Ziethen arrived at Parchwitz during the evening of December 2, having successfully rallied some 18,000 men with plenty of guns and equipment. Scraping together every available man, Frederick could dispose of some 32,000 men with which to undertake the task of driving the enemy from Silesia.
Chapter Seventeen
Preliminaries to Leuthen1
The advent of the month of December precluded any of the swift marches and tricky maneuvers the Prussians could often use with notable success against a less capable adversary. Frederick realized two things: (1) That he must drive the enemy from Silesia at all costs; (2) If he failed the first task, then Prussia’s defeat, considering that Silesia provided a large percentage of the recruits for his army, could not be long delayed. This factor, coupled with its resources and the topographical features, location—jutting as it did towards the heart of the Austrian Empire.
The job that the Prussian king had set before him was by no means an easy task. The Austrians held most of Silesia in what might be compared to an iron grip. By virtue of the new garrisons in Schweidnitz and Breslau, not to mention the large field army with Prince Charles, they virtually controlled the province. The king must beat back the field army first of all and then take back these strong places. He determined to march his small army straight at the enemy wherever he happened to locate them and give battle. As Frederick wrote in his History, “Time of all things, was most precious. Or the province must be given up eternally.”2 He expected to find an army posted on the best available ground and in numbers at least “equal to his own.” Frederick seems really aware of the long odds he was facing. But, so long as Prince Charles’s army remained intact, then the plan to reconquer Silesia would be plainly impossible. Battle, despite the handicap of inferior numbers, it would have to be.
Frederick attempted, with much success, to compensate for his inferiority in numbers by resort to good cheer. He had increased rations distributed to the men, and allowed them to freely indulge in liquors and wines, and promoted whomever at the moment appeared to deserve it—an easy task because of the large casualties that the army had suffered in the long campaign. He had the story of Rossbach told and retold so the gloomy troops of Ziethen could take heart again. The latter troops had known nothing but defeat for months.
In addition, the king called a council-of-war (a rarity for him) during the night of December 3–4. At it he made a speech to his generals3 which has become the most famous he was ever to make on a field-of-battle. The one for which he is most noted in the limelight of history4:
Gentlemen, it is not unknown to those of you who perceive what disasters have befallen us here, while we were away busy with the French and Imperialist Army. Schweidnitz is gone, and the Duke of Bevern beaten; Breslau is gone and a good part of Silesia as well. In fact, my embarrassment would be even higher, had I not boundless trust in my generals; in you and in your fine qualities, which have often been manifested, as the great soldiers and sons of Prussia. There is hardly one among you who has not distinguished himself by some noble, memorable action. All of these services for the State and myself I well know, and will not soon forget!
I, therefore, flatter myself that in this case, too, nothing will be wanting that the State has a right to expect of the valor of you and of your men. The hour is at last at hand! I should think I have done nothing if I left the Austrians in possession of Silesia.
Let me appraise you, then, of my intentions: I intend, in spite of the Rules of War, to attack Prince Karl’s [Charles’s] army, which has nearly thrice our strength, wherever I happen to find it. The question is not of his numbers, or the strength of the position he occupies; all of this, by our courage, by the skill of our methods, we will try to amend and make good. This step I must risk, or else everything is lost for good! We must beat the enemy, or perish everyone of us before his batteries! Make this determination known to all officers of this army; prepare your men for what work is now to ensue, and say that I hold myself entitled to demand exact fulfillment of my orders. For You, when I reflect that you are Prussians, I can not think that you will act unworthily! But if there should be one or another among you who dreads to share all dangers with me, he can have his discharge this very evening, and shall not suffer the least reproach from me.
Frederick paused at that moment for the reaction of his generals, and must have been greatly comforted by their obvious approval of what he said.
