Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Lieutenant Munthe-Kaas and his bugler managed to slip away and join the 11-man alert detail at the gun positions. The guns were positioned to fire against aircraft and they could not fire on targets in the harbor area. Each 40mm cannon weighed over two tons. With considerable difficulty, the men managed to move one gun through the deep snow, along with the machineguns, to a position where they could fire at targets in the harbor. The other three guns were not moved since there were insufficient personnel to operate them.

  Munthe-Kaas was uncertain about the situation since he had not heard a single shot fired in the city. He was unable to get through to the regimental headquarters by telephone and decided to drive there for instructions. On the way, he met Major Omdal who was on his way home to change into a uniform. The lieutenant asked if the situation was such that he should destroy the 40mm guns. The major, who was in a hurry, asked, “Why, can’t you fire them?” Munthe-Kaas answered that he could fire one gun and he turned around and drove back to the battery. The battery never opened fire, partly because of the limited visibility but mostly because of a sense of uncertainty since the city remained quiet.

  Sergeant Eriksen and the off-duty crew for the 75mm railroad gun were also awakened by naval gunfire. They managed to move quickly to the gun position but this did not help much. The gun was positioned where it could fire on targets in the fjord and in the harbor entrance but a rock outcropping prevented the gun from firing on the harbor itself. A locomotive was necessary to move the gun and Eriksen tried to requisition one but the Germans had stopped all railroad traffic and posted sentries along the railroad.

  It had become obvious to Colonel Sundlo, Major Omdal, and Major Spjeldnæs that they needed to concentrate all available forces as quickly as possible. Sundlo had agreed to Omdal’s proposal to recall Co 3 and the attached machinegun platoon. It is claimed that Major Spjeldnæs ordered Co 3 and the machinegun platoon on Framnes back to the battalion headquarters on his own initiative. It was logical that orders to his subordinate units come through the battalion, but the action also suggests that the senior leaders had reached the same conclusion.

  The mortar platoon had orders to take up positions on Framnes where it could fire on the German ships. Sundlo cancelled that mission at the last minute and ordered that all units in the Framnes area withdraw and assemble at the battalion headquarters. While Spjeldnæs may have thought about a withdrawal from Narvik, Sundlo had apparently not given up on the possibility of stopping the German advance. He ordered Spjeldnæs to prepare an advance against the Germans as soon as the recalled units reached the battalion area.

  While Sundlo and Spjeldnæs were discussing the planned attack, a lieutenant arrived with a request from a German lieutenant colonel for a meeting with the Norwegian commander, apparently meaning the battalion commander. Colonel Sundlo decided to talk to the German officer himself, and he asked Major Spjeldnæs to accompany him. Spjeldnæs describes the meeting in a report he made on August 27, 1940:20 “The German officer stated, as soon as we met him: ‘We will not fire if you don’t fire.’ Colonel Sundlo answered immediately: ‘On the contrary, we will fire. If you don’t withdraw immediately, we will open fire.’”

  The German officer also told Sundlo that Denmark had surrendered without a fight and that the Norwegian Government had decided not to resist. Sundlo recommended a 15-minute cease-fire while he consulted his superiors. Spjeldnæs suggested that the cease-fire be extended to 30 minutes and the German agreed. Spjeldnæs hoped that the extra 15 minutes would allow the units withdrawing from Framnes to reach his location.

  Colonel Sundlo proceeded to his headquarters, called the District Command at 0600 hours, and talked to Colonel Mjelde. Not surprisingly, we have two versions of the conversation that followed. First, Colonel Mjelde’s version:21

  Colonel Sundlo reported that the Germans are spread throughout the city and are handing out leaflets. He has talked to the German commander and they have agreed on a 30-minute cease-fire. The German commander will confer with his superiors. The colonel requested instructions. The colonel was reminded about his responsibilities and his earlier orders. The responsibility was his as the local commander in accordance with earlier orders.

