Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Count Brühl, whose unconcealed hatred for the Prussian king was fully returned, at the end of his rope, asked for an armistice to discuss surrender terms. His actions were fully approved by Augustus, who saw no other way out.16

  It was apparent there would no acceptable terms for the Saxons other than surrender as prisoners of war. There have been some cloudy issues raised in this respect. Horace St. Paul relates the capitulation was as good as a done deal on October 12 and 13, and that the Saxons merely “pretended” their bridge had been seized. According to this account of events, Browne only withdrew when Prussian deserters “reported that they had received orders not to fire upon the Saxons.”17 Much of this was questionable, even preposterous. But no one denied Browne’s effort was skillful; he lost “200 men in his retreat”18 back to Budin. That number could have been much higher under the circumstances.

  Browne reached Raschwitz on October 18, after leaving a strong detachment at Kamnitz to help prevent further Prussian activities in the immediate vicinity. On the same day, Colonel MacEliot and his force (some 500 Croats) hammered the Szekely Hussars at Tetschen. A relative unknown at the time, Lt.-Col. Baron Gideon Ernst Laudon, was present with his Ottochaner Croats. Much renown and prominence in the Austrian army awaited this man; he had once applied to the Prussian service, but was rebuffed by Frederick himself.19

  Browne left General MacGuire at Leitmeritz and specifically appointed him to command the men at Kamnitz and the rest of the cordon that was being established to keep the roving enemy bands at bay. Browne was motivated by fears the Prussians had a late season eruption into Bohemia in force under consideration. MacGuire had enough men20 to forestall this remote possibility. By October 20, Browne was in Budin; he had little left of plans for the campaign beyond winter quarters.

  The end of the Saxon military effort and the subsequent failure of Browne’s rescue effort have thus been under Horace St. Paul’s very controversial view. This involved some creativity on St. Paul’s part or else he was simply mistaken. In any event, the articles of surrender were quickly made out and agreed to.

  The components of the Saxon army were treated differentially. The officers were given their parole once they agreed to stay neutral for as long as this current war lasted. (Just how many honored that pledge is not known.) Augustus, with his entourage, including Count Brühl, was granted a request to withdraw into Poland.21 The Prussian king extended the courtesy of pulling off Prussian patrols from Augustus’ line of movement, although Frederick did require a map of the route to accomplish this task. Although a mere formality, the return of prisoners and personal effects of those involved did something to smooth the bad relations that had quickly developed between Saxony and Prussia.

  As for the rank-and-file soldiers, Frederick required their “services.” From the first, Frederick minced no words. Although he had set the officers at liberty, he made no such guarantee about the men themselves.22 And so it went. On October 17, the Saxons laid down their arms.23

  They took them up again as “Prussian” soldiers. None of this prevented the king from trying to recruit the Saxon officers. That was a dismal failure. Only 53 chose to serve in the Prussian army, while more than ten times that many (568) chose to be P.O.W.’s; another 436 even made the trek to Poland to avoid Prussian service.24

  The disgruntled “enlisted” men were straightway converted into Prussian soldiers. Twenty battalions were formed, and Prussian officers were substituted for the Saxon ones. But the king would live to regret his decision. To save time, the new “Prussian” formations were incorporated as bodies, rather than individually inducting the men into existing Prussian battalions.25 This helped ensure much trouble, which developed almost immediately.

  There were some other isolated events as the short campaign wound down. Frederick’s men had occupied and built up a post at Dux (some five miles southwest of Töplitz) into a position of some strength. New activities at the main camp at Lobositz might presage a renewal of Prussian movements. There were new activities afoot, but they involved retreating rather more than advancing.

  To head off that latest agenda, assuming it existed, Browne detached a large detail, including two full companies of infantry grenadiers, under command of Major-General Michael Anton Graf von Althann. The latter was directed to occupy Priesen (October 22). This post would prevent the enemy from making isolated raids into Bohemia. Althann’s men included 400 light cavalry, who were kept out looking for Prussian movements.

