Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  As soon as word was received that Lacy was fleeing on Bischofswerda, Frederick ordered the marching columns to veer the pincer movements to swoop down upon Lacy there. But after a tiring 18-mile trek, the exhausted bluecoats found that Lacy had again flown the coop. For this effort, they came up with only 80 hussars and some equipment to capture. That time around, the Austrians did not halt anywhere close again, but stirred for the security of Dresden. Lacy did not stop retreating until he reached Weisse Hirsch (within a few miles of the Saxon capital), none the worse for wear. Frederick, nothing daunted, decided now to make at once to besiege Dresden before the marshal could return to interfere.45 Certainly, the king’s quick resort to overt offensive operations frequently got him and his army into trouble, but one cannot fault the daring often involved in executing some of those same wild schemes. The opponents of the Prussians, for the most part, were generally more cautious, but lately had been more successful. A trait they shared with Prince Henry. In the history of the world, quite a number of great minds have been misunderstood.

  Chapter Forty

  Frederick Besieges Dresden1

  Frederick had reached Bischofswerda before the separate columns of his army were reunited; there the Prussians paused (night of July 9–10), intending to cross the Elbe and lay siege to Dresden as soon as he could do so. Lacy’s force was still on “Frederick’s” side of the river, but when morning arose on July 10, the latter rose and, wasting no more time, marched directly into Dresden by the Town Bridge. Lacy did not tarry long, but made for the Plauen Chasm, where the Imperialist force of 20,000 men was positioned, on the outskirts of Pirna and Dresden. The king pushed, that same night, to Reichenbach, where he rested for the night, taking up headquarters near-by there at Weissig. Simultaneously he sent for Hülsen, whom he had dispatched to Schlettau in late June, to move down upon Dresden from the westward side of the Elbe.

  The defenses of the city which Frederick was about to besiege were reasonably strong.2 The commandant of Dresden (MacGuire) had at his disposal a garrison of some 4,000 men, who had strong defensive works for their main lines. There was, besides, Lacy’s and Zweibrücken’s forces (some 20,000 men apiece), thus making an aggregate defense total of some 44,000 men against the 30,000 or so that were with the Prussian king. So he was already seriously outnumbered, even without taking Daun’s big army into account.3 After a day of rest had been declared for July 11, early the next morning, the Prussians put down pontoons over the Elbe at Kaditz (about a mile north of the Saxon capital) while Hülsen arrived near the northwest side of Dresden, near Briesnitz, at the same time. About 0200 hours, the preparations completed, the army was marching. By daylight the bluecoats were waiting only for the completion of the bridges to be finished before going across the river to be on Dresden.

  As soon as word was flashed to Zweibrücken that Frederick was preparing to come across the Elbe and, indeed, that Hülsen was even now at hand, he reacted. The Imperialists fell back in company with Lacy upon Pirna, minus 10,000 men detached from Zweibrücken to stiffen MacGuire’s command.4 Yet could Lacy be held responsible for his maneuver? After all, the orders from Daun told him to cover the main army during the march but then to go and help defend Dresden from Frederick “short of fighting a general engagement.” So when he discerned that the enemy were rolling across the last water barrier from close quarters with him he concluded that Dresden could no longer be covered without a battle, he retired. Nevertheless, the allies and not the bluecoats had the decidedly better position before the Saxon capital.5 MacGuire, his garrison now swelled to some 14,000, was confident of making successful resistance, at least until more tangible assistance could be provided to him.6 He had formidable numbers of artillery at his disposal. A total of 110 big cannon, approximately 60 howitzers, and an assortment of other ordnance. This was above and besides the other forces now established in that vicinity.

  Intelligence was received by Hülsen indicating that Lacy and Zweibrücken were vacating their forward posts; he at once forwarded the encouraging news to the king. The latter, who had originally intended to cross the Elbe and make his way towards Dippoldiswalde round the region near Pirna (in order to get behind Lacy/Zwibrücken to deal the knockout blow to the pair), now altered his marching route. As soon as the army was across, Frederick mounted his steed and galloped off for Preisnitz. He was delighted he could take a more direct route for Dresden courtesy of the enemy’s withdrawal, a sentiment he did not hesitate to share with the British Ambassador Mitchell.7 From Preisnitz the Prussians appeared near the western and southern sides of Dresden. MacGuire intently observed his great adversary’s movements thereabouts, across the Weistritz River past the Plauen Chasm. Lacy and company had now abandoned it, a needless move since, in view of their superior numbers, the allies had ample means to retain control of it.