  Colonel Sundlo’s version is that he first briefed Colonel Mjelde on the situation in Narvik. Then he told Mjelde that he intended to attack the German forces that were already in the city. Sundlo asked Mjelde for comments on the intended course of action. Mjelde answered: “You are on the scene and fully responsible.”22

  Although it is impossible to know which version is more accurate, it is worth noting that Colonel Sundlo had discussed mounting an attack with Majors Omdal and Spjeldnæs. The mad scramble to concentrate forces in a central location could also serve to facilitate a withdrawal, a course of action Spjeldnæs was considering. The German forces that had captured the railroad station had swung to the north and they were about to cut the Narvik-Vassvik road. The Norwegian forces would be trapped if the Germans captured that road as well as the railway.

  Sundlo may have tried to find some moral support for the most difficult decision of his career. It was obvious that a decision to fight would lead to a high number of civilian casualties. While Mjelde was correct in pointing out that Sundlo was best qualified to make the decisions, his answer nevertheless strikes one as evasive and not very encouraging. Whatever happened, Mjelde was in the clear.

  Colonel Sundlo headed back to the battalion headquarters after his telephone conversation with Mjelde. Outside the school that served as battalion headquarters, he encountered General Dietl, members of his staff, and the German Consul in Narvik. The general explained that the Germans had come as friends, to which Sundlo answered that the sinking of two Norwegian warships was not exactly an act of friendship.

  General Dietl gave the colonel a short, inaccurate orientation of the overall situation, including his assertion that he had a full division at his disposal and that the major cities in southern Norway were occupied peacefully. He pointed out to Sundlo that powerful elements of his division were already ashore, that numerous German warships in the fjord were ready to bombard the town, and that Norwegian resistance would only lead to needless bloodshed. He demanded that the Norwegians surrender and that all units be disarmed and assembled in their quarters to await further orders.

  Colonel Sundlo made a quick assessment of the situation. Despite an agreement that units would remain in their positions during the cease-fire, the Germans had used the period to secure key terrain and machineguns were set up at all critical junctions. From his headquarters, he had observed the German advance towards the town’s municipal center and the railroad station. The Germans had passed to the left of the Norwegian troops, seized the high ground near the regimental headquarters, and set up machineguns that covered the area around the school where the battalion headquarters and assembly area were located. The Germans occupied the regimental headquarters shortly after Sundlo left.

  Norwegian and German troops in Co 1’s area had become intermingled, looking at each other with surprise and curiosity. Civilians had come into the streets to watch the drama unfold, not realizing the seriousness of the situation. Many, including women and children, were intermingled with German troops. It was obvious that a large number of civilians would be killed as soon as the first shots were fired. The Norwegian troops ordered to withdraw from Framnes had not arrived. The same was true for Co 3, ordered back from the Lillevik-Kvitvik area. Besides Co 1, the mortar platoon was the only force available to Colonel Sundlo. He concluded that the city was, for all practical purposes, already occupied.

  Sundlo requested an extension of the cease-fire so that he could contact General Fleischer for instructions. General Dietl, fully aware of the untenable situation in which the Norwegians found themselves and Colonel Sundlo’s hesitation and indecisiveness, refused to extend the cease-fire. After a tense period of silence, Colonel Sundlo informed Dietl in German, “Ich übergebe die Stadt” (I surrender the city). The time was
approximately 0615 hours.23

  General Dietl asked Sundlo to recall all units and insure that there were no incidents. Any incident would lead to immediate reprisals. Sundlo ordered Major Omdal to notify all units. He then proceeded to his headquarters under German guard. Sundlo informed District Command that he had surrendered the city. District Command notified General Fleischer at 0620 hours.

