Frederick must have been worried that the enemy already held Neumarkt and so again was squarely in the path of the road to Breslau. The king nevertheless rode ahead to the rises but discerned, to his surprise, that the marshal had apparently forgotten to occupy the vital point. Not neglecting himself to take advantage of the enemy’s surprising oversight, Frederick sent men to occupy Neumarkt before the Austrians got wise. This accomplished, the direct road to the Silesian capital was thus gained and a rendezvous with the army of Prince Henry assured.
The following day, Frederick pressed his army on Hermannsdorf (about seven miles from Breslau), where he drew rein, sending an order for his brother to join him there as soon as the Russians were adequately dealt with. Just about then, the royal brothers were engaging in a new game: rôle reversal. With Prince Henry unexpectedly taking up the mantle for an aggressive action, while Frederick suddenly got cautious. Henry had for once been discouraged from taking the offensive by Frederick himself, of all people. The king did not hesitate to state the proposed new offensive, a rapid march against the vulnerable Russian base of Posen, was fraught with dangers.43 It could leave much of Brandenburg and Silesia exposed should it fail. This directive was rather academic, for the lethargic Soltikov took to the road as soon as Frederick drew near, reached Trebnitz (on August 18) and sat down, screened behind almost inaccessible marshy ground. Henry pursued, although Frederick, believing that Soltikov would soon be heading for home, shortly recalled him (August 27) to join his royal brother. Henry left only General Goltz and some 12,000 men to keep track of the Russians,44 while he retired gradually by Glogau to Breslau, where he stayed, feigning illness.45
Prince Henry was out of action for the rest of the campaign, apparently having had his “fill” of his royal sibling. The prince could not stomach to serve as a ‘junior’ commander in any entity where Frederick was in charge. As an aside, the enthusiasm of the valiant Seydlitz for the king’s methods of waging war was also waning, or so it appeared.46 General Forcade took command of his army in his absence. Forcade, a choice that the king would not have favored by any means, took to the road on August 29 to comply with his king’s directives. With the two forces joined, Frederick’s total strength was raised to about 55,000 men, against the weakened Austrian forces of Laudon, Lacy, and Daun, of not over 85,000 strong.47 And they were now busy among themselves looking for who was to blame for Liegnitz.48
Frederick now engaged in maneuvering about in the vicinity of Parchwitz. This period consumed much energy, but, before narrating it, we might find it desirable to see what had been happening in the Russian camp during this time. Same day that Prince Henry’s army returned towards a junction with the king, Soltikov composed a note to Czarina Elizabeth in which he described his future campaign plan: “in the meantime, I shall move by a series of forced marches down the Oder so as to force Prince Henry to follow me … I shall try to attack [Prince Henry] when the opportunity presents itself.”49 Just those few lines reveal Soltikov’s apparent lack of confidence that he could prevail in a contest with the smaller Prussian army of Prince Henry, as well as demonstrating his defensive-minded thinking.
The Russian government apparently thought that he had already had “too many chances” to attack Prince Henry’s army, and had fumbled them all, a situation which had to be known by Soltikov. The marshal’s ill-health was about the same time becoming an issue of more than passing importance. There could be little doubt of Soltikov’s future intentions under the circumstances. On September 11, the troubled Russian commander officially handed over the charge in the army to the Scotsman Fermor.50 No doubt with the tacit approval of his government. However, this could only be a temporary fix, for Fermor himself had become distinctly unpopular in the Russian army.51
Meanwhile, the Austrians continued to progress. Laudon, immediately upon the presumed destruction of the Prussian field forces in Silesia, would then have preferred to press for Glatz immediately. Now, let us examine what had been occurring in Silesia before Frederick’s arrival there.
About June 7, Laudon’s advanced guard began barricading the roads leading to Glatz, but the general himself took camp at Landshut under direct orders from Daun. He was to serve as cover for the main army while it marched to face Frederick, but when the antagonists moved into Saxony, following the success at Landshut over Fouquet, Laudon seized the opportunity of ordering up his siege artillery from Olmütz upon Glatz.
