Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Dowler saw Gubbins in Bodø on May 22 and sent a glowing report back to his superior saying, “I feel that the operations about Bodo could not be in better hands.” Auchinleck gave Cork a summary of Dowler’s report on the situation, concluding, “Gubbins has whole situation well in hand, and is doing very well. He has his plans to stop enemy well laid.”11

  The Scots Guards went into position at Viskiskoia on May 23. Gubbins intended to hold this position until May 27. The Scots Guards were reinforced by the 3rd Independent Co, which had marched south from Rognan, and two Norwegian ski detachments, each numbering about 40 men. The morale of the battalion had deteriorated considerably.

  The pursuing Germans gave the Guards precious little time to rest. They attacked the Viskiskoia positions at 1600 hours on May 23, only a few hours after the British arrived. Adams writes that it was during the heat of the resulting battle that the Guards learned that their popular commander had been relieved. Lieutenant Colonel Trappes-Lomax was ordered back to Harstad. The battalion war diary describes the effect on the troops:

  This crushing blow took place in the middle of an enemy attack, and it is hardly to be wondered at that the morale of both officers and men was still further shaken by the loss of a Commanding Officer for whose personality and ability everyone had the highest respect, and in whom everyone had the greatest confidence.12

  While his career was damaged, Trappes-Lomax was exonerated, promoted to colonel in 1944, and retired as a brigadier in 1948. When he died in 1962, an old comrade wrote the following about his actions in Norway in The Times: “Trappes appreciated every situation during that enforced retreat with calmness, patience and accuracy. He was right where others were wrong time and time again.”13 The removal of Trappes-Lomax was also a disappointment to the Norwegians. He had worked well with Roscher-Nielsen and other Norwegian officers.

  Trappes-Lomax’s relief did not alter the British situation. The independent company was driven back and this allowed the Germans to enfilade the Scots Guards’ main position. It was ironic that Brigadier Gubbins, who had arrived at the battalion, had to cancel his earlier demand that Viskiskoia be held until May 27. He ordered a withdrawal at 1800 hours to a new position behind a blown bridge at Storjord.

  One British and one Norwegian company, along with a Norwegian ski detachment occupied the Storjord position before the arrival of the Scots Guards. This position was given up without a fight when Gubbins ordered the withdrawal to continue through Posthus, which was 20 kilometers further back and now occupied by fresh troops. The Scots Guards were evacuated to Bodø by sea from Rognan on May 25.

  The disposition of British forces in the Bodø area should have aroused Norwegian suspicions that another unannounced evacuation was imminent. Gubbins had decided not to hold Posthus, only to fight another rear guard action. He spread most of his forces along the Bodø Peninsula, supposedly to prevent amphibious and/or airborne landings. This was undoubtedly a genuine concern and it shows the long-term psychological effects of German amphibious operations in Trondheimfjord and at Hemnesberg.

  Roscher-Nielsen pointed out to General Fleischer on May 22 that the British force disposition north of Saltfjord included only one company between Fauske and Finneid. The route to Narvik led through Finneid and Fauske. While Gubbins had assured the Norwegians that this area would be defended, the positioning of the British forces may have led Roscher-Nielsen to suspect that the British were no longer preoccupied with halting Feurstein’s advance in the direction of Narvik. A defense of the Bodø Peninsula west of Fauske would not impede the German drive to the north. It was possible that the Germans would have halted to eliminate the Bodø bridgehead but it was more likely that they would leave a covering force to protect their flank while continuing their advance. Follow-up forces could then deal with Bodø.

  The Norwegians were desperately trying to reorganize and reconstitute their own forces in the area, knowing that these forces alone had no chance of contesting Feurstein’s advance. The trouble-plagued 1/14th Inf was dissolved and parts of it were organized into ski detachments, while other members still fit for duty were distributed among the companies in 1/15th Inf when that unit arrived in the Bodø area. An infantry company from the reserve battalion of the 16th Inf and the 11th Motorized Artillery Battery had already arrived. Company 3, 1/15th Inf arrived in Finneid aboard fishing vessels on May 21. Roscher-Nielsen sent this company immediately into the Sulitjelma area to prevent an enemy envelopment of the Saltdal front.

