Laudon was not apprised of the cancellation of the attack plan in time, and, on September 10, he struck at the Dresden Heath. Laudon pushed out Colonel Franz Riese (with about 1,500 Croats); the latter rolled over Prussian entrenched posts at Mordgrundbrücke. This sudden blow booted the bluecoats out. But there was no follow-up coming for Laudon to benefit from. The infuriated Prussians, three full grenadier battalions strong, launched a rather vigorous counterattack. In the end, Laudon’s men finally managed to beat the enemy back. He then surprisingly failed in his turn to follow up his advantage.
So Frederick struck first. After Laudon had been in his new advanced post for almost two full days, the king sent Retzow to surprise the Austrian commander at Radeberg. Retzow went right to work, basing his operations at Badenburg. Retzow was a good, capable commander, but his formations unaccountably lost cohesion in the woods, and Laudon was one wily foe. Retzow split his forces up, the first was earmarked to strike at Riese’s men while Retzow took his main body down the road towards Bautzen. Laudon still had over 10,000 men with him, not counting the men with Colonel Riese. The latter put up a most furious resistance when the Prussians struck about nightfall, 6,000 men strong. Riese was heavily outnumbered, but he determined to stand to his guns and not to yield if at all possible. Aiding him in this endeavor, the attacking troops could only attack piecemeal as they had fragmented on the march up. With their effort largely dissipated, Riese was able to hold on to his position. The bluecoats were not entirely spent, though, and they also congregated near the scene. Light troops kept probing the woods for further Prussian movements under cover of darkness, but then rather disturbing intelligence arrived that Frederick was going over to the offensive in Saxony. This would compel Daun and Zweibrücken to react to Prussian movements, rather than dictate the remaining campaign season to the royal brothers. Really, the only legitimate shot at recovering Saxony for the year had just went out the window.
Stepping back to the end of the Siege of Olmütz and its aftermath, Frederick realized he would soon have to leave Königgrätz to go face the Russian threat.35 After their hard marching, the king’s Prussians were allowed to gorge themselves on supplies that the enemy had left at the fortress. What was not consumed was ordered to be loaded into provision wagons (for future use), and all made ready to depart. On August 2—18 days after they had occupied Königgrätz—the Prussians marched from that place in the direction of the Oder and an encounter with the Russians.36 The king had seriously underestimated both the Austrians and the Russians, and overestimated his own abilities.37
Fermor did not deign stay in East Prussia, but he spent several weeks preparing to advance. In early March, Russian detachments moved on Thorn and also on Elbing. These places were to be consolidated and built up to aid Fermor’s main army as it crossed the Vistula and prepared to invade the main province of Brandenburg.38 The headquarters were put at Marienwerder (March 9), and envoys from the Austrians were received and instructed about the progress of the Russian effort.
While Frederick and Daun were busy in the country before Olmütz, the Russians, after interminable delays, finally acted. Fermor pushed out Rumyantsev’s men on Conitz, while the latter sent Demikow moving towards Pomerania. Then, a few weeks after, Fermor congregated the various sections of his army at Conitz. The earlier expedition having been reasonably successful, Demikow, with a force of 5,000 (3,000 of them light cavalry) moved rather dexterously towards Kazimirsberg. The bluecoats in his path were not at all pleased to see him, and the Russians seized considerable booty for their trouble. General Stojanow took a small force of cavalry and attacked, ejecting a little Prussian force at Butowe (April 14). Otherwise, there was little resistance. The Cossacks were unleashed to do their job as they saw it. They were seen for the first time in northern Germany and were not welcomed! This was a situation that would not change over time, and become exacerbated with the passage of time.
For that matter, the citizens of Poland could not have been overjoyed to see the Russians appear. Fermor, himself of Scotch-Irish descent, was only too aware of the questionable effectiveness of his troops. Most especially of the merits of the Cossacks. That being the case, the idea to move from Conitz to a forward position was one Fermor embraced with little willingness. If that were not bad enough, a combination of summer rains and melting winter snows had swollen the rivers and the roadways were often seas of mud. And the campaigning season for the Russians was always short. One of the basic problems remained the expanse of Poland which always had to be crossed first before they attacked Prussia.
