Political Justice

by Alexander J Illingworth

  Monarchs were first powerful chieftains who earned the love of their tribe by force, by slight of speech or by glory of deed. Today, monarchs are a dying breed in the traditional sense; the world’s last emperor rules Japan, whilst the Queen of the United Kingdom remains one of the most loved monarchs in the world, with subjects hailing from Canada to the South Pacific. In much of the rest of the world, the hereditary monarch has been replaced with an elected alternative, some acting as mere figureheads with the position reserved for retired ex-statesmen, and others with much greater, quasi-regal powers. Nevertheless, it has not been a smooth transition to this situation, and if we are to continue to defend, as we have been doing, the functionality of constitutional monarchy in a mixed governmental system, we must consider the history of monarchy and devise the best system to both limit a monarch’s power and define his prerogatives.

  Since despotism has been dismissed as an evil, we can safely conclude that absolute monarchy is not a preferable form of government. However, it is from absolutism that the British system of constitutionalism grew, and from this constitutionalism grew the modern system of constitutional monarchy, which is probably much better defined as a ‘crowned republic’. Modern constitutional monarchies retain their monarchy not out of respect for the age-old institution of inherited virtue but out of a desire to ride the popular sentiment which frequently accompanies these monarchies, left from the remnants of respect for tradition which has not yet been destroyed by the critical theory of the New Left. A crowned republic affords the monarch no responsibility, no care or attention for their nation, merely to act upon the whim of a Prime Minister designated by the whim of a misled and disaffected electorate. This is not in the spirit of a mixed government, and it leads to situations such as that seen in Britain today, where the parts of society which have just as much of a right to representation as the commons are expelled from Parliament over abstract notions of ‘equality’ and ‘updating’ the constitution for the 21st century. True democracy is the rule of the people, and if the monarch and the aristocracy are also people, surely they too are part of the demos which deserves to hold political power.

  Godwin’s main criticism of monarchy, and the criticism even used by republicans today, is that monarchy is easily inclined towards tyranny. This is probably true with regard to most absolute monarchies; however, a monarchy is the best medium for defence against tyranny if it is properly managed against the interests of other parts of society. A monarch, as the head of state, should concern himself with the formal opening and dissolution of state and the appointment of a First Lord or Prime Minister based on the advice of his Council and Parliament, and apart from these political duties, should have a regal presence and show reverence for tradition and religion so as to present an image of steadfastness, ancestral respect and morality which the people of a nation can admire. Fundamentally, the benefits of a monarch are this: he is an inspiration, and an object of love of the people. If the purpose of hierarchy is to inspire upwards aspiration and virtue, then the monarch should have a duty to be near-sacrosanct in his love of the traditions of his nation. A monarch is not merely a de jure ruler; a monarch is pin that holds the cart in place against the reins.

  With this love for his nation, the monarch will become solely concerned for its advancement. Even if power over all the people is removed by nature of the parliamentary system, and his duties limited to just a few prerogatives, the value of his traditionalist attitude is not to be underestimated in the greater good of a nation. A monarch concerned for his nation will ensure that a good man is appointed as Prime Minister, such as in the case of George III; he, seeing that his nation was threatened by clamour for reform, corrupt colonial corporations and Revolutionary France, appointed the underdog figure of William Pitt the Younger to the Premiership, who, despite being mocked at first, proved to be one of the greatest and most concerned Prime Ministers that Britain has ever had. When a monarch appreciates the longevity of his family’s history and the importance his position affords him at the head of society, love for the country, and a desire to ensure that its politics functions in the best way possible is a natural instinct.

  In the event of a constitutional monarch overreaching his power, or failing to keep his coronation oaths, which history has proven is an occasional occurrence, the Kingdom of England teaches us the best way to proceed. The betrayal of the English nation by James II, his alignment to Catholicism and disdain of Parliament ended in Parliament’s removal of the King and replacement by a Protestant relation. James, perhaps due to his religious affiliations, failed to realise that his power was derived not from God but from the legitimacy conferred upon him by Parliament, and therefore his people, both noble and common. The ‘Divine Right of Kings’, no matter how much it may appeal to Romantic notions of historical conservatism, must be dismissed by rational men. The benefit of monarchy can be defended purely by its own independent existence, and indeed it must be if traditional government is to champion it to the destructive alternatives which have been forced into place over the past century.

  Godwin argues that a monarch with limited powers may as well not exist at all, since he becomes nothing more than a cipher for the actions of those who hold real political power. This is a misunderstanding, however, which is rooted in the disdain for tradition which radical academics have, the failure to recognise any sort of benefit in the inheritance of ancestral blood and habit, and a desire to destroy any ability of the people to rally around a figure of importance in times of hardship. Who was it who visited the people of London suffering in air raid shelters during the Second World War? It was King George and his consort. The monarch is the embodiment of the nation; in his habits, culture, duties and morality, he forms the gemstone set in the ring of the nation — the most valuable asset in times of hardship, a thing of beauty in a world which values paper rather than gold.

