Great Powers
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259. Back in Washington, the Pentagon’s senior . . “Inquiry” group during World War I. On this, see especially DeYoung, Soldier, pp. 458-62, where the author writes (461- 62): “The Pentagon’s civilian leadership—with energetic support from the vice president’s office—restricted participation by Powell’s Mideast experts in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), set up by Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith in February to manage civilian administration in postwar Iraq.”
259. Under Rumsfeld, the Pentagon . . . detailed in their planning. But they weren’t. On the exercises and poor postwar planning, see Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 72-81. Douglas Feith counters that perception in his book, War and Decision, detailing the Pentagon’s plans (pp. 360-90) and dismissing the Future of Iraq project report’s utility by saying it only “produced concept papers” (pp. 375-76). The problem with that defense is that Feith’s own attempts to produce detailed planning struck most participants as PowerPoint slides and nothing else. Decrying “Rumsfeld’s amateurish approach to war planning” (Ricks’s words), retired Army commander Andrew Bacevich said, “To imagine that PowerPoint slides can substitute for such means [detailed plans] is really the height of arrogance.” Ricks says further, “It was like telling an automobile mechanic to use a manufacturer’s glossy sales brochure to figure out how to repair an engine,” see pp. 75-76.
259. As Thomas Ricks states . . . cost and difficulty of occupying the country.” Ricks, Fiasco, p. 4.
260. While Rumsfeld’s “transformed” force toppled . . . length of time (a matter of weeks). These are all Pentagon official estimates supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
260. Part of the invasion force’s success . . . “cakewalk” was both accurate and irrelevant. The infamous “cakewalk” statement was offered by Kenneth Adelman in his op-ed “Cakewalk in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 13, 2002.
260. As Thomas Ricks argues . . . transformed force “didn’t kill the enemy—it bypassed him.” Ricks, Fiasco, p. 127.
260. Because the U.S. military focused . . . “seemed to fall asleep at the wheel.” Ricks, Fiasco, p. 133.
261. As one soldier who fought in Operation Iraqi Freedom . . . to be doing some of that.” Fredric Smoler, “History and War: An Interview with Eliot Cohen,” AmericanHeritage. com, found online at www.americanheritage.com/articles/web/20070312-eliot-cohen-military-theory-iraq-vietnam-antietam-guerrilla-warfare-nation-building-winston-churchill-military-history-condoleezza-rice.shtml.
261. In the Bosnian peacekeeping . . . occupying force within four months of “victory”! See Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 96-106.
261. Such plans constituted a complete rejection . . . about 14 per 1,000 by the end of 2006. I base these calculations on data provided by James T. Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” Rand Review, Summer 2003, found online at www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html. For more history, see John J. McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press Occasional Paper 16, 2006).
261. Ironically, when U.S. forces surged . . . the form of private-sector contractors (182,000). Cited in “Privatizing the War,” Time, October 22, 2007.
262. Adding to the overall sloppiness . . . put it, “whatever could be outsourced was.” Chandrasekaran, Emerald City, p. 14.
262. Some of these wounds the U.S. military . . . allowing relatively open borders. The list comes from Table 1-1: Successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices, found on p. 51 of Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
264. In the end . . . eliminated the potential costs of coming clean. See Woodward, The War Within, p. 71.
The New Rules: From the “Monks of War,” a New COIN of the Realm
For background on this section, see my “Monks of War,” Esquire, March 2005, found online at www.esquire.com/features/ESQ0306MONKS_214. Most of what follows was based on extensive interviews with several dozen senior military and civilian leaders starting in early 2005 (when I began research for a cover story on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Old Man in a Hurry,” July 2005) and extending through the spring of 2006.
265. Prior to World War I, the U.S. Army . . . smaller companies (100 to 200 soldiers). For more details, see Bill Yenne, Indian Wars: The Campaign for the American West (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2006); and Robert Wooster, “The Frontier Army and the Occupation of the West, 1865-1900,” in Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, August 5-7, 2003), pp. 65-76.
