Harry Truman
Page 60
General MacArthur was fond of saying he had a policy, and President Truman had no policy. But when he testified before Senator Russell’s committee, it became quite clear the shoe was on the other foot. One senator asked him, “Assume we embrace your program, and suppose the Chinese were chased back across the Yalu River, and suppose they then refused to sign a treaty, and to enter into an agreement on what their future course will be, what course would you recommend at that stage?” General MacArthur had nothing to recommend. “I don’t think they could remain in a state of belligerency,” he replied grandly. He had no solution to the problem of maintaining an army across 420 miles of northern Korea, compared to the 110 miles of front we were required to defend along the 38th parallel. He admitted it would be madness to invade Manchuria and begin an all-out war with China’s 400 million people. Where did this leave the General’s much-quoted phrase, “There is no substitute for victory”?
It was Harry S. Truman who had a policy. General MacArthur had nothing more than a collection of disorganized ideas.
Perhaps the man who best summed up the real source of the clash between Dad and General MacArthur was Secretary of Defense George Marshall. It arose, he told the senators:
. . . from the inherent difference between the position of a commander whose mission is limited to a particular area and a particular antagonist, and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States. . . . There is nothing new in this divergence in our military history. What is new and what brought about the necessity for General MacArthur’s removal is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at, and his disagreement with, the foreign policy of the United States.
In his memoirs, General Ridgway concluded: “It was a boon to the country that the issue did arise and that it was decisively met by the elected head of the government, within the ample dimensions of his own high moral courage and without any pressure from political or military quarters. President Truman’s decision should act as a powerful safeguard against the time, in some great future crisis, when perhaps others may be similarily tempted to challenge the right of the President and his advisers to exercise the powers the Constitution grants to them in the formulation of foreign policy.”
The controversy over General MacArthur gave the worst elements in the Republican Party their chance to confuse the democratic process. Joe McCarthy spewed lies and innuendoes on dozens of reputations. He reached a kind of climax on June 14, 1951, when he delivered a 60,000-word speech in the Senate that attacked General George Marshall as a Communist conspirator. For Dad, this was the most loathsome of the senator’s many slanders. That a man who had devoted his entire life to the service of his country could be smeared as a traitor in the Senate of the United States was almost unbelievable to Dad. In his press conference a few days later, he treated the accusation with a contemptuous “No comment.” When it was echoed by other congressmen and some local politicians, Dad called it “one of the silliest things I ever heard. I don’t think that it helps the welfare of this nation to have people who are supposed to be responsible for its welfare making silly statements like that.”
Although bipartisan foreign policy was dead on the Republican side of the aisle in Congress, it was not dead in the White House. One of my father’s first thoughts, when the crisis over General MacArthur’s removal confronted him, was the Japanese peace treaty. Even today, with all the grief and turmoil we have endured because of our involvement with Asia, it is evident that Japan, not China, was the real prize in the Far East. Its immense industrial capacity returned it to the status of a world power - on our side - while China lumbered along in the ranks of the semi-developed nations. On the night that General MacArthur was fired, Secretary of State Acheson, on Dad’s orders, called John Foster Dulles at 11:00 p.m. and asked him to come to Acheson’s Georgetown home immediately. Dulles was told MacArthur was being fired, and the President wanted him to leave immediately for Japan to reassure Japanese leaders that the relief of MacArthur meant no fundamental change in American policy toward Japan.
Some Republican senators advised Dulles to quit and leave Dad in a hole. But Dulles had already invested several months in helping to negotiate the Japanese peace treaty and was intelligent enough to see its vital importance to the future security of the free world. To make sure he did not lose his Republican franchise, he wrote Dad a rather tart memorandum, declaring he would not be “a fall guy” for the Democrats, and demanding an assurance from the administration that there really was no major change in our Far Eastern policy. Once my father gave him this assurance, he was on his way to Japan. After the treaty was signed, Dulles was a key witness at the Senate hearings, even persuading such Republican irreconcilables as China-Firster William Knowland to vote for it.
Only nine days after Senator McCarthy flung his slander at General Marshall, the first fruits of Dad’s Korean policy became visible. Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative to the UN, announced that peace could be negotiated in Korea. Three days later, the Chinese government said the same thing. After cautiously considering various alternatives and sounding the seriousness of the Soviet offer through our Embassy in Moscow, my father ordered General Ridgway to broadcast to the Chinese high command a statement that the United Nations would be willing to send representatives to discuss an armistice. The Communists accepted, and truce teams from both sides began negotiating.
My father knew this was only a first step. He had been negotiating with the Communists for almost six years now, and he was well aware that attrition was one of their favorite tactics. They were prepared to lie and bluster and talk endlessly about nothing, hoping in the end that the other side would grow weary and make concessions. It was terribly difficult to communicate this to the American people, who were inclined to think a negotiation was a prelude to an early peace. When the truce talks droned on, and the fighting continued, the war became more and more divisive.
