by Damien Burke
Concerns were also raised about the security of these particularly expensive aircraft. Proposals were put forward to surround each TSR2 base with chain-link fencing to a height of 8ft (2.4m), with barbed-wire overhangs, though within the RAF it was felt it might be tricky to get Treasury approval for such an increase in security when the nuclear-armed V-force had no such protection. By December 1964 plans were well advanced for two new buildings at Coningsby, the flight-simulator and training-rig buildings, but these were then delayed pending the results of noise trials, to see what level of soundproofing would be needed. Doubts about the project’s future then put any further work in abeyance.
Modern-day Coningsby shows little evidence of the planned TSR2 work. The station became home to the Phantom OCU (the Phantom being bought to replace the Hawker P.1154), and because of this would not have been available for the F-111 OCU, which was instead planned to be based at RAF Honington (which became a Buccaneer base once the TSR2/TFX/F-111 dust settled). The main ASP layout drawn up for the TSR2 OCU was modified for Phantom operations, and constructed closer to the Gaydon hangar with a narrower width (ironically, it later proved to be too small, and a disused runway was used as the base for an additional strip of ASP a short distance away). Chain-link fences do now surround most of the airfield, though they were finally put in place some time later.
Operational Development Squadron
The RAF’s TSR2 Steering Committee decided in 1962 that TSR2 flying in the RAF would begin with an ODS, to be numbered 40 Squadron, formed with the first six pre-production aircraft intended for RAF service. The fifteenth and sixteenth TSR2 airframes would be the first two assigned to the ODS, delivery initially being expected in September 1966 (later this slipped to April 1967). The squadron’s tasks would be to evaluate operational tactics, to set up an Operational Reliability Trial to establish reliability factors and assess equipment wastage rates, and to train prospective instructors for the first OCU course, expected to start in the second quarter of 1967 (later slipped to January of 1968).
Slippage in the programme meant that the initial plans for the Operational Development Squadron to form with the first six pre-production aircraft would have needed bolstering by early aircrew experience on development-batch airframes at Boscombe Down or Warton. BAE Systems via Warton Heritage Group
By January 1965 things had changed. Aircraft No. 15 was now earmarked for identification friend or foe (IFF) and alternator trials, and aircraft 16 was reserved against any major contingencies in the flight-test programme, such as the loss of an aircraft in a crash. This would result in a delay of at least another six months before the first airframe became available to the ODS. A further blow was that the A&AEE stated that, in the timeframe available, it was likely that the first airframes assigned to the ODS would only be available under a limited flight clearance, with restrictions in speed, altitude and bank angle, and no clearance to use the nav/ attack system. Thus training of navigator instructors would be impossible, and only limited pilot flying training would be possible (circuit training only, for example). The delay in the start of flying at the ODS would also mean that crews going through the ground training programme would be finished before aircraft were available for them to fly, so refresher flying training in another type (such as the Lightning) would become necessary.
The recommended alternative plan was to give prospective navigators a part in the development programme, flying with A&AEE pilots, and for prospective pilots to fly under the supervision of manufacturer’s test pilots or A&AEE pilots, with the ODS forming at either Warton, or preferably at the A&AEE’s base at Boscombe Down. In that event, formation of the ODS would consist of two phases, Phase 1 being at Boscombe and Phase 2 taking place with the move, two or three months down the line, to RAF Coningsby.
By December 1968 the unit’s pre-production airframes would be replaced by six production aircraft, and the unit would then move to another base to form the core of the first strike squadron.
Operational Conversion Unit
The major TSR2 flying unit at Coningsby was to be the OCU, numbered 237 OCU (though early plans mentioned 231 OCU). The OCU would include two flying squadrons; a TSR2 squadron that would build up from production aircraft to a total of seventeen or eighteen airframes (as originally planned; by early 1965 this had been reduced to ten airframes in the face of a reduction in the TSR2 buy), and a Hunter squadron consisting of twelve Hunter T.66 trainers (a large-bore-Avonengined version of the T.7). There would also be ground-training and simulator squadrons within the OCU, with two flight simulators. According to early plans the unit was expected to accept its first TSR2 in June 1967, the same month in which Hunter training would begin; TSR2 training would then begin in September 1967. These dates later slipped to February and April 1968 respectively.
