Sacrifice (The Red Gambit Series. Book 5)
Page 3
Two of the major factors that started to reduce morale permanently were the initial supply problems and the growing power of the Allied Air forces. As the advance slowed or was halted, morale started to decline across the board, assisted by the worsening weather.
The Soviet infantryman in Europe, during the early months of 1946, was not a happy soul. His kit was sufficient to keep him relatively warm, and food, although often a meal went missing, was enough to keep him on his feet and about combat effective, although the rations did not put meat on a man’s bones.
Small arms ammunition was in plentiful supply, but there were decided issues with large calibre rounds, and the replacement of lost vehicles and weapons. The appearance of older tanks, removed from frontline service during the German War, gave sufficient warning that all was not well, although new types were also available and arriving with prime formations. Soviet artillery, for so long the powerful arm of the Red Army, was proving much less effective than previously, as Allied counter-battery fire, air attacks, and lack of ammunition combined to reduce their power. With regard to the artillery arm, casualties far outstripped replacements that made it to the front.
The Soviet Engineer forces had received good quantities of bridging gear, explosives and associated engineer equipment, and were probably the nearest to full strength of the military arms of the Red Army
Some new weaponry reached units in the west. SKS carbines made an appearance in numbers, but not enough to supplant the standard Mosin. The promising weapon was issued out to regiments all in one go, although, for some reason, this process started amongst the reserves and rear-line troops first, depriving most of the frontline units of an excellent weapon.
A new infantry weapon, one with great promise, had not yet entered production, as teething problems remained unsolved. However, the AK47 was being made a priority and facilities were already earmarked for its mass production.
The relative lull in hostilities should have given the ground forces time to recuperate, but Allied air and partisan attacks continued to play havoc with the system, although the latter were much decreased in effectiveness and frequency.
T54’s, rushed through the approval process, were churned out as quickly as possible, and, although many were lost en route to the front, enough arrived to fully equip a few units. The vehicle had the potential to be a class above pretty much anything that the Allies could field, but production issues, quality control, and basic errors caused their new crews many headaches.
IS-III and IS-IV production picked up the pace but both types were not particularly numerous amongst frontline units, and for some reason, pre-delivery losses amongst these tanks were higher, well over 50% being lost in transit.
Numerous obsolete tanks, mostly the old 76mm equipped T-34’s, were either field or main workshop converted to mobile AA guns, in an effort to counter the Allied air superiority. Tables of equipment were changed to provide increased AA protection across the spectrum of Soviet units, particularly adding more mobile AA defence to ground formations.
A factory production T-34m46 model with a 100mm weapon was produced in significant numbers, but suffered from lack of proper development, the turret size restrictions and ammunition size alone reducing its effectiveness.
Soviet production of a direct copy of the Panzerfaust placed a good quantity of the effective tank-killer in the infantry’s hands, although there were occasionally some issues over the quality of explosive and with a lack of detonation, which made them unreliable at first.
A copy of the Rheinbote long-range artillery rocket was being tested, the Soviet version ramped up to carry an effective warhead.
So, in summary, the Red Army was less numerous and possessed less hardware in February 1946 than when it rolled across the battle line in August 1945. It had lost a lot of experienced soldiers on its way to the Rhine, and replacements of everything from men to machines arrived in dribs and drabs at the front.
New weapons that could give their soldiers an edge were arriving slowly.
The artillery arm was a shadow of its former self, and was increasing hampered by serious supply issues, as was all of the Red Army.
One simple crucial problem was oil, more specifically fuel. The absence of sufficient quantities of it, or the absence of quality stocks, afflicted every arm of service.
Even the most ‘bull at a gate’ Soviet Generals understood that their machine was broken and no longer the all-conquering force it had once been.
None the less, driven by both professional pride and political pressure from Moscow, the Red Army developed plans to renew the offensive in the spring of ‘46.
Perhaps some of the political will in Moscow derived from claims made by the scientists working on the USSR and Japan’s joint enterprise, Project Raduga.
The Red Air Force.
After its spectacular success with the sneak attacks of 6th August, the Air Force had done extremely well, but the capacity of the Allied air arm to absorb its losses, recover, and reinforce had been hugely underestimated.
Soviet control of the air was brief, if it ever happened at all, and it was only a matter of weeks before the growing Allies established relative control of the European skies.
Again, there was serious misinterpretation of the capabilities of the aircraft that they opposed, and Soviet pilots found themselves at a technical disadvantage across the board.
Before winter set in, the Red Air Force had been totally dismantled as an effective unit, rarely flying across No Man’s land, and generally used solely to respond in defence of Allied incursions.
Specifically, the greatest defect in Soviet thinking, accompanied by a gap in Red Air Force capability, was in the inability to meaningfully intercept the large formations of bomber aircraft that roamed across Soviet-held Europe. Despite a one-off savaging handed out to the RAF night bomber force, and that achieved mainly by flak it should be noted, the remaining interceptors proved unable to prevent attacking formations from reaching their targets, exposing the logistics and infrastructure networks to great harm.
