Tragedy at Dieppe
Page 17
10. Our Historic Task
Sandwiched between Captain John Hughes-Hallett’s naval section and Brigadier Church Mann’s military section of the overall Operation Jubilee plan was a single crudely sketched map of the Dieppe area. The map was titled “110 INF DIV,” and a subtitle identified it as presenting the “order of battle” for 110th Infantry Division. Various flags and circles indicated divisional and regimental headquarters and the disposition of units.1 This map was illustrative of a colossal British intelligence error resulting from a German deception plan.
In July, German intelligence discovered that British agents, largely operating out of Switzerland, were attempting to use French Resistance cells to determine the strength and nature of coastal defences. Information was sought for almost the entire coastal area, but there was a clear focus on Dieppe.2 To disrupt these efforts, German Army Command in the West (OB West) sowed false information regarding Dieppe’s defences. The previous February, the Abwehr (German military intelligence) had captured a Special Operations Executive radio operator in Paris. Forced to serve the Germans or suffer torture and death, the operator agreed to be turned. In mid-July, he reported to British intelligence that a new infantry division had taken over Dieppe’s defences. Its vehicle identification markers resembled a white church topped by a small tower. The radio operator used the term “nave.” Using German insignia catalogues, British intelligence officers matched the description to 110th Infantry Division. As “nave” could be interpreted as either a church or a ship, the fact that the 110th Division’s “totem”—as the Germans called these insignia—was a white Viking ship fit.3 The British took the bait, and on August 1, intelligence reports were changed to remove 302nd Infantry Division from the Dieppe area in favour of 110th Infantry Division. In fact, the 110th was still on the Russian front.4
A Combined Operations intelligence report issued on August 7 stated that the 110th Division had arrived in France on June 11. The report provided detailed operational history of the unit since its formation in December 1940 and traced its service on the Russian front. The division had repeatedly “suffered heavy casualties.” The report stated that the 110th Division was believed to have relieved the 302nd Division but cautioned that “this cannot be regarded as absolutely certain.” Even if it were true, the 110th would “almost certainly have the same dispositions as the old [division].” These included a forward headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille. As to its “fighting value,” the report concluded that it was “potentially a high-quality field force. It has evidently suffered severely on the Eastern Front, but has been in France long enough to have received at least a large proportion of personnel and material. However, no reports of any such replacements have been received.”5
Appendix A of the military plan for Jubilee was duly adjusted—without any of the qualifiers offered by the intelligence section—to show the 110th as having taken over the Dieppe area. It was described as a “first line division” sent to France “to rest and refit... Whilst the division may not be up to full strength, it has a good fighting record.” The division’s fighting strength rested on three infantry regiments, but only one was directly defending the beaches targeted for Jubilee, the appendix claimed. During the first three hours of the raid, the opposing strength would be limited to about 1,700 men. This included the defending infantry regiment, about 500 troops attached to divisional headquarters, a company of infantry east of the River Arques, and some artillery and engineer troops. But within three hours, German reinforcements would begin arriving from elsewhere with increasing rapidity and in ever greater numbers.6
A point of significant concern remained the proximity of 10th Panzer Division, believed to be near Amiens on the River Somme. But the intelligence report said this division was “now considered... on the point of departure.”7 This led to the military plan being slightly modified to reflect the possibility that this division’s mechanized reconnaissance unit, reported in July as stationed at Abbeville to the west of Amiens and about thirty-five miles from Dieppe, might be gone. If not, however, the reconnaissance troops, riding aboard their armoured cars and motorcycles, could reach the beaches within three hours of the first landings.8
In reality, of course, 302nd Division and 10th Panzer Division were still in place. The former had about twice the manpower of the 110th Division estimate. But at least the assessment of how it was deployed closely mirrored the truth. Overall information on German forces was quite highly and accurately detailed—the product of hundreds of photo reconnaissance flights carried out from early 1942 through to the launch of Jubilee.
