The Ottoman Empire: a Historical Encyclopedia [2 Volumes]

by Kia, Mehrdad;

  17. BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917)

  The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was an official letter sent by Britain’s foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, to Lionel Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild, a leader of the British Zionist Federation, stating that the British government viewed with favor the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

  The Balfour Declaration was the result of the tireless efforts of Zionist leaders, particularly Chaim Weizmann. Though the Balfour Declaration committed the British government to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, it also stipulated that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” The “non-Jewish communities in Palestine” referred to the Arabic-speaking population of the country. The statement did not, however, explain how the British government planned to protect the rights of the Arab Palestinians, who at the time constituted the majority of the population of Palestine.

  Foreign Office

  November 2nd, 1917

  Dear Lord Rothschild

  I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

  “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

  I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

  Yours sincerely,

  ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

  Source: “The Balfour Declaration,” Times (London), November 9, 1917, 1.

  18. THREE CURRENTS OF THOUGHT BY ZIYA GÖKALP

  Ziya Gökalp was one of the most influential Turkish intellectuals of the late 20th century. He was a thinker, writer, teacher, and scholar who devoted much of his life and writings to the study of the impact of Western civilization on Islam and Turkish national identity. Born in 1876 in Diyarbakir in southeastern Anatolia into a mixed Turkish and Kurdish family, Gökalp joined the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) at a young age. He was arrested because of his political activities and sent back to Diyarbakir. When the CUP seized power in 1908, Gökalp emerged as one of its ideological leaders and was elected to the Ottoman parliament in 1912. He also began to teach sociology at the Darülfünun (The House of Sciences/University) and published in several intellectual newspapers and journals.

  Gökalp’s works were greatly influenced by the historical conditions of the late Ottoman period and the early stages of the nationalist movement. Gökalp witnessed the decline and the disintegration of the empire and the rise of a secular republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Distinguishing culture from civilization, Gökalp maintained that culture incorporated the national characteristics of a nation, whereas civilization belonged to humanity and was therefore an international phenomenon.

  Through his writings Gökalp advocated the idea of Turks abandoning Eastern civilization and adopting Western civilization while preserving their Turkish national identity and culture. He believed in secularism, democracy, Westernism, women’s emancipation, and political as well as economic independence for his country, the very principles that were adopted as the ideological foundation of the reforms implemented by Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.

  In our country there are three currents of thought. When we study their history we see that in the beginning our thinkers realized the need for modernization. The current of thought in that direction, which originated during the reign of Selim III (r. 1789–1807), was followed later by another—the movement towards Islamization. The third, the movement of Turkism, has come forth only recently.

  Because the idea of modernization has always been a main theme, it has no particular exponent. Every journal of paper has been an exponent of it in one way or another. Of the doctrine of Islamization, the chief organ is Sirat-i Müstakim ([later] Sebil-ür Reşat); and of the school of Turkism, Türk Yurdu. We can easily see that all of these trends have been the expression of certain real needs.

  Gabriel Tarde tells us that the idea of nationalism has been the product of the newspaper, and gives the following explanation; the newspaper has given a common consciousness to those who speak the same language by uniting them into a “public.” In addition to this influence, which has been made rather unconsciously and unwillingly, the newspaper which has spurred the feelings of honour and sacrifice in the masses, merely to increase its circulation, has consequently aroused a consciousness of national traditions and of cherished ideals. The sentiment of nationality once it arises amongst the masses spreads easily over neighbouring peoples. Once awakened, it leads to revivals in moral life, in language, in literature, and in economic and political life by reinforcing the feelings of solidarity, sacrifice, and struggle among its supporters. Naturally the idea of nationality spreads quickly when emulated by neighbouring peoples, especially if they also have the press appealing to the masses in the vernacular.

  The ideal of nationalism appeared [in the Ottoman Empire] first among the non-Muslims, then among the Albanians and Arabs, and finally among the Turks. The fact that it appeared last among the Turks was not accidental: the Ottoman state was formed by the Turks themselves. The state is a nation already established (nation de fait), whereas the ideal of nationalism meant the nucleus of a nationality based on will (nation de volonté). With intuitive cautiousness, the Turks were reluctant, in the beginning, to endanger a reality for the sake of an ideal. Thus, Turkish thinkers believed not in Turkism but in Ottomanism.

  When the movement of modernization started, the supporters of the Tanzimat reforms believed that it would be possible to create a nation based on will out of an existing “nation” composed of several nationalities and religions, and they thus attempted to give a new meaning, devoid of any colour of nationality, to the older term “Ottoman,” which had a certain historical meaning. Painful experiences proved that this new meaning of “Ottoman” had been welcomed by no one save the originators of the term. Inventing this new conception was not only useless but also detrimental, for it gave rise to beautiful consequences for the state and the nationalities—and especially for the Turks themselves.

