Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War
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A chance round blew up an ammunition depot, and set up a chain reaction in which much of Wittenberg was subsequently damaged by fires. The houses in the path of the spreading heat, being made of wood, greatly contributed to the problem. Compounding this bad situation was a desperate shortage of water, which was needed to help combat the flames.
The upshot was, in a matter of a few hours, the conflagration spread even to the famous old church in Wittenberg (to Protestants or, conversely, infamous, to Catholics) the All Saint’s Church (Schlösskirche), which was heavily damaged. The famous door which Martin Luther nailed his 95 theses to on October 31, 1517, thus touching off the Reformation, was destroyed by the flames. Even the tomb of Luther nearby was threatened—a fact which was likely viewed with some indifference in the eyes of the largely Catholic Allies. History was saved here by mere chance. The progress of the blazes was halted only by a moat-like ditch which separated the town.
The Allies found a way to sabotage that. About 2100 hours, in a covert operation, Zweibrücken sent a force to destroy the sluices, which was the harbinger of Wittenberg’s fall. The deed was managed because of a timely demonstration by a body of Imperialists against the Elster-Tör. Before midnight, Salemnon, recognizing that further resistance was futile, sent a messenger requesting terms. The combatants accordingly agreed to capitulation terms. In addition to the whole garrison, which was lost, the Austrians captured 31 guns and “a [great] quantity of ammunition.”105 The artillery consisted of ten of the 24-pounders, four 6-pounders, two 4-pounders, 14 3-pounders, and one 1-pounder.106 Hülsen and Eugene were approaching, but it was now too late. The allies, before Wittenberg, lost 284 casualties, including 43 killed, and shot off 3,115 rounds of artillery shot during the siege.107 It had been a rather short, but debilitating siege for one of Central Europe’s most famous towns, certainly as historical as the Saxon capital of Dresden.
Meanwhile, the Prussians of Eugene and Werner were headed for the stricken Wittenberg. Soon the duo appeared outside of the place, to find the fortress in ruins and occupied by the Imperialists. Zweibrücken thereby accomplished what he had set out to do, reconquer that part of Saxony still in Prussian hands; Eugene and Hülsen had little choice except to retire on Magdeburg. But, again, the allies had only a short spell to celebrate their successes in Saxony, for Frederick was about to march for Saxony.
For the moment, the allies had it their own way. This was not a situation, though, that would likely long endure.
Chapter Forty-Three
Preliminaries to Torgau; Allied Raid upon Berlin
We left the Prussian king at Hermmansdorf.1 The troubled monarch was already looking forward to joining up with the army of Prince Henry, except for a detachment earmarked to look after the Russians. And the singular fact remained Frederick seldom could refrain from seizing the initiative every chance he had, in spite of any odds. Then came an event which threatened to really shake up the situation. On August 30, the embattled king suddenly pushed his army around the enemy’s flank to occupy Schweidnitz, thereby rupturing the allied hold upon the chain of posts in central Silesia. The Austrian reaction was, of course, predictable.
Meanwhile, Daun, pressured by the pace of current events, had been trying to occupy a position from which he could develop an effort against Schweidnitz. The marshal had to be cognizant of the presence of the king’s men, and he was also under pressure from the Empress, who wrote to Daun that there was still time to go perform a rendezvous with the Russians. This directive was allayed by Laudon being earmarked to join up with Soltikov, while the marshal had the more immediate task thrust upon him of seizing Schweidnitz. Another fact seemed clear, especially in view of the fact that the main Austrian army had withdrawn in the opposite direction from the on-coming main Russian force. This belied any claims by the whitecoats that such a juncture was sought out by the marshal.
The Prussian effort was not unexpected. For a few nights prior, scouts reported an increase in traffic over towards the Prussian lines and an increase in the number of campfires thereabouts—which Daun correctly deduced meant that Frederick was receiving reinforcements from Prince Henry. Lacy pressed for the Zöbtenberg, while Prussian troopers fully adapted to the new developments. Daun gradually gave way, edging back upon the Waldenburger-Gebirge, and leaving his adversary free to occupy the now abandoned post at Conradeswaldau (August 31). As far as Prussian efforts on this side were concerned, the marshal was reasonably confident that he could hold off any enemy inroads. The king indeed, rose on September 11, after an enforced pause, from over by Conradeswaldau and lurched westward through Teichau on to Baumgarten, where he took up post.
