Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War
Page 114
8. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 48; König, I, 377–379.
9. Quoted in Christopher Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700–1800 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 79.
10. Account of Quartermaster-General Weywarn, quoted in Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 241.
11. Not to be confused with the other individual named Lieven.
12. From the brigade of Major-General Johann Manteuffel (Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 65).
13. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 100–102; König, III, 428–429, for Schorlemer.
14. Ibid., 104; König, I, 420–422.
15. Jany, II, 463; König, IV, 68–69.
16. Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 71; König, II, 172–177.
17. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 98; König, III, 163–168.
18. Thanks in large measure to Fermor’s order to pull back the field guns alluded to earlier (Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 80).
19. Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 71.
20. Retzow, I, 212; Stühr, I, 277–314; Decker, 89–94; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 337–351; Seyfart, II, 386–391; Dobson, 25; Jomini, Traité, I, 299–307.
21. Die Kriege, Part 3, IV, 99–101.
22. Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 258–259.
23. Jany, II, 462–463.
24. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 16.
25. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 92; König, III, 176.
26. Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 71.
27. Lloyd, Part I, 143.
28. Lloyd, Part I, 145–146; Huschberg, 254–256. We might point out here, while no justifiable excuse by any means, Apraxsin was largely a political general who likely cared very little about the war or its results (Maslovski, I, 244–249).
Chapter 14
1. Sulicki contends the Swedes round Stralsund numbered 5,380 men, reinforced by 11,580 infantry, for a total of approximately 16,960 infantry and 4,000 cavalry (Sulicki, 40–41). Another source says 22,040 men (Preussich-Swedischen Krieges, 1757–1762, 5).
2. Jany, II, 464; Schaefer, I, 347–349; Huschberg, 257–262; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 457–459; Seyfart, II, 383–386; Jomini, Traité, I, 307–308.
3. Pauli, VIII, 150–166; König, III, 180–181. For Stockhausen, see König, IV, 46–47.
4. Geschichte Preussich-Swedischen Kriege, 1757–1762, 7–8. For Oppen, see König, III, 118.
5. Sulicki, 37–64; Helden Geschichte, IV, 650–690.
6. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 180–182.
7. Huschberg, 280–313; Bernhardi, I, 152–175.
8. Showalter, 183.
9. Letter of Ambassador Mitchell, 27 October 1757, quoted in Duffy, Military Life, 139.
10. Among which the Szėchėny Hussars were prominent.
11. This factor would remain true for the duration of the war. This was a clear indictment the French government really had scant interest in “helping” its allies out where its own interests were not directly at stake.
12. Lawley, 48–51.
13. Duffy, Military Life, 139; Waddington, I, 544–560.
14. Lee Kennett, The French Armies in the Seven Years’ War: A Study in Military Organization and Administration (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967), 50.
15. For instance, Soubise enjoyed composing long letters while he was away on campaign. “‘He sent letter after letter… some extended to twelve pages,” closing with a poignant query, “‘How did he leave himself with any time for action?’” (quoted in Duffy, Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 156). How indeed?
16. Letter of Franz Johann Brettlach to Anton Colloredo, 25 November 1757, quoted in Christopher Duffy, Prussia’s Glory: Rossbach and Leuthen 1757 (Chicago: The Emperor’s Press, 2003), 33–35.
17. The French were soon withdrawn.
Chapter 15
1. Wiltsch, 122–182; Jomini, Treatise, I, 175–184; Decker, 95–103.
2. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 182–183.
3. Jany, II, 436–438; Showalter, 186–192; Die Kriege, Part 3, V, 195–235; Retzow, I, 190–212; Varnhagen von Ense, Seydlitz, 59–68; Huschberg, 297–306; Adolf Müller, Die Schlacht bei Rossbach: Eine Judelschrift (Berlin: 1857), 53–73.
4. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 186–187.
5. A commodity the French army had an almost embarrassing abundance of (Kennett, 29).
6. Showalter, 185–186.
7. Brodrück, 114.
8. From a point of vantage from where the Allied commanders believed they were able to spy out the whole of Frederick’s camp.
9. However, Hildburghausen stated later it was 1300 hours before Soubise actually started to march (Tuttle, IV, 126). Asprey states “Hildburghausen,” who had been unable to convince the French commander to march, “moves out on his own.” Then that action actually forced Soubise’s hand (Asprey, 470).
10. Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 364–380; Brabant, 312–336; Seyfart, II, 369–382; Cyril Falls, Ed., Great Military Battles (London: Hamlyn, 1969), 58–65; Dobson, 29.
11. Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 73.
12. This force was more than a mile from the main body of the infantry, advancing as a single body, and not spread out in reconnaissance formation.
13. Soubise, in retrospect, wanted to severe Frederick from the Saale, and he was equally leery lest the bluecoats might occupy Müchelin and sweep down upon Freiburg, the only line-of-retreat open at the moment to the Allies.
14. Rödenbeck, I, 326. It was a good thing that Captain Gaudi was duly alert (König, II, 2–4).
15. Keith, Ferdinand of Brunswick, Seydlitz, Prince Henry, and von Geist.
16. Die Kriege, Part 3, V, 211–212.
17. Brodrück, 115.
18. Snyder, 17–18.
19. Lawley, 51–52; König, III, 36–37.
20. It would appear Soubise around this time thought the Combined Army should pause and await developments on the following day (Duffy, Prussia’s Glory, 70). Events simply would not allow that to occur. For Moller, see König, III, 60–61.
21. Wiltsch, 183.
22. Which was actually not unheard of in that era, but, under the circumstances, highly unlikely.
23. From the cavalry regiments of Brettlach and Trautmannsdorf.
24. Hildburghausen’s account of what transpired on November 5 is actually rather suspect. He makes claims that do not make sense in light of the day’s developments.
25. The Szekely Hussars, 3rd Dragoons, 4th Dragoons, and 3rd Cuirassiers.
26. It must be admitted the Austrian ranks boasted a bewildering variety of languages.
27. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 118. For Katzler, see König, II, 258–259. For Szekely, see König, IV, 69–71.
28. Jany, II, 440–445; Waddington, I, 611–616.
29. Brodrück, 344–347; for Albert Schwerin, see König, III, 469–470.
30. From an elm tree near Lunstädt.
31. Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 79.
32. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 22. As a unit, this was no doubt deserved.
33. Testimony of Lt. von Guardy, found in Brodrück, 322.
34. There had indeed been some anxious moments as the bodies of troops had nearly collided, but the larger portion was yet to even be in the battle. Still, forward progress was halted.
35. Nosworthy, 271–272.
36. Wiltsch, 183; Waddington, I, 617–627.
37. Will & Ariel Durant, Rousseau and Revolution, 50.
38. Mitford, 210.
39. Showalter, 188–190.
40. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 191. “We have honoured the late affair with the name of a battle, though it was really nothing but a rout.”
41. Die Kriege, Part 3, V, 207–223. Excellent account of the action; Complete History of the Present War, 236–238; Lawley, 49–56.
42. Anonymous officer, quoted in Entick, II, 462.
43. Brodrück, 118; Dieudonnė Thiebault, Original A
necdotes of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, two volumes (Philadelphia: 1806), I, 267–270.
44. Letter of Marshal Keith to his brother (Coull, 177).
45. Die Kriege, Part 3, V, 222. This source says 30 officers and 518 men.
46. Kügler, 342; Waddington, I, 628.
47. Die Kriege, Part 3, VI: Leuthen, 108–133.
48. Sulicki, 85–89; on one occasion, for instance, a single “contribution” of 300,000 thaler was extracted.
49. Archenholtz, I, 104–105.
50. Frederick II, Seven Years’ War, I, 217.
51. Helden Geschichte, IV, 687–690; Konig, III, 14–16.
52. Carlyle, VI, 337–338.
Chapter 16
1. Retzow, I, 220–235; Huschberg, 189–194; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 380–407; Seyfart, II, 347–353; Jomini, Treatise, I, 210–216; Helden Geschichte, IV, 710–719; Die Kriege, Part 3, IV, 145–159; Jomini, Traité, I, 220–241.
2. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Elbe to the Oder, 73.
3. Arneth, V, 230–232. Prince Charles had been repeatedly advised to smash the Prussian armies as the best method of regaining Silesia for Maria Theresa. Ideally, we might add, while the Prussian king was still out of the picture as much as possible. The Austrians must have sensed, even at this stage of the war, just how few would be their opportunities without the Prussian king in the picture. That being said, the Prussian forces opposed to him, including General Rebentisch (see König, III, 269–271), took on greater importance for the Prussian cause.
