World Famous Spy Scandals
Page 7
There had been no reaction in Pakistan, when Captain Rathore was arrested on 24th August, 1978. But, as the news of the arrest of army officers in India reached them, there was an unusual reaction there. 107 army officers were arrested by Pakistan Military Intelligence in Lahore, Sialkot, Karachi and Rawalpindi. They were all charged with the offence of spying for India. The trial of these officers was rushed through. After a summary trial for three days by the military courts, two Colonels, three Majors and a sepoy were hanged. The rest were hanged or sentenced to imprisonment at a later date. It is supposed that the Indian spy network was nearly wiped out after these arrests and trials.
Actually, Sambha is the name of a small town located on the Pathankot Jammu highway. No. 168 Infantry Brigade of the 39th Infantry Division is posted there. That is why it was also called Sambha Brigade. The entire Sambha Brigade became involved in this affair and as such this episode was given the name of Sambha espionage scandal. Apart from men of Military intelligence, agents of other secret services were also stationed in Sambha. The agents of Pakistani army and other secret services of that country are very active in this area. This area has strategic importance for both the countries.
Captain Rathore, who has been mentioned in the beginning of this article was posted for internal spying in the Sambha Brigade on behalf of 527 Intelligence & Field Security Company from the year 1974 to 1976. Together with him, Major S.C. Jolly of 16th Corp of Nagarkota and
Major R.P. Madan of Eastern Command did espionage work in Pakistan with the help of informers.
This can only be called as a strange quirk of fate that Captain Rathore who had been warmly praised for his good work in 1977, was now charged and arraigned as a double agent working for Pakistan since 1977. His own former associates, Major Jolly, Major Madan, Major Solanki and Major Talwar were entrusted with the enquiry of the case. Captain Rathore later retreated from his statement given earlier. He claimed that he was tortured to confess that Captain Nangiyal and gunner Aya Singh took him to Pakistan on the night of
July 30-31, 1974.
Apart from Captain Rathore, Captain A.K. Rana, Who had been an officer in the Military Intelligence Department of Sambha Brigade till 1978, was also charged for being a spy of Pakistan. Captain Rana had been posted in 168 Sambha Brigade on 5th January, 1976 and remained there till March, 1978. He had replaced Captain Rathore. Rana was arrested after Captain Rathore divulged a lot of details regarding this espionage network on October 27, 1978. His confessional statement, that formed the basis for the arrest of Captain Rana ran as follows, “I went to Pakistan on January 11, 1976 and also on July 19, 1976. I took Captain Rana with me. There, I introduced him to Major Akbar Khan of Pakistan’s Military Intelligence Branch.”
Nobody knows the activities of the Military Intelligence Branch till the arrest of 53 army officers on the night of January 22-23, 1979. But this is certain that the most of the arrested officers were connected with Sambha Brigade during 1974-78 or with Captain Rathore and Captain Rana in some way or the other. Another 90 army men belonging to 527 Intelligence and Field Security were also taken into custody.
From information gathered from knowledgeable sources, it was surmised that Captain Rathore was called to Delhi and arrested under a well thought out plan. Prior to this, Captain Nangiyal had also been arrested in 1975. He was suspected to be a Pakistani spy, but no evidence was found against him. The persons who testified against him in 1976, happened to be Naik Sarban Das and gunner Aya Singh.
Aya Singh had told the higher officers that Captain Nangiyal had taken Captain Rathore to Pakistan. He had become approver in that case. In this way, gunner Aya Singh was playing two roles—that of an accused and as well as an approver. The other person who appeared as a witness against Captain Nangiyal was Naik Sarban Das. He had been sentenced to six months’ imprisonment twice by the Military Court. This was clear from his record.
Naik Sarban Das was arrested again for some offence, when he was posted in 31st Division at Jhansi. From there he absconded. Later, he was arrested by a police inspector Sewa Singh, of Jammu and Kashmir. He was apprehended on the border. He posed to be a Major in Pakistani army and had a revolver with him.