“Ah! I knew it,” continued the king,
none of you would desert me! I depend on you, then; with that on victory as sure. If I am left on the field of battle and not able to reward you for what you will do on the morrow, our country will see that that is done. Now go down to your respective commands and tell your men what has been said at this council. Now I demand again exact obedience. The Cavalry Regiment that does not, the instant an order is given, dash at full plunge into the enemy, I will, directly after the battle is done, unhorse and make into a garrison regiment. The Infantry battalion which meet, with what it may, shows the slightest sign of hesitating, loses its colors and its sabers, and shall have the trimmings cut from its uniforms! Now, Goodnight Gentlemen! Shortly we will have beaten the enemy or we will never see one another again.5
The generals returned to their men, and told the story of what had just transpired. That very evening, Frederick rode through the camp and talked with many of his private soldiers. Even the ordinary soldiers seemed energized by the whole spectacle. “Seasoned men, who under the king’s command had won so many victories … promised to stand beside each other to the finish.”6
A rumor was circulated to the effect that the king inquired of a certain Frenchman why he had deserted from the Prussian army, the reply was: “Indeed, your Majesty, see how down we have gotten in the world and what a time we are having.” Frederick answered him, without a hint of bravado, “Well, let us try it one day more on the morrow, and, if beaten, we both will desert!” That gossip, whether true or not, received wide circulation in the army. One thing in all of this was for sure, Frederick had shown himself more human to his troops immediately before Leuthen than ever before or again.
As to the Austrians, definite word reaching them that the bluecoats, in spite of inferior numbers and the odds, were earnest for battle, they called their own council-of-war to debate whether to await the enemy’s advance or move to meet them. Counselors were really divided. Daun, generally defensive-minded, was definitely in favor of the former course, while loud, boisterous General Luchessi spoke out with a firm resolve to go meet the foe.7 No hesitation. Prince Charles finally decided upon the second course,8 though hindsight shows he would have been better off to heed Daun’s advice. So the Austrians left their strong positions on the lower side of Breslau and marched across the Schweidnitz River, leaving the little village of Lissa to their right rear, probably in search of a battle with Frederick’s Prussians.
It is also quite possible that Charles meant nothing more than establishing a winter base to secure the Katzbach. On this point, “the army having been [supplied] … for four days, with every thing [sic] necessary.”9 For what? Either course would have been possible under the circumstances. Establishing a winter post or a campaign camp. There was some merit. The often critical Arneth praised the new Austrian camp as a good one,10 so it must have had some good points.
December 4, 0400 hours, Frederick marched from Parchwitz straight towards the enemy’s camp. He heard, with mixed feelings we might add, that the Austrians had accountably left their secure camp behind the Schweidnitz River and were marching at him. The Prussian line-of-march proceeded in four main columns, Frederick—as was usual—with the vanguard, with the destination of Neumarkt, a little village about 12 miles from Parchwitz and only 18 from Breslau itself. Reaching within a few miles of the place, about 1300 hours, the king received word from his reconnaissance parties that the bakery of the enemy’s main army was present there and hard at work, in company with an engineer corps, preparing an encampment. This whole group
was under the protection of about 1,000 Croats, led by our old friend General Gersdorf.
Frederick took action quickly. He sent a regiment speeding round it on both flanks and ordered the horsemen to occupy a height behind Neumarkt where he intended to make camp. Once this was accomplished, he attacked the Croats with the advanced guard11 immediately. The troopers crashed through the gate, and at once attacked the irregulars quartered there. The latter were quickly defeated and driven back in utter disaster.
They exposed the bakery and the engineers. The Croats flew to the rear, found bluecoats on the rise behind and in front, and promptly scattered. A short match that netted 569 prisoners from the Croats as well as 120 of their number killed. The survivors made their way to the village of Borne, where Saxon foreposts were located. Frederick’s men enjoyed the hearty meal that had been intended for the enemy. While the Prussians partook of the unexpected treat, Prince Charles’s men had finally commenced their march. Making sure of rations in the haversacks, the whitecoats started marching about the time that Frederick surprised Neumarkt’s defenders.12 The Prussians were positioned that night (December 4–5) in long, thin order at right angles to the anticipated enemy, now only some ten miles away. Prince Charles was apparently, blissfully, unaware of their proximity to him.
