In front of the Austrian left, the ground was creased by the rolling terrain, creating a defile, which would prove very important in the battle. The monarch’s plan was being forcefully worked out. It was apparent that Luchessi held a formidable post. An attack against his side would likely be broken up by the combination of stubborn enemy resistance and the difficulties of the ground before the bluecoats could ever come to grips. An assault against the Austrian center was ruled out as well, as this would give Charles the outright advantage of superior numbers. Besides, while the Prussians were thus occupied, Luchessi might come marching out from the Zettel Woods (the group of trees in front of the Austrian center) to take them in flank and rear.
That left the left wing, which was finally selected because accessibility from the line of mounds the Prussians occupied was readily available, not to mention the fact its remote location from Luchessi’s flank was far enough removed to preclude any thought of a surprise stroke from him. The whitecoats, for the most part, appeared to be surprised that Frederick would even offer battle with the odds so clearly against him. Indeed, “they [the Austrians] could hardly believe their eyes” when Frederick moved to the attack.12 Worse still, this curious lassitude caused some of the Austrian units to lay aside “their accouterments, putting them together with knapsacks in heaps.”13 Luchessi, meanwhile, had misread the situation. Seeing the bluecoats paused on the road in marching order, which naturally, because of its position, appeared to be threatening the Austrian right, he became concerned. Further, observing the enemy’s pursuit of the survivors of Nostitz’ command towards his flank, he grew alarmed and thought that Frederick meant to attack him. He was thus handicapped by the lack of reliable intelligence.
The Prussians had turned southward, as soon as the king had completed his planning for battle, and smoothly the four columns of the line-of-march became the two of the battle order. From one side of Borne and the road the men turned, as soon as their officers received orders, and moved in behind the knolls. This maneuver served to conceal them from the Austrian lines, while on the other side of Borne the vanguard stayed put to “menace” both Luchessi and the troops of the Austrian center.
The Austrian commanders had been quite curious about all of this, to say the least. With no high posts left, they had to resort to using the tallest buildings in Leuthen to try to ascertain just what the bluecoats were up to. As a result, Prince Charles and Daun were in the unenviable position of knowing almost nothing of Frederick’s movements, while the latter knew nearly the complete Austrian preparations.
The rolling ground was difficult to detect movements in, despite the fact that the tract was mostly open country devoid of forests and shrubbery. Charles guessed as best he could with the limited information available to him. The cavalry which the Prussian king had planted on the line of mounds he took to be the Prussian right, and could not help but wondering why it had been put there. Other than to hold the knolls. Of course, it was also to hold enemy attention. (A task it was obviously doing quite well).
From the windmills, from the tops of churches, from all of the places with any sort of vantage the Austrian staff officers busied themselves scanning the region just in front of them for any sort of movement that might betray Frederick’s intentions. Daun, at the mill at Frobelwitz, seeing the heads of the bluecoats turning to march southward as if aiming for Kertschütz (about two miles south-southwest of Leuthen) supposed them to be retreating. “These people are smuggling away,” he said, “for Heaven’s sake, let them go peacefully!”14
Luchessi, meanwhile, seeing more and more Prussians coming from Borne15 and, knowing that in Frederick’s previous battles, Prague, Kolin, and, to a lesser extent, at Rossbach, it was invariably the opposing right flank that had received the first blow, put two and two together, and concluded that the bluecoats intended to attack him. Alarmed, Luchessi sent an urgent request to Prince Charles and Daun informing them he could not hope to hold off a Prussian attack by himself (in spite of the bravado), but that the cavalry reserves, which were stationed at the moment behind the left wing, where the Austrian commanders themselves believed an attack most likely, should be moved at once to his end of the front to strengthen the post.
