Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The aircraft bringing Captain Sternberg to Narvik also brought a demolition expert, Captain Oberndorfer. He began immediate preparations for demolitions in the harbor and railroad. The storage facilities at the iron ore pier were burned on April 22 and trains with numerous iron ore carriers were driven over the side of the pier to prevent ships from coming alongside. The pier was demolished on April 23. Further demolitions were delayed because explosives were lacking.

  The 3rd Division Headquarters, which had occupied the top three floors of the Hotel Royal in Narvik, was relocated in the evening of April 24. It became operational in Strømsnes on April 25. The move had been planned for some time because of the concentration of Norwegian forces against Group Windisch. Dietl expected that the main enemy effort would be in that area and he wanted to be closer to that part of the front.

  Another event of some importance took place on April 18. General Dietl had thus far operated under General von Falkenhorst, who had his headquarters in Oslo. There was little von Falkenhorst could do to affect the situation in Narvik, about 700 miles from his headquarters. The forces in Narvik were placed directly under OKW, which meant that for all practical purposes, Dietl now reported directly to Hitler.

  The Norwegian Defeat at Bjørnefjell

  The Norwegians were having problems of their own trying to cope with the German drives to the north and east. In the north, the Germans had occupied Lapphaugen on April 13 and were expected to continue their drive with an attack on Fossbakken. In the east, the remnants of the 1/13th Inf were positioned around Nordal Bridge and the Bjørnefjell Railway Station near the Swedish border. The Germans did not launch immediate operations to secure the railway to Sweden. The naval actions on April 10 and 13 no doubt delayed an advance because the required forces might be sorely needed in Narvik. Prior to April 14, the only contacts between Norwegian and German forces in the area to the east of Narvik were through patrol action. This was soon to change.

  Co 1, 139th Regiment, under Major von Schleebrügge, had the mission to capture the Norwegian coastal battery that the Germans believed existed at Hamnes on April 9. Rather than rejoining its parent battalion at Elevgårdsmoen, this company was brought to Narvik and Dietl deployed it to secure the railroad as far as Hundal. It operated as an independent company and was not part of Major Haussels’ 2nd Battalion in Narvik. On April 14, the day after the alleged panic of his troops, Dietl ordered von Schleebrügge to drive the Norwegians from the Bjørnefjell area and secure the railroad to Sweden. The company, reinforced by 20 naval personnel, assembled in Hundal on April 15.

  Norwegian patrols reported increased German activities in Hundal on April 13 and a decision was made to destroy the Nordal Bridge the following day. Lack of dynamite and expertise in demolition resulted in only a partial destruction but the Norwegians believed it was sufficient and that a strong wind would bring the bridge down. This proved wrong and the Germans repaired the bridge to where a light locomotive was able to use it within three weeks.

  Major Omdal withdrew the security detail from the bridge to the Bjørnefjell area in the evening of April 14 because the position was dominated by the Katterat Mountains to the south and the troops were exhausted from lack of sleep and exposure to the elements. Omdal also asked permission to withdraw his force northward to link up with other Norwegian units because of the critical supply situation. General Fleischer denied this request.

  After withdrawing from Nordal Bridge, the Norwegian forces were positioned to cover further stretches of the railroad. Company 3, commanded by Captain Bjørnson, had one machinegun platoon attached but was short one rifle platoon The company was located on the high ground above a railroad tunnel a short distance south of Nordstrømvann. There were security elements to the west and northwest of the main positions. The troops were quartered in cabins and railroad guard facilities during the night of 15–16 April. The planned line of retreat, if that should become necessary, was in a northerly direction between two mountain peaks, Rundfjell and Bjørnfjell.

  Company 1, commanded by Captain Strømstad, was located at the Bjørnefjell railroad complex. The troops were divided between the two main buildings. There was also a small guard detail at the tourist hotel, located between the two main buildings, to guard the 13 Germans captured on April 11. The company had a four-man outpost in the Katterat Mountains. The danger from Elvegårdsmoen was considered most acute since the Norwegians believed they would have adequate warnings of a German advance along the railroad. The main German force set out from Hundal across the rough Katterat Mountains in the afternoon of April 15 while a smaller force (21 men plus the company trains), commanded by Lieutenant Trautner, advanced along the railroad towards Nordal Bridge. The Germans hoped the Norwegians would focus their attention on Trautner’s men, allowing the main force to execute a successful envelopment.

