The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes]

by Kia, Mehrdad;

  The expansion of Ottoman rule into southern Bulgaria and Macedonia alarmed Serbia, which had conceived of carving out a Serbo-Greek empire. In their first major military campaign against Serbia, the Ottomans defeated a Serbian army at Chernomen on the bank of the river Maritsa, on September 26–27, 1371, bringing Bulgaria, Macedonia, and southern Serbia under their control. Sofia was then occupied in 1385, followed by Nish in 1386 and Thessaloniki (Salonika) in 1387 (Jelavich: 31). Despite these setbacks, the Serbs continued their efforts to establish a united Christian front against the Ottoman state. Initially these efforts were viewed by other rulers in the region as an attempt to impose Serbian hegemony. However, the successful Ottoman military campaign against northern Greece and the conquest of Bulgaria convinced the Christian states of southeast Europe that the time had arrived for a concerted effort to block further Ottoman expansion (Sugar: 21). Prince Lazar of Serbia, King Tvrto of Bosnia, and John Stratsimir of Vidin agreed to join a Christian alliance, which defeated an Ottoman army in August 1388 (Sugar: 21).

  Recognizing the threat posed by the alliance, Murad rushed back from Anatolia, where he had defeated the Turkoman principalities of Germiyan, Hamid, and Karaman, forcing them to accept Ottoman suzerainty (Inalcik: 14–15). The sultan now marched his forces to southern Serbia. The decisive battle took place on June 15, 1389, at the Kosovo Polje (Field of the Blackbirds) near Pristina, the present-day capital of Kosovo. Murad I and Prince Lazar were killed on the battlefield, but the Ottomans managed to pull a victory out of the jaws of defeat. The devastating defeat forced Serbia to accept Ottoman suzerainty. Many centuries later, the memory of the battle of Kosovo Polje was celebrated by Serbian nationalists as the last desperate, heroic attempt to save the independence of Serbia and the rest of Orthodox Christian Europe. Murad was succeeded by his son, Bayezid I (1389–1402).

  See also: Battles and Treaties: Kosovo, Battle of; Sultans: Bayezid I; Orhan Gāzi

  Further Reading

  Alderson, A. D. The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.

  Finkel, Caroline. Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2005.

  Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

  Inalcik, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600. Translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

  Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Vol 1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

  McCarthy, Justin. The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923. London and New York: Wesley Longman Limited, 1997.

  Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

  Somel, Selçuk Akșin. Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003.

  Sugar, Peter. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1805. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

  Murad II (1404–1451)

  An Ottoman sultan who ruled from 1421 to 1444, and again from 1446 to 1451. He was born in Amasya in northern Anatolia in June 1404. His father was the Ottoman sultan Mehmed I, who ruled from 1413 to 1421. After the death of Mehmed in 1421, Murad II ascended the throne. The new sultan was a man of science and learning who preferred poetry and mysticism to politics and warfare. He abdicated in favor of his son, Mehmed II, in 1444, but was forced to return to the throne in 1446 after his grand vizier, Çandarli Halil (Chandarli Halil), pleaded with him to assume the reins of power.

  During the first three years of his reign, Murad focused his efforts on eliminating the threat posed by the return of False Mustafa, who took the city of Edirne with support from the Byzantine state (McCarthy: 59). Mustafa, who claimed to be the lost son of Sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402), raised an army against Murad II. Murad II attacked and defeated Mustafa at Lake Uluabat near Bursa in January 1422. Panicked by the defeat, Mustafa escaped, but he was captured and killed in Edirne. The elimination of False Mustafa allowed Murad to attack the Byzantine state, which had supported Mustafa (Inalcik: 19). His siege of Constantinople, however, allowed the Turkoman principalities in Anatolia to revolt, encouraging the sultan’s younger brother, Mustafa, to revolt and attack Bursa (Inalcik: 19). Murad was forced to raise the siege of the Byzantine capital and lead his troops against the Turkoman principalities in Anatolia, which were suppressed (Inalcik: 19). Although Menteşe (Menteshe) and Teke were recaptured in 1425, the sultan could not annex Karaman and Candar (Jandar). The Ottomans feared that an invasion of Karaman would be used as a justification by Shahrokh, the Timurid ruler of Iran, to invade Anatolia (Shaw: 1:45). They could not have forgotten the bitter defeat of Bayezid at the battle of Ankara in 1402 and were determined not to commit the mistake of providing an excuse for a son of Timur to invade Ottoman territory.