But Charles and Daun, who undoubtedly understood the Prussian king’s tactics better, sent only a message to the effect that the reserves were needed right where they were and that, in any case, Luchessi could hold out until help could arrive, if indeed he would be struck. It was always possible the king was performing another of his maneuvers, without any intention of bringing on a battle after all. The allied commanders had seen plenty of that kind of activity before. Or at least it would be indicated by one seasoned veteran. After General Puebla approached Prince Charles and Daun in late morning, he inquired of the likelihood of battle that day. The two commanders did not really believe that would happen, except one seasoned veteran who prophetically told the assembled thong: “They [the Prussians] will strike our left and turn it today.”16
Meanwhile, the reassurances of headquarters provided little consolation for the worried Luchessi, who watched with ever greater alarm as additional Prussians began demonstrating in front of him. Soon a second messenger was being dispatched, with a similar request of the army commanders. They returned in like manner with more argument about an attack on the Austrian right being out of the question but that, if true, then Luchessi certainly could hold his own until reinforcements could be sent to him.
A third message was sent on its way by Luchessi. In it, the once “fearless” man stated if the reserves were not shifted posthaste to his wing, then he could not be held responsible for what might happen on his side. By then it was 1000 hours, and the two Austrian commanders, surveying the maneuvers in front of their right flank, decided that the enemy were indeed planning an assault on that side; instead of on the left. The decision was made at once to send reinforcements to Luchessi. The reserve and even a portion of the left wing cavalry. Daun, accompanied by Arenberg, himself galloped off with these troops, which were being taken some five miles from where the real danger lay; by about 1130 hours, the operation had been completed. The newcomers and the right wing troops sat waiting for an attack that never came and where reinforcements were the least needed. The reserve consisted of the 9th, 16th, 31st, 30th, 55th, 56th, 57th, and 38th Infantry, led by Serbelloni. In all fairness to the Austrian commanders, even the brief account of the battle preserved in Lloyd has to admit “the enemy’s motions behind the hills not being discovered,” the reserves were forthwith moved.17
In the meanwhile, the Prussian march was proceeding: three battalions (one of Itzenplitz’s 13th Infantry and the 26th of Major-General Dietrich Richard von Meyernick) under General Georg von Wedell was ahead of the right—now in advance—followed by Ziethen and 43 squadrons of horse, along with six battalions under Prince Moritz, while the left followed under Retzow and consisted of the rest of the infantry (38 battalions) and 40 squadrons on the flank, under Lt.-Gen. Georg Wilhelm von Driesen.18 The Cuirassiers were complimented by ten squadrons of hussars with the heavy guns amongst them. The rearguard, under Prince Eugene of Württemberg, boasted a strength of 25 squadrons of hussars.
The Prussians set off at about 1000 hours, and the march up took some two hours to complete. About 1200 hours, the bluecoats reached Lobetintz, across from Nádasti’s left wing. Frederick, from the top of the windmill there, looked out and perceived, no doubt to his surprise and great relief, that his ruse had been successful and the enemy’s reserves had been moved from Nádasti’s quarters. Although he was not aware of it, nor would he appreciated having been told, Luchessi greatly assisted Frederick with his difficult task. Thanks to him, the attack would be even better than could have been hoped otherwise.
The march had one other effect completely absent from Kolin. The right wing/center/left wing were simply too close together on that battlefield to try to launch an isolated assault (that was true of Prague as well). At Leuthen, the Prussian army was too
drawn out for this to be a factor. And the Austrian force was definitely too drawn out for its own good.
Nádasti’s position was not by any means weak, but, thanks to the Austrian commanders and Luchessi, it was not now as strong as it should have been. His base line was protected by a battery of 14 guns, posted on Keipern Hill behind his post at Sagschütz, and in front of the road to Radaxdorf/Gross Gohlau and the Schweidnitz River. Behind the front, an abatis had been dug at right angles towards the center of the Austrian front; this, together with the works just described, was the crux of the allied left wing. Nádasti had been placed to cover the Sagschütz-Lissa road. Along the forest, irregulars in great numbers had been deployed to fragment a Prussian attack as much as possible before the opposing forces could come to blows. In addition, the Austrian left boasted the not inconsiderable advantage of the terrain. Here the ground sloped upwards in front of Nádasti’s lines, lending itself to the defenders, while heavy vehicles, such as the Prussian horsed-artillery teams, would find it difficult going.