  Monarchy is a powerful tool in the exercise of government. Without some form of meaningful monarchy, the people have no true leader. To dismiss it is to dismiss government altogether, which as we know is a dangerous fantasy. So long as government is properly structured, and the monarch appreciates and remains within the scope of his duties, a country will be on course for far more political justice than it could without a traditional hearthstone.

  Chapter VIII

  Limited Executives

  Monarchs and ministers are not the sole operators of a governmental executive. American citizens will be familiar with ‘executive orders’ from their Presidents, and pundits from the cabinet offices of most major governments speak to representatives in parliaments and to the media, expressing their intentions for various areas of society, giving opinions which are bound to please some and upset others. The purpose of an executive, as a concept, must be explored. We have already considered that ministries ought to be accountable to a parliament and should restrict themselves to the day-to-day administration of their areas of concern, and kings too should be limited to certain duties in order to ensure a balance between tradition and representation of the people. The truth is that we can find fault in almost every system of government: Godwin criticises monarchy and presidency for both being systems in which power is too concentrated in the hands of a few, yet he founds his own political system on a mass intellectual improvement among the general population where every man and woman is able to express his or her own opinion and exercise individual reason in distinguishing moral right from wrong. If we are to criticise the potential faults of state government, surely the potential faults of an individualistic personal government which he proposes are much greater? The communism of Marx offers similar conundrums: a state-controlled socialism where ministries direct the distribution of property and means of production, until such a time when the state is no longer required when a state of communism — complete equality of person and property — is reached. Godwin’s theory of government is (it seems to me) a form of proto-communism. Both theories rely on a naïve hope that humans ar
e both fundamentally able to achieve equality, and that ministries will not use their power over the people to maintain that power rather than implement an equality of existence.

  Our argument then is this: whilst we must embrace inequality in order to properly sate human nature, whilst using this inequality to our advantage, it is also in our interests to limit the power of the executive in order to ensure it does not take control of the means for providing a society with its own existence, such as in a communistic society, where all individuals become dependent on the state in a horrifyingly sickly manner. If liberty is the best environment in which man may search for the truth of moral improvement, then there cannot be moral improvement when individuals constantly look to their executive government for food, for income, for moral answers. Natural society relies on the executive promoting virtue, community and very little else.

  It is in the interests of society for the executive to be limited in its duties. A virtuous executive should look to the following administrative capacities: the maintenance of a just legal system to punish criminal wrongdoers for the preservation of personal liberty; ensuring that society does not fail those who are not able to enjoy liberty by their unfortunate unavoidable circumstances; the maintenance of a defence force and the security of national borders; the maintenance of low taxation to ensure that the people are not thieved of their rightfully earned pay; fiscal responsibility; maintenance of a low national debt and running a budget surplus, especially outside of times of depression; presenting a good image for the nation on the international stage; the maintenance of its own moral compass; the reporting to parliament of the actions of the executive.

  It has always been a stereotype of the conservative to be in favour of a small state, low taxes and a lack of social and economic interventionism. However, this does not mean that, as modern libertarians desire, the states should refrain from any intervention at all, and the executive should be stripped of as much power as possible, afforded no respect and considered a necessary evil. The executive has the potential for evil, certainly, but it is a necessary good more than anything else. The limits of the executive lie where liberty is threatened, but for the maintenance of complete liberty, the executive must have virtue in mind, and it must not be afraid to use the power which the people have endowed to it for the sake of the moral good of the national community.

  Edmund Burke and Benjamin Disraeli are possibly two of the best examples of European conservatives who recognised the need for a balance between community and the individual, between tradition and classical liberalism. In Burke’s attack upon the French Revolution, he did not fail to express his outrage at the treatment of the aristocracy, despite his love of liberty. The very existence of an elite which has a hereditary tradition does not cancel out the potential for others to enjoy liberty in a society, and thus he saw them as quite compatible. Disraeli, the British 19th-century Prime Minister,21 perhaps best condensed Burke’s ideas into a policy system. His ‘Tory democracy’, or traditional one-nation conservatism, was founded in the love of the nation and the society which forms a nation, with its traditions and social customs forming the bedrock of a national identity held together by duty and morality. One of Britain’s most famous traditions was that of individual liberty, but Disraeli also saw the suffering of the Victorian poor all around him. In the habit of reformers such as Shaftesbury, Disraeli extended the voting franchise and improved the working conditions of many factories and mines, believing in the responsibility those higher up a social hierarchy had to those below.

