Tragedy at Dieppe

by Mark Zuehlke

  Mountbatten considered the idea “a brainwave, so unusual and daring that I decided nothing should be put on paper.”18 If the Germans suspected that Rutter was being restaged, it would meet with disaster. His next task was to sell the idea to the Chiefs of Staff and Prime Minister Churchill.

  Rutter’s cancellation had put Churchill in a bad position. The British had promised President Roosevelt and Stalin serious cross-channel raiding in 1942. Now the summer would pass with no such action. The Americans still hoped to force the British to launch Operation Sledgehammer. Stalin was sending cables bitterly complaining to Churchill of the failure to relieve any pressure from his front. Churchill wanted an attack somewhere. “Like a terrier momentarily released from the grip of a more powerful dog, his one idea was to fly back at the enemy’s throat,” General Alan Brooke noted. Churchill demanded that the Chiefs of Staff “consider yet another plan for invading Norway... and proposed that the operation should be entrusted to the Canadians.” Churchill thought perhaps Lieutenant General McNaughton, “with his more flexible and fertile brain... would find a way out when the Chiefs of Staff had failed.” To nip this notion in the bud, Brooke invited McNaughton to his office on July 9 to discuss the issue privately, as he “did not want him afterwards to imagine that we were suggesting the Canadians should undertake an operation which we considered impracticable.”19

  Mountbatten, meanwhile, pitched restaging Rutter to the Chiefs. “Candidly all were startled and at first argued against it on security grounds. I persuaded them that if they considered a reconnaissance in Force was still necessary in the summer of 1942 then there was absolutely no alternative target that could be got ready in time.”20

  Churchill was intrigued. “In discussion with Admiral Mountbatten,” he wrote, “it became clear that time did not permit a new large-scale operation to be mounted during the summer, but that Dieppe could be remounted... within a month, provided extraordinary steps were taken to ensure secrecy. For this reason no records were kept.”21

  Even as Mountbatten secured approval for Rutter’s rebirth, resistance was rising within the ranks. On July 9, Baillie-Grohman submitted a critique that he had written and Leigh-Mallory and Roberts had endorsed. In their planning, he asserted, Combined Operations staff had failed to conduct a proper military appreciation. Such appreciations identify an operation’s aim, factors either hindering or abetting achieving this aim, and detailed steps required to succeed. “This is not a criticism of the planners in any way,” Baillie-Grohman wrote, even as he itemized how Combined Operations had failed to produce appreciations specific to the needs of the army, navy, and air force components. This lack “made it far more difficult for us to get into the planning picture. There was... nothing to guide us on certain points.”

  Always a reluctant player, Baillie-Grohman felt that the absence of large-scale aerial or naval bombardment beforehand guaranteed failure.22 He had convinced the other two force commanders to seek a return to the planning board that accorded with military conventions. The memo sent Hughes-Hallett into a rage. The “preoccupation of the Admiral with the need for ‘appreciations’ and all that sort of rot,” he thundered, directly opposed how Combined Operations operated.23

  On July 11, Hughes-Hallett faced down the three force commanders at Richmond Terrace. Despite being junior, he seized the offensive—threatening Baillie-Grohman and Roberts with an official inquiry into the reasons for Rutter’s cancellation. Leigh-Mallory, who cared only to draw the Luftwaffe into a duel over Dieppe, staunchly supported his counterparts. But Hughes-Hallett was not to be drawn into this talk of appreciations.24

  Events snowballed. Baillie-Grohman, realizing his concerns would be ignored, requested a reposting. He was immediately invited by Admiral Bertram Ramsay to join his staff, which was engaged in preliminary planning for a large-scale invasion of the Continent. Baillie-Grohman went happily.25

  Roberts, meanwhile, remained torn. He wanted the operation re-examined according to accepted military doctrine. Yet he did not want the Canadians shouldered aside due to perceived lack of aggressive desire. With Baillie-Grohman gone, Leigh-Mallory stepped away from the squabble and let events unfold as they would. He either got his air duel with the Luftwaffe or not.