Despite the apparent indifference of the citizens of East Prussia, the rest of the country was not inclined for Russian “visitors.” There was one bright spot. Even the densest of the Prussians whom Fermor encountered had to admit he was a far more tolerant person than Apraxsin. While the latter had tried to use image and force, implying punishment, to win over the indigenous population, the more cultured, genteel Fermor tried to win the people by resort to decent treatment and respect. When the erstwhile conqueror entered Könisgberg it was “a festival celebration … [employing] the drums and blowing of trumpets.”39
Additionally Fermor left most of the civilian institutions as he found them, telling the citizens they were fortunate, and “can be content under [Elizabeth’s] genteel rule.”40 Many of the female population of East Prussia, especially Königsberg, responded positively to the advances of the Russian Casanovas; of such unions, many children were born. No wonder the Prussian king had vowed to never again visit the province.
Frederick was wise enough to realize he could do without East Prussia quite well if need be, at least until the peace. But, should the population of Brandenburg, Silesia, and Pomerania act in a similar fashion, the monarch then knew his cause was in serious trouble.
We might mention the situation in East Prussia was just a tad too chummy for Kaunitz and the Austrians. They saw their Russian ally as “useful,” so long as they were kept at a safe distance. The easy acceptance by East Prussia of Russian rule was very disturbing for the Austrians. The longer the war lasted and the more the Russians ingratiated themselves into Central Europe, the more uncomfortable the Austrians became. Kaunitz would discover in time that the price for Russian involvement in trying to regain Silesia for Austria would be Russian attachment of East Prussia. Only the death of Elizabeth in 1762 would change that situation. Moreover, as much as Kaunitz and Maria Theresa detested Frederick, even they had to admit they had more in common with the irascible Prussian king than they did with the Russians. Meanwhile, in mid–June, Major-General Platen had sent reconnaissance patrols out to look for the enemy. Captain Zettmar, with a detachment of about 110 men, encountered a force of Russians about the small town of Ratezbur (June 20), but General Demikow was nearby and he simply overwhelmed the Prussian detachment with superior numbers. Zettmar was beaten back towards Neu-Stettin, while Demikow’s Russians heartily punished the local populace with merciless brutality. The general himself was not cruel, but he admitted the Cossacks could be barely controlled.41 On June 26, General Dohna withdrew across the Peene River, leaving no substantial force to oppose the Swedes. The latter had been reduced temporarily to some 7,000 men by the rigors of the previous campaign, but they stayed quiescent only for a moment.42
The Russians had meandered by then on Meseritz, but the Prussians were hard pressed to determine the enemy’s next move. It was generally assumed Fermor meant to march into Silesia to join up with the Austrians. Cossacks had been sent into both Brandenburg and Silesia. Fermor considered his plans for the coming campaign. He was well aware of his great adversary, Frederick. He did not want to face the latter if it could be avoided. The Russian army had been at Posen for nearly a month when the Prussian king decided the situation on the Eastern Front needed his attention. Dohna had ordered General Kanitz back from Landsberg, leaving only a small screening force before Cüstrin. July 1, Fermor’s forward elements took up at Posen, towards which the different elements of the Russian
army converged. The army built up a great magazine thereabouts, which was to be defended by General Resanow with a small force. On July 8, Fermor received news that Frederick had been forced to raise the Siege of Olmütz. This encouraged the Russian commander to press ahead, but an attempt to seize the town of Driesen miscarried when the Prussian force ensconced there refused to give way. Russian raiding parties marauded into Silesia, and, on July 14, the town of Driesen was attacked again, by an overwhelming force. Colonel Hordt could not remain there, and his line was rent asunder, losing some 400 of his men who “fled” to the Russians. Hordt fell back on Cüstrin. Dohna’s forward men were arriving about the same time at Cüstrin, while other elements of his force reoccupied Landsberg before the enemy could appear. July 21, Dohna with his main body appeared, having marched via Pasewalk, Schwed, and Angermünde, at Lebus. There was still some doubt about Fermor’s intentions, finally dispelled by a Russian concentration near Meseritz on July 26.