  Portrait of the Ottoman sultan Murad II (r. 1421–1444; 1446–1451). (DeAgostini/Getty Images)

  The Ottomans confronted two principal obstacles in their attempt to establish total hegemony in southeast Europe. On land, Hungary possessed the political and military power to organize a unified Christian resistance against Ottoman domination. At sea, the power capable of creating serious obstacles to Ottoman hegemony was Venice, which had seized Salonika from the Byzantine state in summer 1423 (Inalcik: 19). The Venetians were determined to maintain their hegemony over the trade and commerce of the Aegean and at the same time prevent the establishment of Ottoman control in Macedonia and Albania (Shaw: 1:47). Thus, war between the two powers became inevitable. The Ottoman-Venetian war continued until 1430, when Ottoman forces captured Salonika (Shaw: 1:48; Inalcik: 19).

  In their attempt to prevent the Ottoman Empire from establishing its control over southeast Europe, it was crucial for Hungarians to maintain their influence over Serbia, Transylvania, and Wallachia, which served as buffers against Ottoman expansionism. Throughout Murad’s reign, the Ottomans fought to establish and preserve the sultan’s suzerainty over Serbia and use it as a territorial base to carry out raids against Hungary. In response, the Hungarians pressured Serbia and Wallachia to throw off Ottoman vassalage and join an anti-Ottoman Christian alliance under their leadership. Serbia and Wallachia tried to maintain their independence by playing one power against the other. When Ottoman armies were fighting in distant Anatolia, Serbia and Wallachia carried out raids across the Danube with the encouragement and support of Hungary, but when the sultan returned to southeastern Europe and carried out raids against their territory, as Murad did in 1424, they retreated and eventually accepted Ottoman suzerainty in return for a promise that the raids against their territory would be stopped (Shaw: 1:47). This game of cat and mouse continued until 1427, when Djordje (George) Branković emerged as the ruler of Serbia. A year later the king of Hungary and the Ottoman sultan agreed to sign a peace treaty, recognizing Branković as the prince of Serbia. For the next three years Serbia acted as a buffer between the Hungarians and the Ottomans (Inalcik: 19). With the termination of the treaty in 1431, however, the conflict resumed. Murad II returned to the policy of attacking Hungary, while the Hungarians tried to use their influence in Bosnia, Serbia, and Wallachia to organize an anti-Ottoman coalition.

  The Ottomans could not respond immediately to the situation in the Balkans. Anatolia had been invaded by the armies of the Timurid monarch Shahrokh, the ruler of Iran, in 1435. By reassuring the Timurid monarch that he did not intend to undermine and destroy the independence of the principality of Karaman and by supporting Shahrokh against the Mamluks of Egypt, Murad avoided open warfare and expanded Ottoman power and influence in Anatolia. With the Timurid threat neutralized, Murad turned his attention to southeast Europe, where the death of the Hungarian monarch Sigismund in 1437 had resulted in internal anarchy and chaos. That confusion allowed the Ottoman forces to carry out attacks against Bosnia, Serbia, and Transylvania from 1438 to 1439, capturing the fortres
ses of Semendria, which had been built by the Serbian king George Branković, and forcing the Serbs and the Bosnians to pay annual tribute to the Ottoman sultan. A year later Murad attacked Belgrade but failed to capture it (Sugar: 28–29).

