The Prussian camp was soon all still with the men resting with their weapons close by, with the king himself near the center of the line. About 0215 hours, a hussar major (Georg Hermann Gottlob von Hundt) came dashing into the post, inquiring in great haste for the king.6 The first authority figure he reached, Major-General Saldern, raised up to listen. The major stated with great excitement that he had stumbled upon some Austrians marching in the utter darkness in considerable strength near Biernowitz.
In his History, Frederick enlarges on the tale. He stated that Hundt’s men were on a patrol he had evidently ordered after dissecting the Irishman Wise’s report. He reported that the change of camp was made with the obvious intention of upsetting Daun’s plan. “I had nothing to fear,” wrote the king, “for by changing the scene … Daun’s elaborate plans” would be wholly useless. Again, these calculations were made on the assumption that the king would maintain a static posture, a presumptuous thought in view of his past record.7
Having a small force with him (200 hussars from Ziethen’s 2nd Hussars), Hundt had been obliged to retire. Saldern directed him to Frederick. Hundt now informed the alarmed king that this intruder was a scant 600 yards distant. The king at once mounted his steed, ordering General Schenckendorf with his troops and ten 12-pounder artillery guns to move to the pommel of the Wolfsberg and there hammer the advancing enemy with his big guns, getting the left ready for an impending action. Laudon was on his mission sweeping to take his prizes as soon as possible. So imagine his great surprise when, on approaching his objective, and, expecting to find the Pfaffendorf rises deserted except for the Prussian baggage and guards, he found instead an awake and fully prepared adversary.8
Schenckendorf opened up on the Austrians, who were marching in dense formation and not expecting such a blow at that point. Still, it could not have been a complete surprise. Frederick wrote that, “Laudon suspected there were some troops ahead [author’s italics].”9 He thought there was some enemy force obviously, but he never expected to face a major battle. Laudon reasoned a Prussian force free battalion and “two regiments of hussars were stationed on the ground in question.”10 But evidently nothing near what he found. A rude awakening when Prussian guns began opening great holes in the forward Austrian lines, bloodying Laudon’s noseguard. The latter was thus immediately put at a terrible disadvantage. Laudon’s men had to strike uphill against an enemy who probably outnumbered his at the decisive point of impact—although he had 35,000 men.11 In addition, the Prussian muskets were “longer-ranged than theirs [the Austrian] weapons.”12 This latter factor alone would have much bearing upon the battle’s outcome. The Austrian advance was repelled in the first moments, but Laudon took quick measures to make the most out of a bad situation. In this unexpected manner, the Battle of Liegnitz had begun. Laudon endeavored to form his men in the low ground below the dangerous rises, but the ground was restricted in space and only some 5,000 men could make up the first line of battle. With these men, a second assault was launched forward but likewise beaten down, aiming at the right of the Prussian position, to outflank the defenders. A third time, the Austrian line advanced, but, riddled by accurate Prussian fire, nothing came of it, and the line veered off. A most desperate struggle now ensued there, always new Austrian advances and failed attacks. It was about 0230 hours. At the north end, the Austrian cavalry, which had galloped around that way, charged the prepared enemy lines present thereabouts.
They threaded their way forward between Pohlschildern and Biernowitz. This stroke shook up the 2nd Hussars of Ziethen and Krockow’s 2nd Dragoons, which occupied the disputed ground. They started to give ground under the impact, but the cuirassiers and the outcast Anhalt-Bernburg unit would, in the end, save the day. The 2nd Cuirassiers of Colonel Heinrich (Prince Henry), slammed forward into action behind Bernburg; it attacked an Austrian battery under Lt.-Col. Georg Ludwig Wiershitski (for which it received the Pour-le-Merite) and wheeled towards the Katzbach. The 5th Cuirassiers pushed back Laudon’s riders, taking ten flags, nine guns, and gaining a Pour-le-Merite in the process.13 Seydlitz’s 8th Cuirassiers performed very well; after turning back the charge of three cavalry regiments, it attacked and captured “five battalions” from three Austrian units, the 1st of Kaiser,14 the 24th of Starhemberg, and Waldeck’s 35th), along with 11 cannon and six battle flags.15 Lost were 111 men.16
At length, the downtrodden horsemen had to fall back towards the Katzbach. The Prussians, under great pressure, were forming a new right wing, under Bülow, which consisted of the 5th Cuirassiers, the 2nd, the 8th Cuirassiers, 2nd Dragoons, and 2nd Hussars.17 For ground support, the 34th Infantry of Ferdinand and the 3rd Anhalt-Bernburg unit, were on hand.18 About this time, Schenckendorf was wounded and carried off the field.