On the previous occasion, the charge that he was a Pakistani spy could not be proved, but this time he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for absconding from the prison. Later on, this man became an important witness in the Sambha espionage scandal. Aya Singh had also been sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in March, 1978, on charge of desertion from the army. Aya Singh became an approver in this case and was fully co-operating with the enquiry commission as a key witness. It was during his interrogation that the names of Captain Rathore and Captain Rana cropped up.
Major General H.K. Kaul, who was Director of Military Intelligence was removed from his post and sent elsewhere. The commander of 39th Division of Sambha Brigade, Major General K. Gauri Shankar, was posted in his place.
Havaldar P.P. Singh who was personal assistant of commander D.P. Nayer of the Sambha Brigade was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. Major Jolly and Major Madan, who had worked with Captain Rathore in 1977 and appreciated his work, were absolved of all charges. As a matter of fact, they had investigated into this scandal. It is really strange that only these two officers were found to be capable and trustworthy in the whole army to enquire into this scandal. Captain Talwar, who had worked as a junior to Captain Rathore was also associated with the enquiry. He had taken out Sarban Das and Aya Singh from the prison and kept them in his custody. It was Captain Talwar who helped them in their evidence. Was there some mystery involved in these affairs?
But the biggest surprise in this scandal was that inspite of so much uproar in the country over this scandal, the Defence Minister, Jagjiwan Ram, did not order an enquiry by the Intelligence Department. The Home Minister,
Y.B. Chavan had suggested this to the defence minister and army authorities. For reasons best known to them they did not do it. Was it to shield some higher ups? The result was that truth could never be unravelled and this scandal remains an unsolved mystery.
Sushma – Suresh Episode
There are many questions that remain unresolved in
this Sambha espionage scandal. Why did the then
defence Minister, Jagitwan Ram, shy away from an enquiry into the sordid affair by the Central Bureau as suggested by Y.B. Chavan, who was the Home Minsiter at that time. How could Pakistan launch an operation to wipe out the Indian counterespionage cell on the night
of January 22-23, 1979? Who informed them of the Indian action the same day? Why did the Pakistan authorities suspect their officers and men, numbering 107, immediately after the arrest of Captain Rathore on August 24, 1978? Why did the Pakistani authorities try some of their officers hurriedly and sentenced them immediately? Experts believe that some one who had full access to the confidential files and documents sent to the residence of the defence minister was behind all these intriguing incidents. He must have been involved in sending information to foreign intelligence agencies.
Readers must be aware of the Sushma-Suresh episode which became the talk of the town. ‘Surya’ magazine, edited by Mrs. Maneka Gandhi, published compromising photographs of Suresh, son of defence minsiter Jagjiwan Ram, involving Sushma. The Intelligence officers believed that Suresh must have been blackmailed.
It is also alleged that Suresh came to know many secret affairs and documents due to his influence in the defence ministry, before these incriminating photographs came to light.
But, who is there to tell the truth? The whole thing will remain shrouded in mystery.
ef
The Daring Courage of Elie Cohen
The Jews learned the art of spying the hard way. Centuries of persecution, purges and pogroms developed in them a natural talent for survival in a hostile environment and the cunning ability to keep their real thoughts, feelings and intentions secret while finding out about those of their oppressors. Since Biblical times, Jews ha
ve been invaluable agents for every nation with espionage aspirations. Forty years ago, it was the underground activities of the Irgun and Haganah organisations which finally brought to reality the long-held dream of the Jewish homeland in Palestine. And since 1948, the secret services of tiny Israel have become the envy of the world.
Their efficiency has been honed out of necessity – no new state has ever had to fight so many wars against neighbours committed to crushing it – and a passionate patriotism unique among intelligence organisations. The exploits of Israeli agents have won admiration even from their enemies. And no one earned it more than the amazing Elie Cohen.
Cohen was the Egyptian-born son of Syrian parents. He worked as a bookkeeper in Alexandria until 1956, when fear of an anti-Jewish backlash from President Nasser after the disastrous Anglo-French Suez invasion, and fighting between Israel and Egypt, made him decide to move to Tel Aviv. His quick brain and superb memory quickly brought him to the attention of Mossad, the overseas arm of the Israeli secret services.