Each course was to consist of forty weeks of extremely demanding training, only the cream of Bomber Command’s crop being eligible even to enter the first few courses. Courses would begin every six weeks. Crews entering the OCU would already have logged around 300hr in trainers including the Hunter, and would be expected to add at least 45hr of TSR2 time to their logbooks along with 76hr of simulator time by the end of their OCU course (initial plans had been for up to 70hr of TSR2 time).
Aircrew training: TSR2 dual-control trainer
From very early on in the project it was clear to the RAF that its new advanced bomber was going to benefit from a dedicated trainer variant. Such would be the expense of each airframe that the cost of losses due to inadequately experienced pilots making errors would be far higher than the cost involved in acquiring some trainer airframes. Early in 1960 BAC made its first proposals to this end, carried out some preliminary project studies and constructed a mock-up forward fuselage. The Air Staff had initially asked for a trainer version with side-by-side seating for two pilots, on which instruction and standardization checks could be carried out. These would cover both flying and operational techniques, including weapon delivery. The cost of such a major redesign of the fuselage turned out to be prohibitive, and the resulting airframe would not have been representative of the operational variant, nor would it have been capable of easy conversion to/from the operational variant. The requirement was put to one side, and a revised training plan put together to do without a dual TSR2 and rely instead of lead-in training with Hunters and extensive flight simulator use.
In September 1960 the dual TSR2 was revisited and a revised specification put together covering a tandem-seat dual-control version that could be converted back into an operational aircraft in time of emergency. The existing tandem mock-up was modified to bring the rear cockpit floor upwards to improve the instructor’s eye line. This was a much more workable plan, and Vickers estimated £12,000 would cover a complete design study.
It was not until early 1962 that BAC was invited again to submit timescales and costs involved in carrying out a full design study for a genuine TSR2 trainer variant. This it did in May, quoting a cost of £16,000 for the design study and an additional £10,000 for windtunnel models and a mock-up, but it was then not until nearly the end of the year that the Air Ministry began drafting a report on the need for the trainer, to present to the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) in an effort to get it to agree and proceed further. In the meantime the RAF had even considered doing without the Lightning T.5 (and sticking with the T.4, which did not have the cockpit instrumentation for the F.3 and later variants of Lightning) in an effort to save money to put towards the dual TSR2. Luckily for a generation of Lightning pilots, the T.5 went ahead.
Months had been wasted in the interim period, which included discussion about whether asking for a trainer would expose the RAF to ‘attack’ from the RN, which managed to get by without dual trainer versions of most of its aircraft (including, of course, the NA.39). This led to deeper discussion of the whole training syllabus within the RAF, and how operational squadrons were established. The RN method was to ‘work-up’ a squadron of more-or-less fixed perso
nnel make-up in an intense period of shore training before embarking in a carrier as an operational unit, repeating the process as necessary. The RAF, by contrast, established a squadron and then drip-fed personnel into it, each needing further training to become truly operational. Thus an RAF squadron, while nominally operational, could consist of a mix of experienced and well-trained crews and crews that were essentially non-operational owing to lack of experience and training. A similar RN squadron would either be fully operational or entirely non-operational during its workup period. Some within the RAF even admitted the RN method could well be better; its front-line squadrons had a uniform standard of efficiency, and it had a reliable and easily predictable number of non-operational units. The RAF’s front line varied in efficiency, and on-squadron training often took a back seat when operational commitments interfered.