  General Fleischer was convinced that Sundlo had failed to perform his duties. The fight that the general expected in Narvik had not developed. Fleischer finally called Narvik direct, but the call was not to Colonel Sundlo. He called Major Spjeldnæs and ordered him to place Sundlo under arrest and to drive the Germans out of Narvik. It is obvious from this order that the general did not understand the situation in Narvik. Spjeldnæs told Fleischer that Sundlo was a German prisoner of war. He also told the general that it was impossible to drive the Germans out of town since he had only about 100 troops at his disposal and these were surrounded by a much larger German force. Fleischer then changed his order. He directed Spjeldnæs to assemble as many units as possible, break through the German lines, and thereafter position the troops to defend the Ofot Railway. Major Omdal appeared while Spjeldnæs talked to Fleischer and Spjeldnæs pointed out that Omdal was his senior and the general then repeated his orders to Omdal.

  The Germans had occupied the high ground around the school and the possibility of a fighting breakout was not promising. The two majors decided to try to bluff their way through the German lines. Company 3 had now arrived at the school. It was obvious that an attempt to leave Narvik would not succeed unless it was undertaken immediately. They could not wait for the other elements of the battalion to arrive.

  Parts of Co 3, Co 1, and a machinegun platoon were ordered to form up in a column with weapons slung over the shoulder. The troops were told to bring only weapons and what ammunition they could carry. Skis and other equipment were left behind. The troops assembled within a few minutes and they marched out of the schoolyard with Major Spjeldnæs in the lead. As they approached a group of German troops blocking the street, a German officer ordered them to halt and asked their destination. Spjeldnæs stopped for a moment and answered truthfully that they were leaving town. The German officer stated that they would not be permitted to leave Narvik. Spjeldnæs gave the officer a smile and said calmly in German, “Doch wir marschieren. Guten Morgen.” This brazen action caught the Germans off guard. While they hesitated, about 180 Norwegians marched through their position. They passed the railroad station, which was already in German hands, without interference.

  Two messengers caught up with the formation as it approached the first railroad tunnel. They had a written message, purportedly from Colonel Sundlo, ordering them back to town. Another Norwegian officer, with a pistol to his head, had forged Sundlo’s name. The two messengers joined the withdrawal. The Norwegians occupied positions near Djupvik where there was an exchange of fire with a German patrol that had followed them. The firefight lasted for less than 30 minutes and there were no losses among the Norwegians. The Norwegians remained near the Hundal railroad station until the morning of April 11. They then decided to continue the withdrawal to the Nordal Bridge, where the terrain was well suited for defense. The force grew to 210 with the addition of the bridge guard detail.

  General Dietl had secured all first-day objectives by 0615 hours on April 9. The lack of shore batteries at the Ofotfjord entrance was his only major disappointment. In less than two hours, the Germans had captured the key town in North Norway, sunk two of the largest warships in the Norwegian Navy, captured three patrol vessels, secured a critically important mobilization depot, and captured nearly 600 Norwegian troops, all without sustaining a single casualty.

  The Norwegian forces left in Narvik were disarmed and imprisoned. This included the headquarters company that had been the the last unit to move from Elvegårdsmoen. The troops in this company were welcomed by German troops as they came off the ferry at Vassvik. Many officers and men managed to slip out of town later and join Norwegian forces in the interior. About three-fourths of the engineer company managed to escape in this manner.

  Colonel Sundlo’s Performance

  Finally, a few words about Colonel Sundlo and his actions on April 8 and 9 are necessary. Sundlo is mentioned in the German directives for Narvik. Admiral Raeder describes him as “an officer with reportedly pro-German feelings,” with whom they should establish contact at the earliest opportunity. Quisling provided information about Sundlo to the Germans but there is no indication that Sundlo was aware of this. Rosenberg mentions him in the memorandum he prepared for Hitler in preparation for his December 16 meeting with Quisling. Sundlo was not the only officer mentioned by Quisling, who was eager to convince the Germans that he had important connections within the Norwegian military establishment. There is no evidence that Sundlo provided any useful information to the Germans. The best indication of this is the fact that the Germans were unaware that there were no Norwegian shore batteries at the Ofotfjord entrance.