Russian scouts were reported as far afield as Silesia and Schwerin towards Damnitz, near to Stettin. It was clear Fermor meant to invade Brandenburg, and a Russian advance into the heart of Prussia was imminent. July 31, Dohna moved from Lebus to take post at Frankfurt-on-Oder. Prussian forward posts were strengthened at Sternberg, in Fermor’s path. Fermor was trying his best to keep the Poles happy, by not subsisting off the land to the extent possible. But this necessitated long, and increasingly longer, lines of supply as the army advanced. With the invasion of Brandenburg decided, Fermor wasted no time. On August 1, General Stoffelne embarked on a mission to drive the Prussians from Zielentzig, Lagow, and Sternberg. The bluecoats in these places lacked the numbers for a fight, and the villages were yielded up quickly enough. Next day, Fermor rose from Meseritz, and bundled forward to Königswalde, just across the Prussian border.
Between Fermor and Berlin lay the Oder River and two principal places: the fortress of Cüstrin and the town of Frankfurt-on-Oder. So the Russian army would have to take control of these points before it could cross the Oder and move on Berlin.
Once the army paused, Fermor ordered forward another body of troopers, under General Browne, with the Observation Corps, to join the main army. Stoffelne drove the Prussians at Zielentzig back upon Reppen. Dohna did not propose to abandon the latter post, and pressed up reinforcements to the station. General Marschall was detailed to take ten squadrons of the Schorlemer and Plattenberg cavalry, and ride to stiffen the post. An infantry reinforcement was also pushed forward, and Dohna was joined by the force of General Kursell and Diercke; about 8,000 men, this force had been covering Glogau against a possible Russian move upon it. Fermor was joined by General Rumyantsev; the latter took post near Dragonmarg. The Russians were posted in a spread out formation: with Rumyantsev in his current post, Fermor ordered off a detachment from him to go probe Cöslin, in the direction of Colberg, to see what the Prussians had going on there.43
Russian detachments went out to see to the situation, and Major-General Dietz was detailed to take the Russian baggage out by Landsberg for safe keeping.44 There were a number of reports circulating about bodies of Prussians close-by. General Stojanow with a 1,400-man force was charged off to make for a new position at Sternberg. Dohna (August 5) sent Major-General Paul Joseph Malachow von Malachovsky galloping towards Sternberg, while Stojanow himself was simultaneously engaged in reconnoitering. At Pötschen, the forces accidently bundled into one another. Malachovsky fell back on Reppen, but the Russians did not pursue. Dietz had barged into Landsberg (August 6), which should have evoked a strong Prussian reaction. General Ruesch, who had been hovering around Landsberg for a couple of days, retired on Soldin. There he received intelligence of reinforcements, while Dietz was scurrying for yet more assistance.
General Cherneyshev was en route from Schwerin and its neighborhood, and Fermor was about to bring his main body there as well. At Reppen, Lt.-Gen. Manteuffel succeeded Marschall, but the Prussian posts stayed alert for Russian movements. August 7, Fermor rose and meandered to Alt-Sorge, and the next day occupied Landsberg. Meanwhile, General Rumyantsev, from a new post at Königswalde, sent scouts towards Reppen. It became obvious the Prussians were still there. Ruesch evacuated Soldin, which the Russians of Stoffelne lost no time occupying. Cherneyshev was sent to force contributions from the vicinity of Landsberg, while Stoffelne concentrated on stripping Soldin of its resources to the extent possible.
August 11, Fermor crossed the Warta with his main force, while patrols probed beyond Soldin to find if his adversary was present. The next night, Manteuffel tried to surprise the Russians ensconced at Königswalde. His hand was tipped, and the enemy sped away. Fermor, with his army now concentrated for the most part, occupied Friedrichsberg, brushing aside any Prussian opposition. Meanwhile, word arrived from Stoffelne that Stargard in the direction of Colberg was well secured, and that the fortress itself was strong, most especially towards the seaward approaches. Stettin had 10,000 men for its garrison. Rumyantsev’s body was ordered to join the main army as soon as he could, once the Corps of Observation relieved him.
