With the campaign finally winding down, Daun was now in receipt of some very specific instructions about winter quarters. The main army was to be put into hibernation in the border country where it could cover as much of the empire’s border country from incursion by Prussian irregulars. Even the Imperialists were making for winter quarters. Zweibrücken rolled into Chemnitz on November 17. His tired men, traversing country which had been muddied up by heavy rains, rested for a full day. The mud was freezing now as light snow began to fall. The men rose from Chemnitz and slipped back on Zwickau (November 20).
Two days after, General Hülsen moved with a substantial force forward on Freiberg. The obvious intent was to compel the allies to abandon any positions in Saxony and withdraw behind the Metal Mountains. There was an allied force at Freiberg, but they skedaddled when news of the impending Prussian advance reached them. Hülsen was in an advanced position, close enough that he could inflict some damage on the enemy. However, he lacked the strength to really force the issue without Wedell. The latter was even then in transit to help out with the cause of hitching the enemy further to the rear.
The gradual withdrawal continued apace. On November 24, Hadik, far afield, finally reached Zwickau. The Imperialists fell back further, this time to Munchberg. There were a very few isolated incidents of sporadic clashes between the armies. We must mention a little-known fact about the Imperialist throng. For anyone who thought the Prussians were bad looters (which, in fact, they generally were not), the Imperialists were a terrible array of easy going vagabonds. The bonds that held these impressed soldiers into some form of military cohesion practically dissolved during the retreat. They looted, plundered the villages they were supposed to be protecting. Only the threat of Prussian appearance—which often was no more than wild rumors—did help minimize the damage. Wandering soldiery could not inflict much damage when they were too busy running away. This could be an exaggerated view, but at this stage of the campaign there was little else that could be expected.
Part of the reason for this kind of behavior had to do with state of supply of the army. In the often freezing weather, the men had only indifferent shelter, little straw to feed their horses or to even keep warm. Wood was a scarce commodity as well. As the allies retreated, they practiced a form of “scorched earth,” which was later employed by the Soviets in World War II against the German invaders. The object was to strip or take away what the Prussians could later make use of to benefit their own army.
This was especially the case of crops that were robbed from local farms and carried into the German Reich. The Imperialists also drove off with them all the horses and drought animals they could find. This was the treatment meted out to the local inhabitants by the Imperial troops, who were their ostensible allies. What was the worst of all, some of the same individuals who had taken full advantage of the system to promote themselves or draw a paycheck apparently took this opportunity to enrich themselves as private individuals at the expense of the Saxons. These were various and sundry people over whom Zweibrücken seems to have exercised little real authority. Numerous complaints were to be lodged over what had happened on the retreat from Saxony. It would not get much better. Throughout this campaign, that army had functioned rather ineffectively. There were others who berated Marshal Daun, feeling he had let numerous opportunities to inflict real damage on the enemy to slip away. In a way, the Imperial troops had been, at best, mediocre, at worst, dangerous to their “allies.”
Frederick, though beaten at Hochkirch, had made positively brilliant deductions to give him back the upper hand. He had moved first into Silesia, then back on Saxony; in each case, his opponents retired before he could even come to grips with them. Now he was again the master of both. The victory at Hochkirch, coming as it did on top of the setback at Zorndorf, was unexpected to say the least for the allies. If Hochkirch did not accomplish anything else, it instilled new confidence into the French allies of Maria Theresa. As for the Russians, their continued cooperation was assured by the Empress Elizabeth. So long as she remained alive, the Russian armies could still be counted upon to help Maria Theresa.
PART V. 1759: THE FOURTH CAMPAIGN
Chapter Twenty-Nine
Frontier Incursions and the Russian Threat
After news of the Russian setback at Zorndorf, and their own reverses over the Rhine, such as Crefeld, the French were not encouraged to continue the war against Prussia. But Hochkirch had shown that the cream of the Prussian army, led by Frederick himself, could be attacked and successfully defeated.1 The bad times, and there had been many, were largely forgotten at Versailles, despite the many financial difficulties.
