Battle Ready (2004)

by Tom - Nf - Commanders Clancy

  Over the course of Operation Provide Comfort, eight tasks had evolved for the CTF (and the operative word here is evolved):

  1. Provide immediate relief and stabilize the population in place.

  2. Build a distribution system/infrastructure for continuous logistics support.

  3. Establish a Security Zone in northern Iraq.

  4. Construct temporary facilities, i.e., transit centers, way stations, support centers, etc.

  5. Transfer the refugee population to the temporary sites.

  6. Transition the humanitarian operation to the international relief organizations.

  7. Provide continuous security for all aspects of the operation.

  8. Enable the ultimate return of the refugees to their homes.

  The mission was continually changing. We didn't just get instructions up front, look at the expected end state, and go and do it. We were probing our way through every stage--often thinking when we reached one stage that we were at the end state. But then we'd see other paths opening that we'd have to follow. Once we'd stabilized the refugees in the hills, we realized we had to move them out of the hills; then we realized we had to put them in a sustainable area; then we realized we had to bring them home; then we realized we had to protect them from the Iraqis. Tasks emerged from other tasks. We were developing them as we went. And we had no idea what the end state would be until we got there.

  By mid-June, the Kurds were back in their homes, and we were able to withdraw our ground forces back to Turkey. There we established a temporary base for a ground reaction force just inside the border at a town called Silopi. Though humanitarian airlift missions were no longer required, continuous combat air patrols were maintained over the Kurdish areas, and the MCC remained in the Security Zone. The ground troops left Silopi in July.

  On July 24, Provide Comfort I ended and Provide Comfort II began. General Shalikashvilli returned to USAREUR, Jim Jamerson resumed command, and I went back to being the deputy. With the ground troops gone, Provide Comfort became an air operation again. Only the MCC and a CSAR capability remained on the ground.

  Now that the air operations had transformed into combat patrols, and the Rules of Engagement gave only Jim Jamerson and me authority to order certain responses to Iraqi threats, Jim felt that I needed greater familiarity with air operations. I was not only thoroughly briefed, but I was taken on a flight in a two-seater F-16 to get a hands-on feel for what the pilots faced. And since we had an aircraft carrier in support, I also flew in a Navy A-6--including a series of catapult shots and traps aboard the carrier. This valuable experience served me well in future joint tours of duty.

  Later, when Jamerson left and Brigadier General Glenn Profitt took command, I was asked by General Galvin to stay on to provide continuity.

  I finally returned to EUCOM in November.

  Provide Comfort evolved into Operation Northern Watch, and continued on for well over a decade until Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

  OPERATION PROVIDE HOPE

  By the end of 1991, it was becoming increasingly evident to Secretary of State Baker that the New World Order was not happening. The twelve republics that had split off from the former Soviet Union--many of them nuclear-armed--were not going to blossom painlessly into democracies and free-market economies. That much-desired outcome faced serious obstacles. Baker concluded that achieving world stability required helping the FSU recover by means of a new international Marshall Plan.

  This was a gigantic undertaking, with many uncertainties: Could the U.S. muster the international community, use NATO, bring in the Japanese and other developed nations, and get the necessary resources? And then, how would this undertaking be received in the FSU itself?

  Baker's vision was to jump-start this post-Cold War Marshall Plan by means of a humanitarian airlift of food, medicine, and other supplies to the republics of the FSU. The operation, called "Provide Hope," was conducted by the U.S. military during January and February of 1992. Once that was under way, Baker hoped other countries would join the effort. He foresaw down the road not just a humanitarian gesture but a follow-up international effort to reconstruct the economies and political systems of the FSU, to encourage investment, to provide the technical expertise needed to bring them up to international standards, and to show them how to operate in the international community.

  The project was headed up by Ambassador Rich Armitage; Congress approved $100 million for the initial effort.

  Though the natural inclination of the military is to avoid getting tangled up in such projects, Generals Galvin and McCarthy jumped on the effort right away. It obviously fitted in with Galvin's long-standing inclinations. He saw the importance of supporting Provide Hope, yet it was far from clear how EUCOM would help.

  Early in January, the decision was made to keep the Provide Comfort Crisis Action Team going, with a focus on Provide Hope; and a meeting was held at EUCOM headquarters to decide what else to do. Someone obviously had to link up with Ambassador Armitage and find that out.

  Tony Zinni got the call.

  General McCarthy turned to Zinni: "We're not sure what this is all about, but it looks like a very good thing, and EUCOM needs to be a big part of it. Rich Armitage is in Bonn [on a trip to solicit European assistance]. Get up there and tell him you're there to support him. Figure out what he needs and go make that happen."

  To Zinni, these are the assignments he loves best--missions that nobody knows how to define or execute; and you go out with what are called mission-type orders: "Go get it done."

  When Zinni arrived in Bonn, Armitage was holding a meeting with German and U.S. officials at the U.S. Embassy. During a break, he was ushered into the conference room to meet Armitage.

