Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Thus closed the narrative of the Battle of Hochkirch. It was to be the last victory of Daun over the Prussians led by their king in battle, although he would win a decisive action against General Finck at Maxen a year after. This encounter was a hard-fought battle, but Hochkirch had none of Zorndorf in it.36 The losses the two armies suffered were the following: Frederick lost approximately 5,381 men/119 officers (5,490 of all ranks) killed or captured; 4,060 wounded/missing; total, 9,450 men, or over ¼ of his manpower. This loss was certainly terrible, as any loss involving human life always is, but nowhere near what could have been expected under the circumstances. In material, Prussian losses were 101 guns (nearly all lost in the two batteries at Hochkirch and Rodewitz), as well as most of their tents and camp equipage.

  One of the biggest, most immediate consequence to the king was the loss of Field Marshal Keith. Keith was another of the ilk of men who were like General Winterfeldt, the king’s confidant up until his death in 1757. The body of Marshal Keith was at first gathered up unrecognized among the dead of the Battle of Hochkirch, although Daun and Lacy both recognized the corpse later. Marshal Daun expressed great sorrow over the demise of Keith. The Austrian high command had him buried with full military honors.37 The Prussian king, on his side, grieved as much as he dared under the desperate circumstances. In 1759, at the order of Frederick, Keith’s remains were belatedly exhumed and brought back to Prussia. He was buried, again with great sorrow, in the Potsdam Garrison churchyard.38 The fortunes of war had been grim for both sides. The whitecoats suffered a grievous loss on their side as well. The eldest son of Marshal Browne, Colonel Joseph Browne, was killed in this Hochkirch battle.39 This episode helps cast light upon the large number of Irish officers who frequently served in the armies of Maria Theresa, often in high command situations. What a contrast with the Prussian service! Most of the higher ranking bluecoat officers, with the exception of men like Keith, were German-born.

  Daun’s losses were surprisingly greater. He had about 90,000 men present, and had 5,939 killed/wounded (325 officers and 5,614 rank-and-file), with about a thousand prisoners, and, most shockingly, over 2,500 deserters who left the ranks during the march through the thick woods, making for an aggregate total of 9,500 men, or ⅛ of his force.40 No doubt a great many of the latter made their way to the Prussian camps, where their stories of large troop movements in the woods had met a mixed reaction before the battle even broke forth.

  Chapter Twenty-Eight

  Aftermath of Hochkirch; Maneuvering to the End of the Campaign

  The Prussian army took up a central position at Klein-Bautzen (on the Spree to the rear and not to be confused with Bautzen). Frederick’s new command post was at Doberschütz, with outposts at Kreckwitz and towards Purschwitz. Daun had indeed gained the victory, at a heavy cost to his own army. Both in terms of casualties and the exhaustion it had undergone as a result of the battle. He remained at Kittlitz and the neighborhood of that place for a week, recuperating/resting his men. The main Austrian army rose from its position on October 20–21, 1758, gradually edging closer upon the Prussians. Frederick’s confidence (or arrogance) that the Austrians would never attack him1 had caused the loss of the battle, one of the most disturbing events of his military career.2

  Meanwhile, events elsewhere were transpiring. Zweibrücken was trying to hold on to Saxony. If the latter could not keep such a position without help from the main Austrian army, he should, as soon as he could, retreat to a more suitable locale. This state of affairs put paid to the long anticipated juncture between the two armies. The Saxon people themselves placed a great deal of faith in this union. What an inglorious conclusion!

  Further, the supply situation of the Imperialists had never been resolved. There was a real shortage of remounts and even fodder for the horses. The men were discontented. Almost the entire campaign, which had held so much promise, was going down the drain in a big way. Zweibrücken’s opinion of the marshal and “his” lack of energy has already been alluded to.