The 302nd division, first raised in November 1940, had deployed to Dieppe in April 1941. It inherited fifteen French 75-millimetre guns that seriously bolstered its artillery. The division assumed responsibility for a fifty-five-mile front stretching from just east of Veules-les-Roses to the River Somme.9
Generalleutnant Konrad Haase commanded the 302nd. Tall and broad-shouldered, the fifty-three-year-old Haase wore round-lensed glasses perched solidly on a prominent nose.10 On November 26, 1940, he was tasked with raising the 302nd Infantry Division, formed as a French occupation unit. Designated a static unit, it was not fully mobile. The division was created by drafts taken from two other infantry divisions. Initially, the division was well staffed and equipped. By spring of 1942, however, many of the division’s best men had been sent to the Russian front. They were replaced with new recruits and so-called ethnic German foreign nationals, such as Poles and Hungarians.11
Haase was competent and always determined to do his duty. He spent most of April carefully studying the division’s defensive sector. On April 12, he described the division’s task as being the “prevention of a landing from the sea and air.” The “focal point of the defence lies at Dieppe.” Haase turned to considering how a British attack might develop. On April 25, he wrote that “Dieppe will not be attacked directly by the enemy, but rather by landing attempts at nearby points and the formation of a bridgehead.” He envisioned the same flanking strategy Mountbatten and Captain John Hughes-Hallett had proposed in the early planning of Operation Rutter. Haase set about identifying where such landings would occur and then establishing positions that could defend them.12
There was no slackness in the division’s execution of its duties. On August 28, 1941, Haase issued an order demanding “Total Commitment” from his men to defending their coastline. “Each officer, NCO, and man must know that the Division is ‘defending,’ that is, that the position must be held to the last shot.” Troops manning defensive positions on any given day were to be in “constant readiness for action, that is, they are prepared to repulse an attack at any time.” During this early stage of readiness, designated the division’s “normal condition,” positions would be occupied only during daylight hours.” The next stage was “increased readiness for action.” Sentries would be reinforced, patrols stepped up, all observation posts, gun positions, and other defensive works manned day and night. Reserves would be on alert. The last phase of readiness was “highest degree of readiness for action.” At this stage, all prepared defences were fully occupied “for defence in expectation of an imminent or identified attack.”
The division’s conduct of battle was “to be such that attempted enemy landings lead to defeat and destruction of the enemy, if at all possible even before the landing... The main line of resistance—that is the coastal strip—must be firmly in the possession of the troops at the conclusion of the fighting; and enemy troops that had reached the mainland must have been destroyed.” This was not mere rhetoric. Haase’s defensive plans were based on defeating an attack right on the beach. Every potential landing spot was to be heavily defended by strongpoints. The troops within each strongpoint were to consider themselves an independent battle group capable of mounting all-round defence.
The division’s Operation Order No. 29 ran to eighteen pages and detailed precisely how the defences would be constructed. Mo
re importantly, it set out a strict doctrine for the division’s response to attack. A regular training regimen tested the division’s tactics through mock drills. By August 1942, Haase’s preparations were well developed. The quality of his troops may have deteriorated due to losses of men sent to the Russian front. But those in place were still relatively well trained and had no doubt that they were expected to man positions with determination, to “the last shot.”13
Haase’s defensive doctrine reflected overall German strategy for European coastal defence. Prior to the end of 1941, the Germans had hoped for a quick and decisive victory over the Soviets. By December, however, Germany had been thrown onto the defensive and it was clear the campaign would be long and costly. With the United States entering the war, probability of an Anglo-American invasion in Western Europe became a true threat. The German high command began seriously considering how to meet such an invasion. On December 14, Hitler’s chief of staff, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, stated that the Führer had decided that coastal regions of the Arctic Ocean, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean “controlled by us are ultimately to be built into a ‘new West Wall,’ in order that we can repel with certainty any landing attempts, even by the strongest enemy forces, with the smallest possible number of permanently assigned field troops.”