The next significant progress was not made until September 1963, when the DRPC decided to award a contract for BAC to begin its design study, though further months would be spent on the usual contract wrangling before a signed contract was with BAC. Meanwhile, a meeting was held on 24 October between some of the Air Staff and BAC to detail the RAF’s current requirements for the trainer. This would be for a total of nine aircraft, seven of which would be for use by the OCU, and two for use as strike aircraft, to be converted to trainers as required. The RAF wanted the trainers to be capable of conversion back to strike aircraft within a week if necessary, and to be able to fly a small number of strike missions with the trainer canopy still in place if time constraints prevented full conversion back to strike fit. A working party would be formed to work on a detailed specification, and costs would be kept as low as possible by earmarking one of the production aircraft as a trainer prototype, with no second airframe as an insurance backup.
The contract for the design study was finally signed in March 1964, and BAC’s Weybridge division (i.e. Vickers) did the design work, designating the prospective aircraft the Type 595. Windtunnel testing was delayed by work on the VC10, and it was not until September that the Warton windtunnels were available. The Preston division of BAC also supported the study, with work on compatibility with the rear fuselage, wings and tail surfaces, plus the benefit of its experience with the Lightning and Canberra trainer variants. The finished design-study brochure, produced in January 1965, was entitled Type 595 Pilot Trainer Aircraft (for further details, see Chapter 12).
A January 1965 brochure illustration of the Type 595 TSR2 dual-control trainer. Trainers would have been capable of conversion to strike aircraft by RAF personnel over the course of seven days or so. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
Unfortunately, the timing of the trainer brochure could not have been worse, reaching the Air Staff while they were busy considering the implications of the TSR2 being cancelled and possibly replaced by the TFX. In February the Air Staff decided that the pressing need for the trainer was not quite as pressing as the need to try and bring costs down, so they postponed any idea of going ahead with the trainer in the hope that they would be able to reintroduce the requirement when (or if) the project was on a surer footing. The RAF’s Directorate of Flying Training turned out to be less than impressed with the view from this proposed trainer, declaring in March 1965 that ‘the present BAC proposals for a dual TSR2 are unacceptable’, and that ‘they have demonstrated the incompatibility of good rear-seat vision and quick conversion to the operational role’. The minimum possible improvement that could be made to make the aircraft acceptable would be provision of a binocular periscope, but preferably this plus a larger (perhaps two-piece) canopy would really be best. To this end the directorate was prepared to accept performance limitations of a maximum indicated air speed of 450kt (520mph; 835km/h) at sea level/Mach 1.4 and ceiling of 40,000ft (12,000m). No further work on improving the design study was undertaken before the TSR2 project was cancelled.
Gnat lead-in training
The existing Gnat T.1 was not considered at all suitable as a lead-in trainer for the TSR2 force, but Folland had put forward a proposal for the Gnat T.2 in mid-1960. This was fitted with some basic navigational equipment, including a master reference gyro similar to that of the Lightning. The RAF did not consider it a worthwhile effort, and Folland came back with a brochure on its proposed Gnat Mk 5 in September 1960. This was a more radical effort, with twin engines and a radar in the nose, somewhat larger and heavier than the ‘normal’ Gnat and with a higher landing speed. While slightly more suited for use as a lead-in trainer for the TSR2, it was still felt to be far inferior to existing types such as the Hunter or Lightning two-seaters and, as a new development, could have resulted in an expensive and protracted additional procurement. Accordingly the Gnat was never a serious contender as a TSR2 trainer in any of its proposed forms.
The Lightning T.5 (a T.4 is seen here) was proposed as the basis for a TSR2 trainer, with the missile pack replaced by a TSR2 navigation kit and the TSR2 FLR replacing the AI.23 radar, along with a TSR2-style HUD. BAE Systems
Lightning TSR2 trainer
In late 1960 English Electric began a study into creating a variant of the Lightning T.5 that could be used as a TSR2 pilot trainer. A report on this was finished in January 1961. The proposed trainer would be fitted with the TSR2’s FLR, repackaged so that it would fit in the Lightning’s bullet radome by relocating some parts of the radar to the forward armament bay. Significantly enlarging the bullet was not an option, as the reduction of airflow to the engines would have demanded a different engine version and loss of supersonic performance. A basic HUD would be fitted in place of the Light Fighter Sight normally fitted; for space reasons this would have to be a simpler unit than the TSR2 HUD. A simplified navigation computer, possibly with Decca Doppler, could be developed and mounted within the main equipment bay if needed, along with a radio altimeter. Standard Martin-Baker Mk 4 ejection seats would be retained, as neither the proposed Martin-Baker nor North American TSR2 seats would fit in the Lightning’s cockpit. The large ventral tank already developed (but which the RAF’s T.5 would not use) allowed for additional fuel.
