Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  After the debâcle at Maxen, the rest of the campaign was anticlimactic. Daun himself, the morning after the capitulation, which needless to say had restored his lost reputation, ordered Beck, holding a force nearby, to attack the Prussian post at Meissen. The place was under the direction of General Dierecke (our old acquaintance Colonel Dierecke from Zittau). Daun hoped to be able to top off the recent victories with a capture of the post of Meissen.

  Beck had moved on Stolpen on November 18. That day, he halted at a post between Erkmannsdorf and Rossendorf. Then, responding to directions from Buccow, Beck pressed then on to Pirna and Trachenberge, where his men got into camp about 2300 hours on November 21. The maneuver must have been difficult, considering the adverse weather conditions. Two days after, Beck sent scouts towards the Prussian post at Meissen. The Austrians gradually crowded over against a line between Grossenhayn leaning upon the Elbe. Beck pulled up short at Radebeul, while Frederick responded to the threat by ordering forward to Meissen two battalions of Anhalt-Dessau, along with three full squadrons of the Möhring Hussars (3rd Regiment). A couple of minor skirmishes occurred over by Gross-Döbritz and Radeburg, but nothing of real consequence took place until December 1, when a makeshift bridge the bluecoats had fashioned out of planks and straw, which had been placed across the frozen Elbe, became unusable because of a sudden thaw in the temperatures. Up until recently, Prussian retention of Meissen, and actually of the Elbe, had meant they could continue to bring supplies by water to supply their needs. Once the river froze over, this was no longer an option. Nevertheless, the loss of the makeshift bridge was very serious, for the town bridge of Meissen had long since been rendered useless.

  The upshot was, Dierecke & Company was effectively left stranded on the East bank of the Elbe, and the marshal recognized the opportunity. In order to ensure the success of this latest endeavor, Daun sent out Major-General Pellegrini to stiffen Beck with additional men in the form of two grenadier battalions, four fusilier battalions, and 500 carabineers.50 Marshal Daun, gripped now by the absolute reverse of caution (a rarity for him), ordered Beck to strike at Dierecke at once. Austrian patrols pushed forward, gradually forcing back Prussian outposts.

  About 0200 hours on December 2, the whitecoats, having just spent a good part of the overnight moving into attack position, rolled forward between Weinhölba and Niederau. But Dierecke had been alerted by the nocturnal activities of the foe, and had promptly abandoned any posts near the villages for ones closer upon Meissen itself, near Zeschwitz.51

  Ultimately, Dierecke put his men in a position running from Sörnewitz, Zaschendorf, over to the Fürstenberg to Zscheila and Bohnitzsch. But the Prussian had only about 5,000 men, including about 1,000 cavalry52; far too few to cover such an extended line. Beck, with some 8,000 men,53 sent forward some hussars which seized Zscheila and threatened the Prussian hold on Vorbrücke. Pellegrini’s men, nothing daunted, laid hold of Proschwitz and the Bocksberg.

  This accomplished, the Austrians set up a small battery of two howitzers and two 6-pounders. Dierecke, desperate now to affect an escape to avoid repeating the debâcle at Maxen, was left with no choice but to try to transfer his force across the Elbe, which was then flowing rapidly and filled with ice floes. The enemy were in unknown strength, and any hope of a rescue force was on the opposite bank of the Elbe. As quickly as possible, Dierecke ordered the collection of any kind of raft, or flat-bottomed boat that would float, to be assembled at Cöllin. The Prussians, once this was accomplished, commenced ferrying across the Elbe to the Ziegelweise.

  As soon as Beck was apprised of the Prussian move, he ordered his guns to open up on the boats as they negotiated the Elbe. Tielke said some 400 men were drowned in the icy waters of the Elbe,54 because “most of the ferry boats were sunk by Austrian fire.” But the Prussians claim little effectiveness from this shelling. In any case, the whitecoats had to abruptly cease this shelling when Dierecke brought six of the big Prussian guns to bear upon them, from the Zaschendorfer Heights, as well as from the Martinsberg and the Knaben Plateau over by Gasern.

  Nevertheless, the bluecoats had been able to bring only part of Dierecke’s command to safety before the window closed on rescue. With the morning, Dierecke remained on the “wrong” bank of the river, with three full battalions, including Anhalt-Bernburg, stranded with him. With the dawn, Dierecke fell back upon Cöllin and the Ratsweinberg to face the fresh Austrian efforts. The whitecoats pressed Dierecke from Niederfähre by no later than 0745 hours, but he continued a brief resistance. Colonel Riese with nearly 1,000 Warasdiner Croats attacked the Prussian position, and provided a screen behind which Pellegrini moved forward to “help” the bluecoats on into captivity. The capper, though, was really provided by Colonel Zedtwitz, whose men spilled over into the terrain hard about Cöllin, and promptly drove straight into the village, while the Prussians reformed in the hills nearby and launched a determined, dogged resistance of more than two hours’ duration. Zedtwitz could make no further progress until he sent a squad to outflank Dierecke’s men and were able to fire into their backs from overhead. By 1000 hours, resistance was at an end. Some 1,500 Prussians were captured, along with nine guns. Austrian losses were 72 men killed and 115 wounded.

  Hearing that Dierecke had surrendered, Daun pushed out from quarters, realizing that he could possibly have Saxony to winter in instead of Bohemia. He emerged from the Plauen-Chasm against Frederick. In numbers, he definitely had the edge: 73,000 or more men against a bare 34,000 or so of the Prussian king. On the other hand, the bluecoats had faced tougher and longer odds before and Frederick would not go away without a drubbing from Daun.

  For example, the king told Major Peter Christian von Kleist, who was to command at Torgau, to prepare for the enemy to appear; he took the Prince Ferdinand (5th) Infantry Regiment from Meissen and headed for Torgau. Soon there was suspicious activity over by Riesa, where the Austrians looked like they might be trying to construct a bridge. A block force was sent to Riesa, but the extent of the Austrian attempts to move across the Elbe there were blocked by some timely Prussian heavy artillery fire. Lt.-Col. von Dingelstedt, moving through the country over by Blumberg and Kossdorf, ran into General Beck’s advanced guard (December 7). The bluecoats had no intention of staying put to fight it out; instead Dingelstedt withdrew down the Elbe slowly away from Beck, while nervously keeping an eye on a late season enemy attempt upon Berlin. Beck moved upon Torgau, where he paused before the place. The Prussians had no intention of abandoning the town, and Frederick responded by ordering General Czettritz with two full regiments of cuirassiers, along with the Kleist (1st Hussar) Regiment and battalions from Anhalt-Bernberg and Wied, to move to cover Torgau from this latest enemy effort. Beck demurred, and with the weather once more reverting to much cooler temperatures, decided against attacking. Beck fell back towards Dresden without further ado, while Czettritz took up a new post over by Kossdorf.

  But, the Austrian move upon Torgau was just one of the tricks Daun still had up his sleeve even as calendar year 1759 threatened to end. For a while, it looked like Marshal Daun would indeed be able to take Freiberg (where Frederick hitched into on December 6), and began to make preparations for what looked like another offensive. The Prussian monarch, of course, had yet to take up winter quarters, so his men were as ready as they could be when the whitecoats approached the Mülde on December 9. Major-General von Linden was at Chemnitz, while Wilsdruf was also noted by the presence of significant Prussian formations. All of this while Frederick, back to his old self, continued to believe the marshal would soon be on his way to Bohemia, as his supply arrangements, which were clearly not adequate, would not be sufficient to sustain his men in Saxony over the winter interlude. Meanwhile, Prince Henry was again riled up against his royal sibling and busy penning acid-laced remarks to Ferdinand about the king, caustic ones like Frederick “would be the ruin of his country” yet.

  And, while Henry and Ferdinand were in close communication, Frederick, not to feel left out,
was involved in writing to Ferdinand he needed help as well; in more concrete form: soldiers. December 4, Frederick wrote to Ferdinand. The latter’s reply came before his new plea for help. The Hereditary Prince Karl of Braunschwig-Wolfenbüttel was to be sent with some 8,000 men to help the main royal army—on December 10.55

  Finally, Luzinsky reported the enemy had moved on Langensalza (November 5). Lt.-Col. Farkas of the Baranyáy Hussars promptly attacked and drove the enemy back upon Marburg. Luzinsky marched on, and, seizing the initiative, gutted a magazine at Wanfield. Afterwards, he moved on Zeitz. The approach of the Hereditary Prince compelled Luzinsky to hitch back upon Saalfeld, where he picked up some reinforcements. Thus given a new lease, the general marched his Austrian force upon Jena; where, many years after, in 1806, the old Prussian Army that had long suffered under a hangover from the glory days of Frederick the Great, was finally smashed down and forced to rebuild from the ashes of the ruin.

  With the arrival of the Hereditary Prince, Frederick ordered him to go help General Linden. The latter packed up, meanwhile, and headed for Marienberg. The king went to Freiberg, with the expectation of attacking the enemy installed on the Weisseritz. His scouts went to look at the enemy’s lines (December 29), but, at length, pronounced an attack to be impossible.56 Instead, the Prussian army finally went into winter quarters.57 As for Daun, the marshal did not have the guts to try anything. That Daun was unwilling to play his hand just when it appeared he was holding four aces shows clearly that nothing had changed. He was still the cautious man he had always been.

  For their part, as the campaign 1759 had clearly demonstrated, the Russians were unwilling to budge an inch with a substantial force until the Austrians agreed to keep them supplied and detached a considerable force to cooperate with them. This sequel suggests that a lack of full cooperation between the two major “allies” undoubtedly helped keep the Prussian cause alive.

  The remainder of the war really demonstrates Frederick’s effectiveness as a military commander of the first rank. Yet, at the same time, it demonstrates all too clearly his frequent reckless use of authority. Very often the monarch did not use his head when confronted with a bad situation. For the whitecoats, much the opposite was true. Daun’s cautiousness had again gotten the better of him, as this campaign 1759 wound down. That he probably analyzed the situation a bit too much. In short, following the victory at Meissen, he withdrew into the Plauen-Chasm again; this time for winter quarters, although Frederick and his army kept the field. At the end of the campaign year, Daun, who had beaten the enemy at Maxen, and at Meissen, Dresden, not to mention out stepping Prussian detachments all year, was no closer to wrestling Saxony from the bluecoats than ever.

  As the new year, 1760, opened, Frederick was attempting to draw out MacGuire from his snow-covered works. At last he admitted defeat, and by the end of January he had moved his men into temporary huts taking up his own winter headquarters at Freiberg. The Prussians in the east now idle, the detachment from Ferdinand returned on February 15 to rejoin him on the Western Front, where we are about to examine military operations for the year. First, though, we turn to the Swedes.

  At the Northern Front, the king had dispatched Manteuffel to head back for Pomerania to reinforce the Prussians thereabouts. General Fersen, with the enemy beginning to gather again, was left little choice but to fall back from the islands he held. October 1, he retired back upon Pasewalk to join forces with Lantinghausen and his men thereabouts. This left a small garrison at Wollin and thereabouts; the Skaraborgs Infantry, Västmanlands Infantry, one battalion of Jänköpings Infantry to anchor the line.58 Manteuffel, instead of confronting the enemy head-on, planned instead to start maneuvering around to upset the Swedes if at all possible. The garrison of Stettin, meanwhile, with little otherwise to keep them occupied, tried a sortie in front of Pasewalk.59

  This effort was entirely unsuccessful, but Lantinghausen, by then, was in desperate straits, short of fodder and insufficient supplies of provisions, was already thinking of retreat. The Swedes had enjoyed little success since Wollin.60 Almost simultaneously, they sent a detachment aiming for Prenzlau (September 26), shaking up affairs, and one more time the distressed residents found themselves being relieved of lots of money. While this was occurring, the troops from Stettin were slowly forced to a position behind the Locknitz.61

  Manteuffel’s men, meanwhile, had continued to advance. Major Knobelsdorf took one battalion of the Hordt Free Battalion, along with 100 hard-riding hussars, who turned up on October 21 near Demmin and surprised the Swedish force established at that place. Although Knobelsdorf ended up retiring on Malchin, this Prussian effort demonstrated plainly to Lantinghausen how vulnerable his position was. The latter withdrew his army on Anklam, closely pursued by the magnificent Belling Hussars. In early November, with winter approaching fast and the very typical Swedish difficulties with provisions and supply lines, Lantinghausen pulled back to the Peene River on November 6. The only Swedish forces remaining beyond the river had been withdrawn before the end of the month. The army was huddled up near Greifswald. There they were as the campaign 1759 wound down at the Northern Front

  At the Western Front, Ferdinand had not been enjoying unbridled success; but the enemy in front of him had been stiffened with new blood. The quality of the French leaders, at the same time, had also improved. Contades and Broglie were a far cry from the incompetent Soubise/Clermont duo.62 Contades being in charge across the Weser in the Rhine area, Broglie, having started from Frankfurt, had moved to take Hesse-Kassel, and was probing for Hanover. The latter Ferdinand was determined to defend. But he had a hard choice.