Despite the strength of the position he held, Nádasti could in no way have held off an attack by the main Prussian body. The front of the latter came marching out from behind the knolls near Löbetintz at about 1215 hours and headed directly for Sagschütz. Their advance threatened the weakened Austrian left. Confronted suddenly by practically the entire Prussian army, Nádasti sent messenger after messenger to headquarters pleading for reinforcements. But it was too late; this time the bluecoat advance was in deadly earnest. As his countrymen emerged into clear view, Wedell moved out ahead to strike the enemy’s line. A battery of six guns followed in support, along with Moritz’ and six battalions and their batteries (one boasted the ten super heavy guns), while Ziethen rode up behind. From the direction of the southwest, about 1300 hours, the Prussians advanced to give battle. Their artillery teams galloped past the infantry and took up position at commanding points, as the marching foot soldiers swept past them to assault the posts in front. The Battle of Leuthen had begun.
Wedell attacked the defenses of Sagschütz. The 26th of Meyernick was led forward by Prince Moritz. The sudden blow towards the left that pushed the Prussian army into battle carried the 26th forward. Moritz exclaimed, “Honor enough!” go back.19 He meant fall back on the second line. A young color bearer in the ranks, Ernst Friedrich von Barsewisch, heard his comrades of the 26th shout, “we’d be yellow bellies to retreat now! Send more cartridges!”20 The impetus carried the men forward, not phased even by an Austrian counterattack launched against it. There were 14 Pour-le-Merite metals distributed; 454 men men, 10 officers had been laid low. The 27th Infantry of Major-General Asseburg, lost its commander, Lt.-Col. Friedrich Wilhelm von Wietstrick, in the right wing at Prague.
There was more. Kursell’s 37th on the left, seized three enemy cannon and thrust deep into the enemy lines. Major-General Prince Friedrich Franz of Brunswick’s 39th Infantry penetrated into the enemy left flank, actually plowing through the first line of his own army in the process. The regiment took 14 cannon from the Austrians while unintentionally disordering their fellow Prussians for this temerity.21 The 41st Infantry of Lt.-Gen. Neuweid fought valiantly on the right between the two Prussian lines, losing 79 dead and 73 wounded. The story of individual units confirms the fact that the Prussian victory here was no accident. The danger in this initial success could come from the Prussian forces so engaged losing contact with the rest of the army. This could result in another Kolin or worse.
The heavy guns of the Prussians opened a punishing shelling of the crude, hastily-made entrenchments which the Austrians had prepared.22 This stroke was successful, and the irregulars were forced out of the underbrush by the converging Prussian troops, who now attacked Nádasti’s main line and broke through it. In heavy fighting, the whitecoats gave way, and the Prussian super heavy guns now gladly added their thunderous roar to the fray. On their right, Ziethen had less success, at first. Nádasti’s cavalrymen actually charged at Ziethen’s formations before the latter had a chance to attack, and for a while the vaunted Prussian horsemen sure had a time of it. Ziethen’s formations formed a great part of the Prussian right. There was support available from nearby troops, including Prince Karl Bevern, with some six battalions.23 This was a strange formation indeed, since formations of foot and horse together were patently out of date, even by 1757 standards.24
The Austrian charge was downhill, and, for a moment, Ziethen’s forward elements were driven back upon their supporters. But the combination of numerical inferiority (on that end of the line) and the steady Prussian infantry support ruined the valiant, but vain, effort. This seemed to be an advantage at Leuthen; this dated formation and all. For as the front ranks of Ziethen’s men fell back, Bevern’s men standing by opened a terrific fire upon the enemy’s horsemen. The intensity of this effort, coupled by additional bluecoats moving up on their flanks and the unrelenting pounding from Frederick’s artillery, soon forced the stunned Austrians back into their own works.
While this was taking place, Ziethen disentangled his men from their cramped position in the marshy terrain and, reforming the lines, surged uphill against Nádasti’s cavalry. This counterattack was more successful, as the latter was broken and fell back into the Rathener Woods, trying desperately to resist the now irresistible Prussian advance.
