Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Diether von Roeder’s navigation officer plotted the ship’s position and it happened to coincide exactly with a plot made by the navigation officer on the British destroyer Hardy at precisely the same time. The British navigation officer appears to have made a slight mistake in the ship’s dead-reckoning position, due perhaps to over-compensation for current and wind. However, the ships were probably not much over one mile apart. Captain Warburton-Lee signaled his ships at 0343 hours (GMT), “I am steering for the entrance of Narvik Harbour.”12 The British destroyers headed for the harbor entrance at eight knots, on the same course as Diether von Roeder. Both sides were unaware that the enemy was so close to hand.

  The first light of dawn was beginning to break when land appeared off the lead British destroyer’s port bow. It should have been the Framnes Peninsula if navigation had been on the mark. However, it turned out to be Emmenes, on the other side of the harbor entrance. This three kilometer mistake in navigation turned out to be very fortunate for the British, since it prevented them from running into Diether von Roeder and giving the German destroyers some warning of the impending attack.

  The British made a course adjustment towards the harbor and despite an increase in speed to 12 knots, the fortuitous delay resulted in Diether von Roeder entering the harbor just moments before the British. It took the British six minutes to reach the harbor entrance. By this time, it was light enough to see a large number of ships anchored in the harbor, but the enemy destroyers were not yet detected.

  Warburton-Lee dispatched the destroyers Hotspur and Hostile to the northeast to prevent any enemy ships that could be outside the harbor from interfering with the attack and to cover any possible shore batteries on Framnes. He entered the harbor alone with the Hardy, telling Hunter and Havock to await their turn to attack. The visibility had now improved to almost one mile, but the haze of the breaking dawn kept the British from immediately seeing the German destroyers. Two of these, Hermann Künne and Hans Lüdemann, were refueling on opposite sides of Jan Wellem. Anton Schmitt was behind the tanker, waiting its turn to refuel. Diether von Roeder had just dropped anchor west of the city pier, and the German flagship, Wilhelm Heidkamp, was further to the south.

  Hardy slid quietly by some of the merchant ships and sighted Anton Schmitt and Wilhelm Heidkamp through a gap between the merchant ships. Bonte’s ensign was observed flying from Wilhelm Heidkamp’s mast.

  The alarm had not sounded as the British broke out their battle flags. Warburton-Lee ordered the engine engaged slightly in order to maneuver into torpedo position. The two German ships were stationary and it was difficult to miss them at this short range. Torpedoes were launched and Warburton-Lee instinctively swung Hardy around and headed back for the harbor entrance at 20 knots. The time was 0430 hours (GMT). The first torpedo missed its target and hit a merchant ship. The second found its mark. The violent explosion detonated the aft magazine on the Wilhelm Heidkamp, blowing off the ship’s stern. The massive explosion tore off the three aft guns and munitions continued to explode for several minutes. Captain Bonte never knew what happened. He and 81 of his crew died instantly. Wilhelm Heidkamp’s skipper, Lieutenant Commander Hans Erdmenger, miraculously escaped death and he managed to secure his wrecked ship to the Swedish transport Oxelösund in order to save the wounded and some of the valuable equipment. Wilhelm Heidkamp remained afloat until April 11.

  Two additional German destroyers were sighted as Hardy exited the harbor at high speed, the Hermann Künne refueling alongside Jan Wellem, and Diether von Roeder. Hardy fired a salvo of three torpedoes at the German warships but they missed and detonated against the piers in the northeast corner of the harbor.