  Today the West as well as the East shows unmistakably that our age is the Age of Nations. The most powerful force over the mind of this age is the ideal of nationalism. States, which have to govern on the basis of national consciousness, are doomed to failure if they ignore the existence of this important social factor. If our statesmen and party leaders do not hold this ideal, they cannot establish a spiritual leadership over the communities and the peoples constituting the Ottoman state. The experiences of the last four years have shown that the Turks who, in order to maintain understanding between the nationalities [under the Ottoman rule], denied Turkism and proclaimed Ottomanism have, at last, realized bitterly what kind of a conciliation the nationalities would accept. A people moved by the sentiment of nationality can be ruled only by men who have the idea of nationalism in themselves.

  The Turks’ avoidance of the idea of nationalism was not only harmful for the state and irritating to the diverse nationalities, but it was fatal for the Turks themselves. When the Turks identified the nation and the state with the already existing nation and state, they failed to see that their social and economic existence was deteriorating. When economic and social ascendancy passed into the hands of the [non-Muslim] communities, the Turks did not realized that they were losing everything. They believed that they were the only class constituting the Ottoman nation, and did not pay attention to the fact that they were excluded from certain classes, especially from those that constituted the most important strata o
f their age. They were not bothered by seeing the existence of economic and occupational classes of which they were not a part, from which they were excluded. As a consequence, they ceased to constitute the masses of people even in Anatolia. They were merely government officials and farmers. Farmers and animal breeders live only on the creative powers of nature, and are not themselves creative powers. Government officials also are not actively productive. The growth and development of the mental faculties, of will and character, are the products of active occupations as in industry and manufacturing, and of practice acts like trade and the liberal professions. It is because of this that it is almost impossible to create a national organization out of a people composed solely of farmers and civil servants. Our incompetence in administration, our difficulties in strategy and logistics, which led to the Balkan disaster, are all due to this state of affairs. The non-existence of efficient government in our country is mainly due to the non-existence of economic [commercial and industrial] classes among the Turks. Wherever the government is based on economic classes, there an efficient government exists. Business men, artisans, and traders want an efficient government for their own interests. Wherever the government is based on the class of state functionaries, it is always inefficient because those who are dismissed from government service always have their eye on government jobs, and those who are in the administration always have an eye on higher posts, and both are for ever discontent with the existing government.

  As the non-existence of the ideal of nationalism among the Turks resulted in the lack of any national economy, so the same factor has been an obstacle to the development of a national language and to the appearance of national patterns in fine arts. And, again, because the ideal of nationalism was not present, Turkish morality remained only a personal and familial morality. The notions of solidarity, patriotism, and heroism did not transcend the confines of the family, the village, and the town. As the ideal of ümmet [religion] was too large and the ideal of the family too narrow, the Turkish soul remained a stranger to the sort of life and to the intensive moral feelings that should be the bases of sacrifice and altruism. The disintegration seen in our economic, religious, and political institutions is the consequence of this state of affairs.

  Turkish nationalism is not contrary to the interests of the Ottoman state; in fact, it is its most important support. As in all young movements, there are some extremists among those who uphold Turkish nationalism, mainly among a portion of the youth, who have caused certain misunderstandings to arise. In fact, Turkism is the real support of Islam and of the Ottoman state, and is against cosmopolitanism.

  Tarde had also shown that the idea of internationalism is a product of the book. Since the newspaper appeals to the sentiments of the masses, it uses the vernacular, the living language. Books, on the other hand, appeal to the abstract thinking of the scholar and the scientist, and are dependent upon neologisms rather than the living word. Scientific and philosophical terms, as a rule, do not grow out of the vernacular of the people, which is natural and living, but are artificial constructs, lifeless words. The natural words of the vernacular carry vital and emotional meanings, and as such are not suited to abstract and conceptual usage. For this reason, every nation has borrowed its neologisms from its religious language. European nations have derived their scientific terminology from the Greek in which the Gospels were written and, as Latin became auxiliary to Greek in the Church, the Germanic and Slavonic languages also inherited much from the Latin. Islamic peoples derived their neologisms mainly from Arabic and, secondarily, from Persian. Even today, when we translate contemporary scientific works [of the West] into our language, we coin Arabic and Persian words for the Greek and Latin terms [therein]. The earliest books were the Scriptures. As ethics, law, literature, science, and philosophy were developed out of religion as separate branches, books began to be written about them as well.

  It follows, then, that as the newspaper helped the rise of the ideal of nationalism by expressing the social and local sentiments of the masses in a colorful way, so the book has been instrumental in the creation of the idea of internationalism, or those aspects of life commonly shared by various nations, by formulating, in an abstract and exact style, the principles, rules, and formulae of civilization whose foundation of knowledge and science originated in religion.

