B009THJ1WI EBOK

by Young, Crawford

  Another of Africa’s largest states, Nigeria, was a second scene of aborted transition. In singular contrast to the sudden, unexpected and abrupt democratizations in most countries, the prolonged and convoluted Nigerian transition extended over nearly a decade, actually culminating in a successful election in 1993 that the military chose to annul. Beyond its longevity, another unique aspect of the Nigerian transition was the protracted effort of the military to blend political elite consultation with elaborate regime orchestration. Beginning in 1985, a study commission largely composed of university faculty and legal scholars labored on proposals for a new democratic order. Federalism, representative institutions, competitive parties and socialism were consensus principles, but the Babangida regime removed the ideological component. A constituent assembly, mostly elected by local government councils, then took over in 1987; two years later, a draft constitution largely based on the 1979 predecessor was proposed, calling for a two-party system, with each required to prove its national character by membership distributed across the country; ethnicity and religion were forbidden forms of organizational discourse. After a failed effort to sort out who would qualify for recognition as a member of one of the two permitted parties, Babangida stepped in to decree that the state would assume responsibility for creating these organisms, one “a little to the left,” the other “a little to the right.” The state then poured ample resources into its chosen creatures, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC).

  A prolonged sequence of elections then followed, beginning in 1990 at the local government level and then ascending to the state and national parliamentary level. Babangida again intervened to suspend the process at the stage of presidential primaries, claiming massive fraud. He launched a new process in 1992, based on indirect elections of delegates to national party conventions, beginning at the ward level and working upward through local government and state echelons. The conventions, each with some five thousand delegates in attendance, duly anointed wealthy Yoruba businessman Moshood Abiola for the SDP and northern financier Alhaji Bashir Tofa for the NRC. Although the elections on 12 June 1993 were far less fraught with spectacular abuse than any prior postindependence national balloting, Babangida stunned the nation by annulling the results even before they were officially proclaimed (but after they had been made public by a democracy advocacy group, the Campaign for Democracy). The NRC initially endorsed the annulment, and its support base in the north and southeast remained quiescent. However, the major centers of SDP support, especially Abiola’s home area in the (Yoruba) southwest, reacted with fury and enduring resentment that persisted through the harsh Abacha era. To this day, the reasoning behind the Babangida dissolution of an elaborate and costly democratic transition on which such extravagant resources had been squandered remains murky. The suspicion lurked in some quarters that the entire exercise was never intended as more than political spectacle, concealing a project of indefinite prolongation of power behind the façade of permanent transition.28

  FAILED TRANSITION AND GENOCIDE: BURUNDI AND RWANDA

  Another pair of intertwined aborted transitions in Burundi and Rwanda descended into horrendous genocidal violence. The two countries had similar (but not identical) ethnic demography, overwhelmingly composed of a pair of ethnic categories sharing the same language, Hutu (85%) and Tutsi (15%). In colonial times, both were ruled by Tutsi monarchies with precolonial roots; as chapter 4 notes, both Tutsi monarchies disappeared with independence, though in very different ways: one was supplanted in Burundi by a Tutsi military oligarchy; the other was replaced in Rwanda by a Hutu ethnocracy originating in a 1959 populist uprising against Tutsi ascendancy.

  In Burundi, Hutu attacks on Tutsi in communes bordering Rwanda in 1988 brought savage reprisals by the Tutsi army and fifteen thousand fatalities, mostly Hutu. A number fled into Rwanda; most invoked the numbing memories of the 1972 genocidal slaughter by the Tutsi military regime of an estimated one hundred thousand (some claim as many as two hundred thousand), all but a small number Hutu. Though the 1972 genocide attracted meager outside reaction, the altered global environment by 1988 produced an international uproar that brought demands for democratization. The Tutsi regime bowed before the pressures for political opening in 1991, hopeful that its control of the state apparatus and conduct of the elections would assure electoral victory for its party, the Union pour le progrès national africain. Admirably free multiparty elections took place in 1993; although overt ethnic appeals were forbidden, the triumphant Front pour la démocratie au Burundi relied on Hutu mobilization for its sweeping victory (73% of the vote). However, the new Hutu premier, Melchior Ndadaye, faced an entirely Tutsi army officer corps and an overwhelmingly Tutsi administration. A few short months later, in October 1993, an army faction assassinated Ndadaye and several other Hutu leaders, triggering a wave of violence across the country that pitted enraged Hutu against a vengeful Tutsi army. The country descended into a maelstrom of civil strife that continued for a decade until a fragile power-sharing settlement in 2003 and then continued to simmer until the last ethnic militia finally agreed to end the fighting in 2008.29

  Burundi cast its shadow on Rwanda; its 1972 and 1988 mass ethnic killings reinforced Rwandan regime views that a Hutu political monopoly had to be preserved, views further cemented by harrowing tales of the numerous Burundi Hutu refugees. Under Juvenal Habyarimana (1973–94), Tutsi were rigorously prevented from assuming leading political and military roles; during that period there had been but a single Tutsi minister and army officer.30 Through the 1980s, however, the country appeared to the outside world as a relatively well-governed polity; its modest developmental success, at sharp variance with most of Africa, won generous aid flows. Although seven hundred thousand Tutsi had fled the country (outnumbering those staying in Rwanda), the remaining Tutsi could profit in the private sector, and tensions were subdued.

