Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Even though the Prussian king received news through his spies that 80,000 Austrians and 150,000 Russians were likely to attack Prussia in the spring of 1757, he had no qualms about opening with a preemptive military invasion of his own. With Russia, Austria, and France all congregating, he felt he had little choice. The rub was, in late August 1756, the Prussian army, massed on the Saxon frontier, opened the war by marching into Saxony. It should be pointed out that Frederick one more time asked the Austrian court about the purpose of Austria’s mobilization, and had again received an evasive answer. Just after receiving the reply, the Prussians crossed the Saxon frontier. The war was on.

  PART I. 1756–1757: THE CONTEST OPENS

  Chapter One

  The Invasion of Saxony

  The march into Saxony which signaled the start of the Seven Years’ War began when the Prussian army, in three distinct columns, swept across the frontier between Saxony and Prussia around 1230 hours on Saturday, August 28, 1756.1 Frederick was in supreme command of his field forces. Seven regiments of hussars, part of his brother Ferdinand of Brunswick’s command, made the journey first, intending to take the city of Leipzig by surprise before any serious attempt could be made to defend it.

  Riding rapidly through Saxony against token resistance, Brunswick’s troopers did just that.2 By the evening of August 29, Leipzig was in Prussian hands. It is interesting to note that Frederick never seriously considered any other route to Austria, such as invading Moravia, because he preferred to proceed through Saxony. Other paths existed, of course, and could have been used just as easily considering the abilities the Prussian army possessed at the beginning of the war.3

  The Prussians might have been pleasantly surprised to find no serious opposition, but the general sequence of affairs was inexorably underway.4 The king’s column crossed near Torgau, detaching Prince Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau5 (leading some 1,711 infantry and 1,551 cavalry) with orders to seize the old Saxon city of Wittenberg.6 Ferdinand,7 leading a second strike force, converged to the right of Frederick, while General August Wilhelm of Brunswick-Bevern (with the third) erupted on the left. Everything ran smoothly, but not by accident.8 The entire operation had been laid out in advance, and specifics decided upon, by both sides, long before the actual invasion,9 a necessity in those days before nearly instantaneous communication.

  While the military operations were proceeding methodically, the Prussian king was careful to preserve the illusion of self-defense. The political niceties of the moment were not ignored. Frederick knew Europe’s crowned heads would be looking at the unfolding of events in Saxony. A mistake could lead to unforeseen political ramifications. Thus, for the moment, the king tried his best to justify the latest Prussian aggression.10 On August 29, Frederick’s ambassador to Saxony, Hans Dietrich von Maltzahn, hastily sought audience with Augustus and his self-indulgent prime minister, Count Heinrich von Brühl.11 Maltzahn assured his troubled hosts of the pacifist intentions of the Prussian king. No harm was meant to the Saxons themselves.12 In fact, the Prussian troops, not surprisingly,13seemed willing to follow their orders not to engage in looting.14 Still Brühl was not entirely convinced, urging the Saxon leader to leave Dresden while he yet could. No signature of King Augustus, though, had as yet been affixed to an aggression treaty against Prussia.15

  This invasion by overpowering military forces, employing some of the world’s finest soldiers, moved swiftly, predictably to fruition, especially as Saxony was relying upon the Austrian army in strength for its best defense.16 In one important respect, the king’s calculations were completely wrong. He believed the Austrians would be unable to send field forces into Saxony at all until the spring of 1757. Frederick nursed the outside hope of cantoning his army in Bohemia over the coming winter. A goal like that was just too optimistic under the circumstances.17

  On September 2, Frederick’s center column breached the Elbe at Torgau and, moving down the opposite side of the river, marched past Belgern, Riesa, and Meissen to reach Wilsdruf, which capitulated without a struggle. No serious opposition had been encountered; indeed, there was no sign of the stunned Saxon army. Bevern swept past Bautzen, Bischofswerda, and Stolpen, to finally occupy Löhmen.18 Here his men encamped for the moment. Meanwhile, supplies and powder were being sent by water from Magdeburg on the Elbe. All told, some three hundred vessels were employed in this naval supply operation.