Even pressing every single captured heavy AA weapon into service proved little inconvenience to the Allied swarm.
During the air battles over the southern Baltic, the Allied trap had removed whole regiments of aircraft from the Soviet inventory, as well as savaging elements of the Baltic Fleet.
Soviet pilot training programmes were accelerated, and new aircraft types were pushed forward as quickly as possible, but it would be some time before the Red Air Force had any hope of meeting their opponents on equal terms, if ever.
Surprisingly, morale amongst the pilots of Soviet Aviation remained high in the face of extreme adversity and heavy casualties.
In summary, the Red Air Force had been crippled by its efforts to support the Red Army and would, for the foreseeable future, only achieve air superiority by concentrating large numbers of its remaining aircraft in one operation, leaving other areas exposed and defenceless.
There was next to no thought given to developing a heavy bomber that could hit back at their enemy.
Standards of pilot training inevitably lowered but there was no shortage of personnel wanting the opportunity to fly in defence of the Rodina.
Slowly, aircraft of worth would arrive but, in the interim, those that flew would be always outnumbered and mainly outclassed.
The Red Navy
In the initial stages of the new war, the Red Navy’s submarine force had enjoyed an incredible run of good fortune and luck, sinking some important Allied naval and merchant assets. In particular, the type XXI U-Boats, captured from the Germans, had been ultra-effective.
The Allies had been slow to effectively respond, which enhanced the Soviet rewards, but they slowly started to sink the Atlantic submarine force.
By late-November, the Red Navy’s serious assets were all lost or interned in various neutral ports on the Atlantic seaboard.
The Soviets considered the Baltic their sea, and rose to the challen
ge of the trap set by the Allies. Hand in hand with their Aviation colleagues, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet lost heavily in the deception operation in the Southern Baltic. This reduced the Baltic Fleet to defensive duties, with the exception of a few submarines still functioning.
Given the needs of the Army and Air Force, Soviet thinking did not encompass reinforcing the fleets, except for modest efforts to replicate the German process of building the type XXI submarine in separate sections in different locations.
It would be no surprise that the morale of the Baltic Fleet was extremely low as 1945 moved into 1946.
In summary, the Baltic Fleet was a spent force, barely capable of policing its own shoreline, its only ability to take the fight properly to the Allies lying with its remaining submarines, who would have to operate under effective Allied airborne coverage, and against the once again effective anti-submarine groups of the Royal and United States navies.
The Northern Fleet and the Pacific fleet had their own problems. The former was blockaded by U-boats and British submarines, the latter confined to its ports by the huge presence of the United States Navy, whose carrier aircraft attacked on a daily basis.
In essence, the Red Navy was a spent force, except for the Black Sea Fleet, whose geographical location meant its ability to influence matters was not high.
Soviet Allies.
In general, forces from Rumania, Bulgaria et al, mirrored those of the Red Army in terms of morale and supply. The exceptions were the Poles who, despite the ransacking of their inventory by Soviet officers keen to resupply the damaged Red Army formations in Western Europe, still enjoyed high morale, possibly because they were, more often than not, garrisoned on home or friendly soil, and were not the subject of heavy air attack.
Imperial Japan.
Mainland Japan was suffering at the commencement of hostilities, and its position has not improved, save that the Allies have lowered the number of offensive bombing missions, simply because there is little of value left to bomb. The nation is slowly starving, despite desperate agricultural measures and rationing that borders on starvation.
In clandestine raids on 6th August 1945, seemingly innocent merchantmen carried the war to the US Navy in a way that the Imperial Navy no longer could. Sneak attacks on US naval installations had been fruitful and damaged Allied efforts in the Pacific area.
At the start of the renewed hostilities, the Chinese-based military forces of Imperial Japan had enjoyed a resurgence and a change in fortunes, ground attacks being generally successful as units equipped with Soviet supplied weapons used their increased firepower to good advantage. Those units equipped with German tanks and vehicles proved extremely effective on the appropriate terrain.
The Communist Chinese, at the behest of the Soviets, and against their better judgement, permitted the Japanese units to advance into contact with the Nationalist forces unopposed.
However, the Chinese Nationalists rallied and managed to halt most of the assaults, and reinforcements started to arrive from the States, bringing large well-equipped formations to the battle, albeit units that had been destined for the Japanese home islands. Soviet units were committed in small numbers, more to maintain the façade of Soviet goodwill and full support, rather than to achieve military success.
Military activity to the south accelerated the advance of the British and Dominion troops, pressing ever northwards to threaten the southern borders of China, squeezing Japanese land forces into a reduced area.
Most of the Soviet military strength assigned to eastern areas was concentrated on opposing any Allied landings on the coast of Mother Russia and in preservation of national boundaries, and Vasilevsky, the Soviet commander, faced enquiry after enquiry regarding forces that could be transferred back to Europe.
