Charles himself was making a furious effort to seal up the enemy’s penetration. As for Serbelloni, holding the cavalry reserves of the main force just beside Nádasti’s now shattered command, he became very nervous at seeing the progress of the Prussian attack. He had enjoyed the most energetic day of his career on the day of Kolin. At Leuthen, he was back to his old, predictable self. Buccow’s forward line, consisting of Kalkreuth’s 22nd Cuirassiers, plus the 4th (Erzerhog Ferdinand) and the 7th Dragoons (Bathanay), was abandoned to its fate, while Serbelloni took the rearward line of his command and pulled back through Leuthen itself. The withdrawal of this force left a vacuum that could not be filled by Buccow’s remaining forces.
Rather than be forced back on to the defense by the sudden enemy advent, Buccow’s horse charged across the open field that separated his command from the surging Prussians. The Austrian effort was made, but the charging cavalry could not break through the front rank of the Prussians. The Bathanay Dragoons got within easy striking distance, and there was a most spirited fight for a while. In spite of the best effort even of the valiant dragoons, the only thing Buccow ultimately accomplished was to gain time for the Austrian infantry reserves to man posts in and about Leuthen. Important enough under the circumstances.
With the deed of briefly stalling the advancing Prussian effort accomplished, the reserve was posted, after this exchange, behind the windmill on the north end of Leuthen. Yet all was confusion, and there was still some chance to turn the tide of the battle against the bluecoats. While all of this was taking place, General Puebla left the headquarters and went to seek out the Austrian right wing commanders with the new assignment. They were to swing around as fast as possible to form part of the new line.
The direction of the Prussian assaults had been turning and they were now facing due north. The Austrian commander threw more men in front of Frederick’s surging army, and ordered that Leuthen be made as defensible as possible with the time at their disposal. The church/churchyard were heavily manned, the land near the windmill packed with artillery. At the higher ground to the north of the village the whitecoats had earlier dug ditches (now crammed with troops) supported by an entrenched battery.
About 1400 hours, the mass of the retreating Austrians was wending back upon Leuthen and its grouping of defense posts. Now Prince Charles, seeing the whole southern front pierced beyond relief, gave a belated order for the army to fall back on a shorter, second line,31 which had Leuthen and its churchyard as the anchor of the position.
This allowed for better deployment of the remaining Austrian troops. The new line went up and down the main road between the Butterberg towards the Rathener Woods.32 The whole stretch was in extent only half the distance of the original front at an angle between Sagschütz and Nypern. Charles’s chances, despite the disaster of the Austrian left, were still good; his uncommitted troops outnumbered the whole Prussian army by two to one, and the latter were clearly slowing in their advance. Frederick’s men were beginning to tire from the incessant marches and the heavy fighting. Had the Austrians possessed the skill and determination to launch a major counterattack about then, the battle might have ended very much differently than it turned out.
Nevertheless, in and around Leuthen some of the heaviest fighting of the day was yet to rage. For a while longer, the issue would remain in doubt. Here the churchyard proved to be the obstacle to the advancing forces. The defenders were of the famed Roth Würzburg Franconian regiment—the 2nd battalion and the whole grenadier company under Captain Adelshaim. The men, caught by surprise at the rapidity of the enemy’s movements, quickly became disordered and piled into the village churchyard33 so that in short order the Austrians were packed like sardines in a can. At some points, they stood up to 100 ranks deep. Needless to say, this environment was hardly conducive to inspiring defense out of demoralized Austrians and allies. The overcrowding was much worse than that of Fermor’s Russians at Zorndorf the following year.
Behind and on either side of Leuthen, the thick masses of Prince Charles’s army stood ranked with large batteries placed among it. The Austrian commander felt a temporary stand could be made until Luchessi and his men came to offer assistance against the still advancing Prussian army. The assault against Leuthen’s churchyard, surrounded as it was by a high stone wall, was launched by General Friedrich Christoph von Saldern’s34 15th Infantry. The 15th performed wonders. The battery was stormed, and seven cannon, which might have helped contain the Prussian advance, taken. Following a furious fight, the advance was renewed, using bayonets and muskets as clubs—since the ammunition was largely exhausted—the bluecoats pressed against a second line of Austrian grenadiers behind the cemetery. These, too, were hurried on their way with substantial losses.