The Austrian commander possessed enough foresight to know that the more he could drag out the time the aggressive Prussian monarch was kept locked into the plains of Southern Silesia, the better for his cause. He gambled that the king would be reluctant to move from Silesia. More opportunities would thereby be opened for the allies, especially in a vulnerable Brandenburg, while the king’s fretting over his other fronts would cause increasing anxiety back in Silesia. Daun’s men were busy pulling back from their forward posts, while new intelligence arrived from Lt.-Gen. Plunkett. The latter was less than optimistic the main army of Soltikov could be called across the Oder, and thus able to form a juncture with their Austrian allies.2 Instead, Plunkett broached the suggestion that the Russians, in lieu of an outright connection, could instead occupy their time with laying siege to Glogau or some other timely, useful diversion.3 Any such operations could be as equally effective in keeping the Prussians occupied as in physically joining up with the Austrians and then conducting operations against the increasingly desperate Frederick the Great.
Meanwhile, the king did finally act. Before 0400 hours on September 17, the bluecoats were on the way, aiming to seize the initiative—launching an involved march to go by Schweidnitz. The Austrians reacted unhesitatingly. Prince Löwenstein’s men, moving up from Haugsdorf near to Oelse, responded. A Prussian force was at the Limmelberg (hard-by Kunzendorf), under Ziethen. General Ried’s men and Löwenstein’s galloped into and drove back the Prussians ensconced thereabouts, compelling the stubborn old hussar to abscond.
This singular Austrian success caused the obstinate minded king to detour his army as it traversed the region near Arnsdorf close to Schweidnitz. Austrian artillery had the angle on the intruders, and certainly had points of observation on the nearby rises overlooking the bluecoats below. Directly some Austrian artillery was sited up and commenced laying down a sustained shelling of the Prussian advance.
General Ried, under growing pressure from the suddenly energetic bluecoats, was deflected from an exposed position at Armsdorf, which was right in the intended path of the Prussians, on to Hoch-Giersdorf. The king drove right through Ried’s old lines and by Schönbrunn. The Austrian effort did help unnerve some of the Prussians, especially in the form of the very tough, seasoned cavalrymen of General d’Ayasasa lurking close-by the struggling Prussian columns. General d’Ayasasa descended deftly upon the bluecoats, and perceived an opportunity to attack the foe when and where they were vulnerable. Prussian infantry was temporarily deprived of cover from the hard-riding Prussian cavalry in a defile hard-by Bögendorf. Coincidently enough, this latest Austrian effort hit the 3rd Infantry of Bernburg, initially forcing the latter to recoil.
But the whitecoats terribly underestimated the resiliency of the Prussian infantry. The first line of the bluecoats caved in all right, but the interior lines were backed up by the potent firepower of the Prussian ordnance, which latter now opened a cannister fire, tearing big gaps in the abruptly startled Prussian ranks. Then Frederick contrived to unleash Seydlitz’ magnificent squadrons. This timely move turned the tide. The riled-up horsemen rode down the enemy, sending the equally startled Austrians reeling. Some of the latter sought refuge in the buildings of Bögendorf. Any remaining enthusiasm by the whitecoats was used up in short order when Prussian artillery, rolled forward by their charged up cre
ws, commenced to shell the intruders and forthwith forced them out into the open and on their way.
Towards 1600 hours, the progressing bluecoats swerved towards General Ried’s men. The latter were suddenly, and squarely, in the path of the advancing Prussians at Hoch-Giersdorf. Ried, suddenly unnerved by the sight of the enemy approaching across the lengthening shadows of late afternoon, resolved to pull out of harm’s way.