Occasionally, an enquiry became an order, and a unit would entrain for the Western Front, leaving the east more and more exposed.
In general, the Japanese soldiers engaged on the mainland were tired and underfed, but still enjoyed good morale, despite some recent reverses.
Similarly, the pilots of the Imperial Air Force maintained their esprit de corps, despite the dwindling supplies of aviation fuel and aircraft spares.
Put simply, there was no Imperial Japanese Navy anymore, and the Allied rode the seas with impunity.
Japanese efforts to produce an atomic weapon had virtually ground to a halt, as scientists moved east to work alongside Soviet colleagues, all for the greater good.
In summary, the Imperial Forces were less supported and less well-equipped than at the start of the new war. The Soviet Union had much less to send in any case, plus Allied bombers also turned their attention to the Chinese infrastructure, causing similar problems to those wreaked in Europe.
There was no reinforcement available for Japanese units, and stocks of munitions and weapons were constantly reduced by fighting or by destruction from the air.
In essence, the Pacific War was already lost, although it would take many months and many more deaths before it was acknowledged by those in power in Tokyo.
The Allies.
Allied Ground Forces.
At the start of the new war, Allied forces in Europe were singularly unprepared for a restart of hostilities, and early Soviet results illustrated the Allied units’ generally reduced effectiveness, with a few notable exceptions.
The Americans, in particular, had moved back large numbers of veteran soldiers, ready for demobbing or, in many cases, to be sent to the Pacific, earmarked for the Invasion of Japan. This had left their European units short in both numbers and quality.
The flow of men and materiel to their home countries was stopped quickly, and reversed, ensuring that units quickly recovered some of their fighting strength.
The Red Navy’s success with its small submarine force made inroads into the reinforcement efforts during the opening weeks, further assisting the Red Army’s advances.
POWs were absorbed into units, helping to bring numbers up to TOE levels, although the ex-prisoners were often weakened and less fit.
Despite some valiant defensive work, the Soviet advances continued and Allied casualties mounted, with some divisions struck from the order of battle due to combat casualties.
Slowly the Soviet advance was halted, as much by air attack and supply difficulties as by steadfast defence.
Units of the new German Republic gathered themselves and soon became a significant part of the order of battle, taking over the Ruhr and a part of the Italian Front.
Similarly, Spain had committed a number of divisions to the Allied cause.
Other Allies sent men across the Atlantic and, combined with troops from the States, the UK and dominion states, France and the German Republic, the Allied armies started to recover their numbers.
As the supply effort cranked up to higher levels, larger numbers of German POWs made their way to Europe from Canada and the USA, swelling the ranks of the German Republican Army even further.
Equipment-wise, the production lines recently turned over to civilian goods again churned out the chattels of war, and tanks, vehicles, guns and ammunition once more flowed in incessant lines from factory to front line.
New equipment, or variations on old, started to appear in numbers that could make a difference.
Conversions like the T20E2 Garand, which put even more firepower in the hands of the US infantryman. Additions like a regulation issue of Winchester shotguns to infantry platoons, a decision made as a result of the high levels of close-quarters fighting encountered since August 1945.
Other technology started to arrive, such as infra-red sights in numbers that could directly affect infantry and tank tactics.
The need for heavier armed and armoured tanks was quickly identified, as the Sherman found itself at a huge disadvantage, much the same as it had against the late German tanks, except the Soviets seemed to have superior vehicles in greater numbers. Much of the Sherman output that arrived in late '45, early '46, was the M4A3E2 J
umbo version, with the 76mm gun and considerably more armour. Production of the Super Pershing was stepped up and, yet again, development projects were pushed along quickly to provide the man in the front line with a weapon of war to do the job.
The Invasion of Japan was put on hold indefinitely, with the Soviet incursion into Europe being made the focus of all Allied efforts, save small numbers of troops sent to reinforce the Chinese Nationalists.
The air war against Japan and mainland China was intensified.
Whilst improvements and technological advances again benefitted from the imperatives of active warfare, the decisions made ensured that priority was given to tried and trusted hardware, which was to be delivered in the numbers needed to throw back the Communist hordes.
Thinking started to change when numbers of newer model Soviet tanks made their presence known, and existing tank types were suddenly found wanting. Development projects shelved as the Allies basked in the glory of the German defeat were restarted and given increased impetus by the imperatives of the front.
The Allied infantryman in Europe, during the early months of 1946, was much the same as his Soviet counterpart. Whilst kit was reasonably functional, in general, the Allied soldiers were less hardy and found the freezing conditions less bearable, a higher number succumbing to temperature related conditions.
Supply was generally good, although there were occasional local shortages, caused mainly by the extreme conditions, and occasionally by pro-communist groups ambushing supply convoys.
That the Allies had command of the air was a boost to morale, but the Allied ground troops were battered and bruised by the hard defensive fighting of the later months of 1945, and morale had become a problem amongst some of the more junior formations, especially those that had seen hard fighting.