Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The most important and accurate report received by the British was one on April 6 from a neutral observer in Copenhagen. The report stated that a German division had embarked on ten ships and that the troops were to land at Narvik on the night of April 8-9. Even this report failed to energize the British. The Admiralty did not believe its accuracy and did not seriously consider the possibility that the Germans might reach Narvik before them. Consequently, the report was not forwarded immediately to the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Forbes.

  The British continued to believe that any German operation would be in reaction to their own operations and did not consider it possible that the Germans might be planning the first strike. This mistaken evaluation based on faulty interpretation of intelligence, underestimation of German capabilities, and an uncompromising belief that the vastly superior Royal Navy ruled out any possibility of a German attack in North Norway had serious consequence for the development of the situation in Norway. This attitude is well illustrated by a notation by Laurence Collier, a high Foreign Office official on a report about German intentions and preparations, “I wish I could believe this story. German intervention in Scandinavia is just what we want.”12

  The British Cancel R4 and Sail to Intercept the German Navy

  British aircraft made the first sighting of German forces in the North Sea at 0848 hours on April 7. They reported seeing one cruiser and six destroyers escorted by eight fighters. A partial report reached Admiral Forbes at 1120 hours and the full report 30 minutes later. At about this same time, Forbes was given the intelligence report that the British Admiralty had received the day before from the neutral observer in Copenhagen. However, the message from the Admiralty ended on an unhelpful note, “All these reports are of doubtful value and may well be only a further move in the war of nerves.”13

  Admiral Forbes also received a report about three German destroyers near the same position observed by the aircraft in the morning, and on a southerly course. He began to doubt the objective of the German thrust and remained in Scapa Flow while ordering the fleet to be ready to sail on an hour’s notice. He was also awaiting results of a bombing attack against the German naval units.

  The attack by 12 Blenheim bombers took place at 1330 hours. The German ships were now 78 nautical miles north of where they were sighted earlier. The attack was unsuccessful but the aircraft reported that the German naval force consisted of one ship of the Scharnhorst class, two cruisers, and ten destroyers. Repeated radio reports by the aircraft giving the German strength, course, and speed did not reach Forbes and he did not receive their report until 1730 hours, after the planes had landed.

  One is entitled to ask why Admiral Forbes remained in harbor after the first sighting. The explanation that he awaited the results of the bombing is not convincing. He could easily have received that report while at sea. With what appeared to be a sizable German foray into the North Sea (complemented by previous intelligence reports), it would seem prudent for the admiral to have taken his fleet to sea and await developments in a more central North Sea location. Whatever the German intentions, this would have placed him in a much better position to take action and could have changed the outcome of the German operations against ports in northern and central Norway.

  The British concluded, from the new position of the German ships, that they were directed against a northerly goal but they could not be certain what that goal was. It could be part of a German attack against Norway, but it could also be an expedition against shipping in the Norwegian Sea or the Atlantic. They did not rule out the possibility that the Germans intended to carry out a bombardment against the southern coast of England. This would seem extremely unlikely since the Germans would not only face vastly superior British naval forces but they would also be exposed to British air power. While they were uncertain about the objective of the German force, the British military leaders, like their Norwegian counterparts, failed to settle on the one potential German course of action most detrimental to their interests.

  The Home Fleet finally sailed to intercept the Germans at 2015 hours. Moulton reports that the last ships of the fleet cleared Scapa Flow at 2115 hours. The fleet consisting of the battleships Rodney (the largest in the Royal Navy in 1940) and Valiant, the battle cruiser Repulse, the cruisers Sheffield and Penelope, and ten destroyers, headed on a northeasterly course at 20 knots. A French cruiser and two destroyers were also attached to the Home Fleet. At the same time, the Germans were proceeding northward at 29 knots.

  The 2nd Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the cruisers Galatea and Arethusa and 15 destroyers, had left Rosyth with orders to proceed to a position about 80 miles west of Stavanger. The 18th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of two cruisers and seven destroyers, was already at sea escorting a convoy of merchant ships to Norway. This squadron was ordered to send the merchant ships back to Scotland and to join the hunt for the German ships.

  The main German force under Admiral Lütjens passed the latitude of the Shetland Islands in the early morning hours of April 8 without encountering British forces. The weather had deteriorated during daylight hours on April 7. Low cloud cover and fog prevented British aircraft from locating the German ships after their unsuccessful bombing attempt at midday. The wind increased to gale force during the night.

  The British were meanwhile canceling their planned operations against the Norwegian coast. Admiral Pound was away from the Admiralty on April 7 and returned late in the evening. With Churchill’s apparent knowledge and concurrence he made decisions that were to have far ranging implications for events in Norway. The third mine-laying expedition at Stadt, on the Norwegian coast, was abandoned and the minelayer and four destroyers that had been tasked with this mission were recalled. The battleship Warspite and the aircraft carrier Furious, both located in the Clyde, were ordered to join the fleet at sea. The departure of Furious was so hurried that its fighter squadron of Skuas was left behind, on orders from the Admiralty.14 The cruiser Aurora and six destroyers, also located in the Clyde, were preparing to escort the troop transport to Narvik. This mission was now canceled and the cruiser and destroyers were ordered to proceed to Scapa Flow and thereafter join the fleet. The Admiralty also ordered that the 1st Cruiser Squadron in Rosyth, consisting of four heavy cruisers and escorts, should disembark the troops destined for Norway and quickly join the fleet. The order reached the cruiser squadron early in the morning of April 8 and the troops were disembarked hurriedly. In the process, they became separated from much of their equipment.

