Henry needed to finish his consolidation of Saxony.20 Finck rolled into Oberschäna, while Hülsen took up post at Öderan. Kleefeld heard about that time that Daun might be in the offing. Finck drew rein with the Prussian van at Klingenberg. Major-General Karl Gottfried von Knobloch moved on Maxen, and, August 10, Finck reached Dippoldiswalde. The Imperialists quickly moved into the vacuum left by Henry’s retreating men. Kleefeld deftly reached Mareienberg, August 9. Two days after, he tried to overthrow a Prussian force near Burkersdorf. The Prussians spoiled this fine effort with a brief, but sharp rebuke. Zweibrücken broached an advance at Kulm, while Hadik probed Prussian forward posts near Dippoldiswalde. It became obvious through it all that Prince Henry was stalling for time, so the Imperialists rethought their priorities.
Kleefeld occupied a forward position at Altenburg (August 13), while Hadik barged into Bürggheisel, August 12. Zweibrücken, for the most part, stayed idle. Control of the Tetschen Castle had passed between the armies, and, on August 16, Major-General Peter Alexander Graf Guasco, operating on the shore opposite to the castle, set to work building a bridge for communication between Postelwitz and Krippen. This was intended to reestablish communication with Daun. The allies and the Prussians were in close proximity. The Imperialist army, on August 17, moved on Schönwalde-Peterswalde. The progress of this march was glacial compared with the energetic Prussians, but it was accomplished.
That same day, Daun got to Zittau. He would use this as a base of operations. It was the avowed intention of the marshal to go aid the Russians. But Daun looked in vain for close cooperation between the French and the Austrians.21 Not to mention the Swedes and the Russians. The marshal suggested in a letter to Maria Theresa, in view of the Prussian victory at Leuthen, perhaps he should try to avoid open battle with the Prussian king.22 He did offer he would seek battle, with the extraordinary condition he did not have to take “unreasonable risks.”23 The Austrians tried to accomplish as much as they could before Frederick returned. On August 20, Daun reached Görlitz. He was shadowed by Ziethen, whose cavalry kept the Austrians under close watch. It was now an open question whether Daun intended for Silesia or Saxony. Charles of Brandenburg-Schwedt was at Grüssau, with about 35,000 men, covering Silesia. Laudon was detached with some 9,500 men to go wreak havoc with the bluecoats at Grüssau. The main body still boasted about 48,000 men. Meanwhile, Prince Henry, with hardly 20,000 men, was growing increasingly concerned about the security of his forces in and around the Saxon capital.
In line with this, the bluecoats built up posts near and about Pirna. Henry spared no effort to utilize his men. There was a good deal of work to figure out the enemy’s intentions. On August 23, about 0300 hours, a small Prussian force went to reconnoiter the allies. Prince Henry moved succinctly towards Struppen. The men encountered a body of Imperialists, which was speedily reinforced by Zweibrücken. The Prussians retreated after a spirited fight. Laudon made no effort to join the Russians, but amused himself with besieging Peitz, which had fewer than 50 men as a garrison. He sealed off the fortress on August 24. The next day, he received the surrender of the place, and then closed an uncharacteristically poor performance by heading right back to Saxony.
Meanwhile, one of Henry’s many letters to his royal brother had been intercepted by the allies, and Prussian thoughts on the contemporary situation were thus revealed. With this added insight, Maria Theresa ordered Daun to seize Dresden while Prince Henry’s men were still in the field. Daun set up an offensive for August 26. The spirit of allied cooperation was waning. Inexplicably, the Imperialists were only told of the march on the previous evening. The goal was clear: Dresden must soon fall. “There is no other way of ending the war than by the downfall of the House of Brandenburg.”24 So wrote Flemming. For a change, even the redoubtable marshal was inclined to agree and full of confidence. He verbally bragged that the king would not come back from the affairs with the Russians with the same caliber of army he had left with. He was proven right, as it turned out. Daun lurched into Bautzen on August 28, and then and there arrived the first communication a victorious Frederick was returning, fresh from victory over the Russians. Daun refused to believe the first rumors of Prussian victory. It is odd the marshal refused to give credence to the rumors.