  Hunter now entered the harbor. Lieutenant Commander Lindsay de Villiers, Hunter’s skipper, was less discriminating in picking his targets. He fired the ship’s torpedoes into the crowded harbor at the same time as he opened up with his guns. The resulting chaos was indescribable. Anton Schmitt’s crew came on deck thinking they were under air attack. This thought was quickly dispelled when a shell hit the forward part of the ship. Lieutenant Commander Böhme was trying to leave his cabin when a torpedo from Hunter hit the ship’s forward turbine room. The explosion jammed the cabin door, trapping him inside. The German warships were now returning fire and Hunter laid smoke as she exited the harbor. Havock entered the harbor as Hunter exited. Her task was more difficult than that of her predecessors. The Germans were now aware that they were under a surface attack and the visibility that had been tolerable 15 minutes earlier was again very limited because of all the smoke from gunfire and burning ships. Havock’s skipper, Lieutenant Commander Rafe E. Courage, spotted Hermann Künne alongside Jan Wellem and opened fire on these two ships. No hits were scored. Hermann Künne had sufficient steam pressure to maneuver away from the tanker. This was done with a great sense of urgency and without taking time to detach the wires and hoses connecting it to Jan Wellem. Commander Courage now turned his attention to Anton Schmitt and gave that ship his full attention. A salvo of three torpedoes was fired at the German warship. The first two torpedoes hit two merchant ships. The third torpedo hit Anton Schmitt in the aft boiler room just after Böhme had managed to open the jammed door to his cabin and was on his way to the quarterdeck. Böhme was thrown overboard by the explosion. He was wearing a life jacket and this saved his life. German and Norwegian sources report that two torpedoes hit Anton Schmitt amidships and that the destroyer broke in two and sank almost immediately.

  Hermann Künne had managed to back away from Jan Wellem and it was located less than 50 meters from Anton Schmitt when the latter received the second torpedo hit. The tremendous explosion sent shock waves through Hermann Künne and temporarily made its engines inoperable. As the forward part of Anton Schmitt rolled over, her mast settled on Hermann Künne’s deck and the two ships became entangled and remained immobilized for the next 40 minutes.

  There is some dispute as to what happened during this first phase of the attack and that is understandable in such a violent and sudden encounter. Captain MacIntyre writes that torpedoes from Hardy caused the destruction of both Wilhelm Heidkamp and Anton Schmitt and that while both Hunter and Havock fired torpedoes, these appeared to have missed. Moulton appears to accept the same reasoning but this may be because he seems to have relied heavily on what Captain MacIntyre wrote about this event. Dickens and Harvey, however, maintain that torpedoes fired by Havock sank Anton Schmitt. German sources and the sequence of events leading to Commander Böhme reaching the quarterdeck at the same time as the torpedo struck the ship, support Dickens and Harvey’s version.

  The German gunfire became increasingly effective as the men began to recover from their surprise, and Courage decided to break off his attack. Havock received fire from Hans Lüdemann, which was now loose from Jan Wellem, and Diether von Roeder as she exited the harbor. Havock was not hit, but Hans Lüdemann sustained two damaging hits. One shell put one of her forward guns out of action while a second shell started a fire in the aft part of the ship, making it necessary to flood the rear magazine to keep it from exploding. Havock was also subjected to a hail of rifle and machinegun fire from German troops on shore. The battle had lasted 30 minutes and the crowded harbor was a terrible scene of destruction.

  Hotspur, skippered by Commander Herbert F. N. Layman, and Hostile, skippered by Commander J. P. Wright now joined the battle, as they had returned from their mission to check any shore batteries at Framnes. Hostile became engaged in a gun battle with Diether von Roeder, still at anchor and immobile. The battle was intense but the visibility was so reduced by smoke that the gunnery was not very effective. Hostile took no hits, but Diether von Roeder sustained two damaging hits. Hunter fired four torpedoes into the harbor and hit two merchant ships, one being the British Blythmoor. The British had fired 22 torpedoes into the harbor. All five British destroyers were now steaming in a rough counter-clockwise formation outside the harbor, engaging targets as they came abreast of the entrance.