The Austrians had already secured the key passes heading into Silesia, over by Silberberg and Warta. Laudon had looked over the available maps of Glatz and had uncovered large gaps between the bastions and what he felt were fatal flaws in the construction of the two fortresses that would make them susceptible to capture. Laudon moved out from Landshut on July 4, hitching on to Lahyn (July 5). From here, Austrian patrols promptly began to intrude upon Prussian positions over by Breslau. Two days after, Laudon’s men reached Goldberg, while Austrian reconnaissance units reached Hochkirch, followed up by Laudon’s main body, and, July 9, he was at Eichholz, from where he could look to fulfill the allied conquest of Silesia. But the secondary objective of seizing Glatz was still very much a part of the mix,52 as evidenced by Marshal Daun and Laudon having a conference at Öttendorf to go over future campaign plans.53 The upshot of this meeting was that Laudon designated a task force under General Draskovitch with specific instructions to start the siege of Glatz. There was more. Laudon was hoping that the Russians would do the same with Breslau, but the obvious Austrian effort within Silesia remained to conquer the province as much by themselves as possible.54
The main attention around and about Glatz was the main fortress at the Western side of the Neisse position, in among some very high rises. The town of Glatz boasted a medieval wall round about it. In this base, the imposing façade of the Alte Festung (Old Fortress) was the salient dominant feature, but on the other end of the works that constituted Glatz was the New Fortress (on the Schäferberg). The major garrison of the fortress was the 33rd Infantry of none other than Fouquet, or, rather, what was left of it.55 Draskovitch unbuckled his engineer captain, Nikolaus Steinmetz, and the director of the siege itself, under Gribeauval, to seize the structure. A siege parallel was undertaken and completed on July 20–21, and the bluecoats were at once put in bad straits.
But the ordnance (114 heavy guns) did not arrive until July 25, and it was the next day, before they could be put into use. The opening bombardment appeared to do little good, against either one of the two fortresses about Glatz, the main one under the command of the Commandant, of Lt.-Col. Barthomamaeus Marquis d’O, while the lesser was led by Colonel Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Quadt zu Wickerad, across the Neisse River. The combined manpower of the two fortresses totaled about 2,400 men, which seemed rather puny against the 40,000 that Laudon could bring to the scene of action. What was worse, a large proportion of the men in the garrison were actually impressed P.O.W.s.
Austrian guns began pounding Quadt’s post about 0400 hours, July 26; his response was limited by the number of guns at his disposal. Nevertheless, the shelling was not particularly damaging, although it lasted until about 0900 with scarcely any relief. The one singular success was the outright destruction of communication bridges that had been erected to keep contact between the two forces. The Austrian shelling was the direct cause of several explosions among the Prussian magazines and it did not help matters that Prussian fortunes as a whole were in much confusion. The Kranich (or, “The Crane”) redoubt was pointed out by Laudon now as a vital sector in front of the main line,56 and was held with insufficient forces. Complicating matters for the allies, the fortress of Glatz, on its westward face, boasted an elaborate series of underground tunnels through which the Prussians could handily press up reinforcements to help preserve their hold upon Glatz.
But there was a glaring weakness. The Kranisch was kept secured by a mere 15 men under Lt. von Bord.57 Now came the task of storming the redoubt. This fell to Harsch, who stormed forward with part of his
own Andlau regiment, led by the brave Lt. Anton Ulrich Mylius, which launched into a counterattack, momentarily driving back the intruders. Some timely howitzer fire beat back the Prussians once again. Laudon’s men were not done by any means. A volunteer force was quickly assembled. Under the command of Colonel Johann Theodor Rouvroy, it was called down to storm the bastions. Major Joseph Bechardht stormed forward with some 50 men against the flèche, and Rouvroy mounted the fortress wall hard-by the Kranich. The issue was not long in doubt. The Austrians found an opening over by the Feld-Tor, and, after a short firefight, and some handy maneuvering, forced the bluecoats to yield.