By the shifting of Laudon’s attack pressure towards the northeast, and the consequent Prussian countermeasures, the line between Ziethen and the rest of the army widened until it disappeared. Even worse, just about the center near Platen, the ebb and flow of battle towards the north and northeast had caused a serious rift to appear. An enemy battalion, which was just about to enter the village when the action started, was not far distant. The opportunity to cut the Prussian army in two was presenting itself. The 26th Infantry (General Linden) and Ferdinand’s 5th Infantry more or less had control of the front thereabouts, but the Austrians were in great strength there.
However, their opportunity was short-lived. Möllendorf, under due direction, who had sighted the hole as soon as it had appeared, hastened towards it with a mixed force of cavalry and infantry—Rathenow’s (1/23) and Nymschöfsky (33/42), plus the 5th Infantry, and fought the advancing enemy to a draw.19 The Austrian advance was checked in the streets of Platen, which was set on fire just when it became impossible to hold the place anymore.20
The impetus of Möllendorf’s advance seemed to be for the bluecoats. Then their progress was checked by a severe raking fire from the big batteries of General Laudon. In a melodramatic moment, Saldern (ever the zealous warrior) offered ten thalers out of pocket to the first person to silence the most persistent of the enemy’s batteries. With the fog burning away in the light of an early brightening morning sky, the task was manageable. A gunner whose name has been, most fortunately, recalled in the annals of history (Kretschmer) put off a shot that ruptured a powder wagon, decimating the offending battery.21 The Prussian advance into the face of the formidable Austrian position now continued.
However, the advance of Laudon’s army was checked and Frederick’s army saved. After their one bona fide chance, the whitecoats had no other. As their attacks were brought to a halt, in heavy fighting, and they began wavering, the king chose that moment to launch a counterattack. The Bernburg regiment moved in to strike, supported by the 34th Infantry. This was the decisive moment. By then it was about 0500 hours. The infantry of Bernburg lowered bayonets and valiantly attacked the Austrian horse. The sight must have been awe-inspiring. One of a relative handful of times in the long annals of military history when infantry would directly attack against their mounted counterparts.22 The 3rd’s charge was an impromptu; apparently neither a senior officer or the king did order the charge. Duffy reported that Bülow admonished Prince Bernburg for not keeping his brigade together.23 The behavior of this unit was likened to a corps of ferries and devils.24 In this case, the Austrian horse, in short, were driven back, but drew infantry support from the center and flank forces to help stiffen their effort. All in vain for the whitecoats; there was just no chance there.
Bernburg, as we have seen, had been disgraced at the siege of the Saxon capital. It was most anxious to redeem itself and its reputation in Frederick’s, and the rest of the army’s, eyes. At the event, Austrian gunners targeted the unit, but it swept on nonetheless, the deafening cry of “Ehre oder Tod” filling the air. There was no turning back at that point. With grim determination, Anhalt-Bernburg crashed into the front line of the Austrians. Bringing up the rear was the 34th, joined by Henry’s 2nd Cuirassiers. In the
event, the issue would be scarcely in doubt. The Austrian forward line, ruptured beyond repair, forthwith fell back on the second.
The latter began to stiffen, a situation enhanced only by the attackers themselves, who had advanced so quickly they were becoming disordered. Worse, the terrain was much rougher, and Laudon saw the opportunity to launch a counterattack. White uniformed Austrians pressed forward, followed by clouds of riders who crashed into the now exposed left flank of Bernburg-Ferdinand. This blow scattered the Stechau grenadiers, took ten standards and threatened the entire Prussian left line thereabouts. Fortunately, less panicky battalions formed rank and speedily brought this final Austrian effort to a halt, aided by the Prussian horsemen who appeared on the scene to drive the enemy back towards Biernowitz.
The Austrians were now discouraged, and Laudon was immediately compelled to give up a losing battle. He retired across the Katzbach, followed and hounded by Prussian hussars, who were starving for a good chase. They sure had one on this occasion. These valiant troopers nabbed some 6,000 of Laudon’s stunned men and would unquestionably have rounded up more had Laudon not set up a battery at Biernowitz.25 This served to cover his retreat. Thus ended the Battle of Liegnitz.