  D
ue to the reduced visibility caused by the smoke from the fires and guns, the three surviving German destroyers and their five opponents were aiming their fire at observed gun flashes. Commander Wright was trying to get into a position to launch a torpedo attack against Diether von Roeder, but Commander Holtorf beat him to the draw. Diether von Roeder had taken a punishing pounding from the British fire. Two shells from Hostile penetrated her port side below the bridge, rupturing a fuel tank, and damaging the steering controls. The fire from the broken fuel tank set the aft boiler room ablaze. The ship was still immobile but Holtorf feared that the spreading fire would reach the magazines and he decided to launch his torpedoes before it was too late. He sent a spread of eight torpedoes between the merchant ships towards the harbor entrance. Hans Lüdemann and Hermann Künne also sent torpedo salvos towards the entrance.

  The British destroyers were now engaged in desperate maneuvers to avoid the many torpedo tracks coming towards them. They managed to avoid most of them, but the after-action reports indicate that three destroyers would have been hit if the German torpedoes had functioned properly by staying at the preset depth. Hardy, Hunter, and Havock reported that torpedoes passed under them and would have been hits if they had traveled at the correct depth.

  Diether von Roeder continued to defend itself in a fierce duel against the five British attackers. The German destroyer had dropped its anchor after returning from patrol and the anchor could not be lifted because the power supply to the electrically operated windlass was severed. The warship was a stationary target on which the British concentrated their fire. The boiler room was ablaze, the fire direction system was inoperable, and a shell struck the mess killing eight men and starting a fire that turned the forward part of the ship into an inferno.

  A British shell hit and destroyed gun number 3, killing six of its crew. Another shell ignited an ammunition locker and one penetrated the ship near the aft magazine. This made it necessary to flood the magazine. Diether von Roeder’s guns kept firing, directed locally since the central fire control system was down. The ship’s engine still functioned and Commander Holtorf backed his ship to safety between the fiery wrecks of merchant ships, dragging the anchor. He managed to reach the Steamship Pier and there the ship remained with its bow facing the harbor entrance. The fires were extinguished with the help of shore-based fire-fighting equipment. Despite the crew being full of fight, Commander Holtorf decided that his ship had sustained so much damage and its fighting ability was so reduced that it would be folly to keep the crew aboard. He ordered all unnecessary personnel to leave the ship.

  Warburton-Lee made a quick assessment of the situation. There was no fire coming from the harbor. The British had counted at least four or five German destroyers in the harbor out of the six that they believed the Norwegians at Tranøy had reported entering Ofotfjord. Warburton-Lee decided, after he was told the ships had 16 torpedoes left, that there was little risk in completing the work he had started and he ordered the destroyers to reenter the harbor and finish off the enemy.

  The British destroyers entered the harbor in a line-ahead formation at 20 knots in order to be better able to avoid enemy torpedoes, and circled in a counter-clockwise direction while raking all observed targets in the harbor with their guns. The British ships exited at high speed about 0530 hours (GMT).

  Warburton-Lee led his five destroyers westward at moderate speed to a point northeast of Skomsnes and held a council of war on the bridge. Everyone favored making another run into the harbor to ensure that all enemy ships were destroyed. It is an understandable emotion by men flushed with at the prospect of complete victory. Warburton-Lee accepted the views of his officers and even ordered landing parties readied. This was a strange order since the landing parties consisted of no more than one lightly armed platoon on each ship and the British had received a hail of small arms and machinegun fire from the shoreline, an indication that the shore was held in force. The fateful decision to make a third foray into the harbor spelled the end to the amazing run of British luck.

  Dickens claims that the Germans finally alerted their five destroyers located outside the harbor about 0530 hours, one hour after the action began. The outlaying destroyers no doubt received word late about the British attack on Narvik, but probably not quite as late as indicated by Dickens.

  Warburton-Lee took his flotilla back into the harbor at 20 knots. The mist and smoke was heavy as the destroyers weaved their way past the graveyard of sunken or sinking hulls of merchant ships in their path. They met gunfire from Hans Lüdemann and Hermann Künne. Those ships were not visible but the British fired at the point of the gun flashes. Hans Lüdemann also fired a salvo of four torpedoes at the attacking British destroyers but they all missed, one passing under Hostile. Hostile ventured a little too close to the enemy in launching its torpedoes and received the first large caliber hit by a British ship so far in the action. The damage from the 5-inch shell was not serious. Hardy, leading the line of British warships, turned west as she exited Narvik’s harbor.

