Prince Ferdinand concentrated three bodies of troops around Kassel, the first under Lt.-Gen. Georg Ludwig Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the second under Ysenburg, while the third was under the Ernprinz. The first two bodies were to move to blocking positions at Schlitz and Hersefeld on March 30.20 The Ernprinz moved out up the Fulda and reached Rotenberg (March 25), then moved on Unter-Wegfurth on March 27. At the latter, a detachment under Major von Stockhausen was put up at Tann to keep the Ernprinz’s left flank secured. Ernprinz reached Fulda the next day, and set about stirring up some fuss within the city. Moving southeast from Fulda (March 30), the allies quickly reached Gersdorf. Light detachments roaming along had reached Bischofsheim.
The roads had been turned to muddy messes by the bad weather. But the Ernprinz still managed to reach Neustadt late on March 31. His forces fell out into a line from Neustadt, through Ostheim, and on to Fladungen. The enemy were close-by in some strength, and the Ernprinz resolved to strike them the following day.
The force at Fladungen, under the command of Major-General von Urff, struck at Tann, forcing back the regiments of Brettlach and Savoy. Arberg had ordered off General von Schallenburg, at Tann, some reinforcements which also made for Wasungen and Meiningen. Major-General von der Schulenburg, commanding two full grenadier battalions and a swarm of light troops, captured Meiningen. Wasungen fell soon after, which put Arberg in a predicament. The latter had to fight a severe engagement near Schmalkalden (April 2). Thus forced back, Arberg joined up with General Guasco at Eisfeld (April 4). The next day, the united throng hitched into more comfortable quarters at Königshofen.
While all of this was taking place, the forces of the Ernprinz took up post at Wasungen, but Schulenberg, after haggling about, rejoined the main army, leaving only Stockhausen with a detachment at Meiningen to withdraw gradually from the region. The Imperial states had suffered greatly in Franconia. There was an outcry against the French, who had utterly failed to help their nearby “allies.” A request for help from Serbelloni directed at Broglie was snubbed outright. For his part, Broglie complained that Serbelloni flatly refused to cooperate with the French.
Meanwhile, Wunsch, joined by Knobloch (with the Fusiliers of Bülow and Braun) descended on Saalfeld, accompanied by two full squadrons of Szekely Hussars. The enemy, under Major-General Philip Georg von Browne,21 took up post west of Saalfeld. The bluecoats unlimbered their guns and opened a sustained bombardment of the town (March 26). Browne abandoned his position, falling back, first on the nearby Sattel Pass, but Wunsch followed up. Browne then retired in the direction of Kronach, from which Hadik was marching to face the Prussians. Wunsch fell back on Saalfeld, there he joined up with Knobloch (March 30). The bluecoats retreated.
The allies reoccupied the vacated area. Major-General Campitelli took up post at Ziegenrück. Guasco was at Ilmenau, supported by MacQuire. The Prussians continued to aim for the main storehouses of the allies, for obvious reasons. Major-General Daniel Georg von Lindstedt moved from Dresden (March 26) with two full squadrons of the Szekely Hussars and considerable infantry support, aiming for Hof. Early on March 28, Lindstedt’s approach to Hof was discovered by the shocked inhabitants. Campitelli fell back with his main force on Pirk, although Kleefeld stayed put at Hof, to cover the retreat. A fierce firefight was put up before Hof was captured by the Prussians. After seeking to force the reluctant Campitelli to a fight, General Lindstedt withdrew for Plauen, where he arrived on April 2. The Prussian haul included 200 prisoners of war. Prussian losses amounted to 30 killed/wounded and 59 prisoners. But the overall impact of these little probes was limited indeed, much as Prince Henry had dictated.22 In his decision to keep the objectives limited, Henry was fully backed up by the king. These intrusions were mostly intended to give the light troops something to do over the layover and to help keep the Reich in some confusion and uproar.
Nevertheless, Colonel von Guldenhof, Commandant at Eger, was cognizant of the vulnerability of the major magazine located there. It was obvious the enemy could have the place for the taking, if they so inclined. Gemmingen, with 10,000 men, was in the field near Aussig. Zweibrücken counted upon Gemmingen to help cover Eger and the territory thereabouts. Brentano had a force of riders covering the road near Töplitz. Gemmingen had received some intelligence that Prince Henry was preparing to move against Eger with some 30,000 men.
April 12, General Platen, with four companies and a cavalry screen, was unbuckled to go against Hof. Major-General von Reinhardt, commanding at Sebastienburg, sent intelligence that a force of about 14,000 bluecoats was on the point of marching on Marienburg. Same day, some of the Prussian cavalry appeared in the vicinity of Marienburg. This news caused Gemmingen to move to concentrate his forces. An allied force under Lt.-Col. von Palaski, riding towards Zöblitz, discovered a strong Prussian force at Marienburg. Other intelligence was received by the allies that Prince Henry was in the offing.23
With the Kalckreuth Cuirassiers, Mainz Regiment, and the Serbelloni Cuirassiers, Gemmingen confronted the surging Prussians. A Prussian attack at Peterswaulde (April 15), noted for its ferocity, ended with the allies in retreat, having lost about a hundred killed/wounded.
Meanwhile, Prince Henry departed the Saxon capital on April 14. Gemmingen tried to take a stand on the rise of Schöbritz. The quick-moving Prussian horse outflanked Gemmingen almost immediately. This left him no choice but to retire further, this time aiming at Lobositz, finally on to Martinowes. Meanwhile, the bluecoats seized Sebastienberg, so Colonel Török and General Reinhardt took up post nearby. All of these maneuvers served to uncover the magazines at Lobositz and Aussig; Prince Henry promptly seized them. While the enemy were busy plundering the magazines, Gemmingen packed up and lit out for Welwarn (April 17). At this point, the allies began to consolidate their scattered force.
But the Prussians reacted too quickly for Gemmingen’s own good. A detachment sent to destroy the river crossings at Libochswitz and Laun, encountered a strong force of Prussians that drove their foe away. Gemmingen, with the river barrier broken, fell back to Tursko, where he picked up some timely reinforcements.
Wunsch took full advantage of the situation by moving on Budin (April 17). The Prussians plundered the town hall, and ordered that 10,000 Reichthalers be handed over without delay or Budin would be sacked. Two days after, with the money not forthcoming, the bluecoats burned down the granary. But the fire, stirred up by winds, spread throughout the town and virtually burned it to the ground. This was almost certainly an accident, for Prince Henry himself offered to make restitution to the suffering inhabitants of Budin.
Other Prussian forces arrived nearby. Kleist galloped into Welwarn, while the Austrians continued to fall back. The Austrians at Prague shuddered at the possible appearance of the Prussians, yet again. General Hülsen, too, was busy. April 15, Kleist struck at Reitzenhain. The Austrian screen force was thin. Colonel Michael Freiherr Benno Mikassinovich von Schlangenfeld was holding Reitzenhein, while Reinhardt was ensconced at Sebastienburg. The Austrians and allies were trying to hold a front from Reitzenhain to Sebastienburg.
At Reitzenhain, the Austrians were preparing a defense. Reitzenhain had a defense force of some 300 men, while Reinhardt held some 2,800 men at Sebastienburg. The Prussian horse led by Major-General von Aschersleben, with the infantry of Major-General Grabow. Before dawn, the bluecoats advanced unsuspectingly towards the outer earthworks at Reitzenhain, which they thought were abandoned. A crashing volley from the works sent the Prussians reeling, while Mikassinovich, switching to cannister fire, fell back to prepared positions right at Reitzenhain. The Austrian commander stayed put, probably for too long. When Mikassinovich tried to retreat to Sebastienburg, his command was cut off and he was taken prisoner along with most of his command.
While the Austrians were being evicted from Reitzenhain, Belling galloped off to Ulmbach, which was found vacated by the enemy. As the survivors bundled into Sebastienburg, Reinhardt resolved to change his post. Belling put in an appearance with his h
ard riding hussars. He caught the Austrians preparing to withdraw further and rode straight into Sebastienburg. Reinhardt’s men managed to briefly hold their post, but the Prussians overlapped it, forcing the Austrians to beat a retreat. Reinhardt was taken prisoner, along with 1,500 men, 51 officers, and three guns.24 Prussian losses were 55 killed/wounded.
With a key post now in Prussian hands, Hülsen moved on Komotau, while Belling smashed the Austrian magazine at Saaz. Brentano fled to Welwarn, where he encountered Gemmingen. On April18, Hülsen reached Postelberg. Belling immediately destroyed the granary stores at Laun. This was the limit of Hülsen’s moves. As for Belling, after encountering a force of enemy cavalry at Brünnersdorf, he burned a bridge over the Eger thereabouts and then drew back upon Komotau, none the worse for wear. Platen pushed off for Hof on April 16. Kleefeld was close-by, and there were reports of much stronger allied forces in the immediate vicinity. Platen quickly evacuated the region as a result.
The allies employed countermeasures. Daun wasted no time in getting reinforcements to Bohemia. General Buccow was sent with three regiments of infantry and five of cavalry to Jung-Bunzlau. The military in Prague was certainly cognizant of the enemy, and a number of timely improvements were made to the defensive posts there. The city was prepared for a resumption of Prussian aggression, should the enemy so desire. Guns, to a total of 131, were mounted on the Little Town’s walls, and additional ammunition for artillery and muskets brought up.
Prince Henry pulled his men off the offensive and started to retire on April 20. As the various Prussian forces pulled back out of Bohemia, the Austrians followed in their tracks. By April 22, Prince Henry’s men were back in Pirna. The losses had been great. The whitecoats lost a total of 1,818 men, in killed/wounded/ or captured. Along with 189 horses, which could pose a minor problem for cavalry remounts. But the balance sheets were favorable. It was estimated that the supplies/provisions captured or destroyed could have provided bread for 50,000 men for 143 days, along with fodder for 25,000 horses for two months.25 On the whole, this was a far more successful incursion into enemy territory than the earlier one.26
The blame for the success of the Prussian foray was placed at Zweibrücken’s feet.27 The Imperialist army had been shifted away, uncovering Bohemia to the bluecoats. The damage inflicted could not be so readily made good. The Imperialists were supposed to cover the stretch from Franconia over the Egerland and Western Bohemia. Zweibrücken cautioned against dividing up his forces, and was ordered to concentrate in such a way that he could consolidate his forces at Bamberg if necessary (April 17). As the Prussians retired, with the pressure easing, Zweibrücken deployed his forces to cover as much of the assigned territory as possible. Hadik was posted to Munchberg; while Christoph Baden-Durlach held Stadtsteinach, and MacQuire was at Asch. Kleefeld was still clinging to Hof, with Ried and some light troops pushed out closer to the Prussian lines.
In preparation for the coming regular campaigning season, Zweibrücken set his temporary headquarters, first to Schlesslitz, continuing to Kasendorf (May 3), and finally to Kulmbach the following day. There was serious doubt among the allies that Zweibrücken was not the man to lead the Imperialist army in the campaign. There were even more misgivings about his Second-in-Command, Serbelloni. Even worse, the two men did not care very much for each other. The chances of harmony among the allied command system were bound to be slim under these troubling circumstances. This was over and above the other difficulties that the Allies were already dealing with.
That was good news for the Prussians. Marshal Daun and the Austrians were most anxious to help alleviate the confusion prevailing among the commanders of the Imperialists. This was hardly an altruistic motive: the efficiency of the Imperialist army during the campaign would directly impact the Austrians. To give Zweibrücken a sort of mentor, the diplomatic Freiherr von Tillier28 was appointed from Vienna. Tillier protested his transfer from the generally stable main Austrian army vociferously to the more volatile Imperialists. Serbelloni was made a Field Marshal, thus temporarily placating him. For the French, they dispatched the Comte de Marainville to represent the interests of France.
Marshal Daun pulled no punches. He sent a letter to Maria Theresa on April 25, communicating his belief that the Imperialist army should be used only for purposes of defense, and not be for any offensive, aggressive purposes at all. The condition of the latter just might justify that grim assertion. There were approximately 25,000 men under arms for the opening of the main campaign. That included 3,200 cavalry. There were 109 guns available for field operations, and the Austrians sent a reinforcement of about 28,000 with 63 guns to help bolster the efficiency of the Reich troops. The preceding winter had been relatively mild, so the soldiers had been drilled more than normal. And, despite the misgivings of Daun, Maria Theresa did indeed harbor some hope that the Reich troops could be used in some offensive capacity.
Zweibrücken, once he arrived to take command at Kulmbach, was almost immediately confronted by a disturbing realization: he knew little about the intentions of the enemy. But Zweibrücken sent a note to Marshal Daun that he anticipated Prince Henry would strike into Franconia first. That same night, alarming intelligence arrived that Prince Henry was advancing to the attack again with some 18,000 men. Zweibrücken decided to stay put and await the developing situation.
Daun was emerging from his winter slumber. From Jarowitz, the marshal moved his headquarters to Schurz, hoping to forestall any Prussian attempts to move into Bohemia or Moravia through Glatz. The Austrian army took up a line between Neustadt and Nachod. On May 9, Marshal Daun called a council-of-war to decide on the best immediate course of action. Buccow, Sincère, Harsch, O’Donnell, Lacy, and the reluctant Tillier attended this first council of the new campaign. Maria Theresa was all in favor of going to besiege Glatz, which capture would boost the Austrian situation in the immediate area, besides providing a springboard for the new season. Daun was looking towards a possible rendezvous with the Russian army.
The Russian factor would once again play a key role in the Austrian plans. Until it could, Daun and his subordinates weighed in on the possible courses of actions. One suggestion was to use the direct approach: take the entire army and move to attack the army of Frederick in the direction of Landshut. Another distinct possibility lay with the reinforced Reich army being sent to recapture Leipzig and stir things up with Prince Henry. As a half measure of sorts, the allies could place about 30,000 men towards the Queiss, to forestall any Prussian plans thereabouts. There were a number of other proposals being considered; but it was finally decided to not involve the Imperialists in any offensive way; at least initially (to the delight of Marshal Daun). The Austrians were to keep that army at arm’s length and away from the Prussians to the degree possible. The marshal also reiterated the importance of a link-up with the Russians. Daun thought it would be wise to be conservative until the Russians were near, and not be committed to any major operations in the immediate area before then.
Daun did send DeVille to seize Reichenberg, while Harsch would keep his detachment closer to the main force. Meanwhile, the Prussian king had written to his brother to congratulate him for a job well done and to urge him to smash into Franconia while he had the enemy on the ropes. It was obvious to Frederick the opportunity being offered to the bluecoats. If nothing else, the king wanted to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. In addition, Frederick wrote to Ferdinand to field a force to help Prince Henry in this latest endeavor.
As for Prince Henry, while he expressed a desire to concentrate between Zwickau and Naumburg, he was very reluctant to take any further offensive actions immediately.29 Uneasy about the safety of Lusatia, he was fully aware of all the effort expended in all of the recent endeavors against the enemy. In short, Henry did not wish to be obligated to another offensive without specific instructions from the king. Frederick forwarded the appropriate instructions, but Prince Henry still expressed serious reservations. The king said this was a uniq
ue situation, and his army could cover Lusatia while Henry was away.
Henry accordingly prepared for the new enterprise. The prince had a strong force (35 battalions, and 49 squadrons) at Zwickau ready to go on May 4. Knobloch and his advanced guard were at Auma. However, to assemble such a force, Prince Henry was forced (as he had feared) to leave territory uncovered. The exposed country was in Saxony. Other than the garrisons of Torgau, Wittenberg, Leipzig, and Dresden, the only field forces available to the Prussians were the Puttkammer Hussars and a couple of infantry battalions.
Prince Henry moved on Hof, while Knobloch took the path of Schleiz and Nordhalben. Another force, under Finck, marched on Waldkirchen with the intention of striking at MacQuire’s command. Knobloch moved to Löbenstein on May 6, while Finck attained Poppengrun. Next morning, Prince Henry, with high hopes, moved towards Oelsnitz.
The Austrians did their best to react to these incursions. To oppose Knobloch, who was marching on Löbenstein, General Ried concentrated his force west of Würzbach, but decided discretion was the better part of valor when the Prussians suddenly appeared in the vicinity (May 7). Ried pulled back in the direction of Steinwiesen. Knobloch followed up to the vicinity of Nordhalben and Teuschnitz. This maneuver put the Prussians in an excellent position to turn the flank of the Imperialists at Kulmbach. Ried bundled into Wallenfels, sending an urgent request to Zweibrücken for some reinforcements. The Imperialists kept almost fearfully back, trying their best to keep from engaging the bluecoats.
Wunsch was unbuckled about dawn on May 9, and he struck full force at Wallenfels. Ried’s men faced a distinct disadvantage in both numbers and position; he just bolted for the woods. Knobloch attacked the town of Kronach, but failed to gain this strategic post. The town was held by Lt.-Col. von Buseck. He could certainly take the field, while Ried, ensconced now at Rugendorf, was being steadily reinforced. Kronach received timely reinforcements (May 10).
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 56