Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Company 7 was reinforced by an assortment of naval personnel but its strength never exceeded that of a reinforced company. The main Polish effort after May 18 was directed against the Ankenes pocket. Company 7’s thin, convex line, covering about five kilometers from Hill 650 to Hill 606 was left relatively unmolested until May 27.

  Company 8 relieved Co 6 during the night of May 18-19. The company was reinforced and supplied by boats on a nightly basis in the week that followed, but all these had to be scraped together from Major Haussels’ forces in Narvik, since Group Windisch was given priority in the allocation of all other forces. Parts of Major Haussels’ engineer and reconnaissance platoons were brought into the pocket along with various groups of naval personnel. These reinforcements increased the strength of the defenders to between 160 and 180 men. One hundred and eighteen men from Co 2, 137th Regiment parachuted into the area near Bjørnefjell on May 25, and were sent into the Ankenes pocket by Major Haussels on May 27.

  Company 8 was already engaged in heavy action on its first day at Ankenes, repelling several Polish attacks. The Germans were in an unenviable position with their backs to the sea, a numerically superior enemy on the high ground to their front, and under frequent and heavy naval gunfire from British ships in the fjord. The situation improved on May 20 when heavy German air attacks were launched against the Poles on the ridgeline. However, as soon as the planes disappeared the Poles launched another unsuccessful attack against the Ankenes pocket.

  One of the greatest German fears in May was a possible Allied threat against the Bjørnefjell base area from the south. The Germans knew from prisoners that the entire Polish brigade was located on Ankenes Peninsula or in other locations on the south side of Ofotfjord. The Germans also knew that total Allied strength was approximately 20,000 and they had a hard time understanding why most of the fighting had been left to the Norwegians and French. Dietl, like Fleischer, considered Bjørnefjell the key to the survival of German forces and he and his staff had to assume that the Allies were of a like mind. A thrust from the south in combination with heavy pressure from the north and threatening gestures against Narvik could lead to a quick collapse.

  The Germans knew that a road ran southeast from Elvegård, near the village of Skjomen. This road turned into a summer road when it reached the east-west valley of Norddal and continued eastward in this valley towards the Swedish border until it reached the north-south valley of Hunddal. This valley leads directly to Bjørnefjell. The route was difficult and long for troops not accustomed to mountains and snow, but even a minor threat from this direction would trouble the Germans since their reserves in this period never exceeded a company and even less than that during the last weeks of May.

  The heavy Allied activities on the south side of Ofotfjord after May 10 caused the Germans to suspect that a wide envelopment could be in progress. The Luftwaffe was requested to make reconnaissance flights in this sector. Group XXI reported that there were no signs of enemy activities in the Skjomen area. Dietl was not completely convinced and he ordered a ski patrol to make a 50-kilometer deep reconnaissance to the south and southwest. Its report confirmed that there were no enemy forces in this area.

  Reports from Major Haussels flowing into the headquarters of the 3rd Division towards the end of May pointed to an imminent attack directly against Narvik. These reports were based primarily on prisoner interrogations.

  German Relief and Supply Operations

  The situation for the German troops in Narvik was growing daily more desperate in late May. While some reinforcements were flown into the pocket and others arrived through Sweden disguised as Red Cross personnel and “specialists,” they were not sufficient to replace the losses or counter the increased Norwegian and Allied buildup. Supplies were also arriving by air but most came by train from Sweden, classified as “humanitarian assistance.” In the early part of the campaign, the supplies arriving through Sweden were mostly limited to rations, coal, and medical equipment. Later, they included clothing and ski equipment. The Swedes would not allow the transport of ammunition, which had to be brought in entirely by air.

  With Group Windisch near collapse, Dietl needed fresh troops to shore up the front and give some of his mountain troops a chance to rest. General von Falkenhorst had only a few paratroopers at his disposal, who were sent to Narvik between May 14 and 16 On May 15, von Falkenhorst asked OKW for one parachute battalion. He argued persuasively that the valiant efforts by the troops in General Feurstein’s 2nd Mountain Division would have been in vain if Narvik could not be held until they arrived. He mentioned the importance of tying down Allied forces as long as possible. His reference to the importance of holding Narvik for political and prestige reasons was no doubt intended more for Hitler than for the officers at OKW.