Keitel acknowledged that the sucking drain of Russia on troop strength and matériel “compels us to restrict construction.” Therefore, first emphasis was placed on building field fortifications and strengthening strongpoints wherever invasion seemed most likely. After Norway, Hitler considered the Franco-Belgian coast most threatened. He wanted special focus on “the areas along the central part of the Channel coast from the Scheldt to the region west of the Seine Estuary.”
In the Dieppe sector, the first three months of 1942 had not seen a flurry of defensive construction. For the divisional commanders in each coastal sector, “launching... a vast coordinated programme of construction would require much planning, and problems of organization and procurement would have to be solved before the lowest echelons could swing into action.” Haase concentrated on evolving his tactical defence scheme. He also had to train the recruits sent to replace three large drafts of experienced soldiers lost to the Russian front.14
Haase realized the length and nature of the coastline made establishing a continuous defensive line impossible. He lacked the necessary troops. Nor was it essential to have men guarding every foot of coast. The long stretches of cliffs were largely unassailable. Where steep ravines cut through the cliffs to the sea, most had no usable beach before them or provided poor routes inland. Consequently, Haase concentrated his defences on logical focal points, “around the ports where landings were possible or probable. With the weak forces under... command,” he wrote, “we knowingly didn’t defend every ravine.” This meant accepting the chance that small commando raids might gain the headlands and cause damage. But Haase decided this risk must be taken.
“Our main strategy is to be as strong as possible near the ports... on which our strongpoints are based, so that an attack from land and sea can be beaten off. Besides that, it is important to have as many mobile reserves as possible in order to be able to support strongpoints and initiate immediate counter-attacks against enemy troops that may have landed in between these strongpoints. It is all the more important to withhold strong reserves as in any large scale assault the enemy will certainly launch a simultaneous air and sea attack against our coastal defences: the air attack consisting of strong airborne and parachute forces.”
Dieppe was the pivotal strongpoint. He deployed here the headquarters of 571st Infantry Regiment and two of its battalions. The division’s engineer battalion was also headquartered in the town, along with two engineer companies. Eight artillery pieces guarded the beach. There were also nine anti-tank guns, including one French tank that had been concreted into the harbour’s west mole. Two other anti-tank guns were mounted at the corners of the casino. These weapons were all manned by infantry. Adding more punch to the defences were two batteries of 3rd Battalion, 302nd Artillery Regiment, armed with light howitzers. Another two batteries of this battalion’s artillerymen were in Dieppe but acting only as porters of equipment and supplies. The 265th Heavy Infantry Howitzer Battery was also in place.
Dieppe’s anti-aircraft defences were strong—one heavy battery of 75-millimetre guns, a section each of 50-millimetre and 37-millimetre guns, and two sections of 20-millimetre guns.
In addition to the divisional troops, Haase could call upon about two hundred men from different naval units and Dieppe’s sixty-man German police force.15 There was also a naval unit designated an “experimental company.” It was robustly armed with five 37-millimetre anti-tank guns and three light machine guns.16
Dieppe’s Naval Force also maintained a defensive screen of three harbour protection boats, which stood offshore every night. These Hafenschutzboots were typically captured fishing trawlers modified for coastal defence by mounting a light artillery piece or heavy machine gun on the bow.17
By August 1942, 302nd Division had transformed its defensive frontage into a very tough nut. Mid-August brought a report that it had sown 8,923 Teller mines, 6,359 Schützenmines (S-mines), and 274 explosive charges described as “miscellaneous.”18 The pressure-activated Teller anti-tank mines were shaped like a covered cooking pan about two and a half inches deep by fifteen inches across. When a tank tread came into contact with the mine, the plunger-style trigger buried under the ground surface ignited the high explosives within. Although insufficiently powerful to destroy a tank, a single Teller could break a track and immobilize it. S-mines were anti-personnel mines. They typically consisted of a canister loaded with 350 ball bearings attached by a spring to an igniting prong. Step on the prong and the spring snapped the canister about three feet into the air before it exploded. The ball bearings would shred the torso of the man who stepped on the mine and likely wound others within close range. Mines were most thickly sown on potential landing beaches and up the length of ravines that might access the headlands. But minefields were also laid farther inland to intercept movement of enemy forces beyond the beaches.