Frederick’s country, after three years of sustained warfare, had greatly suffered. Already lost were 100,000 of his best-trained and veteran troops, sacrificed both on the bloody battlefields he had fought on as well as during the incessant marches undertaken during that time. For the new campaign of 1759, the Prussian king could still put 127,600 men into the ranks, but roughly 50 percent of these men were outright greenhorns.2 A chief reason for reaching the number above involved an exchange of prisoners with the Austrians; “more than 18,000 officers and men were returned” by this useful expedient.3 Prussian recruiters ranged far and wide throughout Central Europe, often clandestinely, trying to gather as many recruits as possible. Promises to would-be recruits of becoming officers in the king’s service were seldom, if ever, fulfilled.4 There was again the ever-present problem of finding sufficient money to pay these troops and to continue to finance the fight, and of trying to train more new officers to replace the ones lost.5
The only lands as yet occupied by the enemy were the East Frisian possessions of Prussia as well as East Prussia. But much of the land still controlled by the bluecoats had been stripped to provision the foreign armies that had traversed them, and not inconsiderable sections plundered to provide supplies for the king’s own armies. On a more personal note, Frederick’s sister Wilhelmine had died on the eve of the Battle of Hochkirch.6 Her loss sorely affected the king, who complained that all his relations were being claimed by death.7 It must have been about the same time when “Old Fritz” was writing, not with exaggeration, “My body is worn out … but honor speaks, it makes me think and act.”8
Frederick knew his attempts to divide the allied coalition against him by going through Austria had failed miserably. At the opening of three campaigns conducted thus far—1756, 1757, and 1758—he had moved directly or indirectly against Austria. But, each time, the desirable objective had not been achieved. Reluctantly, he now realized that his only hope for survival was to henceforth hold his country like a huge fortress against the might of the coalition until one or more of his opponents might grow tired of the war and abandon its prosecution. In short, the offensive mode of warfare was becoming rapidly too expensive to sustain. Lacking any viable alternative, the king was forced to fall back on the defensive.9 His only concession to an offensive would have to be local from now on, strictly limited in nature at that.
This decision was forced on him by a combination of many circumstances. The same bold, impressive marches and speedy invasions he had conducted before had cost him most of his best troops, and Prussia could not indefinitely shoulder such losses. Already, with the war entering its fourth year, a considerable proportion of the Prussian army was composed of foreigners (even more than previously), and a growing number of those soldiers were inadequately trained, ill-fitted to replace the seasoned veterans that had been lost. Frederick spent the winter of 1758–1759 at Breslau, taking little time to relax. Other things besides relaxation needed immediate attention. Again he was wrestling with the problem of providing finances, and for the new campaign he would require about 20,000,000 talers (thalers). Since the Prussian king could not beg, borrow or steal this money from his own countrymen or Saxony/Mecklenburg, he was given no alternative but to debase the coinage of Prussia. Once again, as in 1758.10 This created high inflation throughout the realm. But it provided
the necessary funds, and the large subsidy from Great Britain helped. All told, £670,000 from the English were to be converted by the Prussian mint into well over five million thalers.11 Frederick really needed the subsidy from Great Britain as it turned out. Together, all of these measures furnished the money without which the king could not hope to take the field.
Austria, as well, was suffering the ill-effects of the war, both in total manpower losses and heavy war expenditures. The Austrians had benefitted, like Frederick, from the prisoner of war exchange; more than 22,000 men were returned to the ranks. But inflation in Austria was rising, and there were a host of new taxes and methods to try to make up shortfalls for financing the war. France and Russia were experiencing similar problems with finances. Nor were problems confined to just money considerations alone.
By the spring of 1759, the allied nations, responding to an all-out call to defeat Frederick, had deployed more powerful armies against him than at any other opening of a campaign. Once more, the Austrians, the Russians, and the French would provide the main thrusts, with the Swedes and the Imperialists again playing second fiddle to the main forces.