This compromised the whole Prussian post over by the Alte Festung. By that time, Prussian reinforcements (some 150 men under Major Unruh), coming up from the town, were at the scene, in the company of Commandant d’O and Major Friedrich Christian von Wrede.58 The whole lot was soon taken captive by the advancing Austrians. The catalyst for this event turned out to be because the “regiment of Quadt went over to the enemy en masse.”59 The triumph was complete. Prussian prisoners amounted to the entire garrison, along with some 200 pieces of ordnance, including 101 “brass cannon.”60 Austrian losses were approximately 214. The loss to the bluecoats was very serious here, but considering the make-up/condition of the garrison and that Frederick had picked through the garrison to take the best men for his field armies, hardly surprising.
The Austrians could only be encouraged by this unfolding of events.61 On the other hand, Frederick could not have been equally pleased with the turn of events.62 Quadt, coming out to the rescue, had been captured, and a small detachment, under Major Unruh, sent to outflank the intruder, accomplished little. The commander now, without further delay, surrendered the main fortress (about 1100 hours) without a shot being fired in anger against the new structure. Prussian losses were 2,403 men and 110 officers, while the enemy loss was said to be 64 killed and 138 men wounded.63 Frederick had Commandant d’O court-martialed and apparently imprisoned after the war, but, for the moment, Laudon, rendered secure by the fall of Glatz, was free to move on Breslau. He wasted no time in doing just that.64 Years afterward, the stingy-minded monarch would disdain spending money to make “Unnecessary” improvements to the Glatz fortifications.65
As for Prince Henry, he had scarcely 36,000 men with him, most cantoned near the border with Poland at Gleissen facing the main Russian army. Before he had learned of the fall of Glatz, the king ordered Prince Henry to leave Soltikov alone for a while and go confront Laudon. The latter was sweeping through southern Silesia, but Henry hardly had a mind to obey the directive. He was aware that Soltikov had already established a base at Kalisch and that the latter would no doubt march in his absence. What was worse, Soltikov could elect to go into either Silesia, or still more seriously, into Brandenburg, with very little to hinder him. The bold suggestion to General Bogislav Friedrich von Tauentzein, commanding at Breslau, to march against Soltikov was declined for fear that Laudon might seize the Silesian capital in his absence.
Meanwhile, Marshal Daun was utilizing the time at his disposal in preparing to lay siege to Schweidnitz (July 26). Within that fortress, the Austrians estimated the Prussian garrison to be no more than 3,000 men. Austrian construction of new entrenchments was shortly carried out between the Zobtenberg and the Domanze Heights. Patrols from the main Austrian army hitched into Pitschenberg.
Frederick rescinded the marching instructions to attack the army of Laudon by Prince Henry. The latter, in effect, was facing two big armies, Laudon to the south and the Russians in nearer proximity to the north. He could not move with his much-weakened army against the Russians without inviting disaster. He could not go confront Laudon, because to do that would leave the Russian army free to do what they liked. Besides this, there was always the possibility that the Austrians would merely retire if Prince Henry moved actively towards their positions. So Henry informed the king that about all he could do was already being done, covering Silesia and Brandenburg against Soltikov and leave Tauentzein in Breslau to hold back Laudon if at all possible. This must, perforce, be a purely defensive effort.66
In a few days, Soltikov would make one of those characteristically bad decisions the Russian commanders were well known for by now and relieve the bluecoats of anxiety. But, in the meanwhile, Laudon was ready to move. About 1600 hours, July 26, Laudon’s rearguard took to the road from Glatz bound for the Silesian capital. Within a few more hours, the main body of his men marched off. General Nauendorf moved on Lissa. Breslau was in relatively good shape to take a short siege—in much better condition than Glatz had been. There was for a garrison about 3,900 men, and to give the reader an idea of just how important Frederick considered the capital of Silesia to be, 1,000 of these men were regulars67 fully capable of defense. There were weaknesses, however. The walls surrounding Breslau were not as strong as they should have been and within the city’s confines was a major Prussian P.O.W. facility which housed almost 9,000 men, the greater portion of these being Austrian.68
Laudon was of the opinion that the capital would fall rather speedily, especially if Soltikov cooperated. It is worth pointing out that the Russian army carried no siege train with it; in this respect, the Russians would have no choice but to rely upon their Austrian allies. Were the Austrians, though, relying too much upon their allies from the east? Daun, as well? If so, he should have known better than that.