  Ferdinand, from Leipzig, repaired after a short rest to Chemnitz, by Freiberg and Dippoldiswalde, finally to the little village of Cotta—on the lower bank of the Elbe about a mile west of the Friedrichstadt suburb of Dresden—where his column paused. All told, the march of the three formations, considering the long supporting distances involved (varying but at least three days’ march distance from each other for most of the invasion), had been orderly.19

  The Prussians followed their commission to stay as well-behaved as possible, and the Saxon citizenry adapted readily to the conquerors. This was partially the result of printed flyers which the bluecoats were liberally distributing along the line-of-march. The leaflets spelled out Frederick’s honorable “intentions,” as a “friend” of Saxony. The implication was, the Prussians would only be in Saxony temporarily, only as long as required to accomplish their purposes.

  Even so, the news was not all good for Frederick. After he reached Wilsdruf, the king finally heard the news he had been half-expecting all along: the Saxon army, forsaking the risk of an open engagement, had withdrawn into entrenched works near Pirna. By September 3, the Saxons fully congregated their forces in that post. Assembled lines had been prepared beforehand in case the Prussians made such a move. The Saxons remembered the Silesian wars of 1740–1745; they wanted to be prepared for a resumption of Prussian hostility. To go along with that possibility, large stocks of military supplies and equipment had been coalesced thereabouts. Just sound military judgment.

  However, there was another problem the Saxons had been unable to solve so obviously: greed. Count Brühl was a rather short-sighted minister.20 All along, he had been purloining funds which were earmarked to provide salaries for government officials, as well as payroll payments to the Saxon army. While Brühl was busy amassing possessions paid for with his ill-gotten money, basics the army might require were either delayed or not forthcoming at all because of a lack of funds.21

  One shortage was a sufficient number of ready rations for the field army. Thus, though the men could reasonably seek shelter from Frederick at Pirna, they had little in the way of food for a siege of any length. Hunger was a formidable opponent that could not be held out with high walls. Thus, the situation confronting the Saxons in August 1756 was nothing less than desperate.

  The charitable Saxon monarch was willing to forget the Prussian invasion of his country, offering belated “permission” for the bluecoats to pass freely through his dominions. The latter would not be hindered in their “passage” through Saxony. Augustus was aware of Frederick’s aim to bridle Austrian ambitions in Bohemia. He was willing to sacrifice his new “friends” if his own country were spared. Augustus did, however, insist on the Prussians leaving Saxony as soon as possible.22

  For their part, the Austrians, who should have known better, managed to deceive themselves into believing that Frederick meant nothing more in 1756 than to stand on the defense behind his own frontiers.23 The Austrian high command, the Hofkriegsrath, went out of the way to avoid the basics like transferring additional troops near the frontiers or mobilizing the country.24 As a result, precious time to better prepare was lost largely in enforced idleness. At least as far as Vienna was concerned.

  At the border, where the presence of the potential Prussian enemy was much more ominous, it was a little bit more attentive. On September 3, Major-General Count Friedrich Georg Heinrich Wied was sent with a small force of 3,000 men to go to the frontier, calm the nerves of the local residents, and try to establish contact with the Saxons. Four days later, a thousand cavalry under Major-General Prince Christian Philipp Johann Ale
xander Löwenstein left to gallop to the border and Austrians of Field Marshal Ulysses Maximilian von Browne25 were preparing to move out from Kolin.26

  When the Prussians finally took the plunge, the Austrian high command (not Browne) committed another serious error: they refused to believe the reports that filtered out about the action. As early as September 2, Emperor Francis Stephen had been advised by one of the diplomats in the Saxon capital that the Prussians were across the border in deadly earnest. There were additional confirmations of different degrees trickling in all day, none of which was accepted as genuine at Vienna. Only on September 3, six full days after the first irruption into Saxony, was the Austrian emperor convinced of the sincerity of these reports.27

  This is difficult to comprehend when we realize the border of Saxony was only some 200 air miles from the Austrian city of Prague. The Austrian border was so close that communication between Vienna and any force in the field would take no more than a few days. And the whitecoats (a term derived from the white uniforms the Austrian units employed)28 had cleared out a passageway through Bohemia in order to expedite movements to help the Saxons.29

  But, all things considered, the Hofkriegsrath seemed oddly torpid. Augustus himself was no admirer of the Austrians. He probably preferred the Prussian presence to the Austrian, except for a little affair, a.k.a. the war. The Saxon Elector, also King of Poland (hence the accurate term King Augustus), was quick to realize he stood to gain little, and had much to lose, from tying his star to Maria Theresa’s wagon. In retrospect, he may have felt he had no other choice in the matter.