  Jan Wellem had so far escaped the carnage but its captain now felt that her time had come and ordered the ship abandoned. Jan Wellem carried a number of British prisoners and the captain and his crew remained aboard until the prisoners were lowered safely away.

  The distance from the three German destroyers in Herjangsfjord to Narvik was approximately 10 miles, and the distance to Ballangen Bay was about 15 miles. From the time these destroyers received word about the British attack, they needed to weigh anchors, get underway, and cover the distances mentioned above.

  The official Norwegian naval history agrees with Dickens that the destroyers in Herjangsfjord were notified about the action in Narvik in a message from Hans Lüdemann. However, it states that this message was sent at 0515 hours, at the same time as Warburton-Lee’s destroyers were beginning their second run into the harbor. This seems a more realistic timeline although it is still probably too tight.

  There are therefore reasons to believe that the message may have been sent even before the time indicated by the Norwegian history, possibly after the three British destroyers had completed their first run. It took the German destroyers in Herjangsfjord at least 15 minutes to weigh anchor and they set out for Narvik at the maximum speed allowable by their scant fuel supplies. The British destroyer flotilla exited Narvik harbor after its third run around 0550 hours, about 35 minutes after the German destroyers in Herjangsfjord were alerted if we accept the sequence of events reported by the Norwegians.

  The German Counterattack

  One can well imagine the surprise on Hardy’s bridge when, as the British flotilla turned westward from the harbor entrance, they observed an enemy force steering in their direction from the northeast at a distance estimated to be 7,500 meters. Warburton-Lee was the first to see the enemy force and he estimated that it consisted of one cruiser and three destroyers. He is reported to have told those present on the bridge, “This is our moment to get out,” and as he sent the following message to his superiors at 0551 hours, “One cruiser, three destroyers off Narvik. Am withdrawing to westward,”13 he increased speed to 30 knots and fired the emergency withdrawal signal.

  Warburton-Lee was mistaken as to both the composition and number of enemy ships but the German destroyers were large ships and it is understandable that one could be identified as a cruiser. It was also undoubtedly difficult to ascertain the exact number in the hazy morning light.

  Commander Bey’s destroyers were in an oblique formation that allowed all ships to open fire with their forward guns without endangering each other. They opened fire shortly after they were sighted and the battle developed into a running engagement on a westerly course. The British ships, with the exception of Hostile that lingered behind still looking for targets in the harbor, were able to reply to the German fire with full broadsides as the enemy was off their starboard beam. The fire by both sides was ineffective and all shells fell far short of their targets. The reason was undoubtedly a mistake in ran
ge estimation. The British estimated that the enemy ships were 7,000 to 7,500 meters away when they opened fire. German reports state that the distance was over 10,000 meters.14

  Commander Erich Bey, the commander of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, became the senior German naval officer when Captain Bonte was killed. He was an experienced and respected destroyer officer, but tended to err on the side of caution.15 He was not fully aware of what had happened in Narvik or of the size of the opposing enemy force. The only message he received from Narvik after being alerted stated that Wilhelm Heidkamp was sunk, that Bonte was killed, and that three destroyers were prepared to serve as floating batteries.

  This sounded rather ominous to the new naval commander, who placed heavy emphasis on that part of Admiral Raeder’s operational order that called for the preservation of the ships and their early and safe return to Germany. It was natural for him to conclude that a much superior enemy force caused what appeared to be a disaster and he saw it as his first duty to salvage what was left. It may be, as stated by Dickens, that Bey assumed his three destroyers were trapped, that he intended to fight it out, but that he wanted the two refueled destroyers in Ballangen Bay, Georg Thiele and Bernd von Arnim, to save themselves by breaking out to the west. Dickens goes on to say that Bey actually signaled these destroyers to break out.