During the course of the battle, Prussia had won a small, but timely, victory. “A second Rossbach,” so to speak.26 Part of the problem lay with the three-pronged pincers that would close in upon the Prussians. We must also keep in mind the solid nature of the Prussian infantry.27 Besides, the bluecoats had the advantage of interior lines. “The Devil is in the details,” and, at least, at Liegnitz it so appeared.28 The losses to the two sides were the following (for Laudon they were appalling in relation to his strength): the Austrian loss was approximately 1,408 killed and 2,359 wounded, plus 4,371 prisoners, or nearly a third of the army. Thadden puts the Austrian loss at 1,421 killed, 2,276 wounded, and 4,437 prisoners.29 Also, 80 guns, seized by the victors, were trophies of the bluecoats. Frederick suffered approximately 3,394 casualties—639 killed, the rest wounded/missing. This was due, at least in part, to the fact some of the bluecoat forces had been mere spectators to the action. Only the Prussian main body, 15,000 men, had even been engaged. The contribution of the Prussian artillery was absolutely essential at Liegnitz, especially the light Prussian 12-pounders, which helped decimate the attack of the Austrian grenadiers.30 Without the ordnance, the Battle of Liegnitz could never have been successful.31 The king himself had been in the thick of the fighting. “A grapeshot pierced the skirts of his coat.”32 Fortunately, for the Prussian cause, Frederick escaped serious injury.
As for Daun, he had been southwest—that is upwind of the fight—all this while, judiciously creeping forward against Frederick’s long abandoned camp with a view to taking it in concert with Laudon. The latter was already busily engaged elsewhere. About 2400 hours, August 14, the Pandours finally discovered the truth that the enemy had flown, leaving only a few attendants behind. The fastest rider took the news to the marshal, but it was nevertheless 0100 hours on August 15 before Daun finally heard the tale. He ordered the army to race forward in the tracks of the foe to get in a blow if there was still time. The whitecoats got to and passed Liegnitz about 0300 hours; the scouts perceived a column of thick black smoke rising off on the horizon, toward Platen and Hummel.
They assumed that a battle was either in progress or had just ended (this alternative because no sounds of fighting nor flashes indicating artillery in action were apparent). Daun’s scouts reached the Töpferberg, the marshal sending cavalry over the bridge to probe the other bank and find out what was going on. Ziethen stood opposite in command of some 10,000 men as the Prussian right wing.
Seeing the Austrians drawing near, Ziethen loosened a bombardment with his big guns upon the enemy riders. This hammering was so intense that the cavalrymen were quickly withdrawn. But not before they drove in Ziethen’s pickets, drawing his full attention to them. Daun, ascertaining that the enemy was fully alert in spite of the hour, ordered an immediate withdrawal. He had decided against forcing his way across the Schwartzwasser. Characteristically, Daun had issued no instructions for his army to make even the slightest attempt to engage the bluecoats in battle, once his men had reached the scene of the battle. (Few of the officers were brazen enough to “assume” Daun wanted to seek out an action). His only action during the rest of the night was to issue an order for his army to go back from whence it came.
Now, before we condemn too swiftly, we must keep in mind that Daun’s men were more than six miles from the scene of battle, with little opportunity to close for an action. This should help mitigate the complaints. History has not been kind in its indictments towards the senior Austrian commander for the most part. The circumstances surrounding Daun’s conduct at the battle remain a matter of contention, just as much in 1760 as later. As it worked out, “the failure at Liegnitz in 1760 … [showed Daun] had little confidence in his generals and still less in himself.”33
Lacy, in the meanwhile, had made his “effort” at action, if it could be called that.34 He reached Waldau, from where he planned to barge across the Schwartzwasser into Ziethen’s wing, before his scheme, too, came unraveled. The end result was an abortive, half-hearted attempt to send men into action straight at Ziethen’s lines. Only two hussar regiments did come across on the Prussian lines. But the latter gave Ambassador Mitchell some anxious moments as they apparently tried to accost him in his quarters. Lacy then simply halted his forward motion and paused, more or less awaiting developments.
