Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Frederick was stunned by his communication from Moritz. So dismayed he at once relieved Prince Moritz from command and had him recalled. Prince Wilhelm was sent to assume charge of that part of the army. This was a decision the king would soon have cause to regret. For, while Beck was operating in his sphere, another detachment under Lt.-Gen. Emmerich Freiherr von Morocz was sent up the left bank of the Iser River to shadow the Prince of Prussia’s men thereabouts. Meanwhile, operations in the German Reich had begun.11

  Bad news struck the bluecoats from all sides. The allied coalition, which had been paralyzed by the news of the Battle of Prague, had now taken heart at learning of the Prussian defeat at Kolin, the all the more as it had been unexpected.12 Enemies began closing in from every direction on Frederick and his tiny nation. In Bohemia at his front, there were now 110,000 Austrians finally united in one force and preparing to advance; 100,000 Russians were pressing into East Prussia under Marshal Stepan Fedorovich Apraxsin; 125,000 French were pushing into Hanover and heading for Prussia; 40,000 Imperialists were gathering in Central Germany and would soon be moving to join the French in the West13; the Swedes, 20,000 men under Baron Ungern Sternberg, were before Prussian Pomerania at the north. Altogether, a confusing mass of nearly 400,000 men were moving against Frederick directly or against one of the many isolated territories of Prussia. This was one of the largest combinations of allies united against a single country in history. Frederick was now definitely reaping the whirlwind of what he had wrought in 1740.

  To set against these masses, Frederick could dispose of some 154,000 troops. Some 60,000 with him facing the Austrians; 10,000 in Brandenburg to act as a reserve and to cover Berlin, as well as to watch Silesia and the Swedes; 30,000 with Lehwaldt in East Prussia to oppose Apraxsin; finally, a 54,000-man army (admittedly composed largely of British and Hanoverian troops) under the command of the Duke of Cumberland facing the French and the Imperialists. The campaign of 1757 was entering a new phase, now that the Prussian efforts to take the war into the heart of Austria had failed. A much tougher road for the unfortunate bluecoats.

  PART III. 1757: PRUSSIA IN RETREAT AND RECOVERY

  Chapter Eleven

  The War Settles Down

  At Leitmeritz, Frederick lay encamped for some four weeks. The monarch was quick to talk to his British ambassador, Sir Andrew Mitchell, about his first defeat. In spite of the enormity of the setback, there were no excuses.1 And still more developments. Though the king did not know it, he had suffered a domestic loss within his own house that would affect him far more severely than the defeat at Kolin. On June 28, as the Prussians were winding into Leitmeritz, Queen Sophie, the king’s ailing mother, died in Monhijou (near Berlin). Frederick learned of her demise on July 2, which precipitated a renewed crisis as the reeling monarch withdrew into himself.2

  The loss at Kolin has allowed history to say Prince Henry was largely responsible for extricating the army from Prague and conducting the retreat, as the king temporarily lost control of his senses.3 Certainly the loss of both men’s mother in the person of Queen Sophie paralyzed Frederick for a brief time. And his military reputation had been tarnished, with deep implications, both personally and professionally, as a leader of Prussia. Kolin proved to be “a turning point in Frederick’s life. His aura of invincibility suddenly vanished.”4 But, in adversity, the Prussian king would prove to be as resilient as he had been in any other aspect of life. In a military, as well as a personal, sense.

  Meanwhile, the French were making their presence felt in the West. They were commanded by Marshal Charles de Rohan Soubise, who had been invading Prussia’s western Cleve possessions. Soubise charged into Hanover at the end of March, and made a camp between Münster and Lippstadt, while sending detachments of troops to guard his line of supply. The marshal could dispose of 70,000 men in his main camp, and there were more troops being assembled to link up with the Imperialists in Germany. April 27, Soubise was succeeded in command of this body by Marshal Louis d’ Estrèes. The unexpected news of Kolin had reinvigorated the French. July 2, d’Estrèes sent a force to take Emden, in the process severing Cumberland’s line of retreat.