  The executive therefore needn’t be the director of public morality in every area of life, nor does it need to provide for the general public. Human beings should have the intelligence and the willpower to deal with such concerns for themselves. However, what the executive must do is set a virtuous example to those whom it governs to ensure that virtue is not merely a pretty goal to be aspired to, but an active force in the shaping of policy and public discourse. Executives should stick to the duties we have laid out, as they have done in the past in many countries, to ensure that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness can be the primary concerns of all its citizens, rather than the question of when the next load of government benefits are to be delivered to their doors. The executive must strike a balance: the bringer of liberty and morality; an example of virtue, but not a dictator of it.

  Chapter IX

  Titles

  Our reasons for defending the existence of hereditary titles were ones founded in the belief in inherited virtue and the responsibility of a father and mother to hand the noble traditions of their family down to their heirs. Titles in general, we have seen, are beneficial to a society when used as a reward for virtuous deeds, and they cause a righteous layering of society which encourages those below to aspire to attain the same heights as those above them. But how should titles themselves be ranked? Historical monarchies are famous for having many and complex variations, as well as awarding privileges to members of the royal family automatically, without any sort of proof of value whatsoever. If a virtuous society must have titles of privilege, we must discover how their benefits can be maximised.

  First we must draw a distinction between peerage and purely honorary titles. A peerage of the realm affords the title holder the privilege of sitting in the upper chamber of parliament, since it denotes a nobility of deed and the highest possible respect beneath the monarch himself. Peerages also give the bearer an estate, and are hereditary, and so carry duties with them — first, to take part in political debate, since there is an obligation to attend parliament; second, to properly manage the estate which their title affords them; third, to pass on the history of their deeds or ancestor’s deeds to the next generation so that they might emulate that history. In awarding such peerages, a second hierarchy within peerage is not necessary. In Britain, peers are marked by their status as a Baron, Earl, Duke or Marquess, but in any society, the title of Baron or equivalent is perfectly sufficient for both bestowing the honour of parliamentary privilege and personal respect. The distinction may have been necessary when the titles were first created, when they indicated differing levels of military importance, but when privilege is concerned, there is no need for this difference. In countries where the distinction between peers is already established, such as in Britain, the existing titles might as well be kept distinct until they might need to be rescinded, since most peers treat each other with equal respect anyway. In the creation of new peerages, however, there is no need to differentiate, since the privileges conferred are equal.

  As for honorary titles, these cover the non-parliamentary and non-hereditary offerings, such as knighthoods or national orders. Most countries, even republics, have these, and they may be named after a religious tradition or historical event of particular meaning to that nation. The purpose of these titles is to confer respect to the bearer without offering as much privilege as a peerage. The bearer of such a title may use it in correspondence, or when describing himself in any way, informing those who interact with him that he has performed some deed which constitutes virtue. Each nation will have its own traditions and its own name for such titles, but it is a universal truth that nations do seek to reward certain members of their society with honorary titles — those titles must be respected if they are to have any value whatsoever.

  But what should qualify for an honorary title and what a peerage? Once again this is a matter of aptitude and scale of contribution. Those who have shown political and social virtue, who have a history of bringing about positive change in society for the sake of the suffering, or have debated in political circles for a significant portion of their lives in defence of the common good, should receive more consideration for a peerage than others, due to the political and social responsibilities that the titles carry. Those who make contributions to cultural and scientific life also deserve recognition, since whilst their work may not have a direct correlation to political life, they have offered a benefit to society, either b
y entertainment of the populace, important literary discourse, or by furthering mankind’s understanding of the nature of the world. Honorary titles suit these people best, since it affords them respect without handing obligations to them which differ from their preferred areas of expertise or distract them from their vocation. These sorts of people may be called upon to give expert opinions, or at least have their ideas respected by all in public discourse nonetheless, but they are excluded from the privilege of parliamentary participation, though of course they may still vote for representatives to the lower house.

  So much for titles — but a warning; whilst we have disproved the Godwinian dismissal of titles as ridiculous, the power of these appointments is not to be underestimated. The corruption of the peerage in various countries and awarding of honours to those who are friends of the political establishment rather than virtuous examples is to be condemned, for it demeans the very purpose of having such titles in the first place. The appointment of new peers and orders must be made as independent as possible, ideally with a set of guidelines and requirements laying out the necessary criteria for appointment to a particular noble group. If it is easy for the establishment to appoint whomsoever they like, there will swiftly be no point to titles at all. The removal of hereditary peers from the British House of Lords and replacement with ‘life peers’, and the Prime Minister’s leaving-office honours of David Cameron are prime examples of the destruction of titular privilege by misuse. The House of Lords is now no longer an independent body offering sober thought from the minds of men who have a long tradition of political heritage, but a baneful den of vampires, filled to the brim with former members of the lower house, appointed by former Prime Minister to act like a retirement plan. Meanwhile, non-hereditary honours are given out to the Prime Minister’s hairdressers, colleagues and close personal friends. Such is the nature of titles in a society which has lost all sense of direction, and no longer values virtue.