  Frederick set his headquarters at Grune Wiese, about one mile southeast of Dresden’s walls. As night fell, the bluecoats began constructing batteries for their heavy siege guns, which at that point were still at Magdeburg (orders were in transit to bring them forward speedily). Even the king admitted he had made no preparations for besieging Dresden, “as such an enterprise had not been supposed possible.”8 By now it was Frederick’s avowed plan to grab hold of Dresden before Daun could come back.9 For the moment he utilized the only guns of consequence that he had with him (a couple of howitzers and eight of the cannon) in shelling Dresden, on July 14. The Prussians were in fair shape before the city. Hülsen was present at the northwest side of the place to keep the garrison pinned in, as well as to attack the latter when required. All this while, the Duke of Holstein was at hand to shell Neustadt, and the king, of course, at Grune Wiese. On July 13, Frederick had called upon MacGuire to surrender, by sending one of his Aide-de-Camps, Lt.-Col. Primislaus Ulrich von Kleist, but the latter, viewing time as on his side,10 adamantly refused to discuss it. Significantly, the riled up Prussian monarch promised to handle Dresden the same way that Laudon treated Landshut town after the battle. Late in the afternoon of July 16, the besieged sought to gain some breathing space from the rather persistent Prussians. Colonel Zedtwitz struck at the bluecoats over by Neustadt in order to open—and then secure—a line-of-communication with the near-by forces of General Ried. There was more. Major-General Würzburg was unbuckled, to emerge from the Black Gate, over by Holzhof in the direction of Fischhausen. Würzburg’s men, led by some Croats in the vanguard, emerged upon a developing fight between the bluecoats and the advancing force of General Ried. Würzburg’s men attacked the thoroughly surprised rearguard of the Prussians, who finally were compelled to beat a retreat. General Ried almost immediately occupied Grune Wiese. On the night of July17, around 2100 hours, another Prussian force attacked the besieged over by Wilsdruf and the See Gates, but the whole effort was spoiled by some adroit cannon fire. So, from dawn on July 14, the Prussian guns belched fire upon the historic city of Dresden.

  This pounding began at about 0600 hours. Screened by the bombardment, Frederick ordered some of the ‘Free Corps’ units, supported by some infantry, to drive in MacGuire’s outposts, under Colonel Zedtwitz, beyond the main works. The Free-Corps Courbière (of Wilhelm Renatus de l’Homme Courbière), linked by the Jäger, was unbuckled to strike at MacGuire’s lines. The resulting advance smashed the Austro-Imperialist outposts, driving the stunned survivors back behind the Pirna gate, which was now shut in the face of the surging bluecoats just in the nick of time, by none other than Colonel Amadei. The Allies had no intention other than holding on at this stage.11 Casualties for the besieged amounted to some 312 men.12 Frederick, as soon as he had forced the enemy back there, set up batteries at the Mochinska Garden and atop the hill beside, from which MacGuire had observed them there. From July 14 until July 18, the bluecoats spent valuable time re-digging the old entrenchments which MacGuire himself had prepared when the situation was reversed the year before and he was besieging Schmettau in Dresden. Meanwhile, they awaited the arrival of the big siege guns from Mag
deburg.

  While he waited on the ordnance, the king redoubled the bombardment with still greater fury, and pushed troops across the Elbe to reinforce Holstein, while he had a bridge laid to connect him with Frederick’s main force, with the dual purpose of safeguarding the Saxon capital from that end as well as awaiting Daun. The latter was now returning, the rumor mill had it, to relieve Dresden and MacGuire from the desperate straits they were in.13 That commander was by no means inactive during this period, to impede the enemy’s progress he had a dam sealed up on the Weistritz River, which caused the southern suburbs of the city to flood with river water. Despite this, the bluecoats still made progress with their siege operations against Dresden. A large battery of ten guns, and two howitzers, were built facing the so-called “Neustadt (New Town).” On July 18, the king learned of the arrival of the long-awaited siege equipment, the heavy guns, ten 24-pounders and four mortars. Another Prussian battery, of two cannon, was to the rear of the Zinzendorf Garten hard-by the Pirna road, with yet another battery deployed directly on that road. Immediately, they were deployed within the battery plan which had been erected for them. The bombardment could now be ever increased in intensity.