  The French left an exposed command at Lippstadt under Claude Louis Count de St. Germain. Cumberland, concentrated at Bielefeld, enjoyed a superiority in numbers over St. Germain, but failed to crush him before more French arrived in the area. The Duke of Cumberland seemed in a self-induced fog that, so long as he made no hostile move, the enemy would reciprocate. At the end of May, d’Estrèes slowly moved forward, with the intention of driving Cumberland’s army across the Weser. The latter quickly demonstrated his level of command “proficiency.” With the French trying to outflank him at Bielefeld, Cumberland ordered his army to retreat. In the ensuing needless confusion, and lacking real leadership, the troops fired upon each other, inflicting as much damage as the French did. This almost comic state of affairs continued until Cumberland’s men fell back on Hameln, where they began entrenching.

  Fortunately, with this caliber of a “leader,” there was serious dissension in the ranks of the French. Soubise did not like d’Estrèes at all, and wanted to upstage him in the advance into the heart of Germany. Madame de Pompadour, King Louis VX’s mistress and considered the chief instigator of the French in this war, clearly favored Soubise over d’Estrèes. Duke de Richelieu, who coveted the latter’s command, encouraged this situation.

  But there was more distressing news from East Prussia for Frederick. The great enemy to the East, the Russians, was largely an unknown, unproven entity. For example, the history and the structure of their military were shrouded in mystery to Western eyes from the time of Peter the Great.5 At the end of June, this Russian enemy, in two armies, crossed the border.6 One army, of 37,000 men, under General Villim Villimovich Fermor, swept across near Memel, and, with the aid of a naval flotilla under Admiral Lewis, laid siege to it. The Russian fleet pounded Memel from the sea, while Fermor’s forces worked against the place from the landward side.7 Lehwaldt had his hands full with the second Russian army, this one more than 70,000 strong under Apraxsin,8 near Tilsit. He could thus provide no assistance to Memel, which had fewer than a thousand men for garrison.

  This Russian advance left Lehwaldt’s heavily outnumbered army as the only field force on the Eastern Front and with the enemy, Memel being in clear danger, at both front and rear. Lehwaldt was not used to an independent command either. This would quickly show up.9 Moreover, if Memel fell, the Russian fleet would have a ready port through which they could supply the army, to “consequently prosecute the operations of the campaign.”10 A really severe turn of events for the struggling Prussians in their old homeland. Not to mention the forfeited prestige of possibly losing part of that homeland.11

  In the north the Swedes were also on the move.12 They landed their army near Stralsund while their navy blockaded Stettin.13 This Northern Front gave the Prussians no real worry for now, Sweden really more or less providing a show to justify a substantial subsidy from France to maintain pressure upon Prussia, from that side. Not to mention a continuing fear of their eastern Russian neighbors.14 As for the Reich and the motley Imperialist army, they were preparing to move, but this army was largely a façade and required only slight attention from the Prussians.15 The French were more dangerous. That is, both in mere appearance and in cold, hard reality.

  During the night of July 9–10, d’Estrèes and his French army rose from Bielefeld and moved forward. Before him Cumberland and his “Army of Observation” (as his army was derisively called because of its preference to observe rather than fight) pulled back the patrols, towards the Weser River and the camp at Hameln.16

  Frederick tried to eliminate the danger of the French advance by resort to one of man’s oldest weaknesses, avarice. Through his sister Wilhelmine, the Margravine of Bayreuth, the king corresponded with a high-ranking Frenchman named Mirabeau. Frederick offered five million thaler for peace between France and Prussia, but the Pompadour’s influence was t
oo great and the offer was summarily declined. It was another instance where Frederick’s talents, while so readily apparent on the military scene, were sorely lacking on the political front. Explaining why the king preferred the more certain—and more immediate—behavior of a battlefield compared to the often drawn-out intrigues of politics.

  The French believed Prussia on the verge of collapse (wishful thinking?), and the Pompadour still ached for revenge against the sharp-tongued Prussian king, who had insulted her on a number of occasions. To satisfy that revenge, France seemed prepared to sacrifice her entire Asian and North American possessions to the English—in the end that is just what she did.

