BLAIR’S BRITAIN, 1997–2007
Page 14
the capital after 2005. The government introduced legislation43 to
41 Sir Michael Lyons, Lyons Inquiry into Local Government (London: TSO, 2007).
42 Simon Jenkins, Big Bang Localism – A Rescue Plan for British Democracy (London: Policy
Exchange, 2004).
43 Greater London Authority Bill (London: TSO, 2006).
strengthen the powers of the Mayor of London and, to a lesser extent, of
the London Assembly. The most important new powers affect planning
and housing. In future, the Mayor would be able to override the largest
borough planning decisions, to give permission for a project the borough
had rejected. Hitherto, the Mayor had only been able to veto such projects, not to give them planning permission in the face of borough opposition. The new housing powers would allow the Mayor to allocate
resources for affordable and social housing within the capital, a function
previously overseen by central government. The Mayor’s powers to
appoint some board members and to give directions to the fire authority
were also amended.
The London boroughs opposed the Mayor’s additional powers on the
grounds that they strengthened the metropolitan level of government at
the expense of the local. The capital’s government model remained less
devolved than in Wales or Scotland, but was well in advance of the powers
available at the city-wide or regional level elsewhere in England. Blair’s
attempt at devolution had failed in England, though London suggested
that at some future date another government might try again.
Conclusions
The third Blair government faced a local government system that was,
year on year, slipping away from Labour control. As had happened during
the Conservatives’ long period in power up to 1997, the cumulative effect
of ‘mid-term losses’ left the Labour Party with around 5,500 councillors
in 2007. When they had taken office, they had had just under 11,000
councillors: under Tony Blair, half the party’s elected members had disappeared. In the south of England, only a few pockets remained, in
London and other urban centres such as Brighton, Reading and
Stevenage.
After a decade of New Labour, much of local government performed
well according to the Audit Commission’s independent analyses.
Compared to Whitehall’s relentless bad news stories, e.g. the need to
break up the Home Office, local government in 2007 was a place of sunlit
performance uplands.
Some good decentralising reform was achieved by New Labour. The
‘prudential rules’ system of capital control was a significant improvement
on the belt-and-braces system inherited from the Tories. Devolution to
Scotland, Wales and London represented a genuine diffusion of power.
The removal of compulsion from competitive tendering was sensible and
pro-local. Ministerial rhetoric towards local government has generally
been co-operative and benign.
But underlying the Labour decade has been the reality that wellintentioned ministers from Hilary Armstrong to Phil Woolas via Nick
Raynsford found themselves unable to convince the Treasury or servicesponsoring departments to abandon their vice-like grip on local government. Whitehall had been able to block many attempts to shift power
away from the centre into the hands of even the best councils. The lack of
funding reform following the Lyons Inquiry, the nationalisation of school
funding and the aggressive use of targets all attest to the Blair decade’s
continuation of the centralisation that had flourished for years previously. In the UK 95% of all taxation is paid to the Exchequer.
As a result, a decade of consultation documents, White Papers and
think-tank output has left local government with the drift to central
control largely unchecked and with no reform to funding arrangements.
The failure to bring about radical change during two parliaments when
Blair had very large majorities represented a significant failure to focus on
a key constitutional issue.
Looking ahead to the next ten years, it is virtually impossible to
imagine governments being elected with the kind of majorities enjoyed
by Labour since 1997 – and with such a weak opposition. Tony Blair
missed a major opportunity to decentralise Britain.
5
Central government
. . .
Introduction
Since the Fulton Committee’s report in 1968 there has been a constant
stream of initiatives from Labour and Conservative governments aimed
at strengthening central government and reforming the civil service.
Many now belong to the dustbin of history, their labels redolent of times
past. Who now remembers or cares about CPRS, MINIS, FMI, the ‘3Es’,
Next Steps agencies, and citizens’ charters? A sceptic might remark that
nothing persists except the persistent drive for reform.1
Even against this backcloth of frenetic activity, one word captures the
Blair government’s handling of the central machinery of government –
hyperactive. However understood, whatever the results, nobody can deny
there has been much activity. This chapter tells three stories of central
change: the centralisation story, which claims the changes sought to
increase the power of the Prime Minister at the expense of cabinet and
the departments; the management story, which claims the attempt to
reform the civil service foundered on Blair’s lack of policymaking and
management skills; and the governance story, which argues the Prime
Minister is locked into webs of dependence that undermined his initiatives. Finally, we essay an overall assessment.
