The War Within

by Woodward, Bob

  When I asked the president two years later, he said he had thought his party would retain control of the Senate in the midterm elections. But he did not attribute the losses to the Iraq War alone. Rather, he said, the rash of Republican scandals had played as big a role. "I considered it as much a vote on people not being honest. Some of our members were being indicted. Some of our members went to jail. Some of our members resigned from the House for a variety of reasons.

  "And I'm out there campaigning in safe seats."

  * * *

  On November 8, Hadley reported on his firsthand look at Iraq. In a five-page SECRET memo, which later leaked to the press, Hadley wrote, "The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action."

  One course of action Hadley recommended was "Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to make a recommendation about whether more forces are needed in Baghdad."

  * * *

  The colonels met again with the chiefs on Thursday, November 9, a session designed to prep Pace for a White House meeting the next day with Bush, to discuss what Pace described as "an unscripted way ahead" in Iraq. Rumsfeld and Hadley were expected to present memos. Pace said he was inclined to show some of the colonels' strategic options. But he tossed out several, including Go Home. Everyone knew the president wouldn't consider anything that suggested losing, or cutting and running.

  * * *

  On the morning of Friday, November 10, Bush called Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Hadley, Pace, thenñDirector of National Intelligence John Negroponte and Hadley's deputy, J. D. Crouch, into the Oval Office. They were to begin a formal review of Iraq strategy, the president said. Pointing to Crouch, Bush said, "J. D., you'll head it." To facilitate this and give the matter proper urgency, each of those present was to nominate a senior representative to the review group. The representatives would be expected to devote themselves full-time to the assignment, and Crouch would have meetings daily, including weekends. The president wanted a report within 16 days.

  * * *

  In Baghdad that day, November 10, Casey attended an event for the Marine Corps's 231st birthday, an annual ritual that the Marines treat with great seriousness. From 5 to 6 P.M., he prepared for a secure videoconference with President Bush and the NSC. It would be his first discussion with Bush since election day and Rumsfeld's dismissal. At 6:15 P.M. Baghdad timeó10:15 A.M. in Washington, as the Veterans Day holiday weekend was beginningóCasey and Khalilzad appeared on the secure video. Bush was in the Roosevelt Room with his national security team.

  The general and the ambassador gave their now routine updates.

  In more than two years dealing with Bush, Casey had never experienced anything like it. The president was irritated, distant and unmistakably cold. He had always been upbeat, warm and friendly. But on this day, he was icy and almost rude.

  "Wow," Casey said to Khalilzad after the conference, "that was something. I wonder what's going to come out of this?" Whatever it might be, it was obvious to both that their lives were going to change dramatically.

  * * *

  The next day, Saturday, November 11, Hadley and Rice met with their Iraq team leadersóCrouch, O'Sullivan, Zelikow and Satterfieldóto lay out the questions they wanted to examine: Are the Shia pursuing a hegemonic agenda? Can the United States really influence Iraqi leaders to make decisions in the interest of Iraq, or are they bound to carry out sectarian agendas? What is the relationship between security and political reconciliation? What is the relationship between U.S. force levels and security? The State Department groupóRice, Zelikow and Satterfieldówanted to see if there were some way to make the point that the Iraq War was not the sole dominating issue in American foreign policy. They proposed that the review address the following: How would we define core U.S. interests? Should we refocus on more modest efforts?

  A final question: If Iraqis don't have the capability to handle the security situation themselves, can we create a bridge to a more sustainable situation over time?

  * * *

  Hadley dispatched a SECRET memo early the next week. "The president authorizes an Iraq review to draw upon work already underway in order toÖdescribe the current situationÖoutline the strategic assumptions upon which the effort in Iraq should now restÖdefine America's core objectives and interests." After months of secretly studying the problems with the Iraq strategy, the search for possible solutions was at last officially under way. The first meeting was set for 5 P.M. the next Wednesday, November 15.

  Chapter 21

  Just after 8 A.M. on November 13, 2006, the members of the Baker-

  Hamilton Iraq Study Group sat in leather chairs around the dark wooden conference table in the windowless Roosevelt Room, across from the Oval Office.

  Bush arrived, accompanied by Cheney, Hadley and chief of staff Josh Bolten. After a few pleasantries, the president began. "Iraq is part of an ideological struggle," he said, speaking without notes. "If you don't think this is an ideological struggle, then my comments are wasted."

  The president cited foreign leaders who still agreed with him about Iraq, including Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. They all support the U.S.

  presence in Iraq, Bush said.

  "Al Qaeda is still there. It is active," Bush said. "In our judgment, they are the ones responsible. They are fomenting sectarian violenceÖWith al Qaeda, our job is to find them and kill them." Bush added Baathists to his list of troublemakers. He said that the Shia were protecting their majority by fighting off the Sunnis.

  The president then turned to Maliki. In June, when he had first met with the study group, he had radiated optimism about Maliki. "The prime minister is committed to a unified Iraq," he said now. "He knows he has to reach out to the Sunnis."