  Back in Bohemia, Prince Wilhelm was finding his job of withdrawal no easy task. He was not of the same caliber of leader as his brothers, and there was disunity among his subordinates. The capable Winterfeldt, loathed by Wilhelm and Schmettau and most of the staff, had accompanied the prince to his new command. The formations shaken at Kolin were with this body, so the Austrians selected Wilhelm’s men as their special target. With some 18,000 men, the undertaking was very difficult. The locals were also turning against Wilhelm’s men, by preventing timely delivery of supplies to the Prussians.17

  Prince Charles and Daun had every intention of trying to follow their success, but there were problems that needed ironed out beforehand. The citizens of Prague had many bones of contention with Charles. One of the biggest was the decision to drive some 12,000 of the city’s inhabitants beyond the walls, under rather cruel circumstances, during the siege, but the bluecoats would not permit it.18 Out beyond Prague itself, the Prussians had eaten out the country by the time the Austrians arrived, so the latter were forced to carry their provisions with them. This was accomplished by equine transportation. Frederick had cooly and deliberately stripped the countryside of as many horses as possible, making equipping remounts for the Austrians difficult. Also, Marshal Browne, in the midst of all the confusion, finally succumbed early on the morning of June 26 from tuberculosis and his battle wound.19

  Daun brought his army out to Schwarze Koselitz, on June 22. Scouts were sent to check on the enemy’s movements. June 23, Marshal Daun heard from reliable sources that the bluecoats were in Nimburg, trying to reform from their near disaster. June 24, Daun reacted by moving on Skwoyretz; the following morning, the marshal himself journeyed to Prague to discuss future campaign operations. Charles was still trying to recover from the debilitating siege. On June 26, the main Austrian army was at Podschernitz, although Prince Charles did not issue in full strength from Prague until the end of June. June 29, Daun met the sallying Charles at Czelakowitz. Charles immediately assumed command of the combined army.20

  July 1, General Morocz was pressed off the left side of the Elbe on Bakupen, while Nádasti made straight for the bluecoat lines over near Leitmeritz. With the dispatch of other forces, the Austrians were trying to keep track of the retrograde movements of their foe. Nádasti pushed on Benatek, to await the eruption of the main army thereabouts. His vanguard (a body of Croats at Beck’s command) was at Korka, hard by Jung-Bunzlau.

  Following Keith or going against the king himself near Leitmeritz did not seem tempting targets, so operations against the detachment of Wilhelm were by default. Neither Charles nor Daun ever seemed to come to an understanding about some plan or another to follow. The two apparently never enjoyed working together, since their entire working effort, up to and including the Battle of Leuthen, was fraught with difficulty.

  That was just fine from the Prussian point of view, but none of this sat well with Chancellor Kaunitz, who, in a June 24 conference at Vienna, made clear that the defeated, shaky Prussians needed to be followed up without delay. This to derive whatever advantage Kolin could bring to the troubled state of Austrian arms. Every day that was wasted without trying to follow up their advantage was one that could not be later retrieved. It was to make little difference as this matter of urgency, which should have been pursued aggressively, was left largely by the wayside. Prince Charles and Daun were both too slow and methodical for such a decisive course of action as the circumstances demanded. Later criticism was levied against Daun, the victor of Kolin, in particular. In fact, “the same might have been said of Daun which was said to Hannibal [of Carthage], ‘Thou knowest how to conquer, but how to use thy victory that thou knowest not.’”21

  As for Wilhelm, his orders were to retire as quickly as he was pressed by the enemy, but also he had to keep the passes into Saxony secure and hold Zittau; here his magazines, his lifeline, were located. Wilhelm stayed put around Jung-Bunzlau, which he had retaken on June 30. On July 3, a council-of-war was called, attended by the prince, Winterfeldt, Schmettau, General Karl Christoph von der Goltz22 and General Retzow. It was decided that Jung-Bunzlau could not be held against the main Austrian army, which was advancing now. The army was to withdraw to the West some 30 miles to Neuschlöss.23

  Three days prior, the advanced Austrian troops were charged off to cross the Elbe under General Anton Graf von Colloredo and press for Niemes. Retreat was imperative for the hesitating Prince Wilhelm. During the night of July 3–4, the Prussians rose and made their way westward, reaching Neuschlöss before dawn. Meanwhile, word filtered back (on July 3) to the Austrian headquarters, courtesy of Nádasti, that the enemy were evacuating Jung-Bunzlau for Weisswasser. July 4, the Austrians reached Benatek, with their left deploying almost to the Iser and the right wing wrapped by Struka. All the while, Colonel Laudon continued his energetic ways. He boasted a total of approximately 2,000 Croats and 600 hussars under his command; which force he freely unleashed upon the bluecoats. June 25, Laudon systematically struck at a Prussian detachment of some 2,390 men near Schirschitz. The bluecoats were driven off in confusion, leaving behind 261 captives.24 Laudon lost 13 officers and men.