August 31, Daun’s shaky army took up post at Königsbrück. This would be army headquarters, with the different elements hovering about. Simultaneously, Zweibrücken sent Colonel Andreas Michael Freiherr von Török to join the Austrians. Török reached Kleinröhrsdorf, Austrian scouts reaching Niederrödern. Lacy was out towards Meissen, facing an energetic little Prussian garrison there. Meanwhile, the “rumors” about Frederick’s victory over the Russians were confirmed. Frederick was marching for Saxony. Haste would thus be required, if the enterprise were to succeed before the Prussian king appeared. Over in Silesia, Keith had assumed command of the force at Grüssau; he marched (August 26–27) for Saxony with some 24,000 men, the remaining 11,000 were left under Fouquet in Silesia.25
Prince Henry was making an effort to try to get himself out of the trap the enemy were trying to lay for him, even as he realized his brother was coming. The prince did not want to forfeit Dresden. A force of the Szėkėley Hussars, under Captain Treba, sent forth found Török close at hand. Mayr put men up at Kesselsdorf (August 29). Knobloch was told off to Ostrau, with his men. He was to make himself as visible as possible to the enemy. Austrian headquarters had been slow to believe Prince Henry would hang around Pirna with such an obvious inferiority of numbers. Prussian supply lines through Königsbrück had now been cut, and it was getting harder for Henry to communicate with his outlying forces in Saxony. However, Dresden remained secure, for the Austrian main army had no siege train with it. Besides, Prince Henry was not about to lay down on the job.
On September 1, one of the Prussian deserters informed the Imperialists of an imminent attack from Prince Henry. Zweibrücken had his men fall out, but Henry never showed his hand. Instead, about 2200 hours, his bluecoats suddenly abandoned their camp and withdrew on Dresden. This movement was not suspected by the Imperialists, but took place right under their very noses. The whole episode suggests the “deserter” may have been planted. September 2, early in the morning, allied patrols discovered what had happened. Henry’s new post was one he did not intend to be forced from. Most especially without costly, involved attacks. Ujházy probed at the Prussians, but there was nothing doing. On the other hand, Prince Henry was now back on his heels, on the defensive.
There was need of allied cooperation. With the Prussian king in the offing and Daun putting on the pressure to act at once before the opportunity passed, Zweibrücken balked. Prussian patrols were shadowing him, and the Imperialist commander had much to be nervous about. While Marshal Daun called a council of war to discuss the next Austrian move in light of recent developments, Zweibrücken just plain failed to act. This played right into Prussian hands, and Daun finally decided to stay put on the right bank of the Elbe, aiming for Stolpen.26 Seldom in military history has such a large force played it safe with the number of troops at the marshal’s disposal. Certainly the Austrian rulers were less than pleased with Daun’s performance.
The Imperialists, it turned out, had even less energy. While his enemies were hesitating, Prince Henry knew in order to retain control of Saxony he would have to keep Dresden. Key posts would be required. The Sonnenstein was one of those.
Zweibrücken, meanwhile, sent Kleefeld over the Gottleube. This task force was to bedevil Henry as much as possible, September 1. The latter had to react. The Prussians moved forth from their advanced posts. Hadik thought a surprise assault to seize the works at Meissen was doable, but Zweibrücken refused to sanction it. The Sonnenstein, on the other hand, was viewed as vulnerable. Zweibrücken readily latched onto this as a target, with a small number of troops within, besides being isolated from the rest of Henry’s forces. Colonel Johann Heinrich von Grape was in charge of the defense. The Imperialists lost no time in putting the place
under siege. August 30–31, they started to close up on the Sonnenstein. September 2, overnight, the siege works were completed and the siege started. There was a marked shortage of siege materials, Daun’s men were conspicuous by their absence, and the king was drawing near.