  In sharp contrast, Frederick was not in a generous mood. His last attempt to secure a guarantee from the Austrian government had been rejected outright, which meant the latter could expect no other result than a conflict.30 A war the Austrians seemed to want. So the course the king was now embarking on probably seemed to him the only one open.

  Now whether the Prussian monarch believed an attack in 1756 was inevitable by an armed coalition of powers, thus justifying the so-called preemptive strike upon Saxony, is open to question. However, Frederick sincerely believed it. Most especially as he had to be aware of resentment over his careless remarks about the ruler of Russia.

  There was some basis for this phenomenon. The nation of Russia in 1756 was actively seeking to “reduce the King of Prussia within proper bounds.”31 That truth was not only in Frederick’s head.32 Complications then arose from this scenario. According to letters from the British ambassador, Sir Andrew Mitchell,33 events at the Russian court had “prevented the Russians from executing the project that had been framed of attacking the King of Prussia this year.”34

  Frederick refused to negotiate with Augustus (now cowering in Struppen) beyond ordering him to disband the Saxon army immediately or face the consequences. It became obvious Augustus was stalling for time, so events moved swiftly on. On September 9, about 1100 hours, the king entered Dresden in the company of Field Marshal Jacob Keith—his second-in-command of the center column.35

  General Count Johann Christoph von Wylich und Lottum, with a small force, had actually occupied the city the previous day without opposition. This Saxon failure to fight for their capital seems rather surprising, especially in view of the prepared state of the city walls with vast amounts of war material found there.36 Now things could proceed. The Prussian General headquarters were established at Gross-Sedlitz, in the “garden of the countess Moszczenska.”37 By this point, both Ferdinand and Bevern had reached their assigned positions. As for Frederick, as soon as he arrived in Dresden, he ordered the seizure of the state papers and the official chests searched with a view to find any incriminating documents that might point to Augustus conspiring with the Austrians against him. All of this in addition to the issuing of manifestoes proclaiming his “friendship” for the Saxons.

  The Saxons were taking what measures they could. As quickly as word reached the capital the Prussians were pouring across the border, the government made preparations to depart. The Chevalier De Saxe, who commanded the Saxon cavalry, kept patrols out to snoop out Prussian activities, but that was about it. The army began withdrawing into Pirna from September 1, but Augustus himself only left Dresden on September 9 (Wylich did not bother to storm his quarters). The Saxons successfully sought permission for their king to be expedited to Pirna without Prussian interference—complete with his entourage. The Saxon queen, however, remained at Dresden. She tried to prevent the Prussians from confiscating the official state papers.38 These official documents could be a key justification for the Prussian actions.39 There was more. Whether through carelessness or oversight, the Saxons left large stockpiles of gear in different places throughout their country, not just in Dresden, supplies which the Prussians used to their full advantage, helping to allay their demands for stock. Although nowhere near what the invaders had wanted or would require. In effect, the Prussian king was trying to maneuver matters so the Saxons would be ultimately responsible for the Prussian expenses in Saxony.40

  Augustus’ cause was not entirely hopeless. The works at Pirna were peculiarly suited to a defensive struggle.41 The Saxons held a large chunk of territory there, extending from Pirna and the tall eminence of the Sonnenstein to the Königstein hill. At the latter, the Elbe took an abrupt northward turn veering at Pirna and Dresden. Here the prevailing conditions might just favor a Prussian attack, especially with the small size of the Saxon force.