Marshal Daun sent the Tillier Infantry Regiment towards Hoch-Giersdorf to reinforce Ried, while the Prussians marched on the double to seize the rise. The Austrians, with the advantage of closer proximity, secured the height and drove back the advancing 35th Infantry (of Prince Henry) initially. Additional Prussian reinforcements now arrived on the scene. The weight of numbers pressed hard against the Austrians, and Tillier, like Ried, suddenly had had enough. That unit fled the scene, but Daun, despite many shortcomings, did possess personal courage. He pressed his main army forward, veering off to confront the advancing foe. He learned of Tillier’s panic from the scouts. Issuing orders, in response, to hurry, the marshal pushed his advanced guard on to Seitendorf and gained it before the exhausted enemy could draw near.4 The stubborn Prussian king could not overcome the sheer exhaustion of his men. More than sixteen hours of hard marching, coupled with fighting and dodging around, was just too much. Reluctantly, Frederick broke off the action, after suffering 982 casualties.5 Daun, for his part, lost some 600 men and 14 guns.6
The Austrians promptly began to put in batteries, the bristling artillery it was hoped would help deflect any aggressive tendencies on the part of the king. Daun was still very leery of this formidable enemy who had so often demonstrated his uncanny ability to stir things up in a very short time. Sure enough, next day, September 18, the bluecoats were unleashed against the new post of General Ried, over by Reussendorf. A probing thrust by his men demonstrated in short order that the Austrians were fully capable of meeting the bluecoats point-for-point.7 This was especially because of skillful maneuvering and the growing ability of the Austrians in properly deploying their ordnance at key locations. Still, convinced that he could no longer maintain the line of communication with Glatz short of a battle, Daun began to fret that his provision trains had less and less security.
In retrospect, little had been accomplished under the hot days of marching across Silesia except to cause wastage of men and horses on both sides, although in the case of the king, he could ill afford to lose valuable campaigning time, all while his armies were being driven ever so slowly from Saxony. Since there were no important military operations by either Frederick or Daun during the period, we can turn our attention to what had been happening on other fronts during this period.
Cherneyshev’s detachment and Lacy would become involved in an operation against Berlin, which will be covered below.
At the Northern Front, there was some action against Colberg. As of August 26, the Russians had had the fortress sealed off, some 28 ships, under Admiral Zacharias Mischuko,8 taking part in operations against the garrison in the Prussian port.9 The fleet was apparently quite impressive, boasting the pride and joy of the Russian navy: the 100-gun massive ship of the line Svyatoy Dmiytri Rostoski, under Captain Gorgi Spiridov. Nor was this one the only formidable ship. Others included the Svyatoy Andrey Pervozvanni, Svyatoy Zoann Zlayoust Pervi, Svyatoy Kliment Papa Rimski, Svyatoy Nikolay, and the Svyatoy Pavel; all boasting 86-gun complements.
In addition to the above formidable ships, the Swedes sent a squadron of their ships, in one of the few instances where the Russians and the Swedes closely cooperated during the whole war.10 The Swedish contingent consisted of eight vessels, including six ships of the line and two frigates, all under the command of Vice-Admiral Lagerbielke. The largest of this grouping was the Prins Gustaf, boasting 74 guns. Between the two forces, the allies controlled the waters off Colberg.
Moreover, no doubt remained about the seriousness of the effort to seize control of the port. On August 27, the formidable fleet began lobbing shells at Colberg, and the allied monopoly on the waterfront allowed them ready access to landing forces almost the entire stretch of the coast. Commandant Heyde was resolved to hold tight to his position, and, as the port had already been threatened with capture by the Russians in 1758, he kept the I. Garrison Regiment of Puttkammer, the best trained of the available forces, close at hand. Lieutenant von Hallerman had 24 men and three pieces of artillery with which to defend the Hasenschanze fortified works, from this unit. He had the misfortune to come under bombardment from some nearby Russian ships hard about Binnenrede. Then, September 7–8, an attack was launched against the work which carried it outright; Hallerman and his little squad were accordingly nabbed.