266. As General Mattis likes to say, “Success is a poor teacher.” Quoted in Barnett, “Monks of War.”
268. The timing of the piece . . Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
268. So the sum total of these changes . . . counterinsurgency done right. John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
268. To no one’s surprise, Nagl ended up . . . weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot”). Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pp. 47-51.
269. Now the long war was reformatting . . . in the early twentieth century. The best recent source on this period is Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002). The historical learning curve culminates in the publication of the United States Marine Corps’s Small Wars Manual (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 2004).
269. As such, the new counterinsurgency . . . or at least understand what it’s up against.” Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. xxi.
The New Normal: The Long (Post)war
271. As historian Max Boot argued . . . of broken states in the manner of a social worker. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 336-41.
271. Having said that, history tells us that most insurgencies fail . . . sufficient autonomy. See Donald Stoker, “Insurgencies Rarely Win—and Iraq Won’t Be Any Different (Maybe),” Foreign Policy, January 2007, found online at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3689.
271. As Sewall argues in her introduction . . . can yield success more rapidly and efficiently.” Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. xxviii.
272. In this way, as Sewall notes . . . to the Geneva Conventions in this long (post)war. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pp. xxxiii-xxxv.
272. The dangers of “doctrinal miscegenation,” as Sewall puts it, are real. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pp. xxii-xxiv.
273. Sarah Sewall declares that COIN . . “favors peace over justice.” Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. xxxix.
274. On the first point, consider this excerpt . . . clerks more in demand than riflemen.” David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 2005), p. 94.
274. As Galula avers wryly, “There is room . . . in conventional fights whenever possible). Galula, Counterinsurgency, p. 96.
275. As for the logic of designating some . . . strike the American public as “compelling.” Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pp. xxxi and xl.
275. The Navy elevates humanitarian . . . unable to fill its own quota of personnel in Iraq. On the Navy, see Lieutenant Commander David K. Richardson, USN, Major Lane V. Packwood, ID National Guard, and Daniel E. Aldana, “A Great White Fleet for the 21st Century,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008. On the Army, see Michael R. Gordon, “After Hard-Won Lessons, Army Doctrine Revised,” New York Times, February 8, 2008. On the Marines, see Harold C. Hutchinson, “Landing Ships Outmaneuver Terrorists,” Strategy Page, June 22, 2007, found online at www.strategypage.com/htmw/htamph/articles/20070622.aspx. On the Air Force, see Greg Jaffe, “To Fight Terrorists, Air Force Seeks a Bomb with Less Bang: It Cuts Collateral Damage by Using a Meta
l Powder Instead of Flying Shrapnel; Destroying the Blast Gauges,” Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2006. On the CRC, see Robin Wright, “Civilian Response Corps Gains Ground,” Washington Post, February 15, 2008.
275. Meanwhile the burden of duty gets heavier . . . describes difficult postwar operations. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. xxxi; the original colorful phrase comes from John J. Yeosock, “What We Should Have Done Different,” Part II of In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm (Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000), p. 25.
275. Twenty-something Army and Marine captains . . . and feature seven-day workweeks. See Michael Kamber, “Sovereigns of All They’re Assigned, Captains Have Many Missions to Oversee: Pressures Beset ‘Fixers’ of Iraq,” New York Times, March 21, 2008; and Elizabeth Rubin, “Battle Company Is Out There,” New York Times Magazine, February 24, 2008.
The Global Accelerant: The Privatization of American Foreign Policy
277. The Indian agency system . . . portions of its operations to religious charities. On this, see the article “Indian Agency System,” at the Access Genealogy website, found online at www.accessgenealogy.com/native/tribes/history/agency_system.htm; and Yenne, Indian Wars, pp. 223-307.
277. For the U.S. Army, the Indian Wars . . . Geronimo in the American Southwest. On this subject in general, I found the best overall history to be Yenne, Indian Wars.