A report that the bluecoats had captured Neumarkt and the forces thereabouts soon reached the Austrian headquarters, about 1300 hours on December 4. This was the first inkling that the Prussians were actually that close at hand. The Austrian army was spread for the moment along the high road between Breslau and Leuthen, on either flank were villages, woody hills, and swampy ground to provide some protection from the Prussians.
The right flank leaned on the little village of Nypern, with its peat bogs and very low marshy ground, making a virtually impregnable post from all appearances. The center was positioned near the village of Leuthen; Nádasti brought his command to take position behind Leuthen and Sagschütz to become the Austrian left. The whole line faced west and was in extent from one end to the other some 51⁄2 miles. It was enhanced by a large number of artillery pieces as well as hastily constructed redoubts. Prince Charles had seven full battalions in Leuthen to secure it as the center of the army, while Luchessi, who had command of the Austrian right, was allocated eight battalions for Nypern. The army numbered some 65,000 men present for battle. However, the recent arrival of the Austrians in that vicinity meant they had not had time yet to prepare entrenched works within their lines. None had been started. This would tend to lead credence to the contention that Prince Charles was only seeking winter quarters all along during this pre-battle period.
During the night, the Austrian army was kept in the dark about the various movements of the bluecoats going on and there do not appear to have been any orders issued about the countermeasures that would need to be taken. As a result, anything that could have been attempted could not even be discussed in practical terms.
Chapter Eighteen
The Battle of Leuthen1
The composition of the Austrian army was the following: 84 battalions of infantry; 144 squadrons of cavalry; and 210 guns, although most of these latter were lighter ordnance. A number of heavier guns had been left in front of Breslau, as they could not be easily moved. Also, Prince Charles was suffering from an acute sense of overconfidence. One that would prove terminal for his military career. Witness his “Potsdam Guard Company” reference.2 The cavalry of the right flank was at Guckerwitz and the horse on the left were posted at Leuthen, though the latter would get moved rather quickly, as we will see.
By comparison, Frederick could bring far fewer men to a battle than the whitecoats. The Prussian army was composed of the following: 48 battalions of infantry (21,000 men), 128 squadrons of cavalry (11,000 men), with 167 guns—of which 61 were heavy guns, 96 light guns, and ten of the superheavy guns, lugged by horse and manpower with great effort from Glogau. The last would help the Prussian cause during the ensuing battle. Incidently, the wounds that Seydlitz and Prince Henry had suffered at Rossbach precluded their participation in the coming action; the king had to do without their services at a crucial time.
The bluecoats moved from Neumarkt about 0430 hours (at this time of year long before daylight) on December 5, 1757. A token force—a single regiment—was left behind to guard the army’s equipment and camp. This was done to prevent Prince Charles from pulling a surprise on them similar to the one that had been done earlier on the Austrians. Frederick was on horseback early, and rode out with the van, which had six regiments of hussars, three irregular battalions, and some riflemen.
According to a story related long after the fact, the king (by no means overconfident of victory) pulled Major Friedrich Wilhelm Kleist to one side and told him, in apparent confidence, that, if the coming battle ended in defeat, “his services as an escort [to the king] would be required.”3
The army moved in four columns forward through the damp, hazy hours of the pre-dawn winter morning, destination on the first leg, Borne, some eight miles to the north-northwest. Two columns marched on either side of the lane, with the artillery taking the road itself.
Dawn was just breaking as the advanced guard approached the village. The scouts perceived an enemy body of cavalry ahead in the distance. The northern end of the enemy’s formation seemed to vanish in the prevailing fog, and extended right across the highway over which the Prussian army would have to advance. At first, Frederick believed it might be the right wing of the main Austrian army. But, just to make sure, he put spurs to his horse and personally led an attack against them, in front and flank. The 12th Dragoons of Lt.-Gen. Friedrich Eugene, Duke of Württemberg led the way. The ever faithful Szekeley Hussars rode down the enemy’s right flank.