  Falkenhorst’s arguments produced results. Hitler ordered 1st Bn, 1st Para Regt made available to reinforce Narvik, the same battalion that had landed at Fornebu near Oslo on April 9 and that subsequently participated in the operations in Holland on May 10. It was anticipated that this unit should start arriving in Narvik within a week or ten days.

  In the meantime, Group XXI carried out expedited and abbreviated parachute training for some of the mountain troops. The first group, consisting of 65 men from Co 2, 137th, parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area on May 23. The Germans expected ten percent casualties in the operation, but only two soldiers sustained minor injuries. Another parachute drop was made the following day, this time involving 55 troops from Co 1, 137th. On the same day, 14 troops from Co 6, 138th arrived by seaplane. Another 54 troops from Co 1, 137th arrived by parachute on May 25, as did 44 troops from Co 2, 138th. Forty mortar and machinegun personnel arrived via Sweden on May 25.

  The airborne troops began arriving on May 26 when 81 men parachuted safely into the Bjørnefjell area. Inclement weather delayed the next lift until May 28 when 46 paratroopers were dropped and one mountain howitzer with a crew of five landed by seaplane. One hundred thirty four paratroopers arrived on May 29 with the remaining 46 arriving on June 2. A further 80 “specialists” arrived from Sweden on May 31.9 While 599 troops arrived in the Narvik area between May 23 and June 2, Dietl concluded that he needed another 1,500 to 2,000 men in order to hold out.

  The resupply of weapons and ammunition was not without mishap. Seaplanes successfully flew in five antitank guns and two captured Norwegian mountain howitzers. The airdrop of 15 captured Polish antitank guns was unsuccessful. All weapons became unserviceable. About 30% of the infantry weapons (mortars, machineguns, and sub-machineguns) airdropped were damaged and unserviceable. About 20-25% of the ammunition parachuted into the Narvik pocket was damaged to the point where it was useless.

  Bringing rations and ammunition to the forward troops was a major task for the Germans as it was for the Norwegians, French, and Poles. The Germans started out using two officers and 60 men for this task but this was soon increased to six officers and 460 men, including Norwegian prisoners. About 8,000 lbs of rations and 4-6,000 lbs of ammunition had to be brought forward on a daily basis.10 Some supplies were moved by sleds but most were carried by men, at least part of the way.

  The use of Norwegian prisoners in the supply effort was a serious breach of the conventions regulating the treatment of prisoners. On May 10, Hitler directed that all non-career Norwegian prisoners of war be released and allowed to proceed to their homes. This was an atypical document by the German dictator and since it is so uncharacteristic, it is worthwhile to quote its operative parts:

  … In the course of the campaign in the east German soldiers who had the misfortune to fall injured or uninjured into Polish hands were usually brutally ill-treated or massacred. By way of contrast, it must be said of the Norwegian army that not one single such incident of the debasement of warfare has occurred.11

  The Norwegian soldier spurned all the cowardly and deceitful methods common to the Poles. He fought with open visor and honorably, and he tended our prisoners and injured properly and to the best
of his ability. The civilian population acted similarly. Nowhere did they join in the fighting, and they did all they could for the welfare of our casualties.

  I have therefore decided in appreciation for this to authorize the liberation of the Norwegian soldiers we took prisoner. Only the professional soldiers will have to remain in captivity until such time as the former Norwegian government withdraws its call to arms against Germany, or individual officers and men give their formal word not to take part under any circumstances in further hostilities against Germany.

  This proclamation was a political gesture designed to win favor with the Norwegian people and to lower the fighting morale of the Norwegian troops in North Norway. Dietl was quick to point out that the release of prisoners was not possible in his active theater of operations, since those who were set free would simply rejoin their units via Sweden. However, the most serious objection to their release had to do with the loss of their use in the supply effort and he pointed out that the prisoners were far superior to the naval personnel used for that purpose because they were in better physical condition and used to the winter climate and mountainous terrain.12 Both Group XXI and OKW were thus aware of Dietl’s use of Norwegian prisoners in this manner.

