep the approach channels swept, detected mines during the night of 13-14 August. Possible diversions of the troop convoys were considered. Cherbourg was in any case the destination of some of the ships. But every hour of delay in getting the troops and their equipment to the battlefield would diminish the prospect of averting the use of nuclear weapons, if the Soviet advance was to be checked. It was a balance of risks.

  The French Flag Officer-in-Charge of the First Maritime District had reason to believe that the mines had been laid by a small force of Soviet coastal craft, under cover of the severe fighting in the Channel four or five days previously. It had not been possible to plot all the contacts, while so many things were happening at once. He decided, therefore, having conducted a clearance sweep and re-swept the main channel, to accept the planned number of CAVALRY transports in Le Havre, the remainder being sent to Cherbourg and Brest. In the event, there were no further casualties to the troop convoys. Out of the forty-eight transports which had sailed from the USA and Canada, twelve had been sunk or badly damaged. But ‘the US CAVALRY had arrived in time’.

  This letter written at the time gives one man’s experience of Operation CAVALRY. It is from a young American serviceman.

  “Haslar Hospital