4. Heinz, 72–77.
5. Duffy, Prussia’s Glory, 103.
6. Arneth, V, 237–244. Hadik subsequently hinted his disappointment he did not have more troops available for this operation; Archenholtz, I, 94–96.
7. Helden Geschichte, IV, 605–614.
8. Duffy, Prussia’s Glory, 104; Waddington, I, 606–608.
9. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 152. For Rochow, see König, III, 293–294.
10. Jany, II, 432–433.
11. Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 147.
12. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Nike and Nemesis: The Journal of Horace St. Paul October 5th, 1757 to January 6th, 1758 (Guisborough, England: Gralene Books, 2004), 12–13.
13. Duffy, Prussia’s Glory, 107–108.
14. Arneth, V, 242; Huschberg, 203–205.
15. Although the ordnance had been assembled at Reichenau, Field Marshal Reinhard Wilhelm von Neipperg, acting commandant of Vienna, had been given charge of forwarding the guns. He fumbled the ball in that nearly two weeks went by before the artillery was finally sent. Apparently, Neipperg forgot to send them to the front (Horace St. Paul, 1757 Nike and Nemesis, 16).
16. Christopher Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660–1789 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 123–127. Commandant Seers (see König, III, 478) had his work cut out for him and his garrison of Schweidnitz.
17. The first Austrian trenches to be completed were directly confronting the Garten-Redoute and the Bögen Fort.
18. Horace St. Paul, 1757 Nike and Nemesis, 22.
19. Schaefer, I, 502; Huschberg, 196–201; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 407–411.
20. Die Kriege, Part 3, IV, 185–190; Waddington, I, 686–693.
21. Campbell, Frederick’s Court and Times, III, 82–86.
22. The complete capitulation agreement is found in Johann Gottlieb Tielke Beiträge zur Geschichte des Krieges von 1756 bis 1763, six volumes (Vienna: 1786), IV, 44–50. For Grumkow, see König, II, 87–89.
23. Duffy, Prussia’s Glory, 114.
24. Ibid., 109.
25. Jany, II, 445–446, is a concise account of the early operations of Prince Charles and Bevern in Silesia.
26. Arneth, V, 501–502.
27. Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 80.
28. At the latter, the Prussians had the Free Corps under General Ludwig Malvezzi d’Angenelli (König, I, 9).
29. Groehler, 108.
30. Decker, 104–117.
31. Cogniazzo, II, 41–44.
32. Pauli, II, 94–96; König, III, 440–444.
33. Die Kriege, Part 3, IV, 195–206; Huschberg, 208–211; Retzow, I, 213–235; Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 176–184; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 412–425; Arneth, V, 255–256.
34. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 84.
35. Asseburg’s unit paid a prodigious price; 687 men, 13 officers, down (ibid., 70). His biography in König, I, 89.
36. Blumenthal, II, 345–346.
37. Dorn and Engelmann, Die Schlachten, 87.
38. On the other hand, according to Archenholtz, Bevern “unwisely rejected sound advice” to strike at the thoroughly disorganized enemy while his army, although battered, was, “in order and ready to renew the struggle” (Archenholtz, I, 133–134).
39. Die Kriege, Part 3, IV, 205–221.
40. Lloyd, the ever vigilant critic, maintains Bevern unwisely abandoned an advantageous position at Bernstadtel back upon Bautzen. Possibly if Bevern had tried to maintain a cordon defense, assuming he had enough men to do so (Lloyd, I, 120–121). The problem then becomes Bevern’s clear, pronounced, inferiority of numbers. In order to man defense posts of any length he would have to stretch his available force much too thin for safety’s sake. Of course, arguments like this never carried much weight with the king. As he was a daredevil often on the battlefield, Frederick always assumed so should everyone else.
41. Schaefer, I, 502. Frederick did not mince words on this topic.
42. Some ended up joining the Austrian army, others dispersed to their homes, and still others would later join up with Ziethen and the king in early December.
43. Schmitt, 43–47.
44. Something which the king was by no means above.
45. Varnhagen von Ense, Jakob Keith, 193–196.
46. Krsowitz, I, 96–99; Malleson, 62–64; Janko, 44–48; Waddington, I, 694–695.
47. Complete History of the Present War, 238–240.
48. Huschberg, 189–215; Retzow, I, 210–212.
49. Lloyd, I, 136.
50. Ibid., 131.
51. Lloyd, in his analysis of the Leuthen campaign, thought the situation would have been more favorable had the Austrians stayed on the Schweidnitz River far shore. He contends this would have compelled Frederick to try to ford the marshy river against a superior enemy (Lloyd, I, 136–137). In retrospect, this really might have been the wisest course. But, of course, we have the advantage of hindsight here.