McCarthyism spread like a virus through the nation. The Sons of the American Revolution, at their annual convention, passed a resolution condemning the UN as a “thoroughly un-American and sinister organization” and called upon the United States to withdraw from it. One past president said: “Joe Stalin could ask for nothing better than the United Nations for taking over our country.” Bill Hassett laid a clipping from the Kansas City Star, telling the story, on Dad’s desk, on July 14, 1951. He replied: “The Star clipping which you handed me regarding the Sons of the American Revolution is really an eye-opener. These so-called investigators of un-American activities usually succeed in being more un-American than the people they want investigated.”
My father asked Bill Hassett to prepare a letter to the SAR, and he did it with alacrity. The draft read as follows:
Sometime back, without my approval or permission, I was voted a member of the Sons of the American Revolution.
I note that your organization desires the withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations. It seems to me that patriots usually are unpatriotic themselves when they make resolutions such as this.
I’ll appreciate it most highly if you will strike my name from the rolls because I do not propose to be affiliated with an organization that is doing everything possible to bring on a third world war.
Dad decided this missive would only add to the general uproar and never sent it.
Henry Wallace was one of those thoughtful Americans who was outraged by the McCarthyist attacks on Dad’s foreign policy. On September 19, 1951, Wallace wrote Dad a very strong letter, offering to speak out on what really happened at Yalta, and set the record straight. Dad replied in the following letter:
Dear Henry:
I can’t tell you how very much I appreciated your good letter of the nineteenth. . . .
Your recollection of the situation in China and the supporting documents prove out the facts as set out in the China White Paper.
It is a pity that the Republicans have nothing better to do than try to unearth what they consider to be mistakes of the past. I think the situation was handled as well as it could possibly be under the circumstances and with the facts available.
Thanks a lot for your thoughtfulness in writing me as you did.
My father tried to be philosophical about the abuse he was taking. Earlier in the year, he wrote an interesting letter to Max Lowenthal, his old aide on the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee. Max had drawn an interesting parallel between the eighteenth-century British Parliament’s reluctance to support Dutch troops fighting in Belgium against the French with the Senate’s inability to understand our security was now a global problem. Dad replied:
Dear Max:
I certainly did appreciate yours of the fifteenth and I am familiar with that historical incident to which you refer from Macaulay, in his History of England. Every effort was made to hamper the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene in their attempt to hold Louis XIV out of the low countries - not only by Louis himself but by Britishers in the Parliament. The pattern is the same today in the Far East.
I received a cartoon the other day from the London Punch which showed a Senator making a speech - “What! Let Hannibal use the elephant on his own initiative?” It is this attitude that kept Hannibal from winning the second Punic War. There are innumerable instances parallel to the one taking place in the Senate.
Jefferson’s decision to wipe out Barbary Pirates caused almost as much denunciation as my decision to implement the Atlantic Treaty - so conditions do not change but when all is said and done and history is written people never remember the men who tried to obstruct what was necessary to be done. I don’t think anybody ever remembers the names of men who attacked Washington on account of the Jay Treaty, nor do they remember the attackers who vilified Jefferson for making the Louisiana Purchase. They almost brought impeachment against him. The same thing is true of Jackson and his efforts to maintain the Union.
There never was a man as completely vilified as Lincoln when he took the reins in his own hands and called for 75,000 volunteers to meet the secession of the Southern States. The same thing is true of Grover Cleveland in his ultimatum to England over the Venezuela boundary.
You will remember, and I know you can remember all the editorial writers jumping on Wilson for his sending Funston into Vera Cruz and Pershing into northern Mexico. I don’t think anybody remembers the attackers any more than they will remember those of the present day.
It is the business of the President to meet situations as they arise and to meet them in the public interest. There are at least 176 instances parallel to what we face today.
I certainly did appreciate your good letter.
Along with his global worries and the war in Korea, my father also fretted about a traveling daughter during the spring and early summer of 1951. I went abroad for six weeks visiting England, France, Holland, Luxembourg, and Italy. I had an absolutely marvelous time, lunching with British and Dutch royalty, spending twenty minutes in private with Pope Pius XII, and, in between, trudging like a typical tourist through cathedrals and palaces. Even the St. Louis newspapers said I did a useful job as a “good will salesman.” That really amazed and delighted Dad. Seldom did St. Louis papers say anything good about a Truman.