  After two days of consultation with his divisional staff, Roberts agreed to continue. Hughes-Hallett thought “he was [not only] quite prepared to undertake the operation... [but] in fact gave the impression of being anxious to do so.”26 Lieutenant Colonel Church Mann wrote later that Roberts and he concluded “the [British] Government [had] decided that it was necessary to carry out an operation at once and obviously the only operation which could be mounted on short notice was the raid on Dieppe.

  “It was therefore decided that this operation should again take place using the same troops and the same staffs, and that, since these troops were already completely trained and informed as to the particular tasks, it would not be necessary to assemble them beforehand but that they could be embarked together with their stores and equipment from their normal accommodation areas.

  “The most detailed arrangements would of course [be] required in order to embark the necessary stores in the right ships and craft and a large scale movement exercise [would need to be] arranged with five ports as ultimate destinations.” Despite this quartermaster’s nightmare, Mann was confident. It just required masterful staff work at divisional, brigade, battalion, and other involved unit levels to identify what was required, where it was currently stored, and how it could be moved to the correct vessels.27

  “I could have refused,” Roberts later said, “but it wouldn’t have done any good [as] somebody else would have taken it on.”28 Roberts also did not have authority to withdraw. He was first answerable to I Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant General Harry Crerar and then to First Canadian Army’s Lieutenant General Andrew McNaughton. Neither man would countenance the Canadians being cut out of a Dieppe raid.

  Mountbatten, meanwhile, fended off the recurring anxiety expressed by the Chiefs of Staff and Churchill over the security issue. Although the Luftwaffe had obviously detected the gathering of the ships and finally attacked them, he argued that there “was no suggestion that they knew... the actual mission of the force. And if by some unsuspected chance they had stumbled on Dieppe as our target, they would never for a moment think we should be so idiotic as to remount the operation on the same target.”29 This was Mountbatten at his silken best. The circular logic yielded the desired result. Because remounting the raid was a preposterous idea, the security issue could be set aside. Only someone exceedingly bold would take such an action. Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett were, of course, nothing if not bold.

  The new operation was wrapped in the tightest security. A very limited number of people were let in on the secret, and each was briefed only when their involvement became essential. Mountbatten told McNaughton on July 14 that just twenty people were privy to the rebirth. These included Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff—but not Brooke’s immediate subordinate, Lieutenant General Archibald Nye. McNaughton, Crerar, Church Mann, and the force commanders knew. At Combined Operations, only Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett were apprised. At South-Eastern Command, Montgomery and his personal representative to Combined Operations, Major Goronwy Rees, were aware. Leigh-Mallory and his immediate boss, Air Marshal Sholto Douglas, were the only RAF personnel informed. The newly arrived American commander in Britain, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was informed but sworn to strict secrecy. His inclusion was intended to assuage bruised American feelings over Sledgehammer’s cancellation.30 Not even Britain’s First Sea Lord Dudley Pound was briefed.31 Major Walter Skrine, who had played a pivotal role in analyzing the training for Operation Rutter, was also excluded from the need-to-know list.32

  This exceedingly tight security enabled Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett to cherry-pick who joined the debate over restaging the raid. Mountbatten was determined that there would
be no naysayers. When Montgomery learned the raid might be revived, he immediately wrote Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, General Bernard Paget to say that “if it was desirable to raid the Continent, then the objective should not be Dieppe.”33 Paget, who was privy to the discussion, set about easing Montgomery out of the command chain. Montgomery, who had already burned every paper in his office regarding Rutter, accepted his exclusion without complaint.34 McNaughton wrote Montgomery asking that Major Rees, “who had been a valuable member of the Planning Staff for ‘Rutter,’ might remain with the group to provide continuity in the intelligence work.” Montgomery replied: “Now that you have taken over responsibility, I suggest it is best that I should cut right clear; it is not suitable or desirable that I should have a representative in the party who reported direct to me on what was on... It might lead to trouble.”35