The centralisation story
The trend to executive centralisation is seen by many commentators as
widespread in parliamentary government. For example, Poguntke and
Webb argue that executive presidentialism occurs when there is a shift of
11 On these several labels and a history of reform, see Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, rev.
edn (London: Secker and Warburg, 2001); and Andrew Massey and Robert Pyper,
Public Management and Modernisation in Britain (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005).
. . .
‘political power resources and autonomy to the benefit of individual
leaders’ and ‘a concomitant loss of power and autonomy of collective
actors like cabinets’.2 Such centralisation was on New Labour’s agenda
before they came to power. For example, Peter Mandelson and Roger
Liddle argued there was a need ‘for a more formalised strengthening
of the centre of government’ that ‘provides the means of formulating
and driving forward strategy for the government as a whole’.3 Journalists,
academics and insiders also agreed that Blair sought to centralise power
in No. 10.4 For example, Jonathan Powell, Chief of Staff at the Prime
Minister’s Office, famously warned senior civil servants to expect: ‘a
change from a feudal system of barons to a more Napoleonic system’.5
Blair’s No. 10 aides asserted that ‘Cabinet died years ago’, claiming they
wanted ‘to replace the Department barons with a Bonapartist system’.6
So, this section recounts the story of Blair’s search for a stronger, centralised executive.
Structural changes to both the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet
Office are the main ways in which Blair has sought to centralise policymaking. These included an increase in special advisers, a strengthening
of the Prime Minister’s Office’s role in managing the media and
policymaking, and the emergence of a ‘Prime Minister’s department
that-will-not-speak-its-name’,7 otherwise known as the Cabinet Office.
Special advisers
There were six special advisers working in the Prime Minister’s Office
shortly before Labour came to power. After a sharp increase in the number
of appointments following Labour’s general election victory, there was a
more gradual rise which finally levelled off in mid-December 1999 when
twenty-five special advisers worked in No. 10. Most appointments were in
12 Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative
Study of Modern Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
13 Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle, The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver?
(London: Faber and Faber, 1996), p. 240.
14 For a review of the relevant literature and citations see Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes,
‘Prime Ministers, Presidentialism and Westminster Smokescreens’, Political Studies, 54,
2006: 671–90.
15 Daily Telegraph, 8 December 2001, cited in Anthony Seldon, Blair (London: The Free
Press, 2004), p. 437.
16 Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister. The Hidden
Influence of Number Ten (London: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 291.
17 Peter Hennessy, ‘The Blair Style and the Requirements of Twenty-First Century
Premiership’, Political Quarterly, 71, 2000: 386–95.
the Policy Directorate, which meant that it was staffed by non-civil servants, each shadowing a particular department or policy area.
Two special advisers had prominent roles; Jonathan Powell, and Alistair
Campbell, the Director of Communications and Strategy. Both were given
line management powers over civil servants and, while the post of Chief of
Staff was not new, the role that Jonathan Powell played as head of the
Prime Minister’s Office was unprecedented in scope. The Prime Minister
also appointed unpaid advisers who reported directly to him. The most
notable example was John Birt. He was the Prime Minister’s part-time
Strategy Adviser, located in No. 10. His work was shrouded in some
secrecy until freedom of information requests led to the publication of
some sections of his reports.
Special advisers were also appointed across government, although
concern over their growing numbers and cost led to a cap of two special
advisers for each minister. The only exception to that rule was the
Treasury where ministers were able to draw on the advice not only from
their own appointments but also from the special advisers appointed to
the Council of Economic Advisers. Although there were always several
members of the Council, it was not the collective body its name implied.
Members of the Council worked alongside the Treasury officials who
were responsible for developing policy in their own area of expertise. The
general growth in special advisers, especially in the Prime Minister’s
Office, led to charges of centralisation and politicisation of the civil
service ‘through the back door’.8
Politicians and civil servants consistently deny there is any politicisation, associating that phrase with overt party political beliefs, but there
are other interpretations. Advisers inject party politics into the advice
process of departments. So the role of civil servants changed from providing advice to putting together packages of advice from several sources.