  The Admiralty had decided that every ship was needed for naval purposes. In the process, it abandoned R4 at the exact moment when the conditions for which it was planned were at hand, namely when German forces set foot on Norwegian soil or there was clear evidence this was about to happen. Chamberlain and Admiral Forbes, who already had greatly superior forces at his disposal, were not consulted but it is doubtful that their views would have altered the instructions given.

  The abandonment of R4 did not help secure an encounter with the German ships and the best chance the Allies had for influencing events ashore in Norway was lost. The decision to cancel R4 is an excellent example of how the insistence on overwhelming force to defeat an enemy can led to serious consequences.15 It is likely that if the 1st Cruiser Squadron had departed with the embarked troops in the morning of April 8 as planned, it would have been able to land the troops in Bergen and Stavanger that same evening, several hours before the German arrival. The squadron would then have been in position to intercept and destroy the German task force bound for Bergen. The abandonment of R4 served no valid purpose and, along with the late departure of the Home Fleet, was the most monumental British mistake in the early part of the Norwegian Campaign.

  It is true that the British might have encountered Norwegian resistance in Bergen and Stavanger if they landed in the evening of April 8, particularly coming on top of their massive violations of Norwegian sovereignty that morning. The Norwegi
an directive that British and French warships should not be fired on was not issued until the early morning hours on April 9 when the identity of the attackers was established. However, in view of their instructions not to land if faced with Norwegian resistance, the troops would probably have remained on the warships pending a resolution of that issue. The British would have been in a perfect position to engage TF 3 on its way to Bergen. This would have involved a naval engagement with troops aboard but this was also true for the Germans. There can be no doubt that the four heavy cruisers of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, Devonshire, Berwick, York, and Glasgow and their escorts, clearly outmatched the Germans.

  The British Navy appeared to have their eyes fixed on the possibility that the Germans were attempting a breakout into the Atlantic. The appearance of the German warships in the North Sea, if correlated with earlier intelligence of troopship concentrations in north German ports and reports that a division had embarked for a landing at Narvik, should have led the Admiralty to the conclusion that they were not dealing with a breakout. Furthermore, it was not logical for the Germans to take along almost half their destroyer force, which had a limited cruising range without refueling, on a dash into the Atlantic. Finally, the Home Fleet had an enormous superiority over their opponents without using the ships designated to support R4.

  Both Admiral Forbes and leaders at the Admiralty must have realized that Home Fleet would not be able to intercept the German forces that were sighted if these were heading for Narvik. The difference in the location of the German fleet from the time it was sighted until it was bombed indicated that it was traveling north in excess of 20 knots. There would have been an excellent chance of intercepting the Germans if the Home Fleet had departed as quickly as possible after the sighting but the delay of over 12 hours removed that possibility. Admiral Lütjens’ force had already passed the latitude of Scapa Flow by the time Forbes’ ships finally lifted anchor. The Home Fleet headed on a northeasterly course for 24 hours until it passed the latitude of Trondheim, without any contact with the German ships.

  Glowworm’s Valorous Fight

  One British warship made an accidental contact with German naval units in the early hours of April 8. The destroyer Glowworm was part of Admiral Whitworth’s force heading north to cover the mining operations in the approaches to Narvik. The ship had lost a man overboard and dropped behind to try to pick up the missing sailor. Glowworm was not able to rejoin Whitworth’s force due to heavy seas and poor visibility.

  Glowworm was northeast of Trondheim when she sighted two destroyers from TF 1, Hans Lüdemann and Bernd von Arnim. The German ships had become separated from the rest of the Task Force in the gale and heavy seas. The destroyers were battered heavily and army supplies were washed overboard, as were a number of men, most of them soldiers. Speed was reduced to 22 knots but the formation became scattered.

  Glowworm opened fire on Hans Lüdemann and the German ship immediately increased its speed and headed away from the British destroyer. Bernd von Arnim was further south. It engaged the British ship in a running battle on a northerly course. The German ship was larger and outgunned the British destroyer. However, Glowworm proved more seaworthy and her captain, Lieutenant Commander Gerard Broadmeade Roope, handled her in an excellent manner. Bernd von Arnim, on the other hand, had a hard time in the heavy seas, took considerable damage from the waves, and its target acquisition and gunnery suffered as a result.