The Imperialists, under Major von Voss and Major Karl von Pfirster zu Borgdorf, tried their best. September 3, about 1000 hours, Grape was summoned to surrender his post. The latter would have nothing of it. Part of his force was in the fortress, while another part occupied the town itself under Colonel Hans Sigismund von Sydow. Prince Henry was aware of these proceedings, but could do little about it at the moment. Only threats of shelling resulted, and Grape showed no signs of giving. Zweibrücken pulled a rabbit out of his hat. He dispatched a special task force, under Colonel Johann A. D. von Augė, two full battalions, to the Kohlberg to seize the place. The Sonnenstein could be shelled most effectively from there. Zweibrücken speedily reinforced his new post, until 18 six-pounders, eight 12-pounders, and 12 howitzers made up those batteries.
Before 0500 hours on September 5, the Imperialist guns opened up with a sustained bombardment. Grape’s gunners replied, and scored some hits of their own. However the weight of numbers and Imperialist determination finally brought about Grape’s misfortune. There were barns full of grain at the Sonnenstein, enough to keep the garrison fed. These, struck by accurate Imperialist cannon fire, immediately burst into flames. Moreover, although the Prussian gunners did not lack for courage, much of the garrison, made up largely of Imperialist deserters, was faint-hearted. The Imperialists lacked ammunition for their guns and actually required bigger guns than they had to complete their task. Siege work was not a speciality of the Imperialists by any means.
Grape’s men really helped out the enemy by mutinying. Instead of a rope or the firing squad if caught, these men had been offered amnesty and they readily took it. This sealed the fate of Sonnenstein. The shelling had been short, but certainly not sweet when it ended in the evening of September 5. Prussian losses were 26 dead; the Imperialists had eight killed.27 The entire garrison of 1,500 men was lost. Along with the above, Sonnenstein’s fall yielded up much equipage. “Twenty-nine brass and some iron cannon”28 were among the prizes. Not only did this help temporarily to alleviate the supply problems for the Imperialists, but there was no denying Zweibrücken had nabbed a prize.29
And Daun was at hand! Prince Henry learned, from captured prisoners, that the main Austrian army was headed at Stolpen. The news was most upsetting. The bluecoats set to work on some fortified lines, stretching from the Mordgrundbrücke ridge, heading at Bautzen, and Grüntal, heading at Radeberg. Mayr was in charge of these works.
Meanwhile, the Imperialists continued to edge forward, while part of their force was tied up at the Sonnenstein. Ried was posted up to Zehista, but the Croats roamed farther afield. Hadik and Karl August Baden-Durlach were also on the move. This brought the Imperialists and the Austrians close to cooperating. September 6, at Löhmen, Zweibrücken and Daun met to discuss future activities. They wanted to cooperate against Prince Henry while Frederick was still distant. Zweibrücken, almost immediately, offered to cross the Seidewitz Stream hard by. What Zweibrücken could actually do in concrete terms, though, was much less. The weak supply situation for the Imperialists in and of itself was enough to preclude any major offensive operations. Moreover, Prince Henry was bound to react. Even worse, the king was expected at almost any time and he would be spoiling for a finish fight, if at all possible. Zweibrücken could talk big, but was short on action. When he and Daun kept a rendezvous with Serbelloni and Hadik, great things appeared to be in the works. Certainly the allies had an overwhelming superiority of force: a total of over 130,000 men, with the Austrians and Imperialists bringing about equal numbers to the theater. Prince Henry was far inferior, fewer than 20,000 strong, and he had suffered some loss of confidence with the loss of the Sonnenstein.
There were also additional forces arriving for the allies. Laudon, fresh from recent adventures, occupied Radeberg on September 9. Christoph Baden Durlach reached the region almost simultaneously. His men occupied Wilthen on September 10, and less than four days after, Baden-Durlach latched on to Putzkau. From here, Daun’s position at Stolpen was extended thereby. And Frederick was on his way to liven things up considerably. Meanwhile, the weather, which had been warm and fair, was turning wet and cooler. The marshal must have sensed any opportunity to make a campaign in 1758 decisive was going by the wayside. Still, in a letter designed to soothe the fears of an anxious Maria Theresa, Daun assured her that he was doing all he could to force the issue. As proof, he proposed a plan whereby the allied force would gradually, over a day or so, converge on Henry’s position. This was designed to force Henry’s hand, if at all possible before his royal brother could appear on the scene.30
Success with the Russians had made the king confident, a feeling which Henry did not share to the umpteenth degree. Henry had been the man on the spot, while Frederick left for his Russian adventure. There was no doubt of Henry’s overwhelming inferiority in numbers. On the other hand, the Prussian commander counted on his allied opponents to make mistakes. Nor was this his only asset. As a plus, Henry had a good supply of that commodity his royal brother seemed to lack: patience. Henry, in all seriousness, had once expressed to a shocked king his feeling the war would “likely last four or five years longer.”31 Frederick had good reason to be aghast. To the worried king, it was becoming obvious how much blood, effort and money had already been spent, and yet more fighting remained?