  Armitage, a Naval Academy graduate and later a Navy SEAL, had had a long history in Vietnam both in combat and working for the State Department. In a long career in government, he had been an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense, and then an ambassador-at-large--a troubleshooter. In that capacity, he had brought acceptable settlements to a number of knotty negotiations, such as the Philippine bases contract. All the recent Republican administrations have used him as their frontline troubleshooter . . . the man who can handle the really tough jobs, get done what has to get done, no matter what it takes. He has had vast experience both at the Pentagon and in the State Department. (He became Deputy Secretary of State under Colin Powell.)

  Armitage is a big, powerfully built man, blunt, forceful, to the point, and easily intimidating to those susceptible to intimidation. He does not tolerate fools or people who waste his time, and he doesn't tolerate a lot of idle brainstorming. He knows where he wants to go; he wants to see what people can do, not what they can say. At the same time, he's a very smooth and savvy operator on the playing fields of Washington, with fine-tuned political instincts. He makes few wrong moves.

  Zinni took an instant liking to him. All his instincts told him he and this hard-driving diplomat would work well together.

  But Armitage was not thrilled when he was introduced to the Marine brigadier general from EUCOM. He was polite enough, but his expression said, "Who the hell are you? And what do you want?"

  "I'm on orders from EUCOM to report to you," Zinni said, "and get you any military support you need. I'm here to help you."

  "I'm not sure I need your help," Armitage answered suspiciously, with an expression that was even less encouraging. His long familiarity with the military--always wary of nonmilitary missions like his--had made him skeptical of generals bearing gifts. It was more than likely that Zinni had been sent to keep an eye on him, and to make sure he didn't tap into military assets.

  Armitage knew he did not need EUCOM, and he made that instantly clear (though without saying so directly). His mission was from the Secretary of State; that is, from a level several notches above EUCOM. And Colin Powell was one of his best friends (and remains so). As far as he was concerned, Zinni--and EUCOM--were probably obstructions rather than solutions.
"Who needs EUCOM? I can blow EUCOM away and get whatever I need."

  Zinni quietly pressed his case: "General Galvin is totally sincere. He did not send me to sabotage Provide Hope, but to offer you everything we have on a silver platter. We want to help you get this thing off the ground.

  "Believe me," he assured Armitage, "I have both General Galvin's and General McCarthy's ear: You will get what you want."

  After a time, Armitage softened into a "Well, we'll see" attitude. That was enough for Zinni.

  Back at EUCOM, General McCarthy set up a joint task force (under a special outfit in the Crisis Action Team) to carry out the airlift mission. The JTF was commanded by Brigadier General Jim Hobson, USAF, who had also worked with Zinni on Operation Provide Comfort, and it was composed of U.S. Air Force airlift units--a logistics component to move, stage, handle, and pack the supplies; a psychological operations unit to translate the instructions on how to properly use the relief supplies provided and convey our messages of cooperation; an information bureau to handle the public relations aspects; and the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which was tasked to provide advance contact and coordination at the delivery locations.

  Though OSIA's mission was normally arms control verification, their capabilities (language, small-team deployability to remote sites, etc.) made them ideal for this task. Many airlift delivery locations were in places U.S. aircraft had never flown into--remote airfields where there was little or no information about fuel availability, field conditions, and navigational aids. The OSIA teams made their way to these locations a week in advance, made the contacts on the ground for handling the supplies, and passed on all the necessary information by means of satellite communications.

  The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) supported the operation; EUCOM established a Special Projects Team in their command center to run it; and a Disaster Assistance Response Team from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance joined the effort.

  The relief supplies themselves came from Cold War stocks, prepositioned in Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany--food, medicine, blankets, and medical supplies--much of it in storage since the 1950s. EUCOM units gathered these up and moved them in a massive series of airlifts to places they had never seen before--Dushambe, Almaty, Tashkent, Kiev, Bishket, Baku, and other remote spots in the FSU.

  Meanwhile, Armitage's team watched over the JTF, visited countries and organizations in NATO and the European Union (to gain participation and support for the follow-on efforts), and traveled to the various republics of the FSU (to establish contact with local officials, coordinate future activities, and make assessments of needs). Secretary of State Baker chaired a multination donors' conference in Washington to solicit support and resources for the long-term effort.

  Secretary Baker kicked off the operation in a ceremony at Rhine-Main on January 23, 1992.

  EUCOM had put together a system that would deliver everything Armitage might want. Thus when he came to Zinni and asked, "Can we get a plane to deliver medicine to Kiev?" Or: "Can we move some supplies to Almaty?" Zinni got him the airplanes and set up the deliveries.

  Zinni made things happen--contributing to, demonstrating his loyalty to, and becoming part of Armitage's team; and that impressed Armitage. Loyalty and team playing are important to Armitage--probably a legacy from his military background.

  Meanwhile, the two men were connecting on a more personal level. They liked each other's company, and they shared deep, bonding experiences--combat in Vietnam, weight lifting. It didn't take long for Zinni to become one of Armitage's right-hand men.