  Daun’s shift to the east also uncovered Pirna and Dresden to the enemy. The allies seemed disinterested in covering Saxony. At first, only Colonel Török and a small force was employed on this task. So Daun sent Colonel MacEliot with 1,200 men to go to Wehlen (October 6). This was better than before, and could at least give Prince Henry a run for his money should he choose to attack. Actually, Henry was in no hurry to rock the boat and did not take any major offensive action. He did send out Kleist with cavalry in the direction of Zwickau. There and in that region, Kleist was to do all he could to upset any allied military activities he could tackle. For his part, Hadik did not look favorably upon any Prussian efforts to root out allied positions. He immediately unbuckled Ujházy and sent him, with a small force, to stir up trouble around the Torgau/Eilenburg area. Prince Henry could not help but take notice of Ujházy’s activities.

  This seemed to provide justification for a renewal of the offensive. This made better sense now that Daun, at least temporarily, was out of the picture. Henry took up the gauntlet. October 13, Colonel Salmuth marched from Torgau straight on Herzogswalde to be joined there on the same day by Knobloch and Hülsen. The sum concentration of these troops was not great, but there was a clear superiority of discipline and quality compared to the Imperialists. The troops divided up: Hülsen with the main body moved on Freiberg and Salmuth moved rather succinctly on Nossen. Meanwhile, the allied force deployed at Freiberg panicked as Hülsen approached. They consolidated their forces when a Prussian attack struck early on October 14. Hadik tried to concentrate his men at the Spittelwalde, and made a legitimate effort to oppose the forces of Prince Henry. About noon, Hülsen opened up attacks all along the allied line.

  On this day, the attacks by Prince Henry’s men were rather limited to light troops harassing the line and keeping the enemy from getting a breather. A deliberate attempt it was to keep the Imperialists on the edge. These probing efforts were performed by Hülsen (the ranking officer on the spot); there was no well- developed attack scheduled on October 14. There was an involved effort to storm across the Mulde River, but the Prussians engaged there could make no headway. The Imperialists had seen good to erect substantial earthworks on the east end of the river, and only a direct—determined—assault could carry the day. Batteries were directed by Hülsen to concentrate maximum firepower all along the lines.

  Just about dawn on October 15, the Prussian guns opened up to a crescendo that roared most of the morning. This time, an assault was planned. Yes, the fury was there, but in spite of the inevitable damage, about 1300 hours, a full-scale attack was put forward. The blow was rather savage and Kleefeld (who commanded the Advanced Guard) had his posts pulverized. As his line was caving in, the general gave the order to pull back on Hadik’s line. Hadik’s reaction was predictable. He ordered his men to resist the fury of the attacks and slowly, deliberately and cautiously, the allies withdrew towards Tschopau. Thus was Freiberg finally wrestled from the rather shaky hands of the Allies. Had the Battle of Hochkirch not taken place around the same time, much more could likely have been accomplished.

  As it was, Hadik’s forced withdrawal had utterly transferred the initiative to the Prussians in Saxony, although Frederick would now require the services of some reinforcements as his army had been badly knocked about at Hochkirch. As usual, Prince Henry was not surprised by his royal brother’s activities in war.3

  In short, with Hochkirch a done deal, Frederick required reinforcements from Henry. On October 19, Henry moved out. Two days earlier, Zweibrücken, who in his heart of hearts could not make himself believe that the battle was going to prove decisive (in which he was perfectly correct), made some shifts in his lines to get his forces more concentrated. October 19, Hülsen, who now lacked the strength to keep his hard-won post at Freiberg, pulled back to Dippoldiswalde. He wasted no time.

  The Imperialist reaction to all of this was typical. As soon as the Prussians started to pull back, to ease off, Hadik moved in to take full a
dvantage of the situation. Same day, the Imperialists resumed their post at Bergstadt, all while Kleefeld had reconnaissance parties out probing towards Penig. Inter-allied relations were really strained by this point. Zweibrücken fielded a request for reinforcements from Daun with little concern, and all Daun could do was sidestep the Imperialists and “request” Serbelloni’s men be sent to the main Austrian army as those requested new formations. Dombâle was pushed off in the direction of Daun, and there was no guarantee that the marshal might yet request more of the troops from Saxony. Even though the marshal’s army still boasted superior numbers by itself compared to the king.