The Russians continued on with a degree of progress in their siege, aided by the overwhelming naval superiority they enjoyed. On the night of September 8–9, Russian artillerymen, under the direction of General Demidoff, managed to construct a new battery on the nearby Wolfsberg. This unit was at once utilized, and, under cover of the fire, siege lines were laid out and commenced noisy shelling about 900 yards distant from the fortress. The greencoats were nonplused. They promptly set up a couple more batteries over by the Vörlaufer. Heyde refused to give up hope, and he was also aware that a body of reinforcements was on its way to his rescue.
During all this time, the besiegers were closing in for the presumed kill. September 13, Commandant Heyde fielded an enemy request for surrender by categorically refusing to entertain the notion. Later that evening, though, a chance round blew up the feed supply magazine for Colberg and vicinity—this unfortunate development resulted in the loss of much of the garrison’s supply of flour. If the siege were to be prolonged, this could potentially mean starvation for the citizens and garrison of Colberg.
A couple of days after, the Russian progress on their siege parallels continued, but the real, meaningful progress of their forces to actually seize the fortress and the works thereabouts was glacial. On September 17, Russian patience was rewarded with the erection of another battery, closer in to the fortress walls surrounding Colberg.
The ships discharged some 8,000 men to lay siege to Colberg, being supplemented by an additional force of some 7,000 more Russians which moved overland.11 That day, Russian guns began plastering Colberg, although the shelling was not so severe as to compel Commandant Heyde to surrender.12 In addition, Frederick had already dispatched Werner from Glogau on September 5 in company with 5,000 men, including the 6th Hussars (eight full squadrons) and the Froideville Squadron, led by Major-General Monod von Froideville, from the 5th Dragoons,13 to race to relieve the fortress. The force moved from Landsberg and Schivelbein to hasten to the fortress’s relief.14
On the afternoon of September 18, Werner suddenly appeared on the scene, and struck at the crust of Russian lines of siege. With little fanfare, Werner lunged at an enemy force of some 300 men and a cannon at a bridgehead over by Sellnow. After a short altercation, the Russian detail was driven off, losing 160 prisoners and most of the rest killed or wounded.15 Werner was able to break through the enemy, and slip on into Colberg. The heavy reinforcements brought by Werner signaled the doom of the siege of Colberg. So the Russians at length withdrew (September 23), ending the second Siege of Colberg during the war.16 Russian efforts resulted in the loss of much equipment which could not be moved in time. Losses included 17 guns, five howitzers, and 2 mortars.
Back in the main theater, the activities of the Prussian light parties were threatening to cut off Daun from the Austrian base in Bohemia as September wore on and the deadlock intensified. As always, the marshal was again worrying about the prospect of being cut off from line of withdrawal into Bohemia. On September 24, Frederick sent a small detachment to head for Moravia and threaten Daun’s rear from that end. But the latter’s only reaction was to push out a detachment of his own to deal with the threat. October 4, the Prussian king moved off from before Daun’s line of camp, ending the stagnant period. Within a week of that time, the Austrian main b
ody sauntered towards Torgau, intending to render support to the Imperialists in that region.
We have already noted that Hülsen and Eugene had retired on Magdeburg; there they awaited the advent of the king and the main army into Saxony. Frederick took cover at Schweidnitz; with the van reaching over to a poor little village in the area, Bunzelwitz. In the following year, this latter would play a large role in the affairs of the campaign. During the evening hours of October 6, the bluecoats prepared for new adventures.
October 7, about 0300 hours, General Ziethen took a full 25 squadrons of horse and ten battalions, leading the vanguard off to Striegau, followed up by the king with the rest of the main army. The agitated Prussians rolled through Brochelshof (October 7); same day, Marshal Daun took a well needed breather at Lautrabache. Austrian patrols pressed on to Neulande, towards which, in the course of a few days, Daun brought the main whitecoat army. As for their foe, the king hardly had time to pause, rolling into Sagan on October 11 and Sommerfeld two days after. Daun, alighting at Penzig on October 13, and, next day, at Űllendorf, at the latter, Austrian scouts encountered patrols from the Imperialists.