His training was thorough and ruthlessly professional. Israeli agents are pushed to the limits of physical endurance to test their ability to withstand torture. And Cohen’s cover also had to be perfect. For he was to be installed in Damascus, capital of Israel’s most consistently hostile neighbour, Syria. He was given a new identity, Kamel Amine Tabet, a Syrian Moslem. And to make his new character convincing, he had to learn a new life story involving birth in the Lebanese capital, Beirut, and emigration to Argentina. Cohen perfected his Syrian accent talking to businessmen in Jerusalem, then flew to Buenos Aires via Zurich.
With discreet Mossad back-up, providing an apartment and ample funds, Cohen quickly established himself in the Syrian community as an ardent, Israeli-hating patriot. He made friends with influential people inside and outside the Syrian embassy in Buenos Aires, and impressed them with generous donations to Arab charities. By early 1962, Mossad felt he was ready for the next step, and ordered him to Damascus. He flew to Italy, took a boat to Beirut, and bribed his way through a Syrian border customs post – he did not want prying officials to find his miniature radio transmitter, codes and invisible inks.
Cohen had no time to follow the classic KGB ploy of lying low and not attracting attention. Tel Aviv wanted results fast, and that meant risking exposure by establishing contacts ostentatiously. Cohen moved into a luxurious villa and began trading as an import-export dealer. He told everyone that he was a Ba’ath Party convert who had come home to help his country, and he backed his words with cash drawn on an American bank. He impressed local big-wigs by importing expensive French mink coats as gifts for their wives. At first, the only danger came from marriage brokers, intent on finding him a suitable bride. Cohen politely declined all offers. Not only did he already have a wife in Israel, but he needed his bachelor privacy in Syria to radio secrets to Tel Aviv.
And there was much to tell. His fierce patriotism earned him the chance to give talks on Radio Damascus, aimed at Syrians overseas in Spanish-speaking countries. He accepted at once. He could now learn from the inside about the Ministry of Information, which provided basic material for the broadcasts, and slip pre-arranged code words into the chats for Israeli ears only. These supplemented his clandestine radio transmissions and the secret messages he smuggled out in ‘exports’ to Mossad in Argentina.
Cohen made a point of urging stronger defences against Israel whenever he met important people from the ruling military junta. Anxious to prove that his fears were groundless, they gave him conducted tours of the defences on the Golan Heights, and revealed a network of underground tunnels along the Israeli border. Soon senior army officers made Cohen’s villa a regular meeting place, particularly after he began to provide girls for them, and tongues wagged freely in the relaxed atmosphere.
Cohen ingratiated himself so well that he became an honourary major in the army, and was given a responsible position in the Ba’ath party. This enabled him to accompany the Prime Minister on visits to other Arab capitals, including Cairo, where he sat in on talks between leaders and their military experts. Soon the successful spy had so much material that he had to get back to Israel to unburden his memory. Using a business trip to Argentina as his cover, he flew to Buenos Aires, stayed a few days, then flew to Europe, and slipped unnoticed back to Tel Aviv. Israel now knew exactly the strength of the Syrian forces facing her, and the intentions of their leaders, as well as the plans and attitudes of Syria’s allies.
A Ba’ath party coup soon after Cohen’s return to Damascus early in 1963 put the informer in an even stronger position. Several of his closest friends were now ministers, and he was able to keep the Israelis in touch with all the latest government thinking, together with news of arms purchases and army dispositions.
But such staggering success in so short a time sowed the seeds of its own destruction. Perhaps over-confident, Cohen allowed himself to be photographed in the official group when he accompanied the United Arab Republic’s commander-in-chief of an inspection of border military posts. Then the Voice of Israel radio station broadcast some secret facts Cohen had provided. It was a stupid mistake, alerting the Syrians to a spy in their midst. And when, months later, Egyptian secret police told their Syrian counterparts that an old schoolfriend had identified Kamel Amine Tabet as an Egyptian Jew from the photograph published in newspapers, the game was over.
Though aware of the spy hunt, Cohen courageously continued to file reports to Tel Aviv. One of his last transmissions told of sabotage teams being trained for infiltration. And he was using the radio on the morning counterespionage men burst into his villa and arrested him.