The Normann Dragoons sliced up five cavalry regiments (three Austrian, two Saxon), netting 800 men, 11 officers, and three standards.25 A turn against reforming Cuirassier units smashed them, uncovered and allowed two Bavarian battalions to be captured. To complete the havoc, these valiant horsemen chased the retreating allied forces, seizing two cannon. The “mopping up,” referred to below, might in fact be understating the matter.
However, the 2nd Dragoons had a time of it. It had assisted Normann’s men in driving off Nádasti, but a counterattack by allied cavalry cost 118 men, including Lt.-Gen. Anton von Krockow, captured by the enemy in the midst of his men. The 11th Cuirassiers of Pennavaire and the 5th Dragoons (Lt.-Gen. Prince Friedrich von Bayreuth) led Driesen’s left between Leuthen and Frobelwitz. This blow seized eight cannon, nine flags, four standards, and captured two entire infantry regiments intact, all while riddling their supporters. Ziethen’s own 2nd Hussars smashed the Württemberg-Austrian positions26 in front of it, bagging over 2,000 prisoners in the process. The 11th Dragoons of General Jost Friedrich Ludwig von Stechow, acting in unison with the 2nd Dragoons, sacked the Austrian baggage. Besides the obvious military items contained therein, the men seized “ninety four wagons.”27 Lack of planning had exposed the flour, as well as the whole baggage train, to needless danger.
In retrospect, it certainly seems a mistake to entrust the key to the Austrian left wing to an auxiliary force of Württembergers, who certainly were not nearly as reliable as regular army units and showed a marked reluctance to fight the bluecoats, probably disliking them less than their Austrian “allies.”
So, after about 15 minutes of fighting, Nádasti’s troubled line was fairing poorly. At the extreme flank, the defenders were being turned out of their lines behind Sagschütz, and nearly along the whole of the front of the perimeter the king’s troops were pressing relentlessly on. At the abatis, where the Württemberg units of Truchese, Roeder, and Prinz Louis Regiments were, matters were even worse. Here the constant shelling of the Prussian batteries, including the super heavy guns, had already shaken the defenders when the bluecoats, attacking in oblique order—one battalion after another—-stormed forward, pressing the foe out at the point of the bayonet. Next, Nádasti’s battery on the Keipern was attacked. The Württembergers, retiring hastily, fell back upon it. The Prussian pursuers were right on their heels. Meinecke’s and Bevern’s men surmounted and overwhelmed the battery’s defenders. Soon, they had captured the Austrian posts there, and the angle of Nádasti’s flank was now severed. The Prussians continued to move, mopping up, while futile enemy efforts were hastily trying to organize to recover the battery and the hill. This was a serious tact
ical error, entrusting unsteady troops in key posts.28
Reinforcements from the center were quickly reaching the struggle on the left, but these were of but little help. As the newcomers intermingled with the largely by then demoralized men, they lost cohesion themselves. The Prussians, coming up strongly, drove this mass before them in what could nearly be compared to a cattle drive, with the king’s men as the herders. As one source relates of this critical juncture, “Thousands of the Imperial troops could not close and were carried away by the stream [of men].”29
Charles took desperate measures to make a stand.30 He hastily sent orders to Daun to come back to support Nádasti with the reserves and whatever other formations could be hastily gathered. And, while he waited for his horsemen, Charles sent the infantry forward piecemeal to the support of the battered left wing.
These extreme measures were unsuccessful, since as the new men got to the scene of the struggle they were already tired from double-timed marching, and none ever stood more than one stroke by the Prussians. About then the Austrian left was rolling back under terrific pressure, back towards Leuthen and the center of the army. In no way could the Austrians have delayed for enough time for the reserves behind Luchessi to come to their aid. In utter confusion, Nádasti’s men streamed for cover at Leuthen, although the commander himself was able to keep his cool and tried, in vain, to rally his men again and again.
Now came the coup de grâce to the battered Austrian left. Ziethen charged straight ahead into the defeated mass, and, by 1330 hours, was bagging whole battalions of Austrians as prisoners. The rest were driven upon the center in hopeless confusion. The hussar leader, continuing with his efforts, plowed into what remained of the Austrian army on that scene, and finished off Nádasti’s former line.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 33