278. As Max Boot observes . . . similar experience back home in the Indian Wars. Boot, Savage Wars, p. 127.
278. Kellogg Brown & Root—whose previous incarnation . . . of the mid-1990s. See Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), pp. 100-3.
278. Having achieved its initial fame by guarding . . . as one Blackwater executive puts it). See Pelton, Licensed to Kill, pp. 2-4, 36-41, and 284-87.
279. You’ll also see the U.S. military letting its first LOGCAP . . . facilities overseas to KBR. See Pelton, Licensed to Kill, pp. 100-6 and 119-21.
279. By the time we reached the year 2000 . . . representing another 4 to 5 percent. For data, see Allison Stanger and Omnivore (graphic design firm), “Foreign Policy, Privatized,” New York Times, October 5, 2008. See also Allison Stanger, Empire of the Willing: Why Outsourcing Is the Future of American Foreign Policy—and Why We Have to Get It Right (New York: Basic Books, 2009).
279. Moreover, as Galula noted, insurgencies tend . . . fluid in their ability to change tactics. Galula, Counterinsurgency, pp. 11-13.
280. While it’s true that during the Cold War . . . catch up in economic development. See the 2008 estimate provided by Morgan Stanley, as reported in “Building BRICs of Growth: Record Spending on Infrastructure Will Help to Sustain Rapid Growth in Emerging Economies,” The Economist, June 7, 2008. The estimate projects the following totals: $9.3T China, $2.8T India, $2.2T Russia, $1.1T Brazil, $2.4T other Asia, $0.9T Middle East, and $3.1T other.
The Inescapable Realignment: Reblending Diplomacy, Defense, and Development
281. President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy . . . preemptive war. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (September 2007), found online at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.
281. Taking that high-level cue . . . either the Afghanistan or the Iraq occupation. For an example, see Walid Maalouf, “Presentation, Before the US-Japan Cultural Program, USAID Visitor Center, August 26, 2004, found online at www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/presidential_initiative/diplomacy/sp082604.html.
281. Based on my interviews locally for a 2007 Esquire story . . . across the Horn of Africa. This story was published as “The Americans Have Landed,” Esquire, July 2007. It can be found online at www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707.
281. General James Mattis had been arguing . . . popular support for an insurgency. See the Mattis PowerPoint slide in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. 149.
281. The COIN field manual, in arguing for an 80/20 blend . . . 80 percent political. The COIN posits five essential “lines of operation”: combat operations/civil security operations, host-nation security force development, providing essential services to the population, governance, and economic development. Thus only one of the five lines of operation is logically described as kinetic (combat operations/civil security operations). See the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. 156. See also the section on Mao (pp. 11-13).
281. As such, throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations . . . each other seamlessly. Again, the most important work in this regard is found in the Center for Strategic Studies and International Security/Brookings Institution joint task force, which produced the Transforming Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century report. Prominent security experts who’ve also proposed something similar (despite the titles imposed on their articles) include Robert Kaplan (“Send in the State Department,” New York Times, February 21, 2006), and Max Boot (“Diplomacy for the Real World: Without Changes, the State Department Isn’t Ready to Meet Today’s Challenges,” Los Angeles Times, February 22, 2006).
281. While most nongovernmental voices . . . style of operations found acceptable. Again, this is basically the route taken by the HELP Commission in their Beyond Assistance report.
282. By most historians’ judgment . . . counterinsurgency and in state-building. See Boot, Savage Wars, pp. 99-128; and Robert D. Ramsey III, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press Occasional Paper 24, 2007); and Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press Occasional Paper 15, 2006).
282. But here’s where the “rise of the rest,” as Zakaria calls it . . . to our advantage. Zakaria, Post-American World, pp. 1-5.
283. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual . . . in any coordinated COIN campaign. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. 63; the fourteen are State, USAID, CIA, Justice, DEA, Treasury, Homeland Security, Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, Coast Guard, FBI, and Customs.