  In addition, with Imperial authorization, Laudon had commissioned a large group of civilians along the probable Prussian line of retreat to cut down trees, form obstacles of dirt and rock, and do everything they could to make the lives of the enemy miserable as they retreated. June 28, the resolute Laudon struck again, scattering an escort for a Prussian supply train on the way from Lobositz, capturing the entire convoy and nabbing 157 prisoners in the process.25 The fiery commander even managed to accomplish some naval exploits of a sort. This by sinking four large Prussian barges, loaded with camp equipage, near Aussig. The king was beside himself with anger at these latest developments. Laudon was beginning to emerge as one formidable enemy, a real thorn in the side.26

  Prince Wilhelm’s new post at Neuschlöss was a good one, closer to the king’s main body as well. His men lingered there for just three days, as the Austrian patrols were closing in steadily. July 7, the again alarmed prince pulled up and retired to Böhm-Leipa—some 30 miles southwest of Zittau. From Gabel, this unfortunate detachment drew supplies, although Wilhelm failed to provide Gabel or even Zittau with an adequate garrison to keep the enemy at bay. The bluecoat force round about Gabel hastily made a makeshift line of redoubts and did all they could to help strengthen the stone wall which enclosed the town. Winterfeldt tried his best to point out the “oversight” of exposing the essential towns to capture, to no avail, and to complete the blunder, the main roads were left with insufficient pickets.27

  The case can be argued that the king’s instructions, both in spirit and in substance, were not far removed from the events. Frederick apparently gave his seal of approval on the march to Neuschlöss, and Winterfeldt himself, of all people, was behind the withdrawal on Böhm-Leipa.28 Prince Wilhelm “looked in vain” for concrete orders from his royal brother.29 Frederick’s best case scenario would have to involve him retaining a key position at Leitmeritz, from where he could react quickly to an Austrian invasion into Saxony by swiftly moving on Aussig to fend off such an effort while Prince Wilhelm marched as swiftly as possible to join him. On the other hand, if the main enemy effort was to be against Lusatia, Wilhelm should be able to employ a mountain position to slow down the enemy
while Frederick marched to join him. Such cozy reasoning would soon be upset, because so much was riding on the rôle Wilhelm and his men played in all of this.

  Even worse, Prince Wilhelm was poorly served by his “eyes,” his scouts. The Austrians were said to be covering the main road to Zittau with some “artillery.” One source says an informant, primed for that purpose by the enemy, had passed along word the road from Leipa to Rumberg was packed with troops and ordnance; some 40 Austrian guns.30 Much precious time was lost until this ordnance was discovered to be nothing more than cattle (apparently neutral cattle at that) blocking the road.31 With the Prussian situation following the Kolin debâcle, for the reconnaissance patrols to have performed as poorly as they did here seems inconceivable.

  As it was, the prince eyed with increasing nervousness the raids of enemy irregulars, though he did maintain communication with the king throughout. The latter showered Wilhelm only with denunciations and acid remarks. These could not have encouraged a man who already seemed over his head to start with. July 4, the Austrians took up temporary quarters at Kosmanos. Daun reached Jung-Bunzlau on July 6, and the next day Münchengrätz. The vanguard was led by that most energetic task master, Count Major-General Esterhazy. Münchengrätz was astride the Iser River in front, and the Austrians encamped between a thick wood on the left and a rather large pond on their right.

  For a brief period, Wilhelm appeared to have secured at least a lull. Now, with a large body of Austrians, some 70,000 strong, encamped within five miles or so, the prince was suddenly in bad straits again. The enemy were also being very methodical. July 8, the main Austrian force moved with purpose on Swigan—some 11 miles northeast of Münchengrätz. About the same time, word filtered into the Austrian headquarters in Vienna that Prince Charles and Daun were taking way too much time about advancing against the enemy. Maria Theresa was becoming anxious how Austria’s allies might perceive this situation. Most especially as conditions had never been so favorable for them.32