  Nonetheless, the reduction in Imperialist strength necessitated a contraction of the forces still left in Saxony. Fortunately, the Prussians were also reducing their lines. Hülsen himself abandoned Dippoldiswalde and fell back (October 20) to Gahmig. Zweibrücken, for his part, was reduced to holding skeletonal forces along the Muglitz, along with an anchor post at Frauenstein. But, with Hülsen pulling back (yet again), Hadik came roaring across the Mulde and started feeling out the immediate vicinity. With the withdrawal of troops on both sides the emphasis of fighting was slowly shifting towards Silesia. Especially since both main armies had made their way there. The supply shortage situation for the Imperialists had not eased either.

  The Imperialist high command had begun to openly question whether or not the Austrians had a “secret agenda” when it came to Saxony. Daun’s apparent lack of energy could thus be explained, if this were indeed a true scenario. The Imperialists went so far as to confront Kaunitz in Vienna with their suspicions. Kaunitz assured Flemming and his entourage that nothing could be further from the truth. Flemming was frank; he confessed the Imperialists were starting to wonder if Silesia’s reconquest alone was the marshal’s aim. In return, the Austrians spoke quite correctly that, since only a part of the former Prussian occupation force of Saxony was still present in that province, it seemed logical for Zweibrücken to do all he could to take advantage of the new situation. Nor did things stop there. Zweibrücken himself went so far as to wonder aloud why Daun’s main army, which was still stronger than the Prussian opponent by itself, should need any sort of reinforcements from the Imperialists in the first place. When shortly Daun spun round and started moving to besiege Dresden, all of this contradictory talk in both allied camps was largely forgotten.

  Daun had not come to this decision lightly. A council-of-war was called for at Austrian headquarters for October 29. This was the precursor to the rest of the campaign, which had been another long one for all concerned. Daun would see good only to deploy a portion of his army (namely Los Rios’ and Gaisrück’s men) to go watch what Frederick was up to. The main Austrian army had posts within sight of the enemy and did nothing; even though Daun had 80,000 men against Frederick’s 35,000 men.

  Surprisingly, the latter still intended to make for Silesia to drive Harsch from the walls of Neisse and Kossel, thereby relieving the pressure being applied by the foe to reconquer the province. Marshal Daun, with a fresh victory and congratulatory messages coming from Vienna, perhaps a consecrated hat and sword from Pope Clement XIII—an enemy of the Protestant Frederick—could hardly have considered the king could reach Silesia successfully without risking another battle. He definitely preferred playing a waiting game rather than try to force Frederick’s hand. This was in spite of a military parley in Vienna on September 27, where Kaunitz, piqued by what he considered to be Daun’s dilatory nature, told the marshal that Neisse and other posts in Silesia, at the very least needed to be taken before the long campaign ended with no firm gains.4 This was “suggested” to the marshal, although, in retrospect, Daun did perform a decent job overall during the latter part of Campaign 1758.

  Daun also proved to be the clever one as Wied’s actions, with the siege of Neisse ending as a failure, were announced as a mere ruse to draw the Prussian king towards Silesia. This was patently untrue. The marshal may have foreseen the political consequences for the realm’s prestige if all there was was one failure after another. All of this was set against the backdrop of the “great victory” at Hochkirch. Surely Daun’s reputation among his men had suffered more of a drop.

  Meanwhile, the allies were doing their best to make full use of the Königstein again, in spite of its “neutral” stance as attested in the 1756 peace. Actually, they required the big guns of the fortress for their designs. This could, theoretically, compromise its neutrality. The formidable fortress boasted a Saxon commandant, Lt-General Michael Lorenz von Pinch, who was determined to keep to the terms of the neutrality treaty. This had really occurred over the course of 1757 and 1758. In the end, the fortress kept its integrity against strenuous objections.

  Now certainly with Daun facing the end of a long, laborious campaign, there were becoming fewer alternatives from which to pick. This was the reason the marshal turned back and besieged Dresden. With the advent of December, there had to be some rekindling of the old ghosts of Leuthen. This was a battle the Austrians took no pleasure in trying to relive. Hochkirch itself was supposed to inspire the Russians (and the dilatory Swedes) into more active participation in the war.