  That most dreaded of things for a besieged town, next possibly to famine, fire, now reared its ugly head. On July 19, Prussian mortar fire set the Kreüzkirche on fire.14 Under cover of this blaze, an attempted Prussian assault in that immediate vicinity miscarried. Soldiers promptly left their stations to fight the flames, and Prussian spotters did their best to train guns upon the whole scene. There were four Prussian mortar batteries built facing the fortifications. Responding to the instructions of Frederick, the Prussians really ramped up their siege with the erection of some big mortar batteries. These commenced their deadly work on the morning of July 19. One of the batteries was in the Zinzendorf Garden, one at the Pirna Barrier, one behind the Böhmisch-Kirchof Cemetery, and one “behind the Garden of His Royal Highness.”15 Interestingly, Archenholtz mentioned that the city’s “Jews”16 had to do the bigger part “of the work of extinguishing the flames.”17 Worse, the fire-fighting equipment began to fail for lack of water, and this allowed the fires to spread, aided by swirling winds that seemed tailor-made for such a catastrophe.18

  Frederick, discovering what the enemy had in mind, determined to knock out that new battery. His cannon and siege-guns, aided by the howitzers, opened a terrific bombardment upon that target. After a little while, the work was badly knocked about and set afire. The flames spread to the church building itself. Then, raging out of control, the smoldering conflagration spread from one densely-packed street within the city to another; it was not extinguished until two days later. During the intervening hours, a great part of the Saxon capital was either devoured or heavily damaged. Same morning that the fire broke out, Daun’s advanced guard arrived at Schönfeld, within a couple of miles of Stolpen and less than half a dozen from Holstein’s lines. These advanced units were followed up by new arrivals throughout the morning and afternoon.19 The conflagration spread to nearby residential areas, and threatened to engulf a large part of the bastion defenses, of the Altstadt. One of the main ammunition magazines was right there; in order to save the structure, MacGuire had the walls and doors soaked down in water; even a concerted effort to keep the flames at bay by cooling down the walls of the whole structure. The magazine was thus saved, but the attention paid to it allowed the flames to spread towards the Pirnaer-Tör. Houses in that Altstadt area were engulfed (with as many as 210 out of 740 houses burned down),20 and an additional effort was made by the Austrians to try to prevent additional damage to Dresden. A number of people were recruited to help with the effort, and a most timely shift of the wind prevented the fires from fanning out of control. One more thing. The tower of the Kreüzkirche collapsed during rebuilding.21

  Meanwhile, the marshal had been busy. He had brought his army into Silesia to Öttendorf, but within a week of his arrival there intelligence was received that Frederick had double-backed and was standing before Dresden. Austrian scouts reported the Prussian monarch had crossed the Elbe on the night of July 13–14. July 15, about 0100 hours, the main Austrian army rolled forward through Siegersdorf and Naumburg towards Herzogswaldau in response. Austrian headquarters were put at Leopoldshayn, while General Ried put up his headquarters at Schönfeld. On the next day, Daun’s men moved on Malotitz, and, on July 17, to Klein-Förstchen. A few days after, word came that the Prussian king was already shelling the Saxon capital. Promptly Daun arose and sped back the way he had come, although not nearly as fast as before. To communicate his new plan, the marshal sent Colonel Tillier with a small escort to ride to Lacy’s headquarters and tell him the main army was coming back as soon as possible. July 18, even while the siege guns were arriving in the enemy’s camp, Daun’s advancing throng passed Bischofswerda and were making straight for Dresden.22 On the same day, MacGuire, inside the confines of the city, ordered the last street in Pirna to be flattened by fire. In the event, the grisly instructions were punctually carried out, the now homeless refuges taking shelter at the Plauen Chasm. Next day, he had a couple of small cannon put near the vicinity of the Kreüzkirche23 and the nearby area; from here the Prussian lines of entrenchments and batteries were plainly visible.