  It is not true that the sentiment of internationalism prevailed among men during the earlier stages of history. It is true, however, that there was a sentiment of internationalism during the European Middle Ages. But if we analyze this sentiment, we see that the international love and solidarity of that period was confined only to Christian peoples, and international law likewise pertained only to the rights of the Christian states. The Balkan wars demonstrated to us that even today the European conscience is nothing but a Christian conscience. If we analyze the conscience of the Turk, we shall see that he agrees, for instance, to wed his daughter to an Arab, to an Albanian, to a Kurd, or to a Circassian, but not to a Finn or to a Hungarian. He will not wed her to a Buddhist Mongolian or a Shammanist Tunguz unless he embraces Islam. During the Tripolitanian and Balkan war, those who shared the grief of the Turks and gave freely of their moral support were not Hungarians, Mongols, or Manchurians, but Muslims of China, of India, of Java, and of the Sudan, whose names we do not even know. It is because of this that the Turks regard themselves as one of the Muslim nations, although they belong to the Ural-Altai group from the linguistic point of view.

  Anthropologically, human beings of the same anatomical types constitute a race, but sociologically the nations that belong to the same civilization constitute an “internationality.” When the Turks, as an ethnic people, joined Islamic civilization, the Turkish language assumed an Islamic character with the introduction of the Arab script and terms.

  Thus, the factor that creates the spirit of internationality, and hence civilization, is the book. Consequently, there is no incompatibility between Turkish nationalism and Islam, since one is nationality and the other is internationality. When Turkish thinkers entertained the idea of Ottoman nationality composed of different religious communities, they did not feel the necessity of Islamization, but as soon as the ideal of Turkism arose, the need for Islamization made itself felt.

  However, as nationality is the creation of the newspaper and internationality the creation of the book, modernity is the product of technology. Those peoples are “contemporary” who make and use all those machines made and used by the peoples most advanced in the techniques of the age. For us today modernization [being contemporary with modern civilization] means to make and use the battleships, cars, and aeroplanes that the Europeans are making and using. But this does not mean being like them only in form and in living. When we see ourselves no longer in need of importing manufactured goods and buying knowledge from Europe, then we can speak of being contemporary with it.

  As there is no contradiction between the ideals of Turkism and Islamism, there is none between these and the ideal of modernism. The idea of modernity necessitates only the acceptance of the theoretical and practical sciences and techniques from Europe. There are certain moral needs which will be sought in religion and nationality, as there were in Europe, but these cannot be imported from the West as if they were machines and techniques.

  It seems, therefore, that we should accept the three ideals at the same time by determining the respective fields of operation of each. To put it in a better way, we have to create “an up-to-date Muslim Turkism,” realizing that each of the three ideals is an aspect of the same need taken from a different angle.

  Contemporary civilization, which has been coming into existence for some time through the development of modern machines and techniques, is in the process of creating a new internationality. A true internationality based on science is taking the place of the internationality based on religion. The participation of Japan, on the one hand, and of Turkey, on the other, in Western civilization is giving a secular character to European int
ernationality, as we shall show later; and thus the area of the ümmet is differentiating itself from the area of internationality increasingly.

  In short, the Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic ümmet, and to Western internationality.

  Source: Ziya Gölkalp, “Üç Cereyan” [Three Currents of Thought], Türk Yurdu 3, no. 35 (1913). Reprinted in Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, trans. Niyazi Berkes (New York: Columbia University Press; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), 71–76. Reprinted with permission of Columbia University Press.

  19. CHARSHEES, BEDESTANS, AND BAZAARS

  Every major urban center in the Ottoman Empire had a large covered bazaar, called suq in Arabic and çārşi (chārshi) in Turkish. The bazaars were centers for producing and selling goods that were consumed by ordinary people. The market constituted an important public space in every Ottoman city. Markets served as the center for the people’s social and economic life. The majority of large urban markets also contained an inner market, known as bedestān, where the most precious goods were kept.

  The large covered markets were usually surrounded by wide streets, gardens, and running springs on all sides. The covered bazaar of Istanbul (kāpāli çārşisi), located in the center of the old city, was one of the largest markets of its kind in the world (Freely: 356), a “city within a city, containing arcaded streets, numerous lanes and alleys, squares and fountains, all enclosed within high protecting walls, and covered by a vaulted roof studded with hundreds of cupolas, through which penetrated a subdued light” (Garnett 163–164). One 19th-century European visitor, Julia Pardoe, explained that the covered bazaar was “composed of a cluster of streets, of such extent and number as to resemble a small covered town, the roof being supported by arches of solid masonry,” with “a narrow gallery, slightly fenced by a wooden rail,” occasionally connecting “these arches” (Pardoe: 30).