  It seemed like a no lose proposition. If Dresden were indeed beyond reach, at least the allies would be assured of the greater part of Saxony at their disposal for winter quarters. If there was no dice there, the siege of Neisse could always be resumed. This time with the added bonus of Silesian foothold. Maria Theresa was in full accord with this idea. She penned a note to the marshal, stating as such, on November 4.

  If a move upon Dresden were to be successful, the Prussians would have to be kept busy to divert them from reinforcing the forces in the Saxon capital. This would require the help of Zweibrücken. Daun realized he had limited time for the task upon Dresden.5 The king would never let the situation stand pat. What was clear to all concerned was the success, or failure, of the campaign rested with the actions of Daun’s main army.

  Frederick had adequate guard left in Saxony to hold that place. Sufficient for the Imperialists. Finck was left in charge of all Prussian forces there, as Prince Henry had now joined his royal brother. Schmettau commanded at Dresden. With 14,000 men at Finck’s disposal, the king concluded that he need not fear for Saxony. He ordered that the wounded, after being loaded into some 3,000 wagons earmarked for the task, be sent to Dresden to be attended to there, under escort. This convoy left Bautzen in the evening of October 22; as a preliminary to the new march Frederick had decided upon. The main Prussian army spent the daylight hours of October 23 preparing to march. The array set off about 2200 hours—the king ordering the provision/bakery wagons moved northward under escort toward Förtschen, in the subtlest manner, so that the Austrians would not detect what was afoot.

  The king was very put off by the utter failure at Hochkirch, but he still betrayed some confidence when he addressed his subordinates after the action. He told them curtly, “The marshal has let us out of the trap.”6

  The army was ordered to follow the van up the Spree so Daun’s alert scouts might not be tipped off. All being ready, the bluecoats abandoned Klein-Bautzen. Late in the night, Austrian scouts, creeping into the now deserted encampment, discovered its occupants had flown the coop. Scouts reported the marching towards Glogau. There the king apparently meant to rally his men under the big guns of the fortress and then proceed on Neisse from that side.

  In Silesia, a few days after Frederick’s move, Harsch, at last ready for a siege, finally began bombarding Neisse (the siege guns having just arrived from Moravia) on October 26. But Tresckow would not give in, and before too long he received the help he had been requesting since August. The king, catching up with his bakery and baggage on the march not far near the Spree, crossed the river near Jahmen-Förtschen and paused with his army on the opposite bank. This occurred about the time Daun’s scouts discovered the old Prussian camp empty. The marshal stood organizing the last-minute details of the march into Silesia, while the marshal took note of the fa
ct and, true to form, did nothing. This inaction allowed Frederick to make the very march Daun had been instructed to prevent if he could. The marshal, however, did send off General Wied with a strong reinforcement to help prop up Harsch, while he prepared to move with the main Austrian army.

  Before light the following morning, the Prussian king ordered his army to prepare to march. Soon the men had been split into several columns, to make better/faster passage through the difficult country east of the Spree, and made off hastily. The head of the army pointed south-southeast towards Reichenbach aiming for Görlitz. His intentions are made clear by a peek at a map of the locality, since he could not go through Daun’s army, then he would simply move around him to reach the road for Silesia on the opposite side.

  Obviously, Daun did not believe that Frederick could pull off such a move with an army still shaken by Hochkirch, for the Austrian guard force at Reichenbach was weak and other nearby detachments were weaker still on the road behind. When the Prussian army appeared near Reichenbach early on October 25, it was a move totally unexpected by the Austrians. Prince Henry had command of the Prussian rearguard, and he had been busy fighting off enemy detachments from the time the army had left Bautzen.7

  The “block” force at Reichenbach was soon attacked and driven away, and the king’s men marched on to the road; not blocked now, and open almost into Neisse. That was all the intelligence Harsch needed to hear.8 Hastily, the army moved off. Daun, learning the enemy had reappeared where it was not anticipated, reacted. He rose from Dresha-Walsa (the position his army had been occupying) and moved back east down the road to see to the situation himself. Discovering the news was all too true, the marshal settled his army down about Kittlitz and Hochkirch. The following morning, October 26, Laudon and his troopers were sent to do what they could.