Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  The British evacuation of Bodø and the collapse of the front in Nordland Province gave new urgency to Norwegian offensive preparations. A report by Colonel Finne, the Norwegian liaison officer at Allied headquarters, also caused unease. He reported that the French plan was to capture Sildvik but not advance any further and that the Norwegians would have to take care of the rest.

  On May 30, the division amended its earlier directive and ordered the operations to begin no later than 2400 hours that same day. A phrase in the amendment summed up the sense of urgency, “It is, for the sake of the country, absolutely necessary that the brigades make a renewed effort to bring the Narvik Campaign to a conclusion.”12 The 7th Brigade was asked to report immediately any French failure to participate in or support the attack.

  Problems in getting the French on the north side of Rombakfjord to participate in the planned offensive continued. We have seen that Béthouart viewed the troops in the 14th Bn, CA as unfit for offensive operations and that Valentini voiced the opinion that there was no need for haste since the Germans would either surrender or intern themselves in Sweden within two weeks. Both these officers were aware of the evacuation and the prohibition against offensive operations after the capture of Narvik.

  The 6th Brigade issued its attack order to the battalions on May 29 at 2130 hours. The 1/16th Inf was ordered to attack the eastern anchor of the German line at Hill 620, while the 2/16th Inf was to advance from its rest area to pre-reconnoitered attack positions and capture, as its first objectives, Hills 456 and 615. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion would support the attack from positions between Kuberget and Skitdalsvann.

  The 2nd Bn began its move at 0200 hours on May 30 but the terrain east of Skitdalsvann was mountainous and difficult. The battalion came under intense enemy automatic weapons fire as the units reached the high ground to the north side of the watershed near its objectives. Major Munthe-Kaas viewed the chances of success in a frontal attack as very small and made the first in a series of recommendations that the battalion move into the mountains to the east where the terrain was more favorable. The brigade turned down these suggestions and repeated attempts, frustrated by heavy enemy fire, were made to ford the river or build a footbridge. After wasting almost four days in these attempts, the brigade agreed to move the battalion into the mountains to the east at 1330 hours on June 3.

  It will be recalled that the 1/16th Inf was left on the high plateau after the Germans withdrew to new defensive positions on May 22. An eastward movement, to make room for the 2/16th Inf that was getting ready to move forward from its rest area was begun on May 27. The battalion plan of attack called for Co 1 to attack Hill 620 from the east while Co 2 approached the objective from the west, with the machinegun company supporting both attacks. Company 7 was left in its positions on Hill 931 as flank security. The attack was planned for 2300 hours on May 30 but was postponed until 0600 hours on May 31 because of heavy fog.

  Company 1 ended up attacking the hill from the north, not east as planned. The first attempts were unsuccessful due to German air attacks and stubborn resistance.

  Company 1 reassembled on the northeast slope of the hill and the battalion altered the attack plan by directing Co 2 to attack from the east. Company 1 was to remain in its positions and support Co 2’s attack with fire. Company 2 would move against the German right flank after reaching the plateau between Hills 620 and 698, and Co 1 would then attack Hill 620 on a prearranged signal. Company 2 cleared the plateau by 2300 hours on May 31 after some heavy fighting. The Norwegians were able to hold the gained terrain and Hill 620 was stormed and captured on June 1.

  The Germans describe the fight for Hill 620:

  From May 31 at 1300 hours, several companies advanced against Hill 620–defended by about 90 men with one machinegun and one mortar–from the west, supported by strong supporting fire and partially in heavy fog … In hours of bitter struggle, until late night, heavy enemy attacks, supported by six aircraft, to secure this important hill were repelled three time … The enemy was finally able to break into and hold their positions, without securing the whole hill. In this dire situation, the last division reserve, Co 2, 138th [Lieutenant Renner)] arrived [30 men and more hand grenades and ammunition] … After four more attacks were repelled, the hill, which had been fought over continually for 15 hours, had to be abandoned around 0800 hours [June 1].13

  Company 2 continued its attack against Hill 698 but was stopped by heavy enemy crossfire. The battalion commander also committed Co 7 against this objective. The two companies surprised the German defenders under the cover of a heavy fog on June 2 and gained a precarious foothold on the northern part of the hill. Three Norwegians were killed and nine wounded in the attack.

  Heavy fighting continued throughout the following week for Hill 698 and Border Marker 267A (Hill 623). This key objective changed hands a couple of times. Both Norwegians and Germans accused each other of violating Swedish territory. It appears that both sides were guilty. The Norwegian violation was carried out by a unit commanded by a Swedish volunteer, Lieutenant Jan Danielsen. When confronted by a Swedish officer and accused of violating the border, Danielsen is reported to have replied, “To hell with that, we have to attack the Germans wherever they are.”14 This surprise attack from the east led to the capture of this key terrain.