  Frederick had a much larger force at his disposal. Ferdinand brought 11,695 infantry, 3,131 cavalry, and 52 guns with him. Bevern had 11,676 infantry, 6,190 cavalry, and 34 guns in his column. The king’s main column boasted 24,446 infantry, 5,174 cavalry, and 136 guns. Thus the Prussian aggregate was almost 48,000 infantry, 14,495 cavalry, and 222 guns.42 The odds were stacked against the militarily incompetent Augustus, who had no more than 18,000 men holding his lines under Marshal Count Friedrich Rütowski.43

  Even had this force been assembled in a single body, it could not have been deployed against one of the three columns without fear of being cut off from Dresden by the remaining two. The Pirna movement seemed the only viable alternative under the circumstances, short of withdrawing into Bohemia. The latter was the wisest course open, but would have entailed abandoning Augustus’ country to its fate. He was unwilling to adopt such a course.

  Behind her frontier Austria was still assembling troops, and already had two distinct bodies of men. One, under Field Marshal Octavio Piccolomini, consisted of approximately 22,606 men and was encamped near Königshof-Kolin in eastern Moravia. But that body of men had only just received the necessary horses it would require and would thus demand some additional time to prepare to march.44

  Wied was in Aussig from September 4. The Austrians generally sought to cover their own frontiers, but Wied’s avowed intentions were to open a line of communication with Augustus and keep a wary eye upon the enemy. On September 9, Major-General Joseph Freiherr von Wolfersdorfe took an additional 2,400 men or so with him, plus eight cannon, to help bolster Wied at Aussig.

  In strong contrast to the indecision reigning in the high command, Browne had been fully cognizant of Prussian preparations and the massing of forces more than a month before the actual invasion. Scattered patrols detected the extent of the enemy’s preparations, since it was impossible to keep such full-blown preparedness under wraps. To the marshal, it was clear what was in the offing. On August 25, Browne informed the Hofkriegsrath that the Prussian king was preparing to invade Saxony and that such an encroachment was probably imminent.45

  Now, the inevitable had occurred, and Browne was holding on to Aussig with a less than sure grip. The approaching Prussians probed the town, obviously checking for the enemy’s strength. September 12, General Adolph Nikolaus von Buccow took two full regiments of dragoons and some infantry to go to Königgrätz and, simultaneously, protect the passes thereabouts from the “invaders.” About September 15, the various scattered details of Austrian troops were starting to jell together. That lef
t the men of Browne’s immediate command, consisting of some 32,465 troops gathering at Prague, available for field operations. The other forces would require some time to prepare for the coming battles with the bluecoats.

  Frederick intended, as soon as he had compelled the Saxons to surrender, to march into the heart of Austria at once.46 He had rather lofty hopes of attacking both enemy troop formations simultaneously to break them up, march on Vienna and compel Austria to sue for peace on terms favorable to Prussia. However, Browne could not be suffered to interfere.

  With that express purpose in mind, the king detached approximately half of his army (32,000 men) under Keith, and sent him packing with instructions to make for Aussig and Nöllendorf to act as a counter to the Austrians on the Bohemian border. While Keith was to be so occupied, the king commenced a siege of Pirna with the remaining troops. Ferdinand, marching with the advanced guard of this detachment, encountered a force of Austrians, including Pandours, near Aussig (September 13).47

  These Pandours were part of Colonel Perroni’s command. Perroni had eight companies of grenadiers, 200 cavalry, and 50 hussars accompanying him. Ferdinand had 10,000 men with him, and three rather vigorous little attacks cleared the low-lying area on both sides of Perroni. This move threatened to outflank the latter’s prepared position. By 1500 hours, Perroni, belatedly realizing his danger, fell back on Nöllendorf.48 Ferdinand broke off pursuit and consolidated his position, pausing at Peterswaulde. While he waited, other parts of the army brought forward the materials of war. On September 15, all being prepared, Ferdinand suddenly erupted against an Austrian outpost in front of Nöllendorf, but it was too late. Perroni had already withdrawn into the place. Yet he did not linger there long. His defenders fled to Aussig, in the process alerting Major-General Count de Materni of the nearness of the Prussians.