  The Hungarian reaction to the Ottoman raids was swift. The new king of Poland and Hungary, Vladislav (Ladislas), appointed János (John) Hunyadi governor of Transylvania. Under the leadership of the new governor, the Hungarian forces scored several impressive victories against the Ottoman armies in 1441 and 1442, “killing tens of thousands of Ottoman soldiers at the battles of Hermanstadt and Vazag (Jalomitcha)” (McCarthy: 60–61). They recaptured the fortress of Semendria and pushed the Ottoman forces out of Transylvania, reviving the hope of Christian Europe that it was still possible to confront the Ottoman threat. With support from King Vladislav and George Branković and the participation of crusaders who had been mobilized from various European countries, Hunyadi pushed through the Ottoman defenses in southern Serbia and captured the town of Nish. He also encouraged the Albanian leader Skanderbeg to revolt against Ottoman authority and join the Christian crusade. With momentum on his side and the main Ottoman army bogged down in a campaign in Anatolia, Hunyadi led his forces through the Balkan Mountains, entering western Bulgaria in 1443 (McCarthy: 61).

  With encouragement from his grand vizier and his Serbian wife, Mora, Murad began to negotiate for a cessation of hostilities (Shaw: 1:52). The Treaty of Edirne, signed with Hungary and its allies on June 12, 1444, can be viewed as an attempt by the Ottomans to buy time and neutralize the formidable alliance organized against them. Hunyadi demanded and received the promise that Ottoman forces would return to Anatolia (Shaw: 1:52). The Ottomans maintained their rule over Bulgaria (Shaw: 1:52). The true winner, however, was George Branković, who restored the autonomy of the Serbian state (Shaw: 1:52). Back in Anatolia in the summer of 1444, Murad signed the Treaty of Yenișehir (Yenishehir) with Karaman, ceding some of the territory of Hamid that he had occupied (Inalcik: 20). The sultan then abdicated in favor of his 12-year-old son, Mehmed II (Shaw: 1:52).

  Murad’s abdication caused “a power struggle” within the Ottoman government between the grand vizier, Çandarli (Chandarli) Halil, and the new sultan’s personal tutor, Zaganos, and the beylerbey of Rumeli, Şihabeddin (Shihabeddin) (Inalcik: 20). A new campaign was being organized and led by Hungary. The Hungarians enjoyed the support of the pope, the Byzantine emperor, Venice, and Skanderbeg in Albania (Sugar: 29). Alarmed by the prospect of another attack by Hunyadi, the factions within the government decided to appeal to Murad to assume the command of the Ottoman army. The Christian army, organized in Buda under the leadership of the king of Hungary and Poland, pushed south toward Bulgaria. Despite early successes, however, the Christian army suffered a devastating defeat at Varna on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast on November 10, 1444. King Vladislav was killed on the battlefield (Shaw: 1:53). The last concerted effort to halt the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans had failed, and the Ottoman Empire regained the prestige and power lost to Hunyadi. The Ottoman victory at Varna sealed the fate of the Byzantine state (Sugar: 29; Inalcik: 21). Less than 10 years after Varna, the Ottomans would sack Constantinople.

  Following his victory at Varna, Murad withdrew from politics again, but his retirement lasted only two years. Soon the internal conflict within the Ottoman government erupted again. The grand vizier, Çandarli Halil, defended Murad’s policy of peace with the Christian states, while the advisers of the young Mehmed, Zaganos and Şihabeddin, blamed the Byzantine state for organizing the anti-Ottoman alliance and advocated a “final assault” on Constantinople (Inalcik: 20–21). An uprising by the janissaries organized by the wily Çandarli Halil forced Mehmed to abdicate in favor of his father, who ascended the throne for a second time. Once on the throne, Murad carried out a series of aggressive campaigns against former vassals (Inalcik: 21). The sultan was clearly convinced that some, if not all, of the southeastern European provinces had to be brought under the direct rule of the Ottoman state. Thus, after forcing the Byzantine ruler of the Morea to accept Ottoman suzerainty, Murad began to impose direct rule in much of mainland Greece (Shaw: 1:53). The same policy was applied to Bulgaria, where local princes who had betrayed their allegiance to the sultan were dismissed and replaced by Ottoman administrators (Shaw: 1:53). When the Hungarians, led by Hunyadi, attacked Ottoman territory again, Murad inflicted another devastating defeat on their army, at the second battle of Kosovo in October 1448. With Ottoman rule firmly established south of the Danube, Murad sent his forces to Wallachia in 1449, punishing the country for lending its support to Hunyadi and forcing it to accept Ottoman suzerainty (Shaw: 1:54). He also attacked Skanderbeg in Albania in 1550. By the time Murad died in February 1451, he had re-established Ottoman rule within the territory controlled by Bayezid before his defeat at the hands of Timur in 1402.