  After the outbreak of panic among the naval personnel on May 13, Dietl described them as “useless for combat and a danger to our troops.” Group XXI had therefore arranged to bring the destroyer crews back to Germany via Sweden. Group XXI’s view that the end was near for Dietl’s command may have hastened these arrangements. Sweden granted permission on May 19 to evacuate these crews as “shipwrecked sailors.” Dietl had now decided that these sailors, despite their shortcomings as infantry, were critical for supply duties. This was the beginning of a series of exchanges between Group XXI and the 3rd Division. In the end, it was agreed that Dietl would decide who should be evacuated and make the necessary arrangements through the naval attaché in Stockholm.

  At the end of May and in early June OKW was searching frantically for ways to bring Dietl the reinforcements he needed so that he could hold out until Feurstein arrived from the south. Göring appears to have been unwilling to support the Narvik reinforcement operations. A desire not to divert resources from the western front and to conserve them for the anticipated battle for Britain may have been reasons for this reluctance. On May 16, Hitler had ordered Göring to make gliders available to bring 600 mountain troops to Narvik. After a series of procrastinations, Göring finally ordered the gliders held in Denmark on May 29. Hitler then reduced the requirement to six gliders, but the operation was never carried out.

  On May 30, Hitler decided that Dietl’s troops in Narvik were to be supported by all available means. This represented a change in Hitler’s outlook, probably caused by the successes the Germans had achieved on the western front. Dietl was promised two parachute battalions (about 1,800 men) and another 1,000 mountain troops who were given a quick parachute course. Again, this operation was never carried out.

  In the beginning of June, OKW planned a new operation, code-named Naumburg, to bring relief to Narvik. The plan involved landing a strong force in Lyngefjord, about 90 miles north of Narvik, at the same time as Luftwaffe paratroopers captured Bardufoss Airfield. The plan involved the transport of about 6,000 troops and a dozen tanks to Lyngefjord in the fast ocean-liners Bremen and Europa. A similar plan was discussed when reinforcements for Trondheim were considered. It died because of Admiral Raeder’s opposition.

  Raeder pointed out to Hitler that this operation would take too long to be of any help to Dietl and he suggested that it would be quicker and easier for the Luftwaffe to seize Bardufoss with a glider-borne force and then bring in troops by transports. Hitler decided that both operations (Lyngefjord and Bardufoss) should be carried out simultaneously. The plan envisioned that the ocean liners would proceed to Basis Nord near Murmansk after landing the troops.13

  The OKW eventually agreed with Raeder’s conclusion that Operation Naumburg would probably come too late to save the troops in Narvik. This realization led to another plan, Operation Juno. This plan originated with the German Naval Staff and it was intended initially to be a diversionary operation by the fleet. The worsening situation in Narvik led the naval staff to scuttle the diversionary nature of the plan and substitute an operation that would bring direct help to Narvik.

  The plan called for a naval sortie by the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the heavy cruiser Hipper, and four destroyers. This fleet would undertake a surprise attack on Allied ships and bases in the Harstad area or alternatively, if reconnaissance indicated the possibility of success, an attack in Vestfjord and Ofotfjord. Hitler also wanted the coastal area between Trondheim and Bodø cleared of light Norwegian naval units that interfered with the resupply of General Feurstein’s forces. The light cruiser Nürnberg and a number of torpedo boats were assigned this mission and dispatched to Trondheim. The German warships designated for Operation Juno departed Kiel on June 4. The execution of this operation is covered in the last chapter.

  Allied Air Support

  The Allies were slow in taking steps to provide air support for their forces in Narvik and Nordland Province and when they did, it was inadequate. This slowness is partially explained by the reliance on aircraft carriers and the relative lack of German air operations in North Norway during the first month of the campaign. The unfortunate experience in operating from frozen lakes in the southern part of the country may also have contributed to the delay in bringing in land-based aircraft.

