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BLAIR’S BRITAIN, 1997–2007

Page 49

by ANTHONY SELDON (edt)


  for the first time broken. John Morris MP QC, a Secretary of State for

  Wales in the last Labour administration, was succeeded as AttorneyGeneral by Lord (Gareth) Williams of Mostyn QC and, when the latter

  became Leader of the House of Lords, by Lord Goldsmith QC. Lord

  Falconer QC was the first Solicitor-General and he was succeeded by

  Harriet Harman, a solicitor (so, paradoxically, aligning title with titleholder). She was then made a QC and so was Mike O’Brien after her.

  Before 1997 the Solicitor-General used to act as the Attorney-General’s

  deputy and carried out functions delegated by the latter. Since the Law

  Officers Act 1997, which made the roles interchangeable, the two ministers could divide the duties between themselves as they saw fit, but

  custom, if nothing else, preserved a vertical rather than a horizontal relationship. They have achieved functional but not political parity.

  The Attorney-General continued to appoint the Director of Public

  Prosecutions (DPP), oversee the work of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

  and the Treasury Solicitor’s Office (TSO), and represent the Crown Court

  31 Beloff, ‘Paying Judges’, p. 17.

  32 Cm. 5389-11, para. 4.26, discussed in Frances Gibb, ‘Low Point for High Court

  Appointments’, The Times, 5 March 2002.

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  in major international litigation and trials of the constitutional dimension.

  Lord Goldsmith, an accomplished advocate, was particularly engaged by

  this aspect of his role. But it was during his tenure that the position of

  Attorney-General as a member of the government, yet simultaneously its

  independent legal adviser, came increasingly under scrutiny. His advice,

  allegedly in contradiction to his first impression, that the invasion of Iraq

  in 2003 would be lawful;33 his role in halting the inquiry into corruption

  linked to the sale of BAE systems to Saudi Arabia;34 and his assertion in

  2007 that he retained a necessary part in any decision as to whether or not

  Blair allies could be charged in relation to the receipt by the Labour Party of

  undisclosed loans by putative peers, prompted suggestions that his office

  should be decoupled from government altogether. The seed planted in the

  dying months of the Blair administration may flower in the post-Blair era.

  The criminal justice system

  During the period under consideration both criminal and civil court

  structures and systems were subject to intense scrutiny. A review of the

  Criminal Courts of England and Wales (2001) was carried out by Lord

  Justice Auld, and many of its recommendations were implemented in the

  Courts Act 2003. A key proposal that Crown Courts and Magistrates

  Courts should be amalgamated into a single court was, however, rejected;

  moving together was preferred to merger. The Criminal Justice Act 2003

  made practical provisions for ensuring that fewer cases went to the

  Crown Court.

  A single Commission of Peace for England and Wales was created to

  give JPs a national jurisdiction, though in practice they will continue to

  sit in local justice areas. But concurrently ninety-eight local courts

  closed,35 increasing numbers of legally qualified District Judges (previously stipendiary magistrates) sat together with or in place of lay justices,

  and authority in many areas with implications for delivery of justice was

  transferred from the justices to their clerks. There was in consequence

  a growing sense that, notwithstanding repeated statements by Lord

  Chancellors to the contrary, there was a hidden agenda emanating from

  the Home Office to abolish the very system of lay justice.

  33 A decision whose legal merit was questioned by many eminent lawyers: see e.g. Lord

  Alexander of Weedon QC, Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture, 10 October 2003 at the Law

  Society, and Professor Philippe Sands, Lord Mischon Memorial Lecture 2005, at UCL.

  34 Which prompted a judicial review by two public interest bodies – unresolved at the point

  of writing.

  35 The Magistrate, May 2007.

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  Juries, however, remained talismanic. The Home Office consultation

  paper in July 1998 considered unavailingly the abolition of right to jury

  trial in respect of a range of offences, including grievous bodily harm and

  theft. Provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which allow a trial by

  judge alