Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Although their leader was safe, the Prussians could make no further gains, holding instead tenaciously to the captured works in their hands, too exhausted to even retreat it would appear. This is not surprising.

  The Allies were in similar shape. Their cavalry was truly heterogeneous, as the main thrust of the cavalry units were the 6th Dragoons and the Löwenstein riders of the 31st Austrian.30 Two units which were truly magnificent units, fully equal to the magnificent squadrons of Seydlitz. They were even stiffened by stubborn Russian cavalry, of inferior quality, but eager to demonstrate their worthiness as well. This mounted attack helped out the greencoats, who were being hard pressed. As for the valiant Apcheronski regiment and its neighbors, two fine Russian units—the Pskov and the Vologda Infantry—they lent their aid and momentarily helped check the stubborn Prussian advance. Then, near 1700 hours, the valiant king finally drove in his part of the front, temporarily. Soltikov responded the only way he knew how: with more reinforcements. Again, the newcomers (Kozen and Vyborg, joined by Pfern) contrived to move from the Russian right. This new body blunted the Prussian advance.

  The fresh Austrian infantry/cavalry swooped down upon the recoiling Prussians, forcing them to gang together to form a defense. All of this, it must be remembered, took place along a relatively narrow front, allowing precious little room for maneuvering. The reformed Russians now joined the fray; together the allies drove the enemy mass before them, back to the Küh-grund, from Kunersdorf, back the way they had come. As it worked out, the Küh-grund and vicinity was to prove a strong “trap.”31 The Prussian cavalry were ridden down by the surging allied cavalry. Frederick rallied his men, trying to reverse the tide of battle. Finck was still attacking from the Hühner-Fleiss, to no avail, now the king ordered the horsemen to disengage and ride around to the Mühlberg to aid Finck there. Eugene led some support forces to the scene, to the eastern end then west before they finally turned to face south directly at the enemy. The bluecoats here intended a decisive stroke to roll up Soltikov, but the men had scattered when they marched off, quickly dispersing.

  Eugene was badly wounded trying to extricate himself from the carnage. When he returned, Frederick ordered Puttkammer and his hussars to the task. But that commander was killed and his stroke ended much the same as the first. After this latest assault had miscarried, the Russian infantry, now directly before the Küh-grund, struck forward and retook the line. They remanned the batteries at once, while Frederick reacted by sending orders to retake those guns. A large force of bluecoats advanced then to within some 50 yards of the Russian lines and halted there, exchanging volleys of musketry with the latter for about ¼ of an hour. It was past 1730 hours. A few Prussians even made it to the crest of the nearby hillocks, but unfortunately they lacked either the physical or numerical stamina to recapture the Küh-grund and the disputed vicinity. Kanitz’ 2nd Infantry, pounded so fiercely by these same Russians at Zorndorf, suffered more. Some 472 men and nine officers fell all told on this day.32

  Seeing the Prussian attack stalled, Laudon took the chance to launch his still largely intact forces from behind the Grosser-Spitzberg to complete the overthrow of the Prussian army. By then it was about 1800 hours, and the sun was dipping low in the western sky. As soon as the bluecoats got a view of the surging Austrian force, they were suddenly gripped by panic. The army dissolved into a mass of running men in a matter of minutes, the troops forsaking their weapons and equipment as they did so. However, not all of the men fled. One small force planted itself on the Walkberg to guard the retreat. Elsewhere, isolated groups still put up a bold front. Lestwitz’s 31st lost 431 men on this retreat.33 But, for the most part, the army had been converted into a confused, milling mass of fugitives with only one thought pressing in mind: to retire to the rear and away from the enemy as fast as they could. Indeed, seldom in military history has a battle been so completely lost by an organized army in such a short space of time.

  The press of the Prussian retreat was towards the north to the shelter of the ground beyond. The remnants of Schorlemer’s command strove to cover the retreat, but were forthwith driven into the swamps nearby. This exposed the retreating mass, which were ridden down and bagged by the thousands in their flight towards Zolow and the Hühner-Fleiss at Faulen-Bräcke and Stroh-Bräcke. Still, a great number of the bluecoats managed to take refuge in the churchyard at Trettin, where they briefly thought about rallying. Any such thoughts were put to bed by the impetuous Austrian cavalry of Kalnolky’s Hussars, aided by the nearby 11th Hussars. A vigorous attack, led by the dismounted horsemen, drove the already shaken Prussians from the village. This left them no choice but to abandon what artillery they had managed to drag to a sunken road forward of Trettin. Even by foot rescue was difficult, for the final tally was some 650 bluecoats taken. This really put paid to the matter of providing any meaningful resistance to the allied pursuit. In the event, “he [Frederick] demanded more of his men than they could bear.”34

  The king himself was in the midst of the rout. He seemed to be stupefied by what he saw. Frederick galloped about, shouting, “Children, don’t forsake your King, don’t leave me in this pinch!” and “will none of these blasted balls hit me, then!?!” However, his attempts to rally his men were as useless as they were brave. A panicked army must be like an angry mob, not really aware of what is happening about and deaf to the voice of reason. Frederick was on the point of being surrounded by the enemy troopers when he shouted out “Prittwitz, I am lost!” The latter dashed up, along with an adjutant. The adjutant grabbed his horse’s bridle, and led the king and his horse off at a gallop from the field, while Prittwitz with his command battled the pursuing Cossacks to a standstill.

  That evening, the agitated Prussian king took shelter at Reitwein while Wunsch, who had been left at the bridge to prevent the escape of the enemy, waited until most of the scattered fugitives had gathered at Öetscher and Goritz before he closed up the bridge. Both to anticipate the enemy from moving across the Oder and to prevent a possible wholesale desertion of the demoralized men. Wunsch had earlier marched to Frankfurt in the afternoon; he attacked and seized the town bridges. Then the understanding man blew them up.

  The firing on the battlefield gradually died down and the tortured Battle of Kunersdorf ended. Thus was the curtain brought down upon the drama of the worst defeat that Frederick would ever suffer on a field of battle.35 His men, during the course of the night, were slowly reassembled. Wunsch was summoned by the victors to surrender; the request was refused, of course, though on the morning of August 13 Wunsch withdrew, destroying the crossing points behind him, with no interference. The night before the king had written a letter to his old tutor, von Finckenstein, in Berlin, explaining the defeat: “I attacked the enemy today at 11. Pushed them back to the Jewish churchyard near Frankfort. All the troops were engaged, and did wonders, but the cemetery cost us a prodigious number. Our troops were thrown into confusion, I rallied them thrice; at length I thought myself about to be taken captive, and had to abandon the field of battle. My clothes were riddled by balls, I had two horses shot from under me; it is my misfortune that I am still alive. Our loss is very considerable; of an army of 48,000 men, I have not 3,000. At this moment, all are in flight and I am no longer master of my troops. You in Berlin will do well to think of your safety.” As a postscript, he added, “I have no more resources left, and I will tell you no lies: I think that we are lost! I shall not survive the downfall of my country, Farewell, Frederic.”

  There, sitting in a peasant hut amidst the wounded and the dying, the melancholic Frederick decided to turn over the command of his army, or what remained of it, to Finck. He told the latter this was only because of illness, when he had recovered he would resume command. Reluctantly, the king wrote out the order:

  “The General [Finck] gets a hard commission. The luckless army such as this I hand him is no longer in a condition to fight the Russians, Hadek [Hadik] will probably press on to Berlin, Laudon perhaps, too, if the general
[Finck] goes after they both, Soltikov [read the Russians] will take him in the rear, if he stops on the Oder, he will get Hadek this side. But I think that if Laudon tri for Berlin he could attack and beat him on the way, this iffit go well, would put a good face on misfortune and hold things. Time gained is very much in these desperate circumstances. The news from Torgau and Dresden, Coller my secretary will send him; he must keep my brother, Prince Henry, whom I appoint Generalissimo, informed of everything; to make good the misfortune completely is impossible, but my brother’s orders must be obeyed; the army must swear allegiance to my nephew [Prince Frederick Wilhelm]. This is all the advice, in these unhappy circumstances, I am in a condition to give. Had I still had resources left, I would have stayed by them. Frederic.”

  Next day, August 13, the king felt a little cheerier, now that the army had some 23,000 men, but Finck was in “active” command of this force (a duty it appears he never actually assumed). Frederick sent off a letter to the commandant in Dresden, our old friend Schmettau, to surrender if good terms were offered to him were he to be besieged by the enemy. After a few days’ further rest, August 15, Frederick departed from Reitwein, hearing the encouraging news that the Russians were encamping to the south of Kunersdorf. Not a single one of Soltikov’s men had dared to recross the Oder to the western bank after the battle. The king had again taken heart, resuming command of the reorganizing army (August 16). He promptly sent for Kleist and his hussars to join him from Pomerania. This move left the Swedes free to march into Prussian Pomerania, which they did in a rather lethargic manner.