  To act as a reinforcement, Major-General Heinrich Otto von Burghausen was sent by Browne to Althann’s post with two battalions and two companies of grenadiers—and another 400 horse—on October 23. About this same time, Frederick sent instructions to Keith to abandon the camp at Lobositz.

  There were a number of factors that decided the king to so act. The coming of winter would freeze the rivers, making re-supply by water all but impossible. And the exposed position at Lobositz, on the wrong side of the Metal-Gebirge, jutted uncomfortably into Bohemia. It was liable to Austrian encroachments. In short, there was no safe way for the Prussians to stay there over the winter.

  Keith rose from Lobositz and withdrew towards Töplitz. With this latest intelligence, Burghausen’s orders were rescinded and he moved instead on Perutze. Simultaneously, Hadik was hot on Keith’s heels with his hussars. The Prussian command’s forward elements reached Linay on October 23. Hadik, keeping to his business with seriousness, pulled up short at Paskabola. His orders were to keep Keith’s men close in view, but there was no attempt to bring on an engagement. So Hadik merely shadowed the enemy, keeping patrols out and staying alert. Reconnaissance efforts showed the Prussians were encamped between Linay and Turmitz.

  Frederick’s men evacuated Tetschen, and rumors were flying that the main Prussian army was probing, probably to link up with Schwerin. The latter just then was demonstrating towards Jaromirtz. There was a general Austrian view their formidable enemy was not done for the year yet, and that either the king or Schwerin—if not both—might be still planning some great offensive, even with winter coming. And they persisted in this belief long after it was a realistic possibility.26 Probably because the Austrians just could not believe their Prussian opponent would pull a surprise stroke into Saxony and then tamely surrender the initiative. Even more disturbing, the search of the royal documents at Dresden confirmed only a glimmer of an interest by the Saxons in humbling Frederick; certainly there was no firm commitment on the part of Augustus to join a coalition.27

  On October 25, Hadik’s scouts brought him the welcome news that the enemy were indeed hitching to the rear. The artillery and baggage trains had been sighted, heading towards Saxony, and there were obvious signs the rest of the army was about to follow. Hadik promptly unleashed his troopers. They straightaway made for the vulnerable enemy caravans of supplies and troops, causing much grief. Two days after, Aussig was evacuated by Frederick’s men, and it was apparent to all the general motion of the army was backwards.

  The welcome/detention committee was led by the recently promoted Major-General Lacy, who, from Jung-Bunzlau, kept a nervous eye to make certain the enemy were leaving Bohemia behind. Lacy’s light cavalry kept the pressure on, harassing the Prussians and watching eagerly for stragglers. Just about the same time, the command duo of Althann-Burghausen re-occupied Budin.

  Keith’s rearguard was rather nastily surprised at Geishubel by a large Austrian command under Colonel Friedrich Franz von Vehla on October 31. A short, but spirited, fight cost both sides some losses and Vehla captured much Prussian equipment. This wrote a finish to the campaign of 1756. Both sides nervously retired into winter cantonments, and began looking toward a new campaign in 1757.

  Before we close the campaign, we need to finish with the Schwerin-Piccolomini drama.28

  On October 21, Austrian scouts reported to Piccolomini the Prussians were beginning to withdraw from their positions.29 The destination of this move was initially Jaromirtz, then on Skalitz, in four columns.
The entire operation was covered by seven cavalry squadrons designed to render Austrian reconnaissance efforts more difficult. Spada’s reaction was most energetic.

  He at once attacked and hurried off the Prussians. This pursuit was followed up with such vigor the enemy were tailed almost into Skalitz. As for Schwerin, he did not intend to take a stand even here, knowing the king’s intentions full well. Over the next twenty-four hours, the marshal’s beleaguered men slowly filtered back to the great fortress of Glatz. Being back in familiar country brought the “drowsy” Schwerin to life. He probed (October 26) the enemy post towards Skalitz, which was an outpost of General Spada’s at Tsaclavek—near Jaromirtz. About 1300 hours, the sudden appearance of the Prussians sounded the alarm. Soon after, a sustained cannonade was commenced to test the enemy’s desire for a fight.