As for Dohna, he had been instructed by the king to attack the Russians as soon as he could. This was not a pleasant prospect, and while part of his force was at Reppen, another part was at Frankfurt-on-Oder, to prevent Fermor from crossing the Oder there. August 13, Fermor moved from Gross Kammin, near a thick wood which might conceal Prussian troops. As quickly as possible, the main body of Russian officers went to look over the Cüstrin Fortress now near-by. As for the Prussians who had not yet sought asylum in the fortress, Russian light troops pressed them into Cüstrin and finally forced them to take refuge in the fortress. Stoffelne attempted to force the Oder, but a reconnaissance force sent towards Schwed could not make out the enemy’s disposition, and, besides, the Prussians had already destroyed the bridge across the Oder thereabouts.
General Rumyantsev received instructions to march from Landsberg to accost Stargard. Fermor was desirous of securing that place to establish a magazine, which could really come in handy as an advanced base of operations. Simultaneously, Lt.-Gen. Resanow was ordered to Stolpe, there to safeguard the Russian communications and their magazines back in Poland. These measures were both auxiliary to the main purpose of seizing Cüstrin and thus helping along the invasion of Brandenburg.
Meanwhile, the king was making his way to the scene.45 Daun had had strong bodies of troopers deployed on the three roads leading in that way most direct from Königgrätz, with the forces of St. Ignon and Laudon being placed on the two easiest to traverse. The third of these routes, which went by Skalitz, Nachod past Glatz and towards Schweidnitz, was very steep and led over the mountains between Bohemia/Moravia and Silesia. Daun believed that this last road was not likely to be used by Frederick, whom he realized would be in a hurry to be on his way, so the guard force there was minimal. Of all the commanders that had faced the great Prussian king, he should have known better.
The king, by deceptive maneuvering, gained that road towards the Oder rather easily. He swung his marching columns first in the direction of the better routes, causing Laudon and St. Ignon to move hastily to cover them against him, and leaving the road to Schweidnitz wide open. The irregulars did try to block the Prussians, but they were beaten up, and retired. Over the next few days, the bluecoats threaded their way across the steep mountain passes, and once complete the march was resumed, aiming for Landshut in Silesia. Frederick reached Grüssau on August 8; there he and his men paused for two days while the king prepared a testament for his subordinates, in case something happened to him during the coming battle with the Russians, a people whom he had never personally tested in combat before.
He drew up a document of general instructions to Prince Henry, which was dispatched to him on August 10, while another was sent to General Friedrich August von Finck.46 Frederick made it clear that these instructions were to be followed to the letter in the event of need. One is hard-pressed to believe that Henry would have really heeded these directions from a dea
d, powerless Frederick—whom he frequently disagreed with anyway.
There was little time for such distractions. In Silesia, the king made allowance for the Imperialists and Daun. About 14,000 men were detached (under command of Charles of Brandenburg-Schwedt) from the main army and given the task of holding the Landshut-Grüssau area against all comers, Austrian or otherwise. Keith was originally to have had command of this force, but instead Frederick ordered him to Breslau for rest and recuperation. Keith was very ill at the time. In addition to Charles’s detachment, about 25,000 additional Prussian troops were scattered throughout Silesia under Fouquet, for a total of some 39,000 men to defend the province from the Austrian/Imperialist armies. Fouquet was under the orders of Charles.
The defense of Silesia having been arranged, Frederick himself, with about 15,000 men, marched from Landshut (August 11) seeking a battle with Fermor on the banks of the Oder. His line-of-march went by Liegnitz, past Glogau and Sprottau, near Guben, and on to Frankfurt-on-Oder; the marching troops covering 130 miles in just nine days.47
Chapter Twenty-Three
Operations in Brandenburg Prior to Battle at Zorndorf
On August 20, the king’s Prussians arrived at the gates of Frankfurt-on-Oder; Fermor was out by Cüstrin with his army. The bluecoats initially moved to Tschicherzig. Frederick reached it on August 16, but Dohna was still out of the vicinity busy in his dealings with the Russians. The grueling pace under the hot summer sun had cost the army many heat-stricken deaths, and the rest of the troops were worn out from the fast pace. They needed a little rest and the king received intelligence that there were no Russians south of the Warta. There was no way to link up with Dohna at Tschicherzig, so the royal force sent intelligence that the junction could be made at Gorgast. Dohna had marched from Frankfurt-on-Oder in August 13. A timely force of four battalions, along with 16 squadrons of cavalry, all under General Schorlemer, bound for Cüstrin. It was considered essential for the new troops to get there as soon as possible.1
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