Details of modifications to the standard Lightning trainer that would have been required for a dedicated TSR2 Lightning lead-in pilot trainer. Damien Burke
The report ended by summarizing the proposal in lukewarm terms: ‘This might prove to be a satisfactory alternative to a fully equipped special TSR-2 trainer.’ The proposal languished for a long time, and when the TSR2 trainer came up for discussion again in late 1963, BAC Warton submitted the Lightning TSR2 trainer variant to BAC Weybridge for its thoughts. Henry Gardner’s first question was whether they would be damaging the prospects for an order for the TSR2 trainer by offering a cheaper alternative, but it was eventually also offered to the RAF, who, no doubt to BAC’s relief, confirmed its preference for a full TSR2 trainer variant instead.
Hunter lead-in training
As mentioned above, the Air Staff had provisionally planned to use Hunter T.66s for lead-in training for the TSR2 force. Powered by the gutsier Avon 203, this ‘bigbore’ Hunter two-seater had been introduced for the Indian and Jordanian air forces, and could be provided either by converting existing F.6s as they left squadron service or by upgrading Hunter T.7s. Five low-level flights in a T.66 were laid on for various RAF pilots and navigators in May 1961, flying from Dunsfold through relatively unpopulated areas of Somerset, Devon and Cornwall. They were extremely valuable in demonstrating some of the challenges inherent in high-speed low-level flying and navigation, and all of the RAF officers involved strongly supported the use of the Hunter as a lead-in trainer for TSR2 crews. A side-effect of these five flights was the level of public protest generated, RAF Chivenor being inundated by telephone complaints and the RAF receiving thirty letters of complaint afterwards. The implications for TSR2 low-level training in the UK were obvious, and led to further efforts to investigate the use of overseas low-level training areas.
The Hunter T.12 could well have formed the basis of a lead-in trainer for TSR2 crews,
though it had not been built for this purpose and had been procured by the RAE purely for HUD and FX.126 camera trials. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
Hawker also produced a one-off Hunter T.12 airframe, XE531, for the RAE to use as a demonstrator for a HUD and the new FX 126 camera. Based on the T.66 specification, the T.12 was a conversion of an F.6 airframe with the distance-measuring equipment, IFF, Green Salad UHF homer, nose radar, gunsights and recorder cameras, guns and auto-stabilization removed; upgrades of compass, attitude indicator, oxygen system, electrical supply and braking parachute; and the addition of HUD, an FX 126 survey camera (requiring a bulge on top of the nose to make room for this downward-facing camera), a master reference gyro, an air data computer and ILS (all to be linked to the HUD), and a ‘little stick’ side controller for the Flight Director. The RAE chose an attractive paint scheme of brilliant green with a white nose flash, spine and fin.
The T.12 also caught the RAF’s eye. With work already done to modify the basic Hunter trainer airframe to carry some items of equipment destined for the TSR2, this struck the Service as a relatively cheap way to train TSR2 crews in the use of some TSR2 systems. Flight trials of the HUD in late 1963 were very successful, and the pilots considered that the aircraft could well make a suitable TSR2 lead-in trainer, though it would benefit from the addition of tactical air navigation kit and the reintroduction of the standard Hunter yaw damper, particularly for flight at high speed under turbulent conditions.
Initial Operational Capability: strike squadrons
The first operational TSR2 strike unit would have been 40 Squadron (previously a Canberra unit from 1953, until it merged with 50 Squadron and then disbanded in 1957), and the intention was for it to build up from its initial six ODS airframes in March 1968 (later slipped to January 1969) to a total of twelve aircraft within a year.