  Chapter Thirty-Three

  The Swedes Show Their Hand1

  The Swedes had, earlier in the year, shown a rather curious lack of drive. Heavy demands for Prussian troops had cost the Northern Front its entire field force except for a battalion of troops on Usedom, and a second at Wollin. Frederick was quick to realize he was vulnerable at the Northern Front, but counted on the sluggishness of the Swedes to help him out.

  This seemed good enough until news of the Prussian defeat at Kunersdorf got out. The Swedes then appeared to come to life, possibly out of a desire to carve out their share of a country many believed to be on the verge of collapse. The Swedish Army had some advantage with the use of its naval arm, which helped offset lack of equipment, and, very often, the lack of effort. There had been a rumor about the Swedes cooperating with their allies across the Rhine, but the intended target was to be nothing less than an invasion of Great Britain, not operating directly against Prussia. Any such adventures would have involved the Swedish fleet, of far more significance in that case than their army.

  As for the Northern Front itself, clearly the most important city, from the points of view of both of the antagonists, was Stettin. The Swedes could hold nearly all of Pomerania and still not be secure so long as that powerful fortress remained in Prussian hands. It is not at all odd to say that, after Kunersdorf (when Berlin was largely stripped of its garrison), the Swedes did not push on that city but went elsewhere.

  Any southward advance by these people could leave them vulnerable to a descent by the Stettin garrison. There was a strong force in the city, which showed no intentions of leaving, totaling 7,368 men, including the Garrison Artillery unit Barghardt.2 If Stettin could be besieged and captured, this would require it be denied any resupply by sea.

  To back up the place, the Prussians assembled the closest thing they had to a naval fleet. The chief reason for this flotilla was to secure a water route for the relief of Stettin. Bevern had returned from Austrian captivity and was appointed by the king to be the commandant of Stettin. With little otherwise to distract him, Bevern turned his attention to upgrading the defenses of his new surroundings. His chief enemy, the Swedes, although rather anemic on land, were sure a formidable lot on the water. Their navy truly dominated the Baltic Sea. Bevern’s task was to eat away at that dominance if possible. He was engaged in the winter break of 1758–1759 in building up the aforementioned flotilla. Bevern’s plans were aided by Daniel Schultze, a local merchant of some repute. The sum of their efforts were to transform, to the degree possible, merchant vessels into seaworthy ships of war.3 By September of 1759, the number of vessels so converted was 12.

  The Russians were also busy cooperating with their Swedish allies. As General Lantinghausen’s first order of business was on land, he marched on Pasewalk (August 21) with his main body (some 6,000 men). His initial objective was the occupation of Usedom. Lantinghausen was helped out by a Russian complement of three ships, the Syerergni Orel (66 guns), the Revel (66 guns), and the Sr. Michail (32), which duly stood vigil at Swinemünde. This was hard by the harbor of Stettin.4 The next order of business was certainly the elimination of the little Prussian squadron. The latter vessels enjoyed the advantage of a shallow drought, which made them far more capable of maneuvering room than the enemy’s ships.

  Meanwhile, a Swedish squadron under Vice Admiral Lagerbielke had arrived, but that old specter of lack of cooperation appeared all too often and he subsequently did very little of substance with his Russian allies. (The Swedish commander indeed was looking for an English squadron on the scene.) The Swedish galleys afloat near Stralsund were sent into the channel near Usedom (August 14), but they got no farther than Anklam before the river became too shallow for the heavy ships to navigate. Vessels like the 74-gun ? Gǿtha Lejon. There was nothing to do but lighten those ships. While this process was being completed, the Prussian ships sailed up and attacked the big enemy ships at anchor.

  The Prussian fleet, under Captain Ernst Matthias von Koller, was driven off by the enemy shore batteries. Koller withdrew towards the mouth of the Oder River. Here the Prussian ships5 positioned near the mainland point of Neuwarp across the water from the Woltziger Haken on Wollin, where they were anchored to block the Swedes from farther progressing. The Prussian ships had a complement of 448 sailors, along with 162 soldiers—the latter meant to engage the Swedish ships. But the bluecoats, despite the best efforts of Bevern and company, were simply not on an equal par in terms of their naval efforts and were nowhere near what their dominance in land warfare had wrought. The Swedes quite simply could not long ignore the opportunity to test the mettle of their great foe on the water.6

  By comparison with their well-known and quite effective land endeavors, once out on the water, the Prussians assumed a far less menacing, and less effective, veneer. Bevern’s efforts during the winter layover bore fruit when the patchwork Prussian squadron took to sea in April, 1759. The vessels that made up this force consisted of three types; one of them the Galiot, twin-sailed short, stubby vessels. Two, König v. Preussen and the Prinz v. Preussen, were armed identically: with eight 12-pounders, two 6-pounders, and four small 3-pounders. These were joined by two others, which had the same armament. The Prinz Heinrich and the Prinz Wilhelm. Other vessels, the Galeere type, were little more than blunt-backed fishing vessels. One of this group, the Jupiter, boasted a formidable armament: two 12-pounders, six 6-pounders, and two 4-pounders. Two others, the Neptun and the Merkur, had two 6-pounders, four 4-pounders, and six 3-pounders each. Rounding out the little flotilla were four small, quick-sailing boats, sans names. They were numbered from 1 to 4, and their armament was strained at six 3-pounders.7

  On August 8, the Prussian fleet sailed forward to take up a post in the lagoon of the Frisches Haff. Assuming a position to the east in the lagoon, in a line facing west, hard-by Neuwarp, over towards Wollin. The Prussians were not permitted to remain long undisturbed. But there was no major effort by the Swedes until September 10. By then, the bigger Swedish vessels had been sufficiently lightened to safely navigate the lagoon. On that day, early in the morning, the Swedish fleet, led by Admiral Wilhelm von Carpellan, while deploying into four lines, sailed into view. In the front rank, were the most powerful of the Swedish ships; four galleys of 13 cannon each: the Carlskrona, the Blecking, the Cronobor, and the Malmö. In the next rank, were four demi-galleys of five cannon each: the Cåbilliou, Delphin, Stor
, and the Svärdfisk. In the third rank, were three sloops, backed up by one ship (with howitzers), while the fourth group was of 13 gunboats.

  The two fleets commenced an inconclusive cannonade which lasted until past mid-morning. Then Carpellan, losing patience, ordered his boats to close up on the Prussian Merkur and Jupiter. A struggle that ended with the opponents closed and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the two Prussian ships captured, and the rest of the front Prussian line, the König v. Preussen, Prinz Wilhelm, Prinz Heinrich, and the Prinz v. Preussen, together with the Neptun and the Mars, cut off by a rapid Swedish pursuit. Overhauled, they were quickly captured, while the four remaining Prussian Espings fled to the west.8 In this naval action, marked by major shifting about among the vessels, the Swedes, minus the Cåbilliou, Delphin, Stor, and the Svärdfisk, aided by nine gunboats (which pursued some newly visible unidentified ships to the southern horizon),9 gained the victory. Prussian losses were all but three of their lightest craft, 132 soldiers, 358 sailors captured, and some 30 men killed or wounded.10 The Swedes lost a reported 13 killed, 31 wounded, and one small vessel sunk. The tussle had lasted some four hours. In that short space of time, most of the Prussian naval effort in the whole war up to that point had been dealt a nearly crippling blow.

  The Swedes, meanwhile, continued to campaign actively on land as well. With the Frisches Haff passing gradually under the control of the Swedish fleet, General Fersen, with some 4,000 men, advanced from Wölgast (August 18) to take up a blocking post on the island of Usedom. The foot soldiers were transported to the island by the Swedish vessels. The minimal Prussian forces opposed to him—mostly hussars who were not inclined to fight—were forced back, enough so that Swinemünde was compromised by the transportation of Swedish artillery to the island. August 21, Fersen took up a blocking post at Kaminke, beyond which the Prussians had pressed. The bluecoats on the island were now confined wholly to Swinemünde. At hand, holding the West Redoubt and the enclosures facing Wollin Island, Lt.-Col. Prentz was leading some 450 men. There was precious little time for preparation. The extent of those arrangements involved a brisk reconnaissance of the defenses of Swinemünde on August 24, which produced little collateral damage. On August 27, before dawn, Swedish batteries began a pounding of the enemy lines from the sea. Swedish land batteries joined in the crescendo, and a meaningful attack was launched by Major Anrep, along with Meherfeldt’s grenadiers. Supporting this cast, the Västgöta Cuirassiers and the Abolans Infantry unit made sure of the venture.11 This charge gradually pressed the bluecoats at Swinemünde back on the West Redoubt, although a significant body of Prussians continued to resist. Lt.-Col. Prentz, with a part of his force (50 men, including four regimental guns), was nabbed by the Swedes, who wasted no time in attacking the West Redoubt (into which the remaining Prussians had sought shelter). Although the latter was more like a true fortress than most in the region, the Prussian defenses were not up to snuff.