The Third World War - August 1985

by John Hackett

  Mastery of the sea and air, as the United States had discovered in both Korea and Vietnam, did not necessarily mean mastery on land, but it helped a good deal, particularly in the Middle East. Here there were four main areas of operations for ground forces. One was supremely important; the rest were sideshows. The first was a joint operation by the United States and Iran, supported by the Union of Arab Emirates and Oman, to seize complete control of the Persian Gulf. It involved the elimination of Kuwait and the destruction of all Soviet and UAR forces in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. To start with, Kuwait was edged out of the game. The tacit neutrality of Iraq, whose relations with Syria had deteriorated almost to the point of military hostilities, enabled Iran to remove any threat from Kuwait without a fight. In the summer of 1985, powerful Iranian amphibious and air forces, poised for invasion, together with an unequivocal ultimatum, obliged the Kuwaiti ruling council to announce the severance of their new relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It was a volte face as total as that of Italy in 1943. From being the integrated ally of their UAR partners, the Kuwaitis suddenly became their declared enemies. Better, the ruling council had decided, a change of sides and a chance of survival than the certainty of destruction by Iran supported by US naval and air power. The UAR was without the means of arguing the toss.

  The next phase was less one-sided and resulted in a prolonged, though not very bloody, campaign. The Soviet base at Dhahran was subjected to heavy attack by US ships and aircraft. A US marine force then captured and occupied it. Kuwaiti and Iranian forces established a cordon sanitaire between Dhahran and the Saudi Arabian forces, whose purpose was to guarantee the integrity of Riyadh. Skirmish and counter-skirmish continued, but the Soviet and UAR sea and air units had now been removed from the scene, and the ‘Gulf - no matter what the UAE might think about it - could again be called Persian. For it was Iranian sea and air power, backed by that of the USA, which called the tune there. United States land forces occupied Dhahran and secured and ran the base and its communications.

  “Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed Medilatif el Kasemy was a helicopter pilot of the Union Defence Force, the Army of the United Arab Emirates. He had been loaned by its Commander to take charge of a mixed air regiment equipped with French Lynx and Gazelle helicopters, which had itself been allotted to support the Kuwaiti forces helping to keep Dhahran free from Saudi interference. For a week they had had little to do except patrol, and he was beginning to agree that three-quarters of a soldier’s life is spent hanging about doing nothing. He didn’t mind hanging about, but he’d much rather do it from his air-conditioned house in Abu Dhabi than in the desert. Soon after dawn one day early in September, however, there occurred one of those incidents that made the whole thing memorable.

  He was listening to the Gazelle patrol leader’s report in his Landrover with his Operations Officer beside him. It was still being transmitted when he pressed the horn of the vehicle to alert the Lynx squadron for imminent action.

  “At 0512 hours, at position 738492, mixed force of AMX tanks, Greyhound armoured cars and APC, estimated total thirty vehicles, moving east-south-east,” went the message. “If they continue present direction and speed will reach minefield gap at 850431 between 0600 and 0630. Am continuing to observe, but have fuel for only 40 minutes more on station.”

  The Colonel heard his Operations Officer acknowledge the message, then switch channels and report it to HQ, as he seized his map and did some quick markings with a chinagraph pencil.

  “Tell HQ I’m going to engage as soon as possible and suggest moving the Scorpion tank squadron to just this side of the minefield gap in their prepared positions. I’m going on this mission myself. And tell the Gazelle patrol to look out for us and guide us in!”

  He dismounted from the Landrover and walked rapidly towards the twelve Lynx helicopters with their business-like HOT missiles slung three per side near the skids. The Squadron Commander, with his three troop leaders, was waiting in a group. Rotor blades were turning, mechanics and armaments-men checking. All other crews were mounted. Quickly he gave his orders, adding that he would accompany the squadron in the second-in-command’s Lynx.

  “But it’s your show,” he added to the Squadron Commander.