The high point of my visit was lunch with Winston Churchill at Chartwell, his lovely country home. Churchill wore an outfit which only he could have carried off with aplomb - one of his wartime siren suits and an American cowboy’s ten-gallon hat. He took me on a tour of his gardens and fish ponds, discussing fish, shrubs, and other living things with so much affection and knowledge you almost thought they were people. At the fish pond, he sat down on a stool, took some bread crumbs out of his pocket, and said something that sounded like “Hike. Hike. Hike.” The fish immediately swam to him and took the crumbs he had thrown in the pond.
At the end of our lunch, Churchill announced he had a painting which he wanted me to take back to Mother and Dad, as a present. “I’ll be glad to,” I said, “if you put my name on it so that eventually it will be mine.”
The great man was caught off guard. He harrumphed and wondered if I ought to talk to my father before he did a thing like that. “Just put my name on it,” I said. “I can handle him.”
Churchill’s two daughters, Sarah, who was my friend, and Mary and her husband, Christopher Soames, were part of the luncheon party. They watched open-mouthed while he capitulated and put my name on the painting, which was a lovely view of his favorite North African landscape, around Marrakech.
Only later did Sarah tell me I was the first person who had accomplished the feat of extracting one of his paintings from him. Not even the members of the family had been able to manage it.
In Holland, I had to practice a little polite diplomacy. Queen Juliana remarked that they were looking forward to a visit to the United States, which seemed, in her mind, to be imminent. I had to think fast and assure her we would be delighted to see her in the new White House - which was not yet finished.
On June 19, Dad wrote me the following letter, expressing his pleasure with this response, as well as other aspects of my trip:
Your postscript from The Hague came yesterday in the pouch but the letter to which it is a postscript has not arrived! I guess the letter will come today. You handled the conversation with the Queen of Holland about the proposed visit of herself and the Prince Consort perfectly. I’m hoping they’ll wait until we are settled in the rehabilitated White House before they come.
I sent you a copy of this week’s Life by Mr. Harriman. Mr. Luce seems to have given you a fair shake - but wait it won’t last. Your press over here has been excellent. You are making a great ambassador of good will. . . .
The President of Ecuador comes to town tomorrow for the usual round, tea at 4:00 p.m., dinner at 8 at the Carlton and his dinner at the Statler on Friday. Then he’ll tell me what he wants, go to N.Y. and then back home. I hope we can get him home safely. I’m always worried when these heads of States come to town until they are safely at home again.
Congress is acting up terribly. No appropriations to date. Democrats acting perfect demagogues. Republicans acting as usual. They are about to sabotage my whole five year peace plan but I guess we’ll survive it.
Toward the end of 1951, the picture in Korea began to brighten dramatically. The Communists had finally realized we were not going to be pushovers at the conference table. General Ridgway and his field commander, General James A. Van Fleet, had carved out a solid line across the peninsula, including a sizable hunk of North Korea which made the 38th parallel militarily defensible for the first time. We gave away a small hunk of South Korea, at the other end of the line. We made it clear to the Communists we were not interested in withdrawing to the literal 38th parallel, thereby surrendering all the crucial high ground from which South Korea could repel an invader. After much screaming, the Communists yielded to our insistence on this point. A supervisory truce team composed of neutral nations was finally worked out. Only one point remained to be decided, the exchange of prisoners.
We had 132,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners. Under strict instructions from Dad, our negotiators proposed that all prisoners of war who wished to be returned should be exchanged. He was keenly aware that 2 million people had fled from North Korea into South Korea when the Communists took power there. Grimly, my father declared: “We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.” For the Communists, propaganda victories were as important as military victories. When they found out that 60,000 of the 132,000 did not want to return to Communist territory, they became enraged and refused to sign the truce agreement. If Dad had given way on this point, he could have ended the Korean War well before the 1952 elections. But Harry Truman never surrendered a principle to gain a political advantage. Although it grieved him that the fighting continued, and American soldiers were still dying on Korea’s barren hills, he wo
uld not waver from his stand, all through the year 1952.
For Dad, the numerous ceremonies for Medal of Honor winners, or their survivors were the most trying part of the Korean War. He frequently told the men who won them, “I would rather wear this medal than be President of the United States.”
He scolded himself for this weakness early in 1951. Typically, it was on a day when he should have been enormously proud of himself: “Received the Woodrow Wilson Award today. A wonderful medal with a great citation on the back. Mrs. McAdoo, Sayre, and other highest of the high hats present. It was quite a ceremony. Did not deserve it but that is the case in most awards. But not in those Congressional Medals of Honor I awarded yesterday to the survivors of five Korean heroes. Hope I will not have to do that again. I am a damned sentimentalist and I could hardly hold my voice steady when I gave a medal to a widow or a father for heroism in action. It was similar to giving citations to the men who were shot protecting me at the Blair House - and I choked up just as I did then. What an old fool I am!”
ONLY A FEW days after my father began his second term, General Vaughan asked him: “Are you going to run for reelection in 1952?”