  A 12-man German patrol encountered the Norwegian outpost on the Katterat Mountains on April 15. In the short encounter, one Norwegian was killed and another captured. The remaining two men made their way to Co 1. A larger force was sent out to recover the body of the fallen Norwegian and it did not encounter any Germans. For unknown reasons, the outpost was not reconstituted. This left the approach through the Katterat Mountains unguarded during the night of 15–16 April.

  The Germans had accurate information about the location of the Norwegian units, obtained either from patrols or perhaps from prisoners. The German launched almost simultaneous surprise attacks on the two Norwegian companies. Members of the machinegun platoon were the first to see the Germans around 0400 hours. Co 3 was unable to reoccupy its positions since the Germans had seized them and the company fought from the vicinity of their quarters. Attempts to assemble proved futile because the Germans had infiltrated some of the areas that separated their quarters. The positions of the scattered Norwegian units became untenable when the Germans began using mortars. Those who were able to do so withdrew to the north, linked up with the northwest security force, and continued the fight from a position north of Nordstrømvann.

  Captain Bjørnson became separated from his men and the company executive officer, Lieutenant Torgersen, assumed command. The withdrawal continued when the enemy threatened to envelop the Norwegian positions. The Norwegians heard firing from the direction of the Bjørnefjell Railroad Station. Rather than following the planned line of retreat, Torgersen decided to go to Co 1’s assistance. The Norwegians made a mistake in the route and when they eventually came within sight of the railroad station, they saw smoke rising from it and realized that it had fallen to the enemy. This was confirmed by a Swedish border post. The company turned north, intending to join Norwegian forces in Salangsdal, but the weather turned bad with heavy snowfall. The inclement weather and the exhausted condition of the troops caused Torgersen to cross into Sweden where the troops were interned.

  The Germans also launched a surprise attack around 0400 hours on Co 1. The Norwegians fought from windows in the two main buildings and the Germans did not press the attack. The firing lasted for about two hours and then the area fell quiet. The Norwegians assumed that the Germans had withdrawn but they attacked in greater force around 0800 hours.

  The second attack was supported by heavy weapons, probably the antitank weapons found in each heavy weapons company. The fire forced the defenders away from the windows in the two buildings and this allowed German infantry to approach the western of the two buildings. They blew open the door, stormed into the building, throwing hand grenades and opening fire with sub-machineguns. A few Norwegians jumped from the back windows and some eventually made their way to Sweden. Major Spjældnes and a number of his men were trapped on the second floor and captured. Major Omdal and his troops in the eastern building were captured soon after the first building was rushed.

  The fighting in and around Bjørnefjell resulted in six Norwegian dead, 16 seriously wounded and 45 prisoners. The rest managed to slip over the border to Sweden. Some evaded capture and were able to join Norwegian forces further nor
th and others escaped from German captivity.8

  A Norwegian humanitarian group had established a relief station in Kiruna in Sweden and personnel from this station, with German permission, fetched the 16 seriously wounded Norwegians on April 16 and brought them to their relief station. Two days later, the same organization brought the six fallen soldiers to Kiruna where they were buried on April 24 with full military honors. Occasionally, the Germans allowed seriously wounded or sick Norwegians transferred to Swedish hospitals. Major Spjældnes became seriously ill on May 5 and he was sent to a Swedish hospital after giving his word of honor that he would return to German captivity when well. Spjældnes was released from the Swedish hospital on July 20 and he turned himself in to the Germans in Halden the following day.

  The Germans captured whatever supplies the Norwegians had at Bjørnefjell, including 12 machineguns and 150 pairs of skis that would prove very useful later in their operations. According to Buchner, the German losses at Bjørnefjell were one killed and seven wounded. The German success at Bjørnefjell must be viewed as a remarkable achievement. They were outnumbered almost 2 to 1, operated in unfamiliar terrain, and attacked an enemy in defensive positions.