  Within minutes they were off, swooping over the desert very low in four groups of three. Twenty minutes later he sighted two helicopters, soon identified as the Gazelles he was looking for. There was a quick interchange of information between the Squadron Commander and the Gazelle patrol leader, then the Squadron Commander gave his orders.

  “Bearing 240, three columns armoured vehicles. We attack from north-east in two waves, my group and Alpha first, taking leading vehicles; normal drill of target choice; Bravo and Charlie attack five minutes later taking rear vehicles; return to base for replenishment immediately after attack. Acknowledge.”

  The time was exactly 0555 hours.

  Shortly after 6 a.m. a part of the Saudi Arabian desert was a shambles of burning vehicles and dead and wounded men. There were still fitful explosions. As the Lynx squadron headed back for replenishment, the two relieving helicopters of the Gazelle patrol appeared. There was more exchange of information, more reports to base and to headquarters, which was anxious to learn whether there was any need for support from the mobile column with its guns and British Scorpion light tanks, now standing-to. The Colonel ended his own report with the words: “I don’t think the Scorpion squadron will have much more to do now.”

  “I wonder if we will, either,” he added to his Operations Officer. “Anyway, it was good while it lasted.” “

  Taken from Mirage in the Desert: The Overthrow of Soviet Power in its Challenge to Islam, a collection of reminiscences by officers who took part in the fighting. Amman 1986, trans, and pub. SOAS, London 1986.

  The third phase of this principal operation - aimed, as we have seen, at seizing complete control of the Persian Gulf - consisted of further reinforcing Oman with Iranian and UAE forces. These, in co-operation with the Sultan’s own not inexperienced or inconsiderable army, once more began to cudgel the dissident tribesmen into obedience and to make the Yemeni ‘volunteers’ begin to wonder whether the game was worth the candle. But the elimination of Yemenis and the rehabilitation of the tribes was to be a lengthy affair.

  In Southern Africa, the first real blows were struck with the simultaneous advance of four armies from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia into South Africa in the summer of 1985. The expedition from Mozambique fared worst, that from Namibia best, and the two guerrilla incursions from Zimbabwe and Botswana, although destructive and elusive, had little impact on the outcome of the general battle. In its drive through the Transvaal, the composite army of FRELIMO, Zimbabwe, Cubans and Somalis deployed a respectable force of all arms with proper air, but poor logistic, support. But the attacking forces greatly misunderstood and underestimated their enemies. They had learned nothing from their easy victories over the Portuguese and their battles with Rhodesians. Not only did the South African Volkssturm defend their homelands with skill, savagery and success, not only did the regular South African forces operate with disturbing suddenness and speed, but, much to CASPA’s consternation, the special forces of South Africa’s army took the battle into CASPA’s own base areas, mounting deadly attacks on its airfields and supply depots, on its lines of communication, even on the city of Maputo itself. They had not bargained for this.

  The resistance both in the Transvaal and in Natal of the South African Kommandos was fanatical - but it was a fanaticism tempered with cool measuring of the military odds. The Afrikaaners fought with a ferocity which shocked and dismayed both the cynical mercenaries and the dedicated guerrillas of the invading forces. They were not always successful.

  “2/Lt Pieter Van der Horst had just finished setting up his first ambush. He had received information over the radio two hours earlier that a column of some fifty mixed Mozambique and Zimbabwe guerrillas, supported by two T-34 tanks, were expected to reach his patrol a
rea about now, and it had taken him every bit of the time available to get ready. In his platoon he had thirty-two men, four French medium machine guns, two anti-tank launchers of the Karl Gustav type and two 81 mm Malaysian mortars. They were completely mobile in eight Japanese Landrover-type vehicles and had rations for a week. Two Landrovers with trailers were separately loaded with ammunition and petrol. His men carried 100 rounds each. He had chosen a disused farm which offered excellent cover and superb ambush positions. Through it the main dusty track ran on towards Lesotho. The ambush was laid out over a distance of 300 metres: the first killing group of ten men with the anti-tank weapons and two machine-guns at the front, or southern, end; the rear group with mortars and two machine-guns at the entrance to, or northern part of, the ambush; and his own HQ and support group in the centre with some ten men and plentiful supplies of grenades. His own HQ men had the flamethrowers. Everyone was out of sight, the anti-tank and anti-personnel mines laid, the detonating charges ready for distracting or deceiving the enemy.