  But by the end of the 1980s the corruption in the Habyarimana regime—the pronounced favor enjoyed by Hutu from his northwest region and especially the enrichment of a narrow clique controlling the security apparatus, mostly related to his wife (the akazu, or little house)—were becoming visible. Pressures mounted from an internal Hutu opposition and the international community for political opening. In July 1990, Habyarimana conceded the abandonment of the single-party regime; at almost the same moment, a Tutsi refugee army (the Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF]) that had formed in Uganda, largely from veterans of the insurgent military of Ugandan ruler Yoweri Museveni, invaded their homeland. Over the following four years, a dual-track tragedy unfolded: protracted negotiation for a multiparty coalition leading to elections and an episodic but deadly combat between the Rwandan army, Hutu extremist youth militias (the interahamwe), and the RPF. In an atmosphere of deepening ethnic tensions, the assassination of newly elected Burundi Hutu premier Ndadaye in October 1993 added new explosive fuel. The final detonator was the missile destroying a plane bringing Habyarimana and the new Burundi premier back from a Tanzania conference intended to accelerate the stalled transition in April 1994. The author of this catastrophic act remains to this day unproven; initial blame fell on the Hutu extremists that used the pretext to ignite the genocide, though subsequently suspicions of possible RPF responsibility took root.31 Hutu rage ignited a frenzy of slaughter, led by the interahamwe and Rwanda army, leaving a minimum of five hundred thousand dead, mostly Tutsi (according to the most meticulous and cautious count by Alison des Forges; a figure of eight hundred thousand is widely cited by others).32 Rather than a democratic transition, Rwanda experienced a genocidal regime change, with the RPF seizing power by military force in the wake of the orgy of ethnic killings, for which RPF also had some responsibility. Rather than political liberalization, Rwanda traded one exclusionary ethnic autocracy for another, firmly entrenching the Tutsi minority. Ironically, the major beneficiary is the erstwhile Tutsi diaspora, large numbers of which returned after the RPF victory, and not the resident Tutsi populace tar
geted by the genocide. The internal Tutsi population at the time numbered only somewhat over six hundred thousand, and was decimated by the slaughter.33

  MIXED OUTCOME FOR DEMOCRATIZATION

  Thus, in different ways the initial powerful surge of democratization soon ran its course. The original interactive momentum faded as the sheer novelty of multiparty elections wore off. Initially intense international pressures slackened, especially as internal wars spread in parts of Africa; the preference for stability replaced an insistence on democracy on the part of external partners. France in particular visibly retreated from its insistence on democracy at the 1990 La Baule francophone summit. “Good governance” tended to supplant democracy in external developmental discourse.34

  But multiparty elections had become a familiar and expected part of the African landscape. The new constitutions mostly remained in force, and crucial changes in the capacities of civil societies to find voice and organize persisted. The state monopolies of the media ended as an independent press took root, perhaps alongside government mouthpieces. The state broadcasting and television networks faced competition from FM radio outlets and TV satellite dishes. The human rights movement was energized, led by courageous activists and supported by more active international NGOs.

  In a significant number of countries, sixteen by my count in 2009, regimes might reasonably qualify as democratic; in all but one of these (Botswana), there had been a change of ruling party since 1990 (see table 6.1). The most common category is the regime type that has acquired currency as semidemocracy; in table 6.1, I subdivide this group into a second set labeled “semiauthoritarian” to suggest a more incomplete degree of political liberalization. Some eight countries figure on my roster of semidemocracies, accepting Ottaway’s definition, and seven more in the semiauthoritarian category. These categories and location within them of individual countries are evidently fluid over time.

  In several influential cases, long-time autocrats, after facing significant challenge in the initial multiparty elections, adjusted their modes of operation to accommodate limited and controlled competition, especially at election time, but kept in place much of their illiberal political practice. Fear as a weapon returned to the fore; unexplained disappearances or unsolved assassinations of journalists chilled the ardor for political mobilization. Paradigm cases are Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaore, Cameroon under Paul Biya, Gabon under Bongo, and Togo under Eyadéma, the last two recently de ceased in office and succeeded by their sons. Biya and Bongo especially faced forceful opposition in the first multiparty elections in 1992 and 1993; Bongo won only narrowly. Co-optation and intimidation returned to the fore thereafter, and opposition forces tended to fragment among public disappointment and demobilization.