  The situation for the Austrians looked desperate, and Spada sent a communication to Piccolomini, at Sweti, he needed additional troops. But Schwerin, once more, was not in earnest. Although the shelling from six Prussian cannon did their best work, there was no follow-up attack. After this brief demonstration of Prussian power, the guns fell silent. Soon after 1400 hours, the Prussians abruptly withdrew.

  The Prussians did not stay around Skalitz long, and forthwith withdrew on Reinertz, into which the Duke of Württemberg’s dragoons with some infantry provided cover. Piccolomini’s cavalry were nonplused, and they followed the enemy right up to the camp. Now Schwerin had no aim except retiring into winter quarters. With the season closing, the marshal pulled up stakes and withdrew on Wallesfort on October 29. The Austrian horse followed at a safe distance. Thus the entire effort by Schwerin in 1756 was as a decoy, to divert as much of the enemy’s attention as he could from the main Prussian effort.

  We might briefly relate the fate of Ulrich Bräker. It happened that the reluctant soldier was “accidently” set free from his Prussian obligations during the heaviest fighting at the Lobosch. He made his way to the Austrian camp, where his benefactors proved most obliging. The thought of further military service evidently had scant appeal for Bräker, although there were many in his shoes during that era who made quite the adventure out of serving in different armies, frequently on opposite sides. Even to the extent of switching back and forth between hostile armies encamped in the field. Bräker just wanted to go home, although one of the last glimpses he gives of interest to us was his bird’s-eye view of Prague. His return home started from Prague; the Swiss soldier wrote of the “breathtaking view of” Prague, with its “steeples of copper,” all bathed in sunlight on the day of his departure.30 With that, he quietly bowed off the stage of history.

  Chapter Four

  Winter Interlude; Start of the 1757 Campaign

  The king deployed his army in winter cantonments from Zwickau, Freiberg, Chemnitz, Leipzig, finally through Torgau, and Bautzen. Schwerin put down his quarters at Schweidnitz, and Winterfeldt held the line of the Bober River. The king himself spent the winter quarters at Dresden, in cozy quarters surrounded by good books and intellectually gifted companions, at the capital of his new “ally.” His Prussians had given a good account of themselves in the short campaign thus concluded, but far more serious times were ahead.

  The one serious flaw of 1756 was the Prussian failure to invade Austria itself. At this early stage, such a move may have proven decisive. Had the Prussians marched at Vienna at the very start in August 1756, the conflict may have been over quickly. The prospect of employing the ill-prepared armed forces of Imperial Austria straight out of the gate dealing with a Prussian invasion of their homeland must have been frightening. Unfortunately for the bluecoats, the prosecution of the Saxon campaign had used up the balance of the campaigning season.1 And Frederick would not leave an unsubdued enemy behind him while he moved into the heart of Maria Theresa’s realm.

  Vienna had feared the prospect of Prussian invasion, and the Austrians were pleasantly surprised when the direct enemy threat did not materialize at the start of hostilities. Not only were Maria Theresa’s armies not ready; neither were the magazines they would require to function properly. Henry Lloyd, among many contemporaries, contended that Frederick must have secured at least Bohemia had he launched an invasion of Austria in 1756. Then, at the start of the new campaign, he would “begin the next campaign in Moravia, at least.”2 Perhaps even a siege of Vienna.

  The real situation was much otherwise as the new campaign loomed. With Austria, joined by France,3 Russia, Sweden, and even the states of the German Reich threatening an all-out attack upon Prussia,4 Frederick was worried about the status of his one substantial ally, Great Britain. Even that country at first appeared reluctant to furnish him with aid. Her leaders positively refused to permit English troops to fight on the continent, come what may. Such a policy was too rigid under the circumstances and this stand was soon modified to allow for the defense of British interests in Central Europe, namely Hanover. To help speed matters along, the Prussian monarch sent General Friedrich Wilhelm Count Carl Schmettau into Hanover to expedite that electorate’s entering the war on the “right” side. This would help, since the Elector of Hanover also happened to be the king of England.