  Van der Horst’s radio crackled. It was a helicopter pilot reporting. “Column now within two miles your position, two tanks leading; remainder of force in two parties, approximate strength twenty-plus each party. Some carrying supplies. No heavy weapons.” Van der Horst gave swift and low confirmatory orders through his walkie-talkie to the two NCOs in charge of killer groups. It was to be done broadly as planned. First enemy party with tanks to be allowed to proceed unmolested to Point A; then as second enemy party reached Point B or on his order or by his opening fire, this latter party to be destroyed by machine-gun and automatic rifle fire; immediately fire to be opened by own rear group, leading group to detonate anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, engage enemy tanks with recoilless launchers and destroy enemy foot with machine-guns; his own group to use flamethrowers against tanks. All enemy weapons and ammunition to be secured. If detonating charges required for deception - under his control. If for any reason enemy column does not enter ambush, further orders on radio.

  When they came in sight, the guerrilla forces did not appear to be expecting any opposition. As they advanced, they barely bothered to adopt tactical formation at all, but trudged along behind the tanks, weapons slung over shoulders, talking, chewing, laughing, the gap between the two parties a mere 100 metres. As he watched them coming, Van der Horst was thinking that his plan should work.

  As a plan, it was good. But military plans, as von Moltke observed, rarely survive contact with the enemy. In this case the seemingly unwary enemy suddenly took the whole affair into their own hands. When the guerrilla column was no more than 800 metres away from the ambush, the two tanks deployed to either side of the track and opened fire, first with machine-guns, then with high-explosive shells, on the derelict farm buildings. They were well out of range of Van der Horst’s rocket launchers. The guerrilla foot soldiers rapidly dispersed on either side of the tanks and went to earth. Van der Horst gave a quick order over his radio: “Keep in cover and return fire with mortars and machine-guns. Leading group at five minutes’ notice to move back to get behind them.”

  The tanks kept up a steady fire and seemed quite impervious to the machine guns now engaging them. Meanwhile, to Van der Horst’s concern, the enemy guerrillas seemed to be crawling through the bush to the north of them in an obvious attempt to outflank his own position. It would be foolhardy to try to outface tank fire and allow his force to be pinned down while the guerrillas crept ever closer. He still had one advantage over the enemy - speed. He spoke into the radio again. “Cancel last order. Rear group prepare to mount in Landrovers and move south in fifteen minutes; leading group prepare to give covering fire; my group will follow rear group, covered by leading group, and we will leapfrog back to agreed rendezvous Charlie. Maximum covering fire throughout move. Mortar fire to switch now to Hill 102. Leading group to withdraw when my group established at Charlie. Move on my orders.”

  From a concealed position of great strength, with the expectation of gaining both surprise and success, Van der Horst was obliged to resort to defence, evasion and retreat. And all because he had no anti-tank weapons of sufficient range. It was a lesson well learned, and would not have to be relearned, as before long his unit and others like it would be equipped with the longer-range Milan-type anti-tank guided missiles, also now coming in from Japan. And the helicopters would have a new missile too. For the time being, it was necessary to run away in order to fight another day. After all they had plenty of space. And plenty of time. It was usually shortage of those two commodities that lost wars. Meanwhile Van der Horst, noticing with satisfaction that none of his men had been hit, used a little time to put a respectable space between his command and those T-34 tanks. “

  *Extract from The Veld Aflame: South Africa’s Fight for Survival by a group of participants, ed. Major-General K. E. Rymer, Cassell, London 1986.