Laudon, after all, had served in the Russian army, and knew the Russian language all well and good, but he really appears not to have understood the Russian mentality any better than any of his Austrian contemporaries. Soltikov was not in the least concerned about capturing Breslau until he could be assured that his magazines and base at Posen were safe from Prince Henry’s roving bands.69
At least Daun, still technically superior to Laudon in command, was away in Saxony, so the enterprise appeared to be at least feasible. July 26, Soltikov trudged reluctantly from Posen forward, crossing the Silesian frontier the first of August about Glogau over near Kobylin (Cherneyshev was deployed well back at Rawitsch, which Prussian scouts were shadowing). Against that fortress, the greencoats made a pathetic try at taking it, with little success. Then, making the rather lame excuse that his men needed to rest and baked bread needed time to allow to cool (which cannot be argued, except for the length of the pause), Soltikov actually called halt until August 3 to do just that. He did not trust the Austrian high command,70 and he was weary of trying to attack Prince Henry, who was busy gathering his men in front. Henry’s men were marching through the streets of Glogau while the Russians had passed by. Prince Henry kept moving. Soon he learned that Breslau, and not Glogau, was the proposed scene of the allied link-up. Laudon’s van, under General Draskovitch, arrived outside of the walls of Breslau on July 30, and, on the following morning, Laudon himself with his men were at hand. He carried some 42,000 men with him, considerably outnumbering Tauentzein’s command.
All things considered, he must have expected a rather easy time of the matter.71 Perhaps the swift fall of the twin fortresses at Glatz had made him cocky, but, if this were the case, he would be speedily disillusioned.72 The intruders crossed the Oder on two bridges (secured July 31), Laudon summoning the defenders of Breslau to surrender the place or face having it burned to the ground. He had decided to waste no time with any preliminaries.
The siege guns in fact were still in transit from Glatz, as the Austrians had progressed on Breslau with a bit too much enthusiasm, but Laudon anticipated that he might not even need them. That was before the defiant Prussian response. Tauentzein replied that he had been given Breslau to defend, not to surrender. That left Laudon with no choice but a siege, since to try an assault would not only be costly, but would most likely fail. This because the bluecoats had constructed more works to complement the natural obstacles thereabouts; although the walls around the city were not in the best condition either. In the Austrian headquarters now arrived word that Prince Henry was bringing his Prussians to the rel
ief of the Silesian capital. Laudon wasted no more time.
His siege guns, as soon as they could arrive, were put into action laying down a heavy pounding of Breslau from 2200 hours, August 1, until after midnight.73 A number of fires were reported,74 the Spaeton Palace was destroyed, along with the Dominican Convent—while 30 other structures as well were laid waste, but the damage control was well-organized and these were soon under control. The next morning, Breslau was still firmly in the hands of Tauentzein. Laudon now sent word to the garrison commander telling him that if he did not surrender immediately an impressive number of Austrian batteries, including some 45 mortars,75 were set to blast him and the town to ribbons. No quarter would be offered, not even to mothers or their children. Tauentzein was not buying the bluff. Nor did Laudon hesitate to inform the Prussian commander that Breslau was little more than a commercial town, and, as such, not deserving of the same level of protection, by international “understanding,” as say, Dresden.76
The reply? The Prussian insolently retorted that neither he nor his soldiers were expecting children! Later in the morning, Laudon relented and sent a softer message requesting terms to secure the surrender of Breslau. Tauentzein did not even bother to name terms, and even had the audacity to turn his batteries upon Laudon’s headquarters and forthwith hammer it into ruins. This is hardly surprising. Tauentzein was grimly resolved to hold on to the Silesian capital, but he was not overly confident in this respect. The commander was determined to, “entrench myself with the [1st Battalion of the Royal] Garde on one of the bastions there to defend myself to the last man.”77 That night (August 2–3), the Austrian guns were silent, and the following day there was just scant firing. Prussian losses by that point amounted to ten wounded and four killed.78
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War Page 81