  What was accomplished for Prussia within Great Britain itself was done largely through the auspices of William Pitt, head of the Government Opposition Party, and acting secretary of state.5

  Pitt saw that an alliance of his country with Frederick’s Prussia would help deter French attention from North America and its possessions there.6 The statesman would eventually be dismissed by King George on April 5, 1757, amid the upheavals.7

  With his one important ally still hesitating, Frederick had a difficult time sorting out what to do with the new campaign. At first he believed it might be the wisest course to await the advance of the Austrians into Saxony, but there were other strong contrary opinions voiced. Field Marshal Schwerin and the king’s closest confidant, General Winterfeldt,8 each one a respected military authority in his own right, both suggested invading Austria itself at the start of the campaign. The best defense would be a strong offense. In any case, this course would hasten events on more than just a passive defense would ever do.9

  In a heated discussion on March 19, 1757, Winterfeldt asked the king to contemplate the unpleasant danger of leaving Maria Theresa’s generals quiet in Bohemia while the French and the Russians methodically made their way to the theater of war. A hasty conference was called by the two commanders (Schwerin and Winterfeldt), to whom Frederick sent Major-General Baron Count Christian von der Goltz, held at Frankenstein in Silesia (March 30). At this pivotal meeting, the idea of striking enemy concentrations about Königgrätz was openly broached.10

  The overall plan of campaign itself was beginning to firm up. There was general agreement on a narrow window of opportunity that existed before the various allies could make their presence felt. Going over to a strict defense was merely waiting on events, and would squander that narrow window. So an invasion by the Prussian army, divided again into three columns, this time directed, with full fury, at Austria itself, was planned.11 It appears the general notion occurred to both the king and to Winterfeldt, but the latter’s planning was more advanced. What is clear, however, was that Frederick must have approved the preliminary draft, no matter the authorship.12

  The most likely explanation for this scenario was, when news of the conference reached him on April 3, the king at that point modified the original scheme of limited raids into northern Bohemia into one of a full-scale invasion. This was provided the gathering coalition “cooperated.” This design had the added bonus in the event of a Prussian defeat, retreat would be one back into Saxony. On the other hand, if beaten in Saxony by an invading Austrian army, the Prussian recourse would be nothing short of withdrawal behind their own borders. The choice was a clear one. But the Prussian approach to the campaign was still rather vague though there were at least a choice of options. The Austrians, incredibly, assumed the Prussian king would always behave on campaign like they tho
ught he would.

  Frederick weighed his options carefully, and the invasion of Austria plan was finally adopted. In a rare burst of optimism, the king sent instructions to General Johann von Lehwaldt (holding 30,000 men in posts in East Prussia), to conclude peace with the Russians on the condition that West Prussia—part of Poland—be given to Prussia, if the forthcoming invasion of Austria were a success.

  There were other distractions to keep the king busy in this lull. During the course of the winter, Saxony was administered more like another province of the realm, than an occupied enemy state. Heavy taxes were levied on the Saxon people, and Prussian officials replaced Saxon administrators in key posts. Frederick’s recruiting “campaign,” which had little attraction for many, also fell far short of the mark, as most of the qualified enemy officers simply refused to join the Prussian service.

  This was nothing new (as prospective recruits were often reluctant to serve in the draconian army they often pictured the Prussian to be).13 Manpower shortages would remain a lingering problem for Prussia throughout the war. What about that other commodity needed for war: money? Frederick was already having a time with finances, so it was not just out of base revenge that he took such courses as he did. On the other hand, the Prussian king had already developed an aversion for the Saxons that would last the rest of the war.

  The king, in his History of the Seven Years’ War, interestingly does not clearly point out what he intended to gain from taking the offensive into Bohemia in 1757, and thereby touched off a controversy that has endured to the present. Did he intend a decisive blow? If so, why were more than 45,000 available men deployed in other theaters at a time when their presence might have helped overwhelm the hard-pressed Austrians. If not, a jab at forestalling the gathering coalition with a limited campaign against the principal member of that coalition? If so, why employ almost 75 percent of your available manpower reserves on such an adventure?