  Despite their enormous setbacks, a strange optimism prevailed among the British leaders in Harstad, even after the Germans had crossed Saltfjell. Auchinleck prepared a Special Order of the Day for May 24, Empire Day. It was apparently so well liked that all service commanders signed it. This was the day before the order to evacuate Bodø. A couple of excerpts are illustrative:

  It is our firm intention to stop the further advance northwards of the enemy and to round up their forces in the Narvik area … Our brave allies, the French, had already carried out a brilliant landing operation from boats near Narvik and bundled the enemy out of their forward positions; they are pressing forward steadily in the most difficult country and have the upper hand … Man for man you are more than a match for the Germans so give them what they deserve.

  While the order may have reflected the new mood at the British headquarters, it was also undoubtedly intended to lift the spirit of soldiers who were tired and whose morale was declining. A more accurate reflection of Auchinleck’s view of the situation is contained in a letter he wrote to General Dill, the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a few days later:

  It is lamentable that in this wild underdeveloped country where we, with all our wealth of experience, should be at our best, are outmaneuvered and outfought every time. It makes me sick with shame. The French are all right, real soldiers. As I said, our new armies will have to be very different from our old if we are going to recover our lost ascendancy in battle.14

  The Guards, especially the Scots, and some of the independent companies were well aware that the campaign in Nordland Province had been an unmitigated disaster. They could look back on nearly three weeks of continuous setbacks and retreats. They had never seen a British aircraft and their experience with the navy was one that they would rather forget. They were told repeatedly that the Germans were operating at the end of a very vulnerable supply line, but still they kept coming and the destruction of roads and bridges did not slow them down. The enemy appeared to be suffering less from a shortage of weapons and ammunition than their own units.

  The proclamation was intended primarily for the British troops but it inevitably found its way to forces from other nations. It mentions the French success at Narvik but fails to mention the contributions of the Norwegian and Polish soldiers who carried so much of the burden and losses in the fighting around Narvik. The proclamation did nothing to enhance the reputation of the British among those troops.

  The optimistic mood among the British leaders also infected the Norwegians. The Norwegian leadership was fully aware of the disastrous events in France and continued to be haunted by the fear that the rug could be pulled from underneath them at any time. The 6th Division, however, anticipated optimistically that the operations against Dietl in Narvik and the Bjørnefjell area would end within a few days in his surrender or internment in Sweden. Plans were already prepared to bring the main elements of the division by sea to Sonja (north of Hemnesberg) for operations against Mo from the west, in conjunction with an attack from Bodø. The Norwegians were assured that the Bodø area would be held. Even if most Allied ground forces were later withdrawn, Fleischer and Ruge hoped that their forces would continue to be supplied from Allied resources and would be provided naval and air support.

  The Battle of Posthus and the Retreat to Fauske

  Posthus was a good defensive position. The British forces in this position included four companies of the Irish Guards, three independent companies, and a platoon of field artillery.
Norwegian forces included one infantry company, a mortar platoon, Captain Ellinger’s unit, and a ski detachment. The British had decided to fight a tough delaying action rather than a prolonged defense. The object was to gain time for the preparations of defensive positions on the Bodø Peninsula.

  Posthus is a small village located about 15 kilometers inland from the southern arm of Skjerstadfjord. Saltelva (Salt River) runs through the village and is of considerable width at this point. There were several bridges in the area. The main bridge brought the road from the east to the west shore of the river. There was a suspension bridge spanning the Vatselva tributary that comes into Saltelva from the east, and another bridge across Saltelva about four kilometers north of the village. The area was characterized by dense woods that limited fields of fire and by steep hillsides leading to rugged mountains and ridgelines. It was a good defensive position provided fields of fire were cleared and adequate flank security existed to counter the German preference for flanking operations.