As Gus O’Donnell recently commented, civil servants could no longer
claim a ‘monopoly on wisdom’ but must instead earn their place ‘as principal policy advisers’.9
Individual advisers also played a prominent role in departmental policy
deliberations. For example, Andrew Adonis of the Prime Minister’s Policy
18 See Larry Elliott, Patrick Wintour and Kevin Macguire, ‘Tensions at the Top’, The
Guardian, 16 April 2002, pp. 10–11; and Tony Blair, ‘Special Advisers’, House of Commons
Written Ministerial Statement by the Prime Minister, 24 July 2006, cc. 86–92.
19 Gus O’Donnell, ‘Our 21st Century Civil Service – Creating a Culture of Excellence’, Public
Service Reform Conference, QE II Conference Centre, London, 6 June 2006, at: www.
civilservice.gov.uk/publications/doc/psr_speech060606.doc.
. . .
Directorate often intervened to influence education policymaking,
although some insiders opined acidly that ‘if anyone knew Andrew was
behind a policy, it immediately made people suspicious’.10 The post has
also become a springboard to high government office. Prominent examples include: Andrew Adonis (who became Parliamentary UnderSecretary of State for Schools in the Department for Education and Skills
in May 2005); Ed Balls (who became Economic Secretary to the Treasury
in May 2006); and David Miliband (who became Secretary of State for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in May 2006, having previously held
various ministerial positions).
Strengthening media management and policymaking
Spin, or less pejoratively news management and presenting government
policy, is a long-standing part of the responsibilities of the Prime
Minister’s Office, but this role was strengthened after May 1997. A change
to the Ministerial Code required ministers to clear all major interviews,
press releases and policy statements with No. 10 before they were released
to the media. The Office was also strengthened by creating a Strategic
Communications Unit, which coordinated the release of departmental
statements to avoid clashes. It was staffed by a mixture of special advisers
and civil servants.
A few months after Labour’s second electoral victory, the Prime
Minister made more institutional changes to No. 10. The Prime Minister’s
Private Office was merged with the Policy Unit to form a new Policy
Directorate. Its key functions were day-to-day liaison with Whitehall
departments and writing briefs and speeches for the Prime Minister. It was
also involved in developing short-term policy in the Prime Minister’s priority areas, such as the Respect agenda, announced after the 2005 general
election. A new position of Director of Communications and Strategy was
also created to oversee the work of the Strategic Communications Unit, the
Press Office and the Research and Information Unit. Its stature and influence weakened following the resignation of Alistair Campbell and the recommendations of the interim report of the Phillis Review of Government
Communications.11 Campbell’s replacement was not given line management powers over civil servants and overall responsibil
ity for government
10 Cited in Seldon, Blair, p. 642.
11 Government Communications Review Group, Interim Report at: http://archive.
cabinetoffice.gov.uk/gcreview/News/interimreport.pdf.
media strategy and personnel was handed over to a new Permanent
Secretary of Government Communications based in the Cabinet Office.
Supporting the Prime Minister
The Cabinet Office was always a ragbag of functions bequeathed to it by
former prime ministers. Blair added to the ragbag, although he broke
with tradition in the number of units created and the speed of change.
Early efforts focused on tackling cross-cutting issues. Blair appointed an
assortment of taskforces, working parties, commissions, ‘policy Czars’,
policy forums and policy action teams.12 Various cross-cutting units were
also established or moved to the Cabinet Office, including the Social
Exclusion Unit; the Women’s Unit; the Anti-Drugs Coordination Unit;
the Freedom of Information Unit; and, more recently, the Office of the
Third Sector. Most of these units changed their names to reflect changed
priorities or responsibilities and many were transferred out of the
Cabinet Office to other departments. For example, the Social Exclusion
Unit started life in the Cabinet Office at the beginning of December 1997,
transferred to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister at the end of May
2002, only to return to the Cabinet Office in June 2006, with a revised
name and remit. These changes show how Blair sought to control government functions without bothering himself with too many of the operational details. As Peter Hennessy noted, ‘Number 10 is omnipresent’.13
The second wave of initiatives sought to develop strategic policy for
the Prime Minister. Initially, Blair set up the Performance and Innovation
Unit (PIU) (launched on 28 July 1998) and the Prime Minister’s Forward
Strategy Unit (PMFSU) (launched on 22 June 2001). After the second
general election victory of June 2001, an Office of the Deputy Prime
Minister was established in the Cabinet Office with several new units in
the department, including the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU);
the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU); and the Office of Public
Sector Reform (OPSR).