  See also: Sultans: Mehmed I; Mehmed II

  Further Reading

  Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

  Inalcik, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600. Translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

  McCarthy, Justin. The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923. London and New York: Wesley Longman Limited, 1997.

  Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

  Somel, Selçuk Akșin. Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003.

  Sugar, Peter. Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1805. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

  Tursun Beg. The History of Mehmed the Conqueror. Translated by Halil Inalcik and Murphey Rhoads. Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1978.

  Murad III (1546–1595)

  A sultan of the Ottoman Empire who ruled from 1574 to 1595. Upon the death of Selim II (r. 1566–1574) in 1574, his oldest son, Murad III, ascended the Ottoman throne and immediately ordered the execution of his five brothers (Shaw: 1:179). The new sultan had a voracious sexual appetite. During his 21-year reign, he enjoyed the company of numerous concubines, who gave birth to more than 100 children (Shaw: 1:179). The presence of so many children and their mothers intensified harem jealousies, rivalries, and intrigues. The most powerful faction, led by Nur Banu Sultan, the mother of the sultan, was opposed by a second faction, led by Safiye Sultan, the wife of the sultan. The first faction was allied to the powerful grand vizier, Sokullu Mehmed, and his wife Esmahan (Ismahan) Sultan, the daughter of Selim II and a sister of Murad III. Sokullu Mehmed had served Selim II as grand vizier and continued to hold his position under the new sultan until his assassination in 1579. The second faction was closely allied with the pro-Venetian ministers and officials, who despised Sokullu Mehmed and his enormous influence. Aside from personal jealousies and rivalries, one of the most important reasons for the conflict between the two factions was their approach to foreign policy. Sokullu Mehmed seems to have favored a more peaceful and diplomatic approach to resolving the political, economic, and territorial disputes between the Ottoman Empire and its powerful neighbors to the east and the west, while his opponents advocated a more aggressive and confrontational attitude, which aimed at attacking and intimidating the Safavid dynasty in Iran and the Habsburgs in Central Europe.

  Ottoman sultan Murad III (r. 1574–1595). (Los Angeles County Museum of Art)

  Sokullu Mehmed was triumphant in the early years of Murad’s reign, renewing peace treaties with Venice (1575), the Habsburgs (1577), and Poland (1577). Farther west in North Africa, the Ottomans attacked Fez in present-day Morocco, capturing it in 1578. The establishment of Ottoman rule in Morocco was aimed at countering Spanish and Portuguese designs on the region and served as a warning that the sultan controlled a territorial base from which he could launch an attack on Spain. To counter the Spanish, Venetian, and French monopoly over the commerce and trade of the
Mediterranean Sea, the Ottomans established a close relationship with England, negotiating a trade agreement in 1580 and offering commercial privileges that until then had been reserved for Venice and France (Shaw: 1:181–182). English traders and merchants were granted the right to conduct business in the Ottoman territory without intervention from Ottoman authorities. (Shaw: 1: 182)

  Despite his successes in international diplomacy, Sokullu Mehmed failed to silence those factions within the royal harem who opposed him and encouraged the sultan to adopt a more aggressive policy toward Iran. In the end, the war party outmaneuvered Sokullu Mehmed. With the death of Shah Tahmasp in 1576 and the accession of Ismail II to the Iranian throne, the Safavid state entered a period of decline and internecine conflict within the ruling family. Recognizing the weakness and vulnerability of the Safavid state, the war party began to advocate a massive invasion of Iran with the aim of regaining the territory that had been conquered during the reign of Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566). Aside from allowing the Ottomans to amass booty and increase the revenue of the central government, the conquest of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus enabled the Ottoman Empire to establish direct political, military, and commercial contact with the Uzbeks, who viewed the Shia Safavids as the principal threat to their domination of Central Asia.