The tangled events of this evening do demonstrate again the utter failure of the Austrians to cooperate among themselves. With a more than three-to-one advantage in numbers, and the control of the countryside, the armies of Daun, Lacy and Laudon had been shut down again, by a tired, hungry, discouraged army of less than 25,000 men. Archenholtz relates the Prussian army wasted little time on the battlefield. General Saldern, a man possessing a keen eye and organizational skills, was in charge of the arrangements to march. By 0900 hours, the bluecoats moved off, leaving a wholly deserted battlefield that had been stripped of most anything the enemy, himself disoriented and wobbly, could make use of. Ziethen, following up with the rearguard, and toting the prisoners, captured ordinance, and the wounded,35 marched at about 1300 hours. Again, Frederick was aiming for Parchwitz. There the road bisected and made for Glogau, his earlier goal prior to the battle, or Breslau. At the latter, Prince Henry was waiting, as per orders issued even before the king entered Silesia. As for the valiant Bernburg regiment, its conduct at Liegnitz definitely restored it in the king’s eyes and of the rest of the army. Almost as children before a proud father, some of the men wept as Frederick told the regiment that it had been fully restored to royal favor. The king must have been welling up as well. Sergeant Fugleman, “Chief Corporal,” blurted out then, “and you are again our Gracious King, then?!”36 Then the unit mercifully, “broke into lustful cheers.”37 Small wonder that Frederick is among the few Great Captains who seemed so in touch with his men at times. No wonder he was, both openly and affectionately, called “Old Fritz” by his soldiers.38
That touching gesture aside, the king’s Prussian army was still seriously low on provisions. He had sufficient supplies to last for two more days, and, in spite of the victory at Liegnitz, could not have been in a triumphant mood. On the way to Breslau, at Auras, Cherneyshev stood, interposed between the armies of the two royal brothers. But Frederick formed a clever scheme to get the Russians out of the way. He wrote out a note, ostensibly for Henry, giving it to a peasant to deliver. The latter was told to let himself be captured by the foe, and to only give up the note in order to save his life. The letter stated, in effect, “Austrians totally beaten on this day; now for those Russians, Dear Brother, and swift; do what we agreed upon. I only hope this letter reaches you promptly.” The contents of this dispatch punctually reached Cherneyshev.
The latter at once ordered his men to march towards Trebnitz and Prausnitz. There was really little need for this
bit of trickery actually, for Cherneyshev would undoubtedly have issued orders for a withdrawal anyway as soon as he knew Laudon was beaten.39 The incident did give the king a golden opportunity to use his biting wit, although it does now appear he believed that the person of Laudon had been fatally wounded at Liegnitz.40 Besides, Cherneyshev, in the final analysis, probably doubted the authenticity of the note as well.41
Nevertheless, with the fourth enemy, Cherneyshev’s Russians, thus rooted out of the way, the Prussians were able to reach Parchwitz in the pre-dawn (August 16); here the decision was made to head for Breslau at top speed. There was once again no sign of Daun or indeed anyone moving to block the move. The marshal had spent August 15 in enforced idleness at Grossnig, apparently not even advising Cherneyshev of the recent round of events near Liegnitz.42
In the evening, Daun did belatedly give the order to march and his army crawled forward, with Lacy’s largely intact and Laudon’s tattered commands to probe ahead for a sign of the foe.
About 0600 hours on August 17, the main Austrian army hitched forward on Hohen-Poseritz, while the left side of the army wrapped around Raaben, with the new headquarters at Conradeswaldau. Lacy marched on Streithberg and took up a position on the rises thereabouts. On the next day, he pressed patrols across the Schweidnitz Wasser, taking up a post between Schmellwitz and Stephanstain. The Austrians were cautious, and, to fully demonstrate this, General Brentano moved his forces on Zobten. Meanwhile, Marshal Daun, with his main army resting for the moment, took the opportunity to start constructing some entrenchments.
Frederick, wasting none of the precious time the enemy was offering by hesitation, sped toward Neumarkt, with some patrols extending on Kostenblot. Arriving nearby about 1200 hours August 16, Frederick sent scouts probing ahead. They spotted an enemy party, which promptly fled. The Prussians gave chase. During their pursuit, the scouts came unexpectedly upon the massed formations of what appeared to be Daun’s entire army marching some three miles off in front of and on the knolls where General Luchessi had once stood posted among the scrubby ground at Leuthen so long ago. A lot of fighting and killing had occurred since then.
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 80