  Meanwhile, the bluecoats went so far as to place sharpshooters in strategic areas to annoy and harass the garrison; the allied response was to set up task forces to seek out and “neutralize” the sharpshooters. One of those response teams was composed of one officer and 40 jägers.24

  When the disturbing news was conveyed to Frederick from Holstein that Marshal Daun was at hand he gathered a scouting party, crossed the Elbe and made for the vicinity of Schönfeld to check it out. Discovering that the intelligence was all too true, the king rode back, giving orders to increase the pace of the shelling still more in the hope of gaining Dresden before the big main army under Daun could interfere. Who else would try? Not Zweibrücken, now ensconced at the big castle at Gross-Sedlitz, and an eyewitness to the brutal bombardment that the bluecoats were subjecting Dresden to. Not Lacy, still definitely unwilling to test Frederick in the open. That left only the slow, lethargic old marshal to stop the siege. The marshal was an eyewitness as the Prussian batteries pounded the Saxon capital, setting it afire and bringing what would ultimately be an abundance of reproach on the Prussian king’s character.25 Responding to the instructions of Frederick, as Marshal Daun was perfectly aware, the Prussians had really ramped up their siege with the erection of those big mortar batteries.

  Frederick’s first worry must be Holstein, who was in harm’s way now, but he could always order him across the Elbe by his bridge if it came to that. Daun must be prevented from preventing the capture of Dresden. As for the merciless pounding the Prussians subjected the city to, it put the inhabitants under a severe strain, causing many casualties. In later times, the embattled king would bemoan the inadequacy of the ordnance. “A thousand additional bombs, and a thousand more quintals of powder, must have terminated the siege with glory.”26 The garrison, for their part, could only hope that the marshal would be rapid and end their suffering quickly. The main Austrian army stood with the left wing towards the Ober-Rochwitz, while the right leaned upon the Quirlberg. That evening, Daun sent his van forward to probe the position of Holstein. The latter panicked, thinking that he was about to be attacked in force. He promptly evacuated his lines and fled across the bridge, leaving only the brigade of Major-General Hans von Tettenborn to hold the old lines. The enemy reaction was predictable. A nearly simultaneous assault from within Dresden as well as Austrian forces without compelled Tettenborn, after losing nearly 700 casualties, to abscond.

  This wholly needless maneuver left Daun a free hand to join forces with MacGuire, and, in addition, the entire northern end of Dresden could now be reinforced at the discretion of the Austrians. This singular success, although certainly unintentional, turned out to be the master stroke of Marshal Daun. MacGuire was confident that Daun would s
oon be ready to relieve the besieged from their predicament. And, during the night of July 19–20, the besieged sortied to strike at the Prussian battery. This mission succeeded too well. The Prussian artillery thereabouts, nine guns, could not be removed in time simply because there had been no provision thought out to bring back any ordnance.27 However, the old marshal was the same cautious man that he had always been and would not budge beyond moving a small detachment, under General Ried, directly against the bluecoat post on the Weisser Hirsch.28 Unfortunately, by the time the Austrians reached that post, they found the enemy had absconded.

  General Brentano unbuckled the Esterhazy Hussars and the Rudnicki Uhlans which promptly attacked the Möhring (3rd) Hussars over by Leuben. The latter were driven back in panic, this towards the king’s headquarters at Grune Wiese. Frederick was nearly taken captive (or worse) by the pursuing riders,29 but this did not occur as the Austrians, in their haste, utterly failed to realize just whom they had within their grasp.30

  Daun was still passive.31 For two days—July 19–21—he kept his men around Weisser Hirsch, not even venturing across the Elbe. This although the allies now held all of the northern end almost entirely. The sole exception was Hülsen and his lines at the northwest corner. As for the king, his scouts penetrated to Rupchen and Goppelun, in trying to compel the enemy to give way. Finally, on July 21, MacGuire persuaded Daun to launch a coordinated attack, composed of men from both commands, simultaneously against the Prussians.

  MacGuire’s assault was to consist of the majority of the men under him, under the nominal command of General Nugent,32 who was to sally out against the southern end of the city upon the Prussian outworks there. The force assigned to the task from Daun was to launch an attack from across the Elbe onto the besiegers’ lines. This two-pronged stroke was to destroy the Prussian lines of entrenchments and to drive the enemy off empty-handed. Had there been genuine surprise, there might have been success. But Frederick had advanced warning of the coming blow (coming courtesy of some deserters, no doubt), and consequently had set reinforced posts up. That night (July 21–22), Nugent led his very tired men against the target, while the Austrian detachment from Daun, under Lt. General Ludwig Angern—nine full battalions, five squadrons and ten grenadier companies—started forward as well.