Chapter 17
1. Fraser, 368–370; MacDonogh, 264–266; Waddington, I, 701–716.
2. Frederick II, Seven Years’ War, I, 196.
3. The generals present for this council included Ferdinand of Brunswick; Schmettau; Ziethen; Prince Moritz; Fouquet; Lentulus; and Retzow.
4. There are a couple of versions of this speech. Interestingly, the king chose to give his speech in German, rather than the French he usually preferred.
5. Retzow, I, 240–242.
6. Ibid., 243.
7. Die Kriege, Part 3, VI, 13–15.
8. Cogniazzo, II, 419.
9. Lloyd, I, 128.
10. Arneth, V, 263.
11. Five full regiments of hussars under Major Podgursky.
12. Campbell, Frederick’s Court and Times, II, 95–96.
Chapter 18
1. Die Kriege, Part 3, VI, 1–69; Arneth, V, 260–266; Showalter, 196–206; Stühr, I, 269–275; Joseph Kutzen, Friedrich der Grosse und sein heer in den Tagen der Schlacht bei Leuthen, nebst einer unsassenden Darstellungder Lessteren (Breslau: 1851), 57–134; Huschberg, 221–228; Seyfart, II., 360–368; Jomini, Traité, I, 241–259.
2. Cogniazzo, II, 417–422.
3. Kalkreuth, quoted in Duffy, Prussia’s Glory, 140. Kleist must have blabbed to others of the event. Probably authentic, but Frederick was notoriously guarded about showing a vulnerable side. When the story finally got back to the monarch, his mood can be guessed at.
4. Jany, II, 453; Joseph Kutzen, Der Tag von Leuthen
: Dritte Ausgabe (Breslau: 1860), 64–130; Jomini, Treastise, I, 222–236; Colin Lindsay, Tempelhoffe, I, 185–205; Decker, 118–130; Retzow, I, 235–257; Reihe von Vorlesungen, I, 437–452; Helden Geschichte, IV, 776–797.
5. Nostitz succumbed to his injuries on December 17. The Prussian dragoons of Württemberg (see König, IV, 272–276) had performed commendably.
6. Specifically, Prince Moritz, along with a cavalry escort. Moritz was to lead the main infantry attack at Leuthen.
7. This was actually a slight exaggeration. The undulations of the terrain would have made this physically impossible, even with all other things even.
8. Kutzen, Friedrich der Grosse, 36.
9. Kutzen, Tag von Leuthen, 49–58.
10. Thadden, 321–324.
11. Kutzen, Tag von Leuthen, 64–71.
12. Archenholtz, I, 135.
13. ibid., I, 135–136.
14. Muller specifically mentions this incident (Müller, Schlacht bei Rossbach, 30); Kutzen, Tag von Leuthen, 90.
15. By that point, the entire advanced guard, under Driesen, had arrived there.
16. Cogniazzo, II, 429.
17. Lloyd, I, 129.
18. Pauli, V, 35–84. For Meyernick, see König, III, 45–46. For Driesen, see König, I, 385–388.
19. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 68.
20. Ernst Friedrich von Barsewisch, Meine Kriegs-Erlebnisse während des Siebenjährigen Krieges 1757–1763, edited by J. Olmes (Berlin: 1863; reprinted by Krefeld: Hermann Ruhl Verlag, 1959), 41. More cartridges were located quickly, and it was back to business.
21. Dorn, Infantry Regiments, 94.
22. Kutzen, Freiedrich der Grosse, 80–82.
23. That man was the brother of the disgraced Duke.
24. Dupuy, 37.
25. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 68; König, III, 209.
26. We should mention, in fairness, the units holding there were not bad, but not as good as their opponents were. Prince Charles had been advised specifically against trusting Württemberg units in key positions (Thadden, 321–322).
27. Dorn, Cavalry Regiments, 110; König, IV, 31–32.
28. However, the case can also be argued that the Württembergers had performed “competently” in the past and there was no reason to assume they would act any differently at Leuthen.