  TABLE 6.1. Classification by Regime Type, 2009

  Democratic Semi-democratic Semi-authoritarian Autocratic Transitional Failed

  Benin Burundi Algeria Angola Guinea Central African Republic

  Botswana Congo-Kinshasa Burkina Faso Djibouti Ivory Coast Comoros

  Cape Verde Gabon Cameroon Egypt Madagascar Guinea-Bissau

  Ghana Kenya Chad Equatorial Guinea Niger Somalia

  Lesotho Morocco Congo-Brazzaville Eritrea Zimbabwe

  Liberia Mozambique Ethiopia Gambia

  Malawi Nigeria Mauritania Libya

  Mali Tanzania Rwanda Sudan

  Mauritius Togo Swaziland

  Namibia Uganda Tunisia

  Sao Tome

  Seychelles

  Senegal

  Sierra Leone

  South Africa

  Zambia

  SOURCE: My classification as of 2009, based on Freedom House and other indices, qualitative data from major monographic sources, and interviews. The democratic category includes countries that regularly hold elections generally regarded as relatively free and fair and that are otherwise respectful of constitutional procedures. The semidemocratic group refers to regimes with imperfect elections, limited effective opposition, and impaired respect of civil liberties. Semiauthoritarian regimes are more restrictive of opposition and impose greater limitation on free expression but retain some elements of democratic practice. In the “autocratic” category, even though some token opposition and pro forma elections may exist, rule is essentially repressive. The failed state is lacking undisputed leadership, may be unable to rule over important parts of the country, and is limited in its ability to ensure normal economic operation and to perform basic government functions. The column labeled “transitional” records the 2009 instances where regimes under military or other unconstitutional rule had committed to a transition to democracy.

  Even given the initial discredit of most ruling single parties in the initial stages of transition, a number managed to survive the opening round of competition and restore their long-term hegemony; the Chama Cha Mapunduzi in Tanzania is a classic instance, as it used the discipline of party competition to renovate and reform itself. Other parties, born of the political opening, once in power swiftly learned the advantages of control of the state apparatus in electoral competition. Inevitably the exercise of power opened access to invaluable electoral resources: vehicles, money, the media. Thus the number of cases in which beyond the founding elections of the transition moment there was been a change by election of ruling party is limited, comprising Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, and Senegal. The more common pattern is for a dominant party to enjoy clear ascendancy and a substantial parliamentary majority.

  Also increasingly frequent is a move by incumbent rulers to remove the term limits that were enshrined in the transition constitutions, normally two terms. Parliamentary (and civil society) resistance is sometimes effective. Legislatures have blocked such moves in Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Namibia. In Niger in 2009, after parliament and the courts rejected removal of term limits for President Mamadou Tanja, he dissolved these bodies and unilaterally organized a referendum that duly extended his tenure, which soon prompted a military coup reflecting popular antagonism to these moves. In a significant number of other countries—Algeria, Comoros, Chad, Cameroon, Djibouti, Guinea, Togo, and Tunisia—term limits written into transition constitutions were repealed.

  The number of interrupted or aborted transitions during the post-1990 period is striking (fifteen by my count), in most cases by military intervention.35 Despite the anathema on army coups pronounced by the AU and aid cutoffs from the Western donor community, no fully effective inoculation of the still fragile post-transition regimes has taken hold. Especially vulnerable are the semidemocratic (or semiauthoritarian) regimes whose limitations with respect to democratization were apparent. Patrick McGowan argued in 2003 that quantitative analysis over time showed little real drop in military intervention following the democratic wave.36 Though by my count twelve transitions were interrupted by military power seizure, by 2010 in all cases but Madagascar, army rulers soon had to restore constitutional rule (or in Niger schedule free elections for 2011), even if only semidemocratic or semiauthoritarian in substance or failed in reality (as in my reading, Central African Republic, Comoros, and Guinea-Bissau currently stand). In other cases (Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast, Rwanda) interruptions occurred as a consequence of civil war or illicit civilian power seizures (Ivory Coast in 2010, Madagascar in 2008).

  ZIMBABWE CASE

  In this roster, Zimbabwe is an all but unclassifiable category (though I list it as a transitional state in 2009). Its evolution occurred in reverse sequence to the continental pattern. The negotiated transition following two decades of insurgent struggle provided for a democratic constitution bearing the imprint of the decolonization model examined in chapter 3. The two liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, led by Joshua Nkomo, had different regional bases, reflected in initial electoral returns. A forced marriage in 1987 by the stronger party, ZANU, fused them as ZANU-Patriotic Front (PF) that became a virtual single party, an ascen
dance reinforced in 1990 by constitutional changes eliminating the twenty reserved white seats that Britain insisted on in the independence bargain as a transitional measure. However, Zimbabwe never became a juridically one-party state. But while most other countries opened in the 1990s Zimbabwe effectively closed, becoming a ZANU-PF political monopoly; in 1995 elections ZANU-PF won all but three national assembly seats. Zimbabwe inherited a strong state and prosperous economy, both consolidated in the first independent decade.37 Mugabe, despite his personal Marxist-Leninist convictions, left in place the market economy and initially nurtured a difficult reconciliation with the white minority, after a bitter liberation struggle.38 The record was marred by a vicious repression of unrest in Matabeleland between 1983 and 1986, carried out by the infamous North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade. But far from experiencing the state crisis afflicting most of the continent, Zimbabwe in 1990 was undergoing something that more closely approximated the state expansion moment elsewhere two decades earlier, and before the 1990s was constantly cited as a model African polity.39