  The only German destroyer that attempted to come to Bernd von Arnim’s aid was Paul Jacobi, a ship of the same class as Bernd von Arnim. However, Paul Jacobi took a 55-degree roll in heavy seas, five men were swept overboard, and she lost the use of some of her boilers. Bernd von Arnim also lost two men overboard when she increased her speed to 33 knots in an attempt to outrun her adversary. Neither side scored any hits since gunnery became virtually impossible as the ships were tossed around in the heavy seas.

  Admiral Lütjens ordered the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper to turn around and deal with the British destroyer. Hipper came upon the two destroyers, which were still engaged violently in heavy seas, around 0900 hours. Both destroyers momentarily mistook her for a British cruiser and Bernd von Arnim even sent a couple of salvos in her direction. Hipper opened fire on Glowworm at a distance of 9,000 meters and hit the destroyer’s bridge with the first salvo. Glowworm answered with a salvo of torpedoes, and tried to escape. Hipper laid a smoke screen, avoided Glowworm’s torpedo salvo by some quick maneuvering, and entered the smoke screen. According to German sources, Captain Heye, Hipper’s skipper, feared additional torpedo salvos and decided to ram the British destroyer. According to British sources, Glowworm’s captain, realizing that his chances of escape were next to nil, also decided to ram his adversary. The heavy cruiser was slower to respond to the helm and the result was that the British destroyer hit Hipper and tore away about 150 feet of the ship’s outer armor plating and the starboard torpedo tubes. Heye stated later that the ramming by Glowworm resulted in less damage to his ship then his own attempt at a head-on ramming is likely to have caused. Glowworm was almost crushed by the impact with her adversary, fell away in the heavy sea, and blew up within a couple of minutes.

  Glowworm’s class of destroyers normally carried a crew of 145 men. Hipper managed to rescue 38 despite the rough sea. Glowworm’s captain was among those the Germans tried to haul onto the cruiser deck. However, before reaching safety, he fell back into the ocean and perished. Lieutenant Commander Roope was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry.

  British Miscalculations

  Glowworm provided a valuable service for the British fleet. She sent a series of radio messages starting at about 0800 hours, reporting the location and strength of the enemy force. She continued her reporting until she blew up. The British were able to determine from these reports that the German force, on a northerly course, was located about 300 nautical miles north of the Home Fleet and about 140 nautical miles south of the battle cruiser Renown, now near the entrance to Vestfjord. There were also eight British destroyers in Vestfjord engaged in mining activities.

  Admiral Whitworth, with the battle cruiser Renown and the destroyer Greyhound, turned south at about 0830 hours upon hearing the Glowworm’s report. He had detached the destroyers Hyperion and Heron the previous afternoon to lay the dummy minefield near Molde.

  Admiral Forbes realized he had little chance of reaching the Germans from the south with the main fleet. He therefore detached the faster battle cruiser Repulse (Renown’s sister ship), the cruisers Penelope and Birmingham, and four destroyers to head north at top speed. Later, it became necessary to detach Birmingham in order that she could return to Scapa Flow to refuel. The British were well positioned to bring on a major naval battle with the German surface fleet, but then the situation began to unravel.

  The Home Fleet continued north during the day without making enemy contact. The weather was unfavorable for aerial reconnaissance but a seaplane scouting ahead of the Home Fleet sighted enemy ships around 1400 hours well out to sea north-northwest of Trondheim. The German ships were on a westerly course and were reported by the aircraft as consisting of one battle cruiser, two cruisers, and two destroyers. This was actually TF 2, Hipper and four destroyers. Admiral Lütjens had detached them around 1100 hours and they were steering various courses while waiting for the designated time to enter Trondheim. The British aircraft was fired on, damaged, and landed in Norway where the crew and aircraft were interned. Later attempts to locate the German ships failed.

  The Home Fleet was about 150 nautical miles south of the German ships but the course reported by the reconnaissance aircraft had a major effect on Admiral Forbes’ subsequent tactical decisions. He had been steering a northeast course, which could have resulted in the Home Fleet meeting the German ships as they eventually steered a southeasterly course to enter Trondheimfjord. However, the report that the German fleet was heading away from the Norwegian coast caused Admiral Forbes to alter his course first to north and then, at
about 1600 hours, to north-northwest. In this way, he moved away from the Norwegian coast and allowed a clear path for the Germans to enter Trondheim.

  Admiral Lütjens continued north with the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and the ten destroyers of TF 1. He was in a precarious position. A force of eight British destroyers was based at the entrance to Vestfjord, between him and his target, and Admiral Whitworth was steaming towards him from the same area with one battle cruiser and one destroyer. Another battle cruiser, a cruiser, and four destroyers were coming up quickly from the south-southwest. The main force of the Home Fleet was further south.

  The British Admiralty now intervened in tactical operations. It was beginning to have second thoughts about the accuracy of the report from the neutral diplomat in Copenhagen on April 6 that a German division, embarked on ten ships, was to land in Narvik during the night between 8 and 9 April. They had initially discounted the information as just another move in the war of nerves. In view of all reports coming in about German naval movements, the Admiralty staff were no longer as skeptical as they had been about the veracity of the April 6 report.