  The challenge, he said, was to strike a delicate balance between Iraqi authority and the American presence.

  "We ought to do everything we can to strengthen Maliki," Bush said. "We've got to help and sustain him. We need to strengthen Maliki, not undermine him."

  The president said the prime minister had grown angry about military strikes in Shia neighborhoods. He had expressed frustration with Ambassador Khalilzad. He took it personally when Khalilzad gave the impression that the United States was dictating to him.

  "I understand these frustrations," the president said, adding that on the whole, they were a good sign. "We are holding the Iraqi government to too high a standard, one that our own government can't meet," Bush said. "It is an impossible timetable for a democracy to meet these goals. I would pull our troops out if we could not achieve these goals."

  He added, "It is very possible that our goals can be achievedÖI am running this war." Commanders simply had to tell him what they needed, he said.

  "There is deep concern on the international front that the Americans will leave," Bush continued. "The dynamic in the region is that the Sunnis see the Iranians as the problem, the Israelis less so."

  Concerning Iran, the president stated, "We can't put ourselves where we trade off help on Iraq for Iran's nuclear weapon. History will condemn us."

  The president opened the floor to questions.

  "What is victory?" Lee Hamilton asked.

  "The word that captures what we want to achieve is victory," Bush replied. "We want an ally in the war on terror, a government that can govern, sustain and defend itself."

  Hamilton thought that this was awfully vague and that the president hadn't really figured it out. But he did not follow up.

  Baker asked, "How do we get the Maliki government to do the things we know they need to do?"

  Bush said he had told the prime minister that he must make tough decisions on de-Baathification reform and on an oil-revenue-sharing law. "I'm not making excuses," Bush said, then quickly corrected himself. "I guess I am making excuses for the guy."
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  "What happens if there are inflexible benchmarksóperform or else?" Baker asked.

  "There's a temptation to say, 'You must do this or else,'" Bush said. "We are concerned this will be viewed as an imposition. And Maliki is more likely to respond if he is with us."

  Vernon Jordan said that when his mother asked him to clean out the garage, he always knew what she meant. But when the president spoke of victory, what exactly did he mean? In Iraq, Jordan said, "What does 'finish the job'

  mean?"

  "The people want to know why we are in Iraq," Bush replied. He avoided Jordan's question and turned to what defeat would meanóa safe haven for al Qaeda, loss of American influence, the lost confidence of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, greater Shia influence in the region. The Iranians would "laugh at us" and Israeli-Palestinian talks would disappear from the table.

  "The consequences of defeat would be a disaster for future generations," the president said. "You won't know the moment when you achieve victory. Victory is when the government is functioning, when there is an oil law, when the army is capable of stability. That is a signal of progress. An end to violence, an end to sectarian violenceóthat won't happen."

  Leon Panetta was struck that the president never defined what it meant to win, nor what the United States was ultimately after.

  Bill Perry asked about sending up to 100,000 additional troops. We could do it for a short time, Bush replied, noting that General Casey didn't think anywhere near that number was necessary.

  Is a draft necessary? Perry asked.

  "Absolutely not."

  What about increasing the size of the armed forces?

  "Well, we're considering that."

  Sandra Day O'Connor said that Maliki was very weak. How could the United States help strengthen him?

  "We can strengthen him by giving him more authority over his security forces," Bush replied.

  "How much patience do we have?" Hamilton asked. "The fact remains Prime Minister Maliki has not taken the hard steps. How long can we go down this road at the cost of $2 billion a week, losing men every day?"

  "Maliki actually is taking steps," Bush replied. "He is working to isolate Shia militias from al-Sadr, trying to get al- Sadr to help. We have lots of intelligence on Maliki going after death squads, and it is not fair to say that he is a catalyst for sectarian violence. He gets a bum rap."

  When the United States goes after Shia militias, the president said, "We notify the prime minister. We have well-meaning plans, but the military is heavy-handed. Maliki has to deal with his people saying, 'What the hell are you doing in our neighborhood?'"

  Ed Meese asked about reconstruction.

  "We've pretty well run our string on reconstruction," Bush acknowledged. "Congress won't spend any more. That's why we want the international community to come forward." No one needed to point out that the international community had pretty much left Iraq in the hands of the Americans.

  Bush said that Saudi king Abdullah's attitude had shifted dramatically. He no longer was focused on Maliki but rather viewed success in Iraq as a buffer against Iran.

  "It's tough to sustain these policies without progress on the ground," Panetta said. He asked about the hold and build strategy and the Baghdad security plan: "How are we doing?"

  "Baghdad is a mixed bag," Bush replied. He said he often got asked if the soldiers were sitting ducks at the neighborhood outposts, or whether they were fighting. "They are fighting," he assured them, adding with pride, "We killed or captured 1,700 just in the month of October."

  Seventeen hundred of what, he didn't specify.

  "I am as frustrated as the American people," Bush continued. "Death trumps success. When you are building schools or opening hospitals, that's success. Mosul, success. Tall Afar, that's pretty good, but now it's being challenged. We can build schools every day and that won't be reported as success.