283. Legendary baseball manager Casey Stengel . . . from the guys who are undecided.” Listed at “Casey Stengel, The Official Site,” found online at www.caseystengel.com/quotes_by.htm.
283. This is what Secretary . . . conventional wars to come—great-power wars. Robert M. Gates, “Remarks to the Heritage Foundation,” Colorado Springs, CO (May 13, 2008) available online at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240.
283. Colonel John Nagl . . . mentoring and building up militaries in failed states. See John Nagl, “A Battalion’s Worth of Good Ideas,” New York Times, April 2, 2008.
284. Interestingly enough, the “direct action” . . . of this growing responsibility. See Sean D. Naylor, “Support Grows for Standing Up an Unconventional Warfare Command,” Armed Forces Journal, November 2007.
284. Our troops in the field . . . defense budget that is higher than it has ever been! For an example of how bad this was in Iraq, see John Files, “Reimbursement Program for Troops Stalls: Rules for Repaying Soldiers for Equipment Remain Unfinished After a Year,” New York Times, October 3, 2005; and Major Paul Cucuzzella, USA, “Soldiers May be Reimbursed for Protective Gear: There Is No Need Anymore for Soldiers to Purchase Protective Equipment on Their Own,” ArmyStudyGuide.com, January 13, 2006, found online at www.armystudyguide.com/content/news/Top_Military_News/soldiers-may-be-reimburse.shtml.
284. Run through the list of insurgent tactics in the COIN . . . sabotage, and seizure. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pp. 115-17.
285. The harsh truth, as Barrett Tillman argues . . . aerial vehicles for real-time surveillance. Barrett Tillman, What We Need: Extravagance and Shortages in America’s Military (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007), pp. 17-218.
The Better Normal: The Command-After-Next
This section owes much to reporting I did in eastern Africa in the spring of 2007 for the Esquire article “The Americans Have Landed” (July
2007), found online at www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707.
286. The recent rise of the Salafist Group for Preaching . . . confirm that judgment. For an example of its spread, see Michael Slackman, “In Algeria, a Tug of War for Young Minds,” New York Times, June 23, 2008.
286. The task force did register one immediate big hit . . . right out of the movie Syriana. See Philip Smucker, “The Intrigue Behind the Drone Strike: Yemeni Official Says US Lacks Discretion as Antiterror Partner,” Christian Science Monitor, November 12, 2002.
287. It will “reduce the future battlespace” that America . . . intention nor desire to own. “Reduce the battlespace” is the motto of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
289. This is an unprecedented development . . . operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. For an example of the blowback, see Gordon Lubold, “Pentagon Scales Back AFRICOM Ambitions,” Christian Science Monitor, May 16, 2008.
289. To that end, SOUTHCOM already moves . . . commander structure of AFRICOM. An internal Southern Command briefing of early 2008 proposed a “new model” similar to that of Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key West, but also replicated the AFRICOM split deputy commander model, with the civilian to be a Department of State official.
289. That sort of vertical knowledge . . . is Colonel John Boyd’s famous “OODA loop”). See Coram, Boyd, pp. 327-44.
289. But according to the new Army-Marine COIN . . . built up—not a loop to be rushed. Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. 144.
290. Across the entirety of the Cold War . . . it has accumulated almost four dozen more. Find the list of sixty-three operations (as of June 2008) online at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf.
292. Eventually, Congress would grow so frustrated . . . conversation with this entity. As of September 2008, Congress was already expressing its frustration with AFRICOM’S proposed blend of diplomatic, defense, and developmental aid assets, threatening to cut the command’s budget deeply if the Secretary of Defense could not offer a better rationale for the command’s structure, indicating a desire on the part of Congress to demilitarize the entity somewhat—not a bad instinct; see “Questions About Military’s Role in Africa Spur Steep Africom Cuts,” Inside the Navy, September 15, 2008.