  Even when the invading columns from Mozambique did meet with some success in their advances, they threw away their advantage by their savagery to the black inhabitants they claimed to have come to deliver. The Cuban proxy leaders of the FRELIMO bands were men to whom the death or mutilation of wholly innocent men and women was of no moment. Such was the short-sightedness and vindictiveness of the invading army’s leaders that they were ruthless where they should have been conciliatory, and - in the case of their own members who revelled in excesses - tolerant where they should have been stern.

  The invasion from Mozambique was held, but CASPA would not lightly give up the battle. Guerrilla forces from Botswana were advancing deep into enemy territory, reinforced by incursions from Zimbabwe. But what was rapidly becoming clear was that South Africa was holding on.

  Long before it was all over, the USSR had wholly ceased to be in control of anything that was happening either in the Middle East or in Southern Africa. Orders from Moscow, growing in confusion and inadequacy in the last few days of August 1985, had, by the end of the month, virtually ceased.

  The United States now faced a huge new problem. This was not wholly unforeseen, but in the event it was greater, and came to a head sooner, than had been expected. Very considerable forces of all arms of the Soviet Union, disposing of immense masses of war material, with hordes of technicians, advisers and civilian operatives of every sort, were now spread over vast areas with no coherent purpose and no further reason for being where they were. Some units and formations went on fighting, for a while at least, wherever they happened to be, to whatever local end seemed to their commanders sensible. Others sought the earliest opportunity to surrender to the nearest American headquarters, at any level. One startled US captain signalled to his superiors that he had at his disposal two Soviet generals, an acre of officers and ten acres (approximately) of Soviet rank and file, all now disarmed, and he requested orders. Local belligerents made a beeline for Soviet weapons, equipment and stores, and more than one Soviet unit, compelled to defend itself against raiders, found itself in action with the support of some microcosm of the US forces to which it had surrendered. Soviet ships usually made for port and tied up. Many aircraft simply flew home, or as near to it as fuel allowed. Many thousands of men drifted away, leaving heavy weapons, equipment and stores where they lay for whoever chose to take them away.

  To tell the story of the mounting of the United Nations Relief and Repatriation Organization (UNRRO), which soon took over from the United States in the concentration and maintenance of the remnants of Soviet forces deployed in Africa and the Middle East, and then set in hand the long and complex business of getting the men (and women too) back to their homes, is no part of our present task.

  The operation still goes on as we write, having had to face many more difficulties than those confronting the United Nations Displaced Persons Organization, set up at the same time in Europe. No history of the time, however, would be complete without reference to one of the least tractable problems to emerge in the immediate aftermath of the war. There will be traces of its impact in Africa and the Middle East for a long
time to come. It will be many years, for example, before the last weapon brought by the Soviet Union into Africa and the Middle East in the chapter of the world’s history which ended so abruptly in 1985, ceases in one hand or another to serve a purpose.

  The elimination of Soviet support, direct or by proxy, heralded the end of any further external intervention. The security of South Africa was assured by the success of her own armed forces in resisting and defeating tactical attack, with some help from the efforts of the US Navy. These efforts, though aimed directly at the peripheral operations of the Soviet Union, also had the result that both the Soviet proxy fighters and the indigenous guerrillas were largely cut off from the sinews of war. The end to the strategic external battle was far indeed from bringing to an end the only sort of struggle of enduring concern to the Africans - the internal one. Bitter battles between Angola and her neighbours, and within Angola, were matched by frontier incidents in Zaire and a renewal of the disruption of Mozambique. South Africa, though everywhere penetrated, held firm at the core. Her front-line adversaries, while clinging to the idea of confrontation, began to look to their own internal welfare. Far from a Confederation of Africa South coming into being and flourishing, a de-federation of those dedicated to set it up was already in progress.