  "If I didn't think it was worth it, we would leave. We need to win an ideological victory. I am not making excuses, but we cannot improve in the short term. This is worth it because of the consequencesÖ. Your report can make a significant contribution here, if you deal with the tendencies toward isolationism in the country. There is an attitude in the countryó'Let's get out. Let's protect our trade. Let's keep immigrants out.' We need to deal with the psychology of engagement in international affairs and position this country so it remains a leader. If we count on Europe or anyone else to lead, they will not lead. The United States has to take the lead on all these tough issues, or it just won't happen."

  Chuck Robb, the early advocate of adding more troops, asked if the president was prepared to do something very dramatic in the short term in Baghdad.

  Bush mentioned a short-term bridging mechanismóa clear reference to a surge. If Gates, the designated new secretary of defense, and the commanders recommended it, he said, he'd be inclined to accept it.

  I later asked the president about his comment to the group about a "short-term bridging mechanism."

  "I don't know what that means," he said.

  Hadley chimed in. "You're talking about, and you say this, 'Look, we want to get to the point where the Iraqis can take responsibility for security.'"

  "Right," Bush said.

  "Which is what we had been doing under Casey and Rumsfeld," Hadley answered. "But you're saying, 'They don't have the capacity to get there right now.'"

  "Yeah, that's right," Bush said.

  "We need something to bridge to the point where they take responsibility," Hadley said. "And that's the surge."

  "Okay," Bush said.

  At the November 13 meeting, Robb pointed out that the president had offered a strong defense of Maliki.

  "Is Maliki the right man?" Bush asked. "Casey says yes."

  Robb asked whether Maliki had set internal benchmarks.

  He's talked about it, Bush said, but he hasn't really set any.

  "We by God need to lean hard on 'em!" Baker interjected, referring to Maliki and other Iraqi leaders. Baker was given to spontaneous outbursts during the course of the study group's interviews.

  Americans are not united, Hamilton said. The country is moving away from this war. He wasn't sure whether the country could sustain a foreign policy without unity of effort.

  Bush at first offered no response, but he later returned to the question. "Most Americans don't want to leave," he said. "Most Americans want to support a plan that is workingÖ. We can succeed. It won't be pretty. We need the help from fresh eyes outside the government. We will be in Iraq for the duration of my presidency.

  "Those running in 2008 don't want to deal with this. That is a chance for us." He seemed to be suggesting that the study group and he might work something out. "This is a big damn deal," he said. "Our idea is to make the American people know we're working for victoryÖ. If I say we're looking for something short of victory, I am out of here tomorrow."

  Bill Perry later recalled in an interview that Bush was both passionate and overbearing. "He was not seeking advice from us," he said. "He was telling us what his view of the war was. The president held forth on his views on how important the war was, and how it was tough, how we stay together. It was a Churchillian kind of a thingÖ. There's going to be blood, sweat and tears and all that. It was that sort of a moment. It is quite clear that he had this image of a great global struggle, and he was presiding over it, and Iraq was just one element of that, and that the people who were wavering on Iraq did not see the big picture the way he saw it.

  "To my mind even as he was saying it," Perry said, "I thought he was comparing himself to Churchill. This is not the way we think of Bush in his public statements. It really was an eloquent Bush. He was wrong, I thought, but eloquent."

  When I spoke to the president later, I told him that Bill Perry had called his statement to the Iraq Study Group

  "Churchillian."

  "That's kind of him," Bush said. "That makes me feel good when somebody says something nice like that."

  * *
*

  After the president left the Roosevelt Room, the members of the Iraq Study Group remained in their seats for a secure videoconference with General Casey in Baghdad. Bush's ice-cold reception after the election had been a jarring confirmation for Casey that the commander in chief was on his final tune-out with the current strategy, and with him.

  "It's not about us. It's about the Iraqis," Casey told the group.

  "Enduring strategic success will only be achieved by Iraqis," he explained. "And if it happens, it will take longer than we want. The government of Iraq and their leaders must make tough decisions and they're not likely to do it on our timeline. We're relying on a government that lacks capabilities. The government is relying on Shiite militias."

  The real problem, Casey said, was the sectarian violence by Sunni and Shia extremists, but "the Iraqi government just wants to focus on al Qaeda and the Baathists."

  Casey wanted a drawdown unequivocally. "We have to reduce our footprint to a level that is acceptable to the Iraqis.

  We are two thirds of the way through a three-step process to transfer security responsibility by the end of 2007."

  He said the United States had enough troops in Iraq and sufficient resources. If he'd seen a possibility to achieve goals by having more troops, he would have asked for them.

  "Here are the problems with more troops," Casey said. "It's an Iraqi problem. The more coalition forces we put in, the longer it will take the Iraqis to achieve the objectives that they need to and to take responsibility.

  "More troops can have a temporary effect in a highly local area, but it will delay the long-term resolution that needs to happen."