  There are several reasons for the Norwegian failure. They may have seriously underestimated German abilities to operate in the mountains to the east of the railway and rumors of German “demoralization” after the naval battle may have reached them and given a false sense of security. Major Omdal placed too much reliance on civilian warnings of any German move against Bjørnefjell. The Germans were quick to seize all communications facilities in Hundal, thus preventing any telephonic warning. It was noted in chapter 5 that the 1/13th Inf displayed serious leadership problems at virtually all levels. This was again apparent at Bjørnefjell.

  The Norwegian lack of adequate early warning measures was a serious mistake for which the majors and the company commanders are primarily responsible. Placing all of Co 1 in the two main buildings without any outposts or forward positions to keep the Germans away was not wise. In addition, Co 3 should have kept about one third of the men in the defensive positions at all times. This defensive force could have been relieved periodically to give the personnel rest and shelter from the elements. These are elementary and routine precautions for properly trained, disciplined, and well led units. While the weather conditions were miserable, they were no more so for the Norwegians than the Germans.

  The German Situation in Mid-April and Early Supply Efforts

  The loss of Bjørnefjell was a serious Norwegian setback and an encouraging development for the Germans. By securing the railroad from Narvik to the Swedish border, Dietl had accomplished all immediate objectives spelled out in his operational order except for capturing Bardufoss Airfield. The seizure of Bjørnefjell could alleviate the acute supply and reinforcement problems if the Swedes were prevailed upon to allow trans-shipments.

  After securing the railroad to Sweden and the occupation of good defensive positions along the northern front, Dietl decided that was all he could do with the resources at his disposal in face of stiffening Norwegian resistance. The Germans were aware that Norwegian mobilization was proceeding rapidly and that the forces confronting them in the north were growing in strength daily. At the same time, they worried about Allied landings on the coast.

  Dietl’s troops did not have much heavy equipment and weapons when they landed. Most of their artillery washed overboard on the stormy passage and the supply ships destined for Narvik never reached their destination. The Germans were helped immeasurably by the early capture of Elvegårdsmoen, with its ample supplies of weapons and provisions. However, the mountain troops were not clothed and equipped for operations in the terrain and climate in the Narvik area. Instead of their usual winter gear, their clothing and equipment were more suitable for spring conditions. Things such as sleds, skis, and winter bivouac and camouflage equipment were lacking. One can only conclude that the Germans, like the British, misjudged the climate in Narvik at this time of the year or that they did not expect the Norwegians to offer any serious opposition after the capture of their main cities.

  The destroyer crews more than doubled the forces available to Dietl. While these men were armed and provisioned from captured Norwegian stocks at Elvegårdsmoen, their usefulness in land operations was questionable. However, they constituted valuable assets for the close protection of Narvik and other installations captured by the Germans. This allowed Dietl to send most mountain troops to the front. The naval personnel were instrumental in bringing ashore guns and ammunition from the sunken destroyers. The five British armed merchantmen in Narvik harbor on April 9 each carried two 105mm guns. These were brought ashore and two were mounted on rail cars. The sailors were also active in getting the railroad back into operation. The fact that some were dressed in captured Norwegian uniforms, a breach of conventions, was the source of much criticism.

  The Germans made a concerted effort to supply the Narvik forces by air. The first aircraft to arrive was a Ju-90 that dropped ammunition at 1130 hours on April 12. A Do-24 (seaplane) landed in Narvik around 1230 on April 13 with ammunition for the destroyers, but this was too little and too late.

  Eleven Ju-52s, commanded by Colonel Bauer, landed on the frozen Hartvig Lake in the evening of April 13. The aircraft brought the 2nd Battery, 112th Mountain Artillery Regiment, commanded by Captain Lochmann, from Berlin. The unit consisted of about 100 men who brought with them four 75mm guns.

  The Germans had similar misfortune in using frozen lakes as landing fields as the British did in central Norway. Three aircraft were damaged while landing and one was destroyed by Norwegian aircraft. There was a sudden thaw in the weather creating a layer of water on top of the soft ice. The aircraft froze into the ice as the weather again turned cold, and this prevented all but one from taking off. The remaining aircraft on Hartvigvann were eventually captured by the Norwegians, but then unfortunately destroyed by British bombing.