  Despite this, Konrad Sundlo became Norway’s Benedict Arnold. Word spread everywhere after April 9 that Colonel Sundlo was in German service and that he had betrayed his country by surrendering Narvik. For example, the very competent researcher Hans-Martin Ottmer, writing in 1994, refers to Sundlo as a betrayer of his country. He claims that he failed to carry out the orders from the division by not alerting his troops or occupying defensive positions, despite having adequate time to do so. Consequently, the Germans were able to land their troops at their leisure without any resistance.24

  Sundlo’s scapegoating began when General Fleischer sent out a communiqué after the loss of Narvik. The communiqué, while carefully worded, left no doubt that Fleischer meant to convey that Narvik fell to the enemy due to Colonel Sundlo’s treason and several newspapers receiving the communiqué stated so without hesitation. The communiqué read, in part:25

  Colonel Sundlo initiated immediate negotiations for a cease-fire and withdrew the troops to Framnes. The Germans occupied the city and the Norwegian troops were surrounded between the Germans and the sea. The division commander, who was in East Finnmark, was notified about the situation by telephone and he ordered Colonel Sundlo’s second in command, Major Omdal, to arrest Colonel Sundlo …

  Hovland writes that on October 5, 1948 Sundlo was sentenced to life in prison at hard labor for failing to make the necessary dispositions and preparations to meet the expected German attack on Narvik, and for surrendering his troops to the enemy. It is true that Sundlo was sentenced to life in prison at hard labor in 1948, but the statement leaves the wrong impression with respect to why this sentenced was imposed. A military court of inquiry after the war cleared Sundlo of the charge of treason and did not reprimand him for surrendering the town.26 With respect to Narvik, the court found Sundlo guilty of “negligence and incompetence.” Sundlo was stripped of his commission and sentenced to life in prison for his actions as a province official during the war and his effort to secure Norwegian volunteers for the German army on the eastern front.

  In General Fleischer’s biography, Hovland refers to Colonel Sundlo as a “rotten apple.” He denounces Sundlo’s failure to follow orders and states that Sundlo was the direct reason why very weak German forces managed to capture Narvik through a bluff. He writes that Colonel Sundlo must bear the responsibility for the serious consequences the loss of Narvik had for the country and Norwegian and Allied forces.

  Colonel Sundlo and his staff made inexcusable mistakes. He neglected to alert the engineer company and the 75mm railroad gun unit, or include them in two important meetings. The commander of the antiaircraft battery was not invited to the last commanders meeting at Sundlo’s headquarters. Major Omdal failed to include these three units on his itinerary when he drove around alerting commanders shortly before 0400 hours. Elvegårdsmoen was not alerted. Finally, there were no efforts made to notify and seek the cooperation of the civilian authorities in town.

  There were ser
ious leadership problems in Narvik on April 8 and 9, especially in the 1/13th Infantry. The blame for the poor performance of this battalion cannot be placed on the soldiers. They would undoubtedly have performed as well as those in other battalions in the 6th Division if they had competent leadership. The leadership of both their officers and NCOs failed at virtually every level. There are examples of orders not carried out, breakdowns in the chain of command, troops not kept informed, a glaring lack of initiative, indecisiveness, failures to follow directives, and lack of plain common sense in the absence of orders. The remnants of the 1/13th Infantry battalion continued to turn in a poor performance after its withdrawal from Narvik.

  Most of these failures can be traced to inadequate training, very limited periods of active duty in the 1930s, leaders well past what is considered an acceptable age for the rigorous physical and mental demands of combat at battalion and company level, and of course, to total lack of combat experience. Most units facing the shock of combat for the first time have problems, but strong leadership and extensive training can minimize these.

  A conclusion repeated by several authors is that Colonel Sundlo failed to take the proper “military precautions” before the “expected German occupation of Narvik.” The “military precautions” he failed to take are not spelled out. No military officer in North Norway expected a German attack before receipt of the British message around 2000 hours, and that message came with a note from the highest military authorities that it was not believable. On his own authority, Sundlo ordered the machinegun company and mortar platoon at Elvegårdsmoen into Narvik and reinforced the Nordal Bridge guard detail. He did not intend to move the other two rifle companies into Narvik but when the order came, he implemented it as quickly as possible.