  Lieutenant Rohr’s platoon held the far right of the German line, up against the Swedish border. Rohr’s report to Schleebrügge indicates that he felt that what was appropriate for one side should also be appropriate for the other:

  On the 7th or 8th of June, about 40 Norwegians with at least three machineguns crossed the border into Sweden and at 0230 hours attacked our right flank on Hill 698. Our weak border security force was thrown back after two soldiers fell. Both platoons Adler and Appeln received orders to immediately retire some distance, cross the border, and attack the Norwegians from the rear.15

  The German counterattack forced the Norwegians off the hill but eventually both sides abandoned the area around the border marker as Swedish troops appeared and hoisted the Swedish flag. In his description of the heavy fighting for Hills 620 and 698, Buchner notes that after long having neglected the deep and open German flank, the Norwegians were forced into frontal attacks against well-prepared defensive positions.

  The German supply situation was becoming desperate, as was their lack of reinforcements. The bad weather during this period, with heavy fog, rain, snow, and sleet, prevented aerial resupply. Troops on both sides suffered severely and were completely exhausted. They had difficulties in moving around and fell asleep, even while under attack. While these conditions plagued both sides, Group Windisch had reached such a state of exhaustion that a total collapse was imminent.

  The 3rd Division journal mentions on June 2 that there had been no resupply of ammunition for six days and that they managed only because there were no enemy attacks on the Narvik Peninsula. The journal also notes that one reason they were able to hold the front was because the Norwegians did not launch simultaneous attacks against more than one objective and this enabled the Germans to bring forward badly needed supplies to the threatened areas. It also allowed the Germans to reinforce the threatened areas in a timely manner with forces from Group Windisch’s left flank and from the units facing the Poles and French.

  It is ironic and tragic that the Norwegians and Allies failed to coordinate their efforts. The Norwegians remained virtually idle in the days prior to the Narvik landings and during most of the period when the French and Poles were attacking towards Sildvik. Because of the lack of activity on the northern front, Dietl was able to commit all incoming reinforcements and some units from Group Windisch to counter the Allied drive. When the Norwegians began their offensive, the Poles and French remained inactive, and this allowed Dietl again to switch units to the threatened sector. It is very doubtful that the Germans in the Bjørnefjell area would have survived if these attacks had been coordinated in such a way as to keep maximum pressure on both fr
onts.

  The loss of Hill 620, the threatened loss of Hill 698, and the attacks against Holmevann were direct threats against the German base at Bjørnefjell. Late on May 31, Dietl had already decided that he needed to withdraw his forces to a shorter line in order to make reserves available. On the northern front, the Germans withdrew their left flank to the western slopes of Rauberg. The front on the Narvik Peninsula was also pulled back about two kilometers. These withdrawals allowed the Germans to form a company-size reserve in each battalion.

  The Norwegians were within seven kilometers of the Bjørnefjell Railroad Station and the logical next objective of the attack was Rundfjell if the German resistance on Hill 698 and north of Holmevann was overcome. With Rundfjell in Norwegian hands, the forces confronting the French and Poles would be in an untenable position and forced to withdraw. The hope was that the capture of Rundfjell would force Dietl to surrender or withdraw into Sweden.16 The date for the final attack was set for June 8.

  EVACUATION, ARMISTICE, AND DISASTER

  “You may think we are running away from the enemy, we are not, our chummy ship has sunk, the Glorious is sinking, the least we can do is make a show, good luck to you all.”

  ANNOUNCEMENT BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER GLASFURD TO THE CREW BEFORE TURNING HIS DESTROYER AROUND IN A DESPERATE ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIPS, AS RECALLED BY THE DESTROYER CREW’S LONE SURVIVOR.

  Evacuation Plans

  Foreign Minister Koht and Defense Minister Ljungberg were in London when the Germans attacked in the west on May 10. Lord Halifax asked to see them and they met in the afternoon of May 10. Ljungberg asked the British Foreign Secretary if the events in Holland, Belgium, and France would cause any changes in the help promised Norway in the form of troops and materiel. Halifax assured his visitors that a cabinet meeting earlier in the day had decided there would be no changes.

  There is no reason to question Halifax’s sincerity. In fact, two days later Churchill, who had become Prime Minister on May 10, offered Admiral Cork the 2nd French Light Division, located in Scotland. The return of this unit to France was delayed for three days pending a reply. Cork answered that, for administrative reasons, he could not receive the French troops before May 30. In a message to Cork on May 14, Churchill sounded even more positive by expressing the hope that Cork would clear out Narvik as soon as possible and thereafter work himself southward in increasing strength.1

  Even as late as May 19, there were no hints that Churchill was thinking about a possible withdrawal. He was adamantly opposed to the Mowinkel Plan (discussed later in this chapter), which called for the neutralization of North Norway. “The main remaining value of our forces in Norway is to entice and retain largely superior German forces in that area away from the main decision. Norway is paying a good dividend now and must be held down to the job.”2

  Churchill’s tone changed the following day, May 20, after a report by the Inter-Service Planning Staff to the Chiefs of Staff. The consequences of a defeat in France and the loss or withdrawal of the British forces from that country were beginning to set in. It was emphasized that every ship, aircraft, and anti-aircraft gun was needed at home. That night, Churchill informed the new defense committee that since the Germans were now in a position of strength where they could demand troop transit through Sweden, the Allies would no longer be able to advance from Narvik to the iron ore fields and that Narvik had no significant importance as a naval base.3 He concluded that holding Narvik drained British resources, a stark reversal of the position he had expressed the day before. However, as late as May 23, Churchill considered leaving the evacuation in a planning stage.