  If Broglie marched further and he maneuvered towards him, that would be tantamount to sacrificing Lippstädt, along with the line of supply and communication. Instead of committing himself then, Ferdinand stayed put on the Weser. Broglie had some 35,000 men in Frankfurt, and Ferdinand was resolved to take it back. Ordering a concentration at Fulda of the various formations at his disposal, except those in Münster, Ferdinand made ready to do battle. Soon his strength had built up to 30,000, including those men who had been with Prince Henry. The French, fired up by a new scheme from Contades to try to end the war in the West by the end of 1759,63 meanwhile, had moved to Bergen. This was a small village directly on the road to Frankfurt, through which Ferdinand would have to pass.64

  The country thereabouts was bisected by hills, ravines, and gullies. About daybreak, April 13, 1759, Ferdinand shook his army into motion, throwing out scouts to probe in the direction of Bergen. From about 1000 hours, the artillery was in play, Ysenburg leading the van.65 He struck at the French position, in steady, deliberate assault. Resistance was determined, and utilizing their own artillery and the difficulties of the terrain, the French broke up the first attack wave. Repeated assaults were made until the attackers had shot away their ammunition, all to no avail. In one of these charges, Ysenburg was killed. The fighting entered a temporary lull, and another allied effort was broken up by some of Broglie’s advancing reserves. Seeing no reward for the bloodletting, Ferdinand broke away and retired to Windecken, but not until 0200 hours the following morning did he deign fit to make off. He strode to Münster, and the French did not pursue.66 Still, the outcome of Bergen must have really encouraged Contades, at least for a time, that the goal of finally winning the war in the West was within reach.

  Ferdinand lost 2,500 men killed/wounded in this battle, along with five guns. Broglie lost about 1,900 casualties. France made itself proud of the victory, and praise for Broglie was high there. Meanwhile, after his withdrawal from Bergen, Ferdinand lost Minden, observing the inexorable advance of the enemy. Shortly, Osnabrück fell to the advancing French, the main allied magazine. About the end of July, the allies were shuffled about in the vicinity of Minden; below it, Contades and 30,000 men were deployed. Broglie with an additional 20,000 was at the Weser, other French forces were near Münster or wrestling for Lippstädt. Ferdinand did have some successes during this period; hi
s reconnaissance parties took Bremen and retook Osnabrück, although soon after he lost Münster to the enemy.

  Ferdinand was quick to try to get Contades rooted out by striking at his line of supply; he detached forces to probe in the direction of the French at Gohfeld, where the supply wagons rendezvoused. The Prince of Brunswick was in charge of this detachment, which had weakened the main allied army. Ferdinand’s left leaned upon the little village of Todtenhausen under the command of General Wangenheim; the left of this post was flanked by the Weser, but the right appeared to be exposed. This seemed to Contades to be an opportunity to strike and outflank the allies. In fact, however, the position was merely to decoy the enemy. Evening of July 31, Contades had a force on the march to strike the foe, some 50,000 men, towards Minden. Broglie crossed his men by the town bridge there at Minden, following which he spread out his command facing Todtenhausen. The allied posts ran from Stemmern, past Hartum, within his post, Ferdinand had just 36,000 men (although this did not include Brunswick’s 10,000). Contades planned to move his army in eight columns to attack, but if the troops moved too slowly, then Ferdinand might have a good chance of dealing with the threat.67 Interestingly, both Frederick and Prince Henry thought Ferdinand had “lost his head” when he moved towards battle at Minden.68 That is, until he won his decisive victory.69

  The French right leaned on Bastau, the cavalry being assigned to the center rather than on either flank. Contades planned to go forward about 0500 hours next morning. Broglie was to get the ball going, rolling up the enemy opposite. The latter marched his men through the night, and the following morning at the appointed time he was standing at the prearranged site. Inexplicably, he did not then attack, content with shelling the French posts before him. The previous night, Ferdinand had been scouting, so by the time that Broglie opened his bombardment the allies were already underway.