by Damien Burke
Initial plans had centred on introducing the TSR2 to RAF Germany before any UK front-line units were formed, RAF Brüggen and RAF Laarbruch being chosen as the two bases that would be used for TSR2 units. Gütersloh was considered an imprudent choice, being forward of the planned high-altitude air-defence missile zone. Geilenkirchen was planned to be a Lightning base, and Wildenrath, with its transport hub, was considered likely to be too congested in times of tension. Brüggen and Laarbruch both already had many of the facilities required; nuclear weapons storage, Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) compounds and a Mobile Field Photographic Unit.
Brüggen also had a Maintenance Unit based there, which was considered to be particularly useful when introducing the TSR2. (In fact 431 MU was an equipment depot only, not a repair or servicing unit. Laarbruch’s 420 MU was the repair, salvage and modification unit.) Moreover, the rundown of the Canberra force was beginning with Brüggen’s 213 Squadron, then operating the Canberra B(I).6, and this would leave ample room for a new TSR2 squadron to form there. It was decided that, for the first year, all TSR2 facilities would centre on Brüggen, with Laarbruch coming on line as a TSR2 station a year later (NATO recommendations being that no more than one squadron be based on an airfield, to reduce vulnerability to surprise attack).
However, the Spotswood report on the future shape and size of the RAF, produced in early 1964, changed these plans. The major change here was to withdraw all plans for basing TSR2s in Germany. This would substantially reduce their vulnerability to surprise attack, and also ease maintenance and indirect running costs. Thus the TSR2 line-up was recommended to be changed as follows (see box, below).
No adjustment in total numbers was authorized despite the increase to 140 that would have been necessary. The Spotswood report had far-reaching consequences for the make-up of the RAF. One of the first effects was the change of 40 Squadron’s base, which was now to be RAF Marham in Norfolk. A second strike squadron would form within six months of 40 Squadron’s establishment, also building up to twelve aircraft, and also at Marham. No specific squadron number is mentioned in surviving documentation, nor are any hints given as to the identity of this squadron. At least one flight simulator would also have been provided at Marham, possibly two.
Initial Operational Capability: reconnaissance squadron
A further eight airframes, fitted out for reconnaissance, would form a third squadron after the two strike squadrons had been established. While no specific squadron number is mentioned in surviving documentation, the Director of Air Staff Plans did write to the AOC Bomber Command on 14 April 1964, stating: ‘… re-equipment of the Canberra PR.7 squadron should be completed in early 1969’. This indicates that the first TSR2 reconnaissance squadron was likely to have been 13 Squadron, as this was the only Bomber Command Canberra PR.7 unit at the time.
When the plan had been to introduce the TSR2 into service in RAF Germany first, the first reconnaissance units were to have replaced Canberra squadrons there. These would probably have been 17 and 31 Squadrons.
As the TSR2 reconnaissance force was to be a low-level tactical reconnaissance force, it was felt that it would not necessarily require direct access to the Central Reconnaissance Establishment by being based at RAF Wyton, though this was an initial suggestion, and RAF Marham was favoured in later planning and confirmed several times as discussions progressed.
Operational turnaround at a main base. Here, RAF personnel are shown winching a triple rack of 1,000lb HE bombs into the weapons bay while fuel and oxygen are replenished and a starter cart stands by. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
Operational use
The RAF initially intended reconnaissance squadrons to carry out no training for the strike role, and to specialize entirely in reconnaissance, a decision slightly at odds with the multi-role ability of the aircraft. By contrast, strike squadrons would be expected to carry out limited reconnaissance tasks using the permanent fit of cameras in the aircraft, in support of overall reconnaissance operations, post-strike assessment and prestrike intelligence gathering. For the reconnaissance squadrons, choice of the reconnaissance equipment used would be dictated by the quality of imagery required, the weather and the speed with which the information was needed. For optimum imagery, day photographic coverage was best (and at night, active linescan); for getting information back to base as soon as possible, line-scan with data transmission; and, when the weather was too poor for visual reconnaissance, radar reconnaissance would be used.
Night-time operations would have been commonplace for the TSR2 force. BAE Systems via Brooklands Museum
If nuclear conflict looked likely, the TSR2 force would be dispersed to a variety of airstrips, usually no more than two aircraft per strip. The various ground functions required to support strike or reconnaissance operations, weapons provision, photo interpreters and so on, would be dispersed to fewer locations, so any sorties flown would need to recover to this more limited subset of dispersal airstrips.
At the outset of nuclear war the TSR2 strike force would strike its pre-planned targets with whatever combination of nuclear weapons was judged appropriate to each one, and return to a base capable of rearming and refuelling the aircraft; if any still existed. Further strike operations would depend entirely on the level of devastation inflicted upon friendly forces, and could possibly involve support of army operations if poor weather precluded the use of more suitable close-air-support platforms (which would, in NATO planning, be provided by other air forces). The TSR2 reconnaissance force would have pre-planned targets within both enemy and friendly territory, the former to be reconnoitred for target acquisition purposes, and the latter to be visited after the initial nuclear exchange in order to assess the level of damage inflicted by the enemy. In a conventional conflict this latter task would be of much less importance.