  The British occupied the Posthus positions in their customary double line of defense, primarily along the west side of the river. This time they sent out an outpost line and right flank security. These forces came from Independent Co 2, part of which had still not arrived in the area at the beginning of the engagement. Independent Co 1, which had preceded the retiring Scots Guards, was also involved in the fighting according to most sources but if so, it is not clear where they were positioned. They may have augmented the outposts and flank security detachments. The first line of defense consisted of three companies from the Irish Guards, echeloned to the right. Company 1 was posted on a wooded ridgeline on the east side of the river, just to the south of the village. Companies 3 and 4 covered the road on the west side of the river but their location also allowed coverage of the east shore. A Norwegian ski detachment augmented the security of the right flank and another security detachment and the mortars were located on the hillside off the British right flank. Captain Ellinger’s detachment was located immediately behind the British first line of defense. One company from the Irish Guards and Independent Co 3 occupied the British second line of defense, about three kilometers to the north. A platoon of artillery was located along the road, about one kilometer from the infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Stockwell, the former commander of Independent Co 2, commanded all British forces at Posthus.15

  The exhausted Scots Guards withdrew through the positions of the Irish Guards at midnight on May 24. Fitzgerald notes that the two units passed each other in silence, without the customary jeering and exchange of good-humored insults. The bridge across Saltelva was blown behind them, leaving Co 1 of the Irish Guards rather isolated on the east side of the river except for a long detour over Vatselva into the village and across another bridge further downstream. Posthus was, along with Stien, the sharpest encounter between British and Germans forces in Nordland Province. The fighting raged for the better part of two days.

  The German attack began in the morning of May 25 on the east side of the river. The lead element consisted of bicycle troops. They rode directly into Norwegian machinegun fire from the west side of the river as they rounded the bend in front of Co 1 of the Guards, and suffered a number of casualties. The attack followed the now familiar and effective pattern of probing and the build-up of pressure along the front to fix the defenders while other units fanned out to search for openings or weak spots in the flanks. In the meantime, supporting mountain howitzers, mortars, and machineguns went into positions to support the attack. The German forces involved in the fighting on the first day consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Sorko’s reinforced 2/137th Bn, well supported by the Luftwaffe.

  There was a lull of several hours while the German infantry deployed after the bicycle troops were ambushed. The initial phase of the German attack drove back the British outposts but was halted by heavy fire from British artillery and Norwegian mortars. An attempt to storm the positions of Co 1 of the Irish Guards around 1400 hours on the heels of a strafing attack by five German aircraft against the mortars and artillery failed, but the company soon found its left flank enveloped. The lull that followed the German attack gave Co 1 a chance to disengage before its line of retreat was cut. The company commander, Captain Eugster, sent two platoons off the ridgeline with orders to cross Vatselva via the suspension bridge. He remained with one platoon to cover their withdrawal for half an hour. When the time came for the last platoon to withdraw, it found that the bridge had been destroyed prematurely. The river was too swift and deep to ford and, with the Germans hot on their heels, the troops linked rifle straps and sent a good swimmer across to fasten one end to the opposite shore. The platoon was able to cross with only minutes to spare before the Germans reached the riverbank. The company moved north along the east side of Saltelva and crossed to the west side via the suspension bridge located a short distance north of the British second line of defense.

  German air attacks had forced the battalion commander to relocate his CP. Because of the movement of the CP, the battalion commander did not learn about the withdrawal of Co 1 until about 1800 hours. He sent Co 2 and Independent Co 3 to the east side of the river to shore up that flank by occupying the dominant high ground between the two rivers. These units were in position on the high ground between the two rivers by 0430 hours on May 26.