  On July 14, the new command structure began to take shape by way of a directive setting out operational basics and providing a new code name—Jubilee. It was a circumspect document, giving no hint of the target. Rather there would be “an emergency operation” using the same forces. “The locality and form of the new operation are being chosen so as to ensure that the training of individuals of lower formations will be as similar as possible to that which was given for Rutter.” As Baillie-Grohman and the senior staff of his department had all departed, Mountbatten announced that Combined Operations would provide the naval staff.36

  McNaughton learned that day from Crerar that 2nd Division would “probably re-commence... training.” As with Rutter, McNaughton immediately sent Lieutenant Colonel G.P. Henderson to represent him at 2nd Division headquarters.37 On July 13, Church Mann had been promoted to brigadier general staff at I Canadian Corps. Within days, Roberts requested his return as the chief planner.38 Crerar consented, and Mann was soon behind a desk close to Roberts, who had little patience for the minutiae of paperwork and detailed planning.

  On Thursday, July 16, the force commanders met in second-floor rooms set aside for the planning at Richmond Terrace. Roberts and Leigh-Mallory were joined by Hughes-Hallett and Mountbatten. For the other two force commanders, this was the first word that Hughes-Hallett would command naval forces. Mountbatten explained that there was too little time for a new officer of flag rank to be included in the operation.39

  Discussion turned to how the original plan might be changed or improved. Of particular concern was the use of paratroops. The likelihood of their dispersion by winds had scuttled Rutter. It was decided to eliminate this unpredictable element. Hughes-Hallett reported on his recent visit to Admiral Sir William James, Naval Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. “It had been virtually decided,” he had informed James, “to re-mount the Dieppe raid with slight modification to the plan.” The raid would likely occur “on or about August 18.” James provided some good news. He could offer the addition of two ships, one being the passenger ferry HMS Invicta, which had just completed Landing Ship, Infantry conversion on June 3. Invicta could carry six Landing Craft Assault and about 250 troops. The LCAs were the new variant of the old R-Boat. Although still plywood hulled, they were slightly larger and capable of carrying about thirty-five men. More importantly, a drop ramp had been added to the front, so the troops no longer had to leap over the bow and sides. Hughes-Hallett immediately recognized that the addition of these two vessels and their LCAs meant he could substitute commandos for the airborne troops.40

  The airborne troops’ primary purpose had been silencing the powerful coastal batteries at Varengeville to the west and Berneval to the east of Dieppe. Both batteries posed a serious threat to the invasion ships and might also shell the troops ashore. This role could, everyone agreed, be fulfilled by two independent commando units. No. 3 Commando would knock out the Berneval battery and No. 4 Commando the battery at Varengeville.41 Although the two commando leaders would be “responsible to [Roberts] for their plans,” they would prepare these themselves.42

  To maintain security, the three force commanders decided that the “troops should be kept in ignorance of what was required of them until the last moment and not be briefed until a few hours before sailing.” This would avoid having troops confined to ships for several days, resulting in much unnecessary physical and psychological discomfort.43 The briefing “should not be until the operation is definitely about to take place.” Senior naval and military commanders would have to be informed earlier so they could make necessary arrangements and plans. But they were only to “be warned in the strictest confidence that an emergency operation is being planned for August and may be ordered to take place at short notice. They will be informed that the same personnel will participate as in the case of ‘Rutter,’ although the objectives will be different.”

  This latter provision proved unworkable. When Brigadier Church Mann began outlining the plan to brigade and battalion officers, he never offered “any suggestion... that the objective would be different and the briefing was done on the exact and original model of Dieppe.”