Under ideal conditions, the interpretation of reconnaissance information gathered by the TSR2 reconnaissance force would take the form of three phases. First of all a brief report giving essential operational information; secondly more detail, produced within hours and based on the study of film and radar prints; and thirdly very detailed information of a technical or specialist nature produced over a matter of days. In a nuclear conflict it was felt that only first-phase interpretation would be possible. No intelligence centre was likely to survive for an extended period, and a nuclear conflict could be over within days. Only a sustained conventional war would both require and allow the luxury of in-depth study of reconnaissance material.
The TSR2 strike force was not intended to take any part in a strictly conventional war in Europe. Its aircraft would sit out such a conflict in dispersed sites, only coming into use if the conflict escalated into a nuclear one. The reconnaissance force would be available for army support, but not in strike operations because of their lack of relevant training. A conventional conflict outside of NATO could, however, see use of the TSR2 strike force with conventional weapons. In this case a typical bomb load would be six 1,000lb HE bombs in the weapons bay, and would not normally rise beyond a total of ten bombs. Rearming with the same type of load was to take no more than half an hour; a change from conventional to nuclear loads no more than 75min.
While the requirement had called for the ability of the aircraft to be ‘weatherproof and remain serviceable with only the minimum of routine attention for thirty days in the open’, it was soon obvious that the sheer complexity of the many onboard systems would make this a challenge unlikely to be met. One possible solution was the provision of temporary hangars, and with that in mind P. Frankenstein & Sons teamed up with Handley Page to create the FHP Air-Portable Hangar, an impressive affair capable of being transported by the RAF’s then-current transport types (such as the Argosy) and erected within hours at a dispersed site. This was large enough to accommodate up to three TSR2s for storage, or partly accommodate two with room enough for groundcrew to carry out basic servicing. With its fabric doors closed, the hangar was designed to be able to withstand winds of
up to 75kt (85mph; 140km/h) and substantial structural loading including a hefty deposit of snow.
The Frankenstein/Handley Page Air-Portable Hangar would have been a near-necessity for dispersed TSR2 operations. BAE Systems
Centralized servicing
Initially, RAF Marham was suggested as the servicing base for the TSR2 force, but when the plans for the first reconnaissance squadron changed and they were scheduled to be based at Marham, Wyton became the first choice for servicing base. Like Marham, it was large enough to handle a significant number of airframes and the various requirements in terms of new buildings and taxyways.
Other bases
Basic parameters for acceptable airfields were set out:
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Runway length of 8,000ft (2,440m) or more required for normal basing, with permanent arrester installation
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Runway length of 6,000ft (1,830m) or more for exercises, with portable arrester gear
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Runway length of 2,400ft (730m) or more for operational use when required
The primary reasoning behind such large runways for an aircraft design for STOL performance was the single-engine-failure safety case. An engine failure on take-off, in the short-take-off configuration would leave the aircraft unable to climb away, so it would be normal peacetime practice to use less take-off flap and extend the takeoff run, enabling a faster climb-out and reducing the risk of a crash if an engine was to be lost at a critical moment. Similarly, at normal approach speeds and flap settings, as would be used for a short landing run, a single engine failure would result in the aircraft failing to maintain height against the drag of the flaps, and thus a lower flap, or zero flap, setting would be required. In the case of a fully loaded aircraft this would increase landing distance to above 7,000ft (2,130m). Wet conditions, or high crosswinds causing reduced brake parachute use, could well extend the landing run to above 9,000ft (2,740m).
As well as stations already mentioned, Akrotiri in Cyprus and Tengah in Singapore were both of suitable size to cater for regular TSR2 operations, and were at one point or another earmarked as TSR2 bases. A list of possible Master Diversion Bases was also put together; these were airfields large enough to accept TSR2 diversions and situated close to normal training areas or TSR2 bases. Each would be equipped with suitable barrier or arrester gear. The list included Leuchars and Waddington.
Overseas training
Low-flying training has always involved a certain amount of nuisance to those who live under the flight paths, and the amount of noise expected to be generated by the TSR2 was thought to preclude any possibility of significant low-level training being carried out in the UK, or even in Germany, where, since the end of the War, there had been a casual disregard of the population’s wishes or opinions on aircraft noise.
With the UK and Europe mostly out of the picture for low-level flying, the hunt was on for alternative parts of the world, and these boiled down to a number of possibilities including Australia, Libya and Canada. With the Australian’s decision to buy the TFX, plans to use Australian ranges for TSR2 training evaporated also, and the political situation in Libya looked increasingly likely to preclude any reliable basing there in the future. Hal Far in Malta became the favoured choice for a base for Near East training (the actual low-level flying was to be carried in Libya or Turkey if circumstances permitted), with RAF Goose Bay in Canada the primary alternative, offering terrain similar to that of Eastern Europe. To avoid the expense of setting up bombing ranges overseas, training with practice and live weapons would be carried out on existing UK ranges.