  The aircraft carrier Furious was present in the waters off North Norway until April 26. This carrier had no fighter aircraft aboard and this, and the difficulty in keeping aircraft serviceable, severely limited its usefulness. For most of the next two weeks, the Allies had no combat aircraft other than a squadron of seaplanes in the Narvik area. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal arrived off Narvik on May 6, and remained there until May 21 when the carrier Furious delivered a squadron of Gladiators to operate from Bardufoss. The threat to the aircraft carriers from German aircraft and submarines was a grave concern in the British Navy. While the carriers operated from well offshore in order to minimize the air threat, their aircraft and those of the Norwegians were initially able to contest German air operations, carry out attacks against shore targets, and provide limited support for ground operations.

  The Allied evacuations in south and central Norway freed German air assets for use in the north. The opening of a land connection between Oslo and Trondheim allowed the Luftwaffe to base and support expanded air operations from Værnes Airfield and this soon made itself felt in the Narvik area. German close air support operations were, as already mentioned, hampered by two facts. First, the scale of Luftwaffe maps (1:1,000,000) made effective close air support practically impossible. The lack of ground-to-air communications was the second problem. While the 3rd Division received the necessary radio equipment on May 6, an air force liaison officer was not provided until May 20. His efforts increased the effectiveness of close air support operations and resulted in improved coordination and support from the air operation center in Trondheim, which directed all air operations in North Norway.

  Increased German air presence in the Narvik area and the inability of the carrier aircraft to effectively contest this increased threat speeded up Allied efforts to establish shore-based air operations. The increased German air activity also began to take its toll on the British Navy. The battleship Resolution was withdrawn from the area after a German bomb penetrated three decks on May 18. The antiaircraft cruiser Curlew was lost on May 26 with many of her crew as she provided antiaircraft protection for the construction of the airfield at Skånland.

  Ash writes that Admiral Cork “had been scouring the countryside for possible landing grounds since his earliest days in Norway.”14 In fact, construction of a new airfield at Skånland was started but never completed to the point where it could be used. Several fields that could be made operational with much less effort were available. There
were fields at Bardufoss, Elvenes in Salangen, Banak, Bodø, and Mo but all had to be cleared of snow and improved to support fighter operations. Hundreds of civilian laborers were involved in making Bardufoss and the field at Bodø ready to receive British fighter aircraft. Within two weeks after the decision to station two squadrons of fighters at Bardufoss, a number of protective shelters for aircraft were built and snow was cleared from three 900-meter runways.

  Because of the delayed decision to bring in land-based fighters, the Bardufoss Airfield was not ready to receive British fighter aircraft until May 21. The 263rd Gladiator Squadron took off from the aircraft carrier Furious. The weather was bad and two of the 18 aircraft crashed into a mountain on the way to Bardufoss. However, by the following day the Gladiators were established on the airfield and able to conduct air operations in the Harstad-Narvik area.

  It was planned to have the 46th Hurricane Squadron operate from Skånland. This squadron took off from the aircraft carrier Glorious on May 26 and attempted to land at Skånland “but three out of eleven aircraft tipped on to their noses on landing as a result of the soft surface of the runway.”15 The squadron was diverted to Bardufoss from where it operated until the end of the campaign.

  It was not until the middle of May that the British decided to establish an airbase at Bodø. The Norwegians provided a large labor force from the Bodø area and they had the field ready for operations on May 26. Initially, the ground proved too soft here as it did at Skånland but this was rectified when the runway was re-laid in 14 hours. Except for the three Gladiators that came down from Bardufoss, the British never used this airfield and its capture by the Germans after the British evacuated Bodø gave them an operational airfield close to Narvik.

  The Norwegian air group was down to one serviceable aircraft in early May. The rest were shot down, had crashed, or were unserviceable due to lack of spare parts. The aircraft flown in from the southern part of the country performed well in support of the forward brigades but the lack of spare parts reduced their number because some aircraft had to be cannibalized to keep others flying. Some pilots without aircraft were sent to England to receive fighter aircraft training and new aircraft.