  After their ill-fated experience on the lake, the Germans turned to airdrop and the use of seaplanes. Three Ju-52 transports appeared over Hartvigvann at 1030 hours on April 14. They did not attempt to land but dropped their loads of medical supplies over the lake. Two Do-28s landed near Narvik in the afternoon of April 15, carrying mortar ammunition and medical supplies. Both aircraft took off later that evening. A message from Oslo at 1215 hours on April 16 stated that a flight of He-11s was on its way to attack enemy naval forces in Narvik. The 3rd Mountain Division journal notes sarcastically, “the announced flight—two planes—arrived at about 1400 hours and one dropped bombs over Narvik harbor, now empty of enemy forces.”

  Attempts by the German Navy to bring supplies to Narvik by submarines did not succeed. On April 10, SKL ordered three submarines in homeports (U26, U29, and U43) readied for a re-supply mission to Narvik. The submarines left Germany between 12 to 16 April, each carrying 40 to 50 tons, mostly ammunition. Because of the uncertain situation in Narvik, these boats were redirected to Trondheim.

  The seizure of the Bjørnefjell area improved General Dietl’s supply situation. After the German troops reached the border, the German Government demanded permission from Sweden to send supplies to Dietl’s troops through that country. The Swedish Government agreed, on April 17, to permit the transshipment of supplies of “a humanitarian nature.”9 The following day, Sweden granted permission for the transit of Red Cross personnel. The first shipment reached Sweden on April 19. It consisted of 34 railroad cars with 25 tons of medicines and medical equipment, 20 tons of clothing, and 350 tons of provisions. The train arrived in Bjørnefjell on April 26. It is estimated that the provisions on the train were sufficient to sustain 4,000 troops for three months. The train also brought 30 intelligence personnel, apparently disguised as Red Cross workers.10 The Germans were also allowed to send personnel to Germany and the first transport consisted of 514 personnel. These were primarily crews from German merchant ships sunk in Narvik as well as naval specialists that the SKL required back
in Germany.

  Fleischer’s Offensive Plan

  While Fleischer had no precise knowledge of the German order of battle, he knew that it was possible to achieve local superiority since a large portion of the German force had to defend Narvik and the railway to Sweden. It was important to keep the Germans guessing as to the location of the attacks and to present them with multiple threats that would make it difficult for them to switch forces on interior lines to meet Norwegian thrusts.

  General Fleischer’s original offensive plan, after halting the German advance along the road at Lapphaugen, involved launching attacks along multiple axes. Gratangen was the brigade’s immediate objective. The 2/15th Inf, supported by the 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn and reinforced by Co Forseth, would engage the Germans at Lapphaugen and drive them south along the road to Gratangen (Route 50) while the 1/16th Inf moved west from Bones through the wilderness in Vassdal, Gressdal, and Raudal. The 1/12th Inf would attack across Fjordbotneidet from the north. The Alta Bn would constitute the Brigade reserve from a location near Levangen, behind the advancing 1/12th Inf. The Norwegians hoped that the Germans would concentrate their defense along Route 50. The force advancing through Fjordbotneidet would threaten the German left flank and their line of retreat along Route 50. The force moving from Bones could bring about two possible successes: the destruction of the main German force by cutting their line of retreat or the early capture of Bjerkvik and Elvegårdsmoen by the force moving northwest through Raudal.

  The two sides spent the time after April 13 consolidating their positions and preparing for future operations. Both sides, particularly the Norwegians, engaged in heavy patrol activities. The Norwegians needed information about German strengths and positions in preparing their offensive. From the patrol activities, the Norwegians concluded that the enemy had two battalions in the Bjerkvik-Gratangen area, with about 300-400 troops in Gratangen. They estimated correctly that the Germans had one reinforced company at Lapphaugen. German ski patrol, from 15 to 60 men in size, operated regularly to the east in the Hartvigvann-Gressdal area but a move against Bones or Lund was not attempted.