  The situation appeared more distressing the next day as the noose around the British, Belgian, and French forces began to tighten. The Chiefs of Staff, in an appreciation of the military implications of a withdrawal from Norway, provided the necessary impetus for an evacuation order and spelled the end to any hopes the Norwegians might have had of carrying on the struggle with Allied air and logistic support. The Chiefs estimated that it would take 28 days from the time the order was given to bring the forces in Norway back to Great Britain in an operational condition. A telegram ordering the evacuation was sent to Cork that evening (May 24) and the War Cabinet approved the order on May 25, followed by the Supreme Allied War Council on May 31. While the evacuation decision proved final, there were misgivings within the War Cabinet and even Churchill toyed with the idea of leaving a garrison in Narvik.

  The British also decided to proceed with the attack on Narvik. The reasons given for proceeding were to ensure that the harbor facilities were destroyed and to cover the evacuation, which are difficult to square with the actual situation. In anticipation of losing the city, the Germans had carried out a thorough and systematic destruction of the harbor facilities, starting on April 22. The German troops were in no position to interfere seriously with an Allied evacuation. In fact, it is arguable that it would have been simpler to evacuate from the positions occupied by the Allies prior to Narvik’s capture than it was after they had advanced into the interior. However, operations in the final days of May and early June diverted German attention away from any thoughts that the Allies were about to depart. They were completely unaware of the evacuation since they considered that the Norwegians and Allies were in ideal positions to undertake a final push that they felt incapable of containing.

  The real reasons for capturing Narvik before the evacuation were probably due to pride and prestige or, as argued by General Béthouart in retrospect, because a victory was needed for Allied morale. In the process, several hundred Allied and Norwegian soldiers and sailors gave their lives without any major benefits. The delay, although impossible to foresee by the planners and decision-makers, meant that it took place at the same time as the German fleet made a sortie that brought a calamity to the British Navy.

  The British government had instructed Cork and Auchinleck to keep the evacuation a close secret, with knowledge limited to senior British and French officers. The need for secrecy is understandable. Allied mistrust of Norwegians continued and any leakage of information would jeopardize the evacuation.

  The Allied commanders had a distasteful task. Not only were they required to abandon a campaign when final victory was within reach, but they were required to keep that knowledge from the Norwegians and they no doubt felt that they were again abandoning their comrades on the field of battle. General Béthouart said as much, “I am operating with Norwegian troops whom for reasons of national honor, I will not abandon in difficulties on the battlefield.”4 Auchinleck’s feelings are summed up in a hand-written letter he sent to General Dill on May 30, one day after Churchill decided that the Norwegians still could not be told about the evacuation. “The worst of it all is the need for lying to all and sundry in order to preserve secrecy. The situation vis-à-vis the Norwegians is particularly difficult and one feels a most despicable creature in pretending that we are going on fighting, when we are going to quit at once.”5

  The Norwegians reacted very angrily to the British evacuation of Bodø, leading the British to believe that they were discussing an armistice with the Germans. While there was no serious consideration on the part of the Norwegians to negotiate with the Germans, the meeting between Ambassador Dormer and the Norwegians on May 30 was very heated. Mr. Hambro told Dormer that Norwegians could no longer trust the British and he complained about the apparent lack of cooperation between the British Navy and the British Army. This elicited a sharp reply from Dormer that Hambro was in no position to pass judgment on such matters, and cooperation was in fact excellent. Hambro replied that if this was true, the situation was even worse than he had thought.

  In view of these strong statements about the Bodø evacuation, the Allies could not be sure what the reaction would be to far worse news. The carefully worked out deception plan for the evacuation was as much directed at misleading the Norwegians as it was to conceal the operation from the Germans. There were those in Allied headquarters who felt
that telling the Norwegians was tantamount to informing the Germans. The movement order, codenamed Alphabet, had an appendix, which informed people privy to the evacuation how to answer questions from individuals who were not in on the evacuation plans. There were three main points: 1) The capture of Narvik allowed forces to be redeployed to better advantage for future operations; 2) A planned move of the Allied base of operations from Harstad to Tromsø to minimize German air threats; and 3) The need to prepared to move forces to the Finnmark Province in case of German or Soviet threats in that area.

  Despite concerns by Cork and Auchinleck about worsened relations with the Norwegian as result of not telling them about the impending evacuation, Churchill decided on May 29 that there should still be a few days delay in informing the Norwegians. To soften the blow of the eventual disclosure of the evacuation to the Norwegians, he told Admiral Cork to offer them “the alternatives of evacuation or being left in positions capable of further defence.”6

  By the end of the month, it became obvious that the Norwegians had to be informed since it would be next to impossible to disengage French and Polish forces without their knowledge and acquiescence. It was also impossible to conceal all evacuation operations since some of the supplies and heavy equipment were shipped out before the end of May.