The Swedes and Prussians opened the new season with some campaigning. In January, after the Swedish army had withdrawn to Stralsund, there were two important posts still held by the Swedes. Demmin had a large garrison with artillery under Colonel Ehrich Gustav von Lilienberg. As for Anklam, it had a still larger garrison with more artillery under Lt.-Gen. Count Grafen Johann von Sparre. Prussian forces under Manteuffel blockaded both places on January 10. He had batteries set up, and commenced shelling the foe on January 15. Neither post was in shape for prolonged siege. Demmin’s garrison marched out on January 18. General Kanitz attacked Anklam and forced it to surrender as well (January 21).12
For the Austrians, Daun was again in supreme command, and once more he had 100,000 men. His main army, which was concentrated just south of the Bohemian border, composed some 53,000 men. One important factor was changed: the Austrians now wanted a juncture with the Russians. They had come to this point because they had been unable to take on Frederick successfully by themselves. Witness their inability to take full advantage of changing circumstances, such as those following Hochkirch.
As for the psyche of the Austrian soldiers themselves, their faith in ultimate victory had to be shaken as the war dragged on and casualties just mounted. Matters were not helped by the eroding confidence in the structure of the army’s leadership.13
Frederick was determined to neutralize the Austrian threat before the Russians could appear. For now, the latter were still inactive. The king was willing to admit now that the Austrian artillery and infantry were fully capable of matching his own. To complement the new allied strategy, there were several operations before the time of normal campaigning. Hardly had the new year opened, than operations on the Western Front were underway. Soubise had retired, following his operations the previous season, into a position between the Mayn and Lahn rivers. Ysenberg kept an eye on him with some 10,000 men. Soubise, by some clever deception, was able to occupy Frankfurt-on-Mayn on January 1. He gained the city on the pretense of passing one or two regiments through the town, and then admitted other troops who quickly extinguished all opposition.14
A month after this incident, Prince Henry (headquartered in Dresden) was ordered to make another foray into the enemy country over the Saale, to upset the Imperialists there, but to go no farther than Erfurt. Major-General Ebenreich Friedrich von Aschersleben took a mere 450 men for this raid. Rumors greatly exaggerated the size of his forces, and the alarmed enemy reinforced the garrison at Erfurt. Aschersleben did not tally in the neighborhood, he retired to his own lines (February 9). The enemy responded with a probing force under Major-General d’Arburg. The latter sortied towards Kassel, but without offensive intent. The allies did not see things that way. The two forces then engaged in “waltzing” from one fluid post to another. Prince Henry and Broglie tentatively opposed each other. Very little came of any of this, but Ferdinand was made aware of reviving French hopes. With allied plans unfolding, Ferdinand ordered a concentration of his dispersed field forces round about Kassel. The prince kept his operations as much of a secret as possible. The Ernprinz was unbuckled to make a quick sortie out of Fulda (March 30), rolling through Bischofsheim and Meiningen, while Wasongen was snagged by allied light troops.
The Ernprinz, hauling loads of booty and some prisoners-of-war, was back at Fulda on April 7. Ysenberg and Holstein-Gottorp both operated against the French, with limited measures that gradually crowded the French into committing their hand. French forces tended towards Frankfurt, and Ferdinand was very uneasy over their presence thereabouts. He had it on good information that Broglie’s force was not united. So Ferdinand took his opportunity. April 9, his men lurched off. By April 12, Ferdinand’s army, operating in detachments, was in control of Windecken.15
Broglie, as soon as word arrived his forward posts were being driven in, ordered his men to concentrate at Vilbel-Bergen. A set of prepared works thereabouts was ready in case of need, and scarcely had the last of the French taken post when the allies appeared (April 13).16 Broglie had some 30,000 men with him, and there was brief hope that Ferdinand might take better time to prepare an assault, at least for one day. This would give time for Broglie to be reinforced by St. Germain with an additional body of men. Ferdinand instead struck immediately.17
French plans were very involved. They believed that Ferdinand could be forced over the Weser, thereby forfeiting Lippstadt, Münster, and that immediate whole region, by the efforts of Contades and an auxiliary force, now led by Broglie. Provided the French allowed him no peace. Soubise had relinquished command of the latter in early February, as he was occupied elsewhere. Ferdinand, ever alert, did not intend to wait passively for French aggression. He was aware of French hopes, but he was also cognizant of the enemy’s vulnerability in Hesse. If the foe ever had an Achilles’ heel, this was it.