Meantime, Daun had cooked up his plan, for the last legitimate chance to trounce Prince Henry alone. Hadik, with his men, would edge up on Henry’s flank, all while avoiding any actual fighting. Laudon would station himself near Neustadt, while Christoph Baden-Durlach took the post at Stolpen. Daun, meanwhile, would move stealthily on Niederpoyritz, and there prepare to hurl his army across the Elbe on to the enemy. This was set for the night of September 10–11.32 On September 9, a reconnaissance was carried out in the area to assure the plan was both practical and likely to succeed on merits. Between all of this, Henry was supposed to be pressed until he tried to break out of his predicament.
Zweibrücken fully intended to comply with Daun’s plan, so long as he could reasonably do so without endangering his army. To this end, he ordered his grenadiers on Zehista as a jump off point. About 1750 hours on September 10, in an absolute torrent of rain, the men moved out. In the prevailing weather, they likely expected any waiting they did would be of short duration. The unfortunates spent the entire night out in the open, waiting for additional instructions. While these men waited idly for events to unfold, Hadik probed towards Hausdorf. Kleefeld joined this effort, and the two received some problems from Henry. Hadik’s stroke was almost due north, right at the heart of Henry’s prepared position. It required very heavy fighting on the part of the Imperialists to wring Hausdorf from Prussian hands. Moreover, plans were detailed, orders had been cut and even the most cynical of the allies had to believe something great was about to happen. All units had been briefed on the parts they were to play, and the armies to stand to, awaiting the aforementioned additional instructions.
At the last “staff” meeting before the jump off, Daun announced to a shocked group of officers that an advanced force of Frederick’s army was reported to be at Gross-Döbritz. Frederick and Keith met at Grossenhayn on September 9, giving the king 35,000 men.33 This sudden revelation put a whole new spin on what had been a thoroughly prepared for plan. The whole operation was subsequently canceled and all ranks had to express their regret. As the men were already in motion, something had to be done to bring about a reasonable conclusion to the operation. If the reports were true, Frederick would be in an excellent position to turn Daun’s right flank, and jeopardize not just the success of the plan but also endanger the Austrian army itself. Nevertheless, the French representative, Major-General Antoine-Marie de Malvin Comte de Montazet urged the plan to be carrie
d forth—at that point, it was a mere two hours to jump off for the army. Why not proceed? In this opinion, he was joined by the brave Lacy.
Just what the allies were to do eventually was still a great mystery. Daun stood by his gut feeling to call off but yet not quite call off the attack. About 1400 hours, orders went out to send out the grenadiers and the bridging team, which would be required if the proposed attack were to go forward. Now the latter two forces got underway, but about nightfall, the order to halt arrived. Then, on September 11, after the forces had halted in place all night, there was a prospect for renewing the advance. Instead, the entire plan and its details were scrubbed. This irritated Zweibrücken to no end. He blamed the timidity of Daun for the whole fiasco.34
On the other hand, the marshal felt like Zweibrücken and his “lack” of preparation over the previous couple of days was really to blame. Back home in Austria, many felt strongly that Daun had fumbled the opportunity presented to him to crush Prince Henry before Frederick’s arrival. Although there were still a number of plans being half-entertained on the part of the allies, the situation had been profoundly altered. Frederick was never the kind to await an enemy’s advance if he could possibly help it, and he acted. Frederick and Prince Henry were busy contemplating how to draw Daun out into the open for a fight. Very much had been altered in the course of a few days’ time.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 41