  Discussion returned to supporting the raid with a heavy air bombardment. Because of tide considerations, two windows were available for the operation: one between August 18 and 23, and another between September 1 and 7. “In neither period,” Leigh-Mallory explained, “is the state of the moon satisfactory from the point of view of night bombing.” He “stressed the fact that accurate bombing of the houses on the sea front could not possibly be guaranteed. If bombing is to be carried out at all, it should be timed to take place as... close as possible to the time of landing.” Alternatively, he suggested, “it might be better to dispense with the bombing, and to rely entirely on supporting fire from the destroyers.”44

  Roberts did not like losing the heavy bombing support, but he consented because he feared “that the destruction caused by such an attack would make the passage to tanks through Dieppe difficult if not impossible.” It was also felt, he wrote, “that a large scale attack, probably inaccurately placed, would merely serve to place the enemy on the alert. At all stages it was insisted that bombing could only be carried out by night and [as a result] inaccuracy, rather than accuracy, was guaranteed.”45

  This meeting was followed by another at 1800 hours involving only Mountbatten, McNaughton, and Roberts. McNaughton summarized the basic details of the revived plan and instructed Roberts “to proceed with plans and preparations... at once.” This was mere formality, and the three men quickly turned to their primary task—establishing a senior chain of command. Mountbatten said that during Rutter it seemed that Admiral James in Portsmouth “was not in the best position to act as Supreme Commander and discharge the responsibility of despatching the expedition.” He proposed assuming this role himself. McNaughton said the decision was for Paget to make. This was not what Mountbatten wanted to hear, but it was also true. When asked, Paget required that the “decision whether the operation was to take place would be made” by Mountbatten, James, “and the Force Commanders in consultation.” This differed from Rutter only in the elimination of Montgomery.

  Although Montgomery was excluded, McNaughton was determined to make this a certainty. McNaughton announced that he would ask Paget “to agree to General Crerar being named as the responsible military officer to coordinate and if this were done I would arm him with appropriate authority as regards the use of Canadian troops.” Further, “the detailed proposals for the Operation when prepared would be subject to my approval in the same way as [Paget] and Chiefs of Staff Committee had approval for operations of British troops.”46 Jubilee was suddenly becoming a Canadian plan, albeit one whose essentials still derived from the Rutter operational plan.

  That evening, McNaughton telephoned Paget’s office and requested a meeting, which took place on the night of July 17. Paget agreed that the chain of command would run from him to McNaughton, then to Crerar, and then Roberts. Crerar “would be the responsible military officer” under the same terms previously held by Montgomery. Paget would formally notify Mon
tgomery that he was written out. For an operation playing out as rapidly as Jubilee, the formalities took a surprising ten days to conclude. Not until July 27 did McNaughton formally notify Crerar that he was now the “responsible military officer for operation Jubilee, and I direct that you place yourself in contact with CCO [Mountbatten] to concert plans therefor.” He authorized using elements of 2nd Division and the Calgary Tank Regiment.

  On July 28, a Tuesday, Crerar notified Mountbatten “that he was at his disposal for a meeting,” which took place two days later.47

  Mountbatten had been busy tying down Combined Chiefs of Staff authorization. His approach was oblique. On July 20, Mountbatten had requested that Hughes-Hallett be appointed Naval Commander for “the next large-scale raiding operation.” The minutes of this meeting provide approval only “by inference,” as the official Canadian military historian later put it. He added, however, that the “absence of more specific approval in the record is probably the result of determination to take extreme security precautions in connection with the revived operation.”48

  The first formal meeting of the force commanders to openly discuss Operation Jubilee occurred the next day at Richmond Terrace. Mountbatten chaired. In addition to the three force commanders, the two new commando leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Lord Lovat and Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater, attended. The number of officers being brought into the picture was expanding. Lieutenant Colonel G.P. Henderson from 2nd Division; Air Commodore G. Harcourt-Smith of No. 11 Group, RAF; Commander David Luce and three other naval staff from Combined Operations; and a secretary were present.