All of the Dieppe Stützpunktgruppe (Group of Strongpoints) was surrounded to landward by a continuous barbed-wire obstacle that wrapped out on the eastern flank to encompass Puys. Berneval was protected inside its own defensive perimeter. The heights immediately east of Pourville lay within the Dieppe wire, but the village and facing beach did not. These were more lightly protected by wire and mines on and around the beach.
As the Canadian Army historian later put it, the Dieppe front was “very strong in artillery.”19 The coastal battery at Varengeville, designated No. 813 Coastal Battery, was particularly powerful. Lieutenant Colonel Lovat’s No. 4 Commando was to take this battery. It consisted of six 150-millimetre Krupp guns, each capable of firing a 113.5-pound round to a maximum range of 25,000 yards. Its ammunition consisted of about two thousand percussion-fused high-explosive shells. The battery was manned by two officers commanding about ninety-three men. Each gun had a ten-man crew. Firing of the guns was usually under direction of a battery sergeant. The two officers, meanwhile, were set up in an observation post on the clifftop about 1,500 yards northwest of the guns and next to Pointe d’Ailly Lighthouse. A concrete bastion, this observation post had a convex front facing the sea in which a two-foot-long observation slit had been cut. From here the officers would direct the battery’s fire onto targets. The battery had at least one pre-designated firing target. This was the sea to the front of Dieppe, about 8,500 yards distant. On command, the battery could bring fire upon this area almost immediately. In the event of attack by parachutists—fully expected in Haase’s defensive scheme—the battery was so organized that the gun crews could be reduced to four men and the rest quickly sent to man an all-round defense.20
On Dieppe’s opposite flank, at Berneval, the 2/770 Coastal Battery would fall to No. 3 Co
mmando. It possessed four 105-millimetre guns and three 170-millimetre guns. This battery was defended by 127 battery troops, with a field picket of ten men from No. 1 Company of the 302nd Division’s 570 Infantry Regiment guarding the approach off the beach at Petit Berneval. The battery was also protected by two 20-millimetre anti-aircraft guns. A nearby radar station was manned by 114 Luftwaffe personnel, who were well positioned to reinforce the battery.
To the northwest of Arques-la-Bataille and roughly parallel to the airfield, No. 265 Coastal Battery contained four 150-millimetre howitzers. This battery was to be wiped out by the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders as part of their push against the airfield and divisional headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille. It stood about four miles inland from Dieppe on high ground, which enabled it to easily fire on the beach and out to sea. It could also bring Pourville under fire. Four other coastal batteries more distant from Dieppe could range on the landing beaches.
In addition to the coastal batteries, 302nd Division had established four batteries of its own. Each was armed with four 100-millimetre Czech field howitzers. Battery ‘B’ was just inland of Puys and was to be eliminated by the Royal Regiment of Canada after it won the beach there. On roughly the same line from the coast, Battery ‘8’ lay just over a mile inland. No raiding troops were tasked with eliminating this battery. Battery ‘7’ stood inside the Dieppe wire just to the west of Quatre Vents Farm and less than a mile east of Pourville. It was to be knocked out by the South Saskatchewan Regiment. Also inside the Dieppe wire was Battery ‘A,’ situated about two miles southeast of Pourville and one and a half miles southwest of Dieppe. This battery was also not specifically targeted.
Running along the headland extending from east of Pourville to the cliff overlooking Dieppe, eight 75-millimetre guns were stationed. Anti-aircraft guns manned by Luftwaffe troops were numerous, with the 302nd Division’s sector alone containing thirty.