Fortunately, the army proved to be only General Nostitz with three light-duty Saxon horse regiments, plus two Imperialist hussar regiments—Nádasti’s and the Dessewffi Hussars—which had been placed ahead of Borne to gather up the remnants of the force from Neumarkt as well as guard the road to Breslau, it being just five miles from Borne and ten to Breslau.
Nostitz was taken completely by surprise. The allied troopers, who should have been watching with more alertness, were jumped by a wily foe who appeared out of what seemed nowhere; out of 800 men, Nostitz lost 540 and two battle standards in a short fight.4 The survivors were sent at a full gallop past and through Nypern, towards Luchessi’s sphere of influence. Nostitz himself was severely wounded and just did escape from being captured by the bluecoats.5
The road having been cleared, the king sent his prisoners back in full view of the army, while his men marched through Borne, halting on the far side for a brief rest. Taking his staff officers with him,6 the king rode forward to the Scheuberg, the farthest northern mound of a line of knolls between the Austrian army and the region of Radaxdorf. This rise would play a big role in the upcoming struggle. From the Scheuberg, Frederick observed the army of Prince Charles and Daun stretched out across the road directly ahead as well as right and leftwards, covering all three roads leading on into Breslau. He discerned how it extended from Nypern, where the right ended, straight round, sort of a like a large “L,” back from Sagschütz and on to Gross Goblau, where the left stood refused like the horizontal bar of the letter. Here the big Austrian army was positioned.
By now the haze had gone, and the light of the early morning was brightening, which made it so easy to see the Austrian deployment that the king is said to have remarked: “one could almost count it man by man with one’s eyepiece.”7 Estimates of the enemy strength were between 80,000 and 90,000.8 In any event, Prince Charles’s intentions, to cover Breslau at all hazards, were plain enough. But the loss of Borne, more than any other preliminary operation, contributed to the Austrian disaster that ensued. For, from there, the road for Frederick was open almost into the enemy’s lines. From the knolls beyond, Charles’s army could be studied with a careful thought designed to bring about its ruin. But, most importantly of all, this line of mound
s, which divided up the terrain thereabouts, would conceal Prussian movements behind them, as Charles had no higher post by then. Advantage: Frederick. After reconnoitering the enemy’s position, the monarch sent his vanguard cavalry against the survivors of the Nostitz force, to prevent them from warning the main army of the imminent advance of the Prussians.9
Though the Prussian pursuit was rapid, a few men from the Borne detachment did indeed reach Luchessi’s command, but their disoriented rumblings caused the Austrian commanders to dismiss this “incident” as little more than a Prussian scouting party on the prowl.10 Simultaneously, the king called forward his forward most cavalry and gave it instructions to occupy this line of mounds, with the Scheuberg as the most northern, and hold the rises against all comers.
For the next three hours, the Prussian monarch stayed at that hill, comparing the contending armies, studying and formulating his plan-of-battle.11 Looking now at the terrain we can see the task that Frederick had set for himself and his army. At Nypern and the place where Luchessi was positioned, the ground was boggy and too rough for serious offensive operations, although woody tracts lay just ahead of the Austrian right as a sort of blinder to shield movements from him.
The majority of the ground consisted of low, but uneven ground, not high at all; indeed, the Scheuberg and its neighboring mounds were not hills at all in the true sense. The main road ran through Borne to Leuthen, and just beyond it the latter split before crossing the Schweidnitz River. The southernmost branch ran to Hermmansdorf, the northernmost on Lissa and Goldsschmeiden. South of the highroad from Neumarkt, lay Sagschütz and Radaxdorf (the latter near the end of the open countryside flanking Borne) and the latter was not nearly as wavy as on the north. It was more favorable for an attack by the Prussians. And, most fortunately, the country near Leuthen happened to be an old Prussian parade ground, so the king and his men knew it intimately. In front of Borne, towards Frobelwitz and Gross Heidau, the ground rose up just enough to conceal movements from Borne—this was the reason Borne’s loss had been so serious—from Austrian scouts.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 32