Compatibility with the Victor tanker force was investigated early in the project, and this diagram from Handley Page, showing refuelling positions, was drawn up even before the TSR2’s final configuration was decided upon. In-flight refuelling was initially considered only in relation to ferrying operations, such as transits to overseas training areas. BAE Systems
Colour schemes
In 1963 overall white anti-flash was the colour scheme in vogue for the RAF’s nuclear bomber force. The effects of nuclear weapons were still being researched, and the initial fears had been that the thermal overload from a nearby nuclear flash would critically damage vulnerable portions of an aircraft, such as parts constructed from lighter gauge metal, like ailerons. The TSR2 was expected to be no different, with some fuselage panels made of lighter-gauge metal and wing and fin trailing edges made from a honeycomb sandwich that was also more vulnerable to high temperature doses. Accordingly, BAC intended to produce the TSR2 in an overall white finish with pale red and blue markings. Pale red was reserved for warning items, such as ejection-seat warning triangles, with pale blue for everything else.
The RAF was already uncomfortable with white for its new low-level strike aircraft, suggesting in February 1963 that light grey was a slightly better option that would retain some thermal protection while making the aircraft somewhat less conspicuous, if only while parked on an airfield, or operating at medium to high altitude. However, research later in 1963 found that the whole anti-flash philosophy had been something of a waste of paint. Three threat scenarios had been envisaged, from near misses by the following weapons:
1.
Attack by intercontinental ballistic missile while parked or scrambling.
2.
Attack by nuclear-tipped SAM while airborne.
3.
Reflected flash from the aircraft’s own weapons delivered in a lay-down attack under the worst possible conditions of reflectivity (such as snow-covered ground and cloud cover).
In the first two cases it was clear that anti-flash paint was only going to help if the weapons in question had missed by quite some margin, but it had not been realized that the safe distance at which thermal overload could be dealt with by white paint was still within the significant overpressure zone created by the blast. In simple terms, the blast was either going to get you or not, and if it did not, the thermal pulse from the flash was not going to be that significant. This meant that paint with far less reflectivity, namely camouflage, could safely be applied. This led to the introduction of camouflage to the V-force bombers, and the question of camouflage for the TSR2 force was then also raised.
Discussions in mid-1964 revolved around applying a similar scheme to that for the V-bomber force: a topside mix of Dark Green and Medium Sea Grey, with undersides remaining anti-flash white. In the case of the underside, thermal protection against nuclear flash was still judged to be more important than any attempt to hide a low-flying aircraft from ground observers. The flash of white that would be visible to an airborne fighter pilot looking towards a turning TSR2 was not considered. (Indeed, it took until the mid-1970s for light undersides to be replaced by wraparound camouflage on other types, such as the Buccaneer.) Overall Dark Green was briefly favoured, despite being of little use to hide an aircraft parked on the ground.
The all-white colour scheme was an anti-flash paint job applied to minimize the thermal dose received by the airframe in the event of a nearby nuclear detonation. By 1964 camouflage was in favour, and the TSR2 would not have worn the anti-flash scheme in RAF service. Damien Burke
The consensus of opinion by July 1964 was that existing NATO-standard documents on bomber camouflage would be suitable, and in September 1964 BAC was instructed to apply one of the NATO standard colour schemes from NATO STANAG 3085. This was scheme 1a; topsides in Dark Green and Dark Sea Grey with undersides in Silver, all colours being applied with a high-speed (semi-gloss) finish. BAC was not wildly impressed with this directive, as many of the airframe skin thicknesses had been defined by the thermal parameters they were expected to experience, including nuclear flash. A change of paint finish to darker hues would increase the thermal dose, which was of particular concern in the area of the forward fuel tank, which was integral with the outer skin of the forward fuselage. The company’s initial suggestion was to apply camouflage to only two aircraft, from either the development batch or pre-product
ion batch, to assess the paint’s performance. While the RAF wanted camouflage applied immediately, and certainly no later than then tenth (first pre-production) aircraft, BAC could not oblige, as production was too far advanced.
At a meeting on 9 October the new external paint finish requirements were discussed. The undersurface colour of silver was not available in the new acrylic paints that were to be used, and it was accepted that pale grey or white might have to do instead. Some concessions had been granted to BAC to avoid the use of certain standard markings, such as yellow-and-black RESCUE arrows, on the white-painted airframes, but these concessions would not have applied to camouflaged aircraft, which would have been expected to conform to all of the RAF’s standards of the time.
A preliminary camouflage scheme layout for the aircraft, which included a white underside, was drawn up by BAC in November 1964. (It was an unusual scheme that the RAF would have been unlikely to accept, owing to the high fuselage demarcation line.) As all electrical transparencies on the aircraft were manufactured in a white finish and had to be left unpainted, and many components had already been painted white, this would simplify the application of camouflage to the pre-production airframes, as fewer items would have needed to be stripped and repainted. Cancellation came before any camouflage paint was ever applied to a TSR2 airframe.
A pre-production airframe in the BAC camouflage colour scheme drawn up in November 1964. The radome, fin tip and wing panels were dielectric areas manufactured in a white finish; BAC was keen to save money by using already-manufactured items, but they would not have been acceptable to the RAF in these colours and have thus been depicted in black instead. Ronnie Olsthoorn