  After a time, somebody asked Zinni, "Okay, so what are you now? What do they call you?"

  Zinni gave the question a second's thought, and then made up his title: "I'm the Military Coordinator for Armitage," he said. The title stuck.

  Zinni was provided an office with Armitage's team at the State Department in Washington, and he had another office at the Rhine-Main Air Base53 in Germany, where they were running the JTF. But he spent most of his time crisscrossing Europe with Armitage. They flew to Moscow and St. Petersburg, to Ankara, to Brussels. They dealt with NATO and the EU. They coordinated support, participation, receipt, and distribution of the aid and the future larger-scale reconstruction effort. They worked with U.S. government assessment teams on the ground in the FSU and with local officials. They were all over the place.

  The airlift operation ran until the end of February and delivered 2,100 tons of food and medical supplies to twenty-two locations.

  Zinni spent three months on Provide Hope after the end of the airlift. During that time, Armitage worked tirelessly to transform into reality the vision he and the Secretary of State had put together.

  As time passed and the military requirements ended, Zinni's work for Armitage took him increasingly into the economic54 and political realm. Though Armitage wanted to keep Zinni around, it had grown obvious that the military aspects of Provide Hope had faded away.

  "There's no point in your hanging around here anymore," Armitage told Zinni finally. "Why don't you go back to EUCOM? As things move on, we might get you back in, but there's no sense in your hanging out here."

  The need for Zinni to come back never materialized. By the end of spring, the mission was folding. The silence from the international community had been deafening. Other countries did not have the will or share the vision; they were simply not interested in participating in a new Marshall Plan.

  What kept them away?

  The world of the early '90s was not the world of the late '40s. This wasn't a devastated Europe threatening to collapse into communism. It was a Europe of individual nations who were not only beginning to feel their own oats but had serious problems of their own to solve. The Germans, for instance, had to pay for German reunification.

  No one was interested in working under a U.S.-led program . . . or in laying down the necessary resources.

  It was nevertheless a badly missed opportunity; and much of the turmoil and instability that came afterward in Russia, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere could have been avoided if the nations of the free world and their organizations (like the UN and the EU) had been more farsighted.

  ZINNI'S INVOLVEMENT in "Operations Other Than War"--like Provide Comfort, Provide Hope, Provide Promise, and others while at EUCOM--provided a wealth of experience that he later drew on constantly. These were fascinating, exciting missions . . . like military operations, even combat operations. On these missions, he got to do what he loved best--get out into action in the field, but with the added thrill that he was saving people's lives.

  Later he participated in several other Operations Other Than War--such as the one in Somalia--that have been seen as the most advanced models for military-civil operations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions. No one has had more experience in these kinds of operations than Zinni.

  Chapter FIVE

  SOMALIA

  AFTER EUCOM , Tony Zinni returned to Quantico as the deputy commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).55

  The MCCDC watches over the Marine Corps requirements and structure in doctrine, organization, material, training, education, and leadership development; and it manages the Corps' career schools for its officers and enlisted (all of which together make up the Marine Corps University).

  It was an obvious assignment for Zinni, yet he was not overjoyed to have it. As he saw it, his recent experience could have been better used in an operational assignment. ("Every officer worth his salt always feels he is the best qualified operator in the Corps," he comments.)

  On the other hand, returning to Quantico brought him back into the doctrine, training, and education base with which he was familiar. There he'd be at the red-hot center of all the exciting, revolutionary changes that General Gray was creating, and there he himself would be provided with a forum for his own ideas for change. He knew he had a lot to contribute to Quantico. His tour at EUCOM had convinced him that U.S. military services would soo
n be forced to improve their performance significantly in joint operations and to develop programs for handling the messy new third world missions that were clearly on the horizon.

  The Marine Corps, specifically, had to examine its organization, its doctrine, and the way it fought, taking a hard look at the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed for nontraditional missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The new missions that he had tackled at EUCOM were not aberrations--the Kurdish relief effort, the NEOs, the engagement with former Warsaw Pact militaries. They were the face of the future. And Zinni was convinced that the Marine Corps, with its tradition of flexibility and resourcefulness, could more easily adapt to these missions than could other services, and pioneer the kind of post-Cold War force that was ideally suited to it.

  Zinni was granted his wish to explore these new ideas . . . but not, as it happened, in the classrooms and on the fields of Quantico. Instead, he became a major player in the most trying and tangled U.S. military peacekeeping operation until the occupation of Iraq in 2003. It made the Kurdish relief in '91 seem like a walk in the park.

  By November 1992, Zinni had been at Quantico for six months. Shortly, he would be in the zone for promotion to major general. The next summer would change his fate one way or another; he'd either be moving up to a new command or out into civilian life.

  That month, while working to develop a new war game with the Navy, he learned that President Bush had decided to launch a joint task force to conduct a humanitarian operation in Somalia. Zinni was vaguely aware of the desperate and worsening situation in that country--civil war, famine, disease, anarchy, thousands of innocents dying. The news of the humanitarian operation, however, came out of the blue.