  The Germans, however, did not press the attack on the east side of Saltelva. During the night, while the British commander moved almost half of his combat power to the east side of Saltelva, German combat engineers constructed a pontoon bridge about a kilometer south of the main bridge at Posthus. Sorko’s command, now reinforced by units from Schratz’ group, crossed the pontoon bridge in a steady stream. By early morning, the Germans had successfully switched their main attack to the west side of the river at the same time as the British had moved half of their combat power to the east side of the river. They were also trying to secure the log bridge over the river at Posthus. The destruction of this bridge had been only partly successful. Company 4 and the Norwegian detachment were able to keep the Germans from crossing the remnants of the bridge and inflicted a number of casualties on the attackers.

  The Germans drove back the British outposts on the west side of the river and began a flanking movement via the high ground to the southwest of Posthus Bridge. Stockwell committed his last reserve, part of Independent Co 2, in a vain attempt to counter the envelopment. The second line of defense was now empty. As happens so often in an engagement, the initiative was with the attacker. The two companies on the east side of the river were mere onlookers to the main event on the other side of the river.

  Brigadier Gubbins gave the order to retreat around 1130 hours but the order was not carried out until about 1900 hours. Independent Co 2 withdrew after its unsuccessful attempt to counter the German envelopment and took up a delaying position near the suspension bridge in order to allow the two companies on the east side of the river to cross back to the west side and the road leading to Rognan. Independent Co 3 received the order to cross the river but could not reach the bridge before it was destroyed. Company 2 of the Guards did not receive the order to withdraw until a Norwegian liaison officer arrived and told them. This happened after the bridge had been destroyed. The two companies were left to make their retreat on the roadless east side of the river.

  The disengagement of Cos 3 and 4 was helped by the unexpected appearance of a lone British aircraft that strafed the German troops. Three aircraft had flown from Bardufoss and landed at Bodø Airfield to refuel. They took off again as the Germans were bombing the airfield. One crashed, one returned, and the third is the one that made its appearance above the withdrawing Irish Guards. In the history of the Irish Guards, it is claimed that this lone aircraft shot down three Heinkels. Derry and Ash claim that the two Gladiators that remained after the third crashed shot down two German aircraft and damaged two more. German sources do not mention the loss of any fighters or bombers but they do record the loss in this area of two transports on
their way to Narvik.

  The Norwegian volunteers under Captain Ellinger occupied two delay positions along the route of withdrawal, one at Sundby and one at Meby. These delays provided the Irish Guards with the time they needed to embark on ferries and fishing boats that brought them across the fjord to Langset, from where the road continued to Finneid and Fauske. The German pursuit was slowed because at that time there was no road between Rognan and Langset. Later that year, in London, Colonel Stockwell introduced Captain Ellinger at the Irish Guards Officer Mess as the man who saved their lives in Norway.

  Of the two British companies that made their withdrawal on the east side of the river, Independent Co 3 managed to re-cross the river and board the last ferry. Company 2 of the Irish Guards was unable to cross the river and made a 30-kilometer march through very difficult terrain to Langset.

  The Irish Guards and the Independent Cos reached Finneid early on May 27. The unit history relates that those unaccounted for at Rognan arrived throughout the day in twos and threes. By evening, all were accounted for except 20 members of the battalion staff. One eventually reached Fauske alone. The British remained in Fauske until the following night when they moved eight kilometers further west.

  The advance of the 2nd Mountain Division through Nordland Province won the forthright admiration of their enemies. Churchill writes:

  At Bodo and Mo, during the retreat of Gubbins’ force to the north, we were each time just too late, and the enemy, although they had to overcome hundreds of miles of rugged, snow-clogged country, drove us back in spite of gallant episodes. We, who had the command of the sea and could pounce anywhere on an undefended coast, were outpaced by the enemy moving by land across very large distances in the face of every obstacle. In this Norwegian encounter, our finest troops, the Scots and Irish Guards, were baffled by the vigour, enterprise, and training of Hitler’s young men.16