The allies had been engaged in their turn in fortifying several posts near Gotha,18 and were determined to make for themselves a strong base thereabouts. Prince Henry,19 in mid–February, detached General Knobloch with instructions to march into that country and break up the enemy concentrations. Ferdinand, watching from his cantonments, sent 4,000 men to sweep the country in concert with Knobloch. There was no serious fighting, but Zweibrücken’s men did make some trouble. Henry himself went no further than Naumburg. Knobloch was to move as quickly as possible upon Erfurt, as his force would be strong enough that he could handle about any contingency with the foe. Both Frederick and Henry were alert, and the former sought to be kept abreast of enemy movements. Henry had some 37,000 men in Saxony. When word of Ferdinand’s overall planning reached Frederick’s ears, the king instructed Prince Henry to move from Naumburg gradually on Erfurt.
The Austrians had done precious little behind the frontier, although in northwest Bohemia (from Aussig on to Eger) they had thrown up barricades in anticipation of an attack by the foe. Prince Henry for his part awaited their appearance. The king wanted him to take the offensive and swing upon Bamberg to keep their adversaries off balance.
Knobloch moved out on February 24, bringing the Grenadier Battalion Young Billerbeck and Major-General Friedrich August von Schenckendorf, along with some additional regulars (some 15,000 strong), including an artillery train of four howitzers and four 12-pounder cannon. The bluecoats made for Erfurt, where they intended to seize what they could and thus help cripple the enemy thereabouts as much as possible. General Aschersleben maneuvered through Hochheim to help back up Knobloch, while Prince Ferdinand sent a force towards the Werra, a support force led by Ysenburg.
On the afternoon of February 24, the Prussians were close-by Erfurt, according to intelligence reaching that place. Erfurt’s gates were closed, and citizens put on the alert. Lt.-Col. von Kleist appeared with a complement of 200 hussars, demanding entrance to Erfurt. Aschersleben arrived about then, and the two forces took post on the G
algenburg. A party was sent to summon the city, led by Wunsch and Major von Oelsnitz. Capitulation terms were arranged, for Mayor Colonel Otto Graf von Hagen, who agreed to cough up 150,000 thalers (talers) to rid the vicinity of the invaders. Kleist pressed on to Gotha, and on the way encountered Arberg’s troops at Philippstahl, which prompted the latter to retire from the scene. Next, Kleist rode on Hunfeld (March 4), while another force galloped on Fulda. But the overall Prussian effort was limited, because the enemy were busily gathering reinforcements. Wunsch encountered a strong fortification at Ilmenau. Still, the garrison was forced to beat a retreat, but Major-General Pietro Alessandro Guasco and Wunsch could not follow up with the advantage.
At this stage, the two sides began to draw apart, the Prussians retiring out of range. Ysenburg had been successful in his endeavor, having encountered little enemy resistance to his adventure. But the Imperialist troops moved back into the vacuum created by the retreat of the bluecoats. A raid was arranged to go against the Pro-Prussian territories of Hesse-Kessel by the allies. Lt.-Gen. Johann Ferdinand Balthazar Freiherr Kölb set out with four battalions plus four companies of grenadiers (March 14) with specific orders to attack the city of Schmalkalden. Early on March 15, Kölb’s men attacked and overwhelmed the few defenders of the place, taking Schmalkalden completely by surprise. The result was not just psychological, but a rich haul of material goods as well. A rich haul of hostages, war material including the area’s major supply of muskets, many, many barrels of flour (always a staple for eighteenth-century armies). This bounty was dispatched homeward in about a hundred wagons towards friendlier quarters.
This irruption was perceived as a real threat to the likes of Ferdinand. The latter was very alarmed for the safety of Ysenburg’s men from the active enemy. The general thought a move against Fulda would help forestall any such dangers. Ferdinand sought to secure Prince Henry’s cooperation with a detachment or two of his own.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 55