There was a heavy price to pay for these prodigies. One of the battalion commanders, Lt.-Col. von Diercke, 501 men, 17 officers paid with their lives or in battle wounds for the “privilege.” Möllendorf’s force, mentioned below, was also worthy of consideration.
Reaction was quickly forthcoming from the whitecoats. An Austrian battery was advanced to a ridge just north of the village, here it was meant to debar Frederick’s men as they debouched from Leuthen. From here, as well as from every vantage point within and about Leuthen, but especially from the churchyard, they unleashed a heavy cannister shot straight into the advancing ranks of the enemy. This resistance was only a temporary block to the king’s men, who could now sense victory within their grasp. By then it was 1430 hours, and the crisis of the battle had been reached.35
Saldern’s men hesitated in front of the churchyard under the withering fire. One of the eyewitness accounts say the effort was temporarily stalled. With his commanding officers failing to act, Senior Captain Wichard Joachim von Möllendorf, leading the 3rd battalion of the regiment, took matters into his own hands. “He leaped up, screaming, ‘Men, we must go! Follow me!’” then Möllendorf bundled forward, smashing through the barricaded door. Despite a desperate Austrian attempt to resist, “[Möllendorf’s] battalion smashed through the opening, and … [spread] out to the right and the left.”36 Möllendorf’s men broke into the grounds of the churchyard and drove the defenders out after a terrific beating.37 Münchow’s 36th Infantry helped to storm the battery, but it lost 167 men in the process.38
The Austrians, in this final phase of the battle, made a desperate defense. Meanwhile, Pennewitz’s 10th Infantry was foiled in its initial blow. About then, the heavy Prussian guns started to blast holes in the churchyard wall. Meanwhile, the Austrian reserves had been called forward, these had crossed/passed in front of Leuthen. Not all of the defenders fought well. The 56th Infantry of Mercy panicked at the attack of the bluecoats and flew wildly to the rear; the 57th of Andlau could not form a front because the tightly-packed houses of the village interfered with its deployment,39 this formation was between Leuthen and the 38th, in which Prince de Ligne had taken command once at the works.
The latter described how his men had to stand forward of the main line, many time bullets would fly over their heads or even kill men from their own comrades stationed behind. All of the senior officers having been shot, he took command of the regiment (at the time he was a Captain by rank), then he ordered a retirement towards the windmill after most desperate fighting.40
Frederick, meanwhile, had ordered the reserve—until then having been idle in Borne—forward into the fray, at the same time making additional reinforcements from the Prussian left, at Radaxdorf. Then he ordered Retzow to bring the entire left up on the run. Prince Moritz surged forward with the Prussian center to lend weight to Wedell’s right. For nearly an hour, the struggle for control of Leuthen raged,41 and the only remaining Prussian force not already caught up in the vortex raging there was Driesen. He was needed right where he was, as we shall discern in short order. Retzow’s own 6th Infantry suffered heavy losses before the cemetery as well: 36 dead and 156 wounded.42 Major-General Pannewitz’s 10th Infantry suffered even greater losses. 741 men, i
ncluding 12 officers, were laid low in this unit.43 Most of the losses sustained by this particular unit happened to be suffered at the village.
The battle was now very nearly deadlocked, the advancing Prussians being equaled by the packed masses of Prince Charles’s still potent formations. That Austrian battery north of Leuthen proved for a time to be a serious concern for the Prussian king. He remedied this situation quickly. He positioned the heavy and super heavy guns on the Butterberg; with the advantage of firepower by virtue of the latter pieces the whitecoats were speedily reduced. Now the Prussian gunners concentrated on the Austrian lines, and sent salvo after salvo crashing forward to decimate the defenders. Then the infantry, coming up with bayonets at the ready, drove the Austrians from one section of the new front after another. The big guns really broke things open. The Prussian advance, as a direct result, started regaining momentum.