The repercussions of the arrest were enormous. Cohen was tried in secret, not so much for security reasons as to save embarrassment among Syria’s rulers and their furious Arab allies. Two French advocates briefed by Israel were not allowed to defend him, or appeal against the inevitable death sentence. Their protests at this ‘defiance of all moral rules’ was ignored, as was Israel’s unprecedented, top secret offer of army lorries, tractors, medical supplies, ten Syrian spies and more than a million dollars in exchange for one life. Elie Cohen was publicly hanged under floodlights in Damascus’s Martyrs Square at Midnight on 18 May, 1965. His body, mutilated by torture, was buried in the city, and all Israeli requests for its return were rejected.
The master spy’s exploits led to the collapse of the
government. Cabinet ministers who had befriended him were hounded out of office. Sixty army officers were arrested, and seventeen executed for compromising the safety of the state. But the real damage to Syria only became apparent in 1967 during the Six Day War, when Israeli troops quickly routed the forces that had taunted them so long from the ‘impregnable’ Golan Heights.
ef
The Champagne Spy
While Elie Cohen was establishing himself in Damascus, an equally ingenious and extraordinary Israeli spy was winning acceptance in the upper echelons of Egyptian high society in Cairo. For four years Wolfgang Lotz, a German-born Jew, conned police, army and espionage chiefs in Gamal Nasser’s republic by wining and dining them in a way which earned him the nickname ‘The Champagne Spy’. And after sending back a stream of priceless information which helped Israel win the Six Day War, he survived to join the victory celebrations in Tel Aviv.
During the 1950s, Israel was increasingly concerned at the growing number of ex-Nazis hired by Egypt to work on fighter aircraft and rocket missiles. It was clear Nasser intended some devastating strike against his Jewish neighbours. Painstaking detective work by Israeli secret agents all over the world and sympathetic intelligence men in America, France and Germany helped pinpoint the 400 scientists, technicians and engineers involved, and how they were hired. But Israel needed somebody inside Egypt to find out how the work was progressing. It did not take Mossad chiefs long to locate the ideal candidate.
Wolfgang Lotz was the son of a Mannheim theatre impresario and an actress, so playing roles was in his blood. After his father
died, his mother emigrated to Palestine in 1933. At 16, Lotz first tasted undercover work with the Haganah, fighting to protect Jewish villagers, and during
World War II he served in the British Army as a Commando, seeing action in the desert battles against Rommel, and picking up Egyptian dialects while stationed in the Suez area. Then he joined the new Israeli army, winning promotion to major after distinguished campaigns in the 1948 war of independence and the 1956 Sinai battles. By I960, he had proved himself ice-cool under pressure. He was fluent in English, Arabic and German. He was also blonde and German-looking. He was just what the Israeli spy masters needed.
Lotz agreed to play the part of a pro-Nasser ex-Nazi who hated Jews. After intensive training in the tricks of the espionage trade – coded messages, invisible ink etc., he was sent back to Germany to perfect his cover. He travelled from city to city, familiarising himself with the latest slang, and the names of sporting and TV stars, for use in small talk. Since he was born in Germany, his life story was based on his real name and birth certificate. It was not too difficult to pretend he had fought with Rommel during the war–he had fought the battles, but on the other side and to hide the fact that he had left Germany in 1933, an 11-year stay in Australia was invented.
Armed with letters of introduction from carefully cultivated new friends met on his return to Germany, Lotz sailed to Egypt as a tourist in January, 1961. Posing as a breeder of top class horses, he asked staff at his Nile-side hotel where he could go riding. They directed him to the Cavalry Club, an exclusive haunt of police and army chiefs. On his first visit, he complimented police general Youssef Ghorab on his horsemanship. Ghorab, delighted with the flattery, invited him to dinner the next night. There he was introduced to other influential guests as ‘Germany’s top horse breeder’. Everyone was enthusiastic when Lotz said he was considering opening a stud farm in Egypt. And within weeks he was on close terms not only with Ghorab, but with Colonel Abdul Rahman, deputy head of Egyptian military intelligence, General Fouad Osman, chief of security for Egypt’s rocket sites, and many of the Germans working on Nasser’s secret projects. He returned to Europe to report to his Mossad masters.