Luchessi, seeing the left of the Prussian army bare to an enveloping attack (or so it appeared), tried to make amends for the morning’s blunders by launching an attack with 70 squadrons to win the battle. It was still possible. Had these troopers been allowed their way, Leuthen might yet have ended differently. Unfortunately, Driesen, with his squadrons, was behind the Scheuberg with instructions to watch for any such move on the part of Luchessi’s men. Between 1600–1630 hours, the latter perceived the decisive moment had arrived. He burst out with his troopers, but it was a truly fatal error.
Driesen waited until the enemy had ridden past the hollow near the Scheuberg and then, under the helpful cover of the formidable guns on the Butterburg, he came charging out to hit the Austrians from all sides. The main line of 30 squadrons charged Luchessi from the front, while ten squadrons (consisting of the Bayreuth Dragoons and the hussars) went riding over the flanks, as other hussars, under Puttkammer, smashed the rearguard, the faithful Kollowrat Dragoons. The Prussians were successful, and some of the enemy troopers scattered, particularly the right flank units.
However, the Austrians were professionals, too, and they fully intended to make a determined stand, if given the opportunity. The cavalry supports for Luchessi’s second line tried to do that very thing. The Benedict Daun (31st Dragoons), along with two regiments of cuirassiers, Serbelloni’s and Anhalt-Zerbst’s, swung around to confront the Bayreuth Dragoons and Driesen’s 7th Cuirassiers.
The whitecoats plunged headlong into action. For a time, the intensity of the fight threatened to splinter the unit. The remaining Prussian forces on that side leant aid at the decisive time, and the enemy were finally forced to give way under the weight of numbers. Prince Friedrich Eugene of Württemberg now appeared, bringing with him 30 squadrons. The hussars quickly lost cohesion as they struck Austrian infantry huddled on the right of Leuthen. The two armies here intermingled, and fought it out. The exchange, in fact, was most furious, for a time.
The Austrian horse, with numbers hopelessly telling, resolved to stand its ground. The Bayreuth Dragoons put paid to the whole business; they swept forward into the 27th Fusiliers of Baden-Durlach and Wallis’ 11th. In this stroke, the 11th Cuirassiers (Pennavaire) lent its aid. The Austrians on this part of the front were simply overwhelmed. On the side, the guns of the big Austrian batteries fell silent finally as the gunners were caught up in the vortex, and there was no hope for victory now. They could not fire their guns, as the bluecoats overlapped the batteries and intermingled with the gunners. However, it took the utmost the Prussians were capable of to overthrow the might of the Austrian army. During the rout, Luchessi fell, having been beheaded by a cannonball. He had helped bring the army to this crisis, and he also, quite unintentionally, helped cap its defeat.
Driesen, rendered free from his original task by this very foolish move of Luchessi, now went charging into the flank and the rear of the second Austrian front. The 4th Cuirassiers (Gessler) hammered home the final attack from Radaxdorf. Dorn relates that an enemy standard was seized by “Major von Oginskii.”44 Driesen’s pursuit ended rather abruptly in the wake of his victorious engagement with Luchessi.
Prussian accounts of Leuthen tend to exaggerate the extent of the Austrian rout. The left was savaged in an unanticipated counterattack from the 31st Dragoons and Stampatch’s 10th Cuirassiers. Colonel Ludwig S deEramo was leading this stroke, which flung Driesen’s men back. Rather soundly, we might add. Certainly, the Austrian army had some fight left in it. More on this in a bit.
Just a bit after, Prince Charles ordered the 33rd Infantry (Amadei’s men) to try its hand at attacking the surging Prussian forces on its right. This lone body of infantry soon ran into Stampatch’s men along with any other remaining vestiges of Austrian resistance, trying to blunt the Prussian pursuit. Still further back, Nádasti, who had taken a post to the rear to shield the bridges from Prussian fury, did all he could to prevent Ziethen from capturing the bridges, cutting off the retreat of the Austrians, and making Leuthen an even more decisive battle than it was otherwise turning out.
In order to stall the enemy effort, Nádasti deployed a portion of his men in the thick woods, with guns at the ready. Then a decoy force of horse lured the enemy cavalry forward. Ziethen’s overeager hussars charged forward and got plastered in the woods from the well-concealed (and thoroughly prepared) enemy formations. The Prussians withdrew. Since Ziethen had no infantry back-up immediately available, the pursuit was temporarily thwarted. Not too much should be made of this. Every great event contains twists and turns that could potentially undo the results of the event. Leuthen was just another one of those.
Driesen wheeled to the right and rolled up the rear elements of the enemy’s infantry, and, while he was so engaged, Wedell attacked the Austrians in the side of Leuthen. The charge of Luchessi was thus the decisive thing that ended the matter. Prince Charles’s army, taken in front and flank, broke up and flew in a disorganized mass back upon Saara and Lissa. In a couple of minutes, the routed men were seeking the safety on the far bank of the Schweidnitz River. Prince Charles ordered another withdrawal—obeyed by the few units left—and attempted to stand again near Lissa. By now, however, his men were disheartened and as the bluecoats, on the order of their king, pressed on in their advance towards that place, a few volleys of musketry and gunfire were sufficient to send even some of these men scurrying to the rear.
But, if every dark cloud does indeed have a silver lining, then the manner of the withdrawal from the battle by the Austrians on the day of Leuthen was it. Elements of Stampatch’s command, rallied in the person of the exceptionally, enterprising officer named Colonel Ludwig Caraccioli de–Ermano, helped cover the retreat with local counterattacks. As we have seen. However, as the latter had but three squadrons of cuirassiers and one of dragoons, his efforts were largely localized and limited.
There were others. The Esterhazy Regiment tried to cover Stampatch, while General Nádasti, as resourceful as ever, had stabilized some of his infantry units about the Rathener Woods. The Prussian pursuit was energetic, and when the enemy had drawn too close, Nádasti put 12-pounder cannon to use to “persuade” the enemy cavalry of his earnestness.
Ziethen, leading this pursuit,45 was content to just set up his guns and engage in a long-range artillery contest.46 Nádasti used this intervening time to pull back from the stricken battlefield.
The Austrians simply were not interested in seeking another engagement like the one just concluded. Among the retreating throng, Buccow was given the odious task of trying to blunt the bluecoat advance. That ‘Johnny on the Spot’ took up a post at Kunzendorf, from where he did all he could to get badly needed supplies of flour and other supplies into Schweidnitz, while his men simultaneously began to empty out the magazines at Landshut. Time was of the essence, and Buccow did not waste it. This was being accomplished as the Austrian survivors fled from the field.
However, Fouquet would not suffer to let Buccow alone in peace. He rather vigorously struck at Buccow’s position, which was near Landshut. The attack was beaten back (December 21), but Fouquet ordered up more me
n. A more determined attack the next day brought about Buccow’s retreat, when his less than reliable Croat screen fled from a post they should have been able to hold, at the Bucherberg. This behavior compelled Buccow to fall back to the Kirchenberg. Now it was obvious that Fouquet’s pursuit could not be thwarted farther. The disintegration of Austrian resistance in the wake of Leuthen was almost shocking.
The Battle of Leuthen was over by 1700 hours, and, as the sun (largely hidden behind the clouds) was setting, the whitecoats were making their way towards Breslau. The Prussian monarch made a hasty march with the Seydlitz Cuirassiers (without the distinguished Seydlitz) and three grenadier battalions on Lissa; where he feared that the enemy might bar his forces at the bridge from further advance. The going was difficult for all concerned. Heavy snow clouds were beginning to spill their contents upon the stricken field and the suffering men thereabouts. Ziethen with a dozen hussars soon joined this little ensemble, and the trampling of the horses on the frozen ground, with the snow flying on a cold December evening, can well be imagined.
The night was so dark that the only lights were flickering lanterns used by Frederick and his little force. Despite this, about 1900 hours, the little party attacked the Austrian forces left near the bridge and speedily drove them off. A surprise volley of about 60 musket shot rang out about 1830 hours, just before the king reached Lissa. In response, nearly 300 Prussians swept forward to finish the day’s work. The king admonished Ziethen for allowing the hussars to drift back on the main body rather than taking the point—far posts on reconnaissance.47 The men scattered to the cover of the tress on both sides of the road, and the grenadiers, roused by the sound of gunfire, moved out in support. A drowsy innkeeper from Saara, roused from his “sleep”48 by the unexpected visitors, was brought along by the stirrups of the king’s horse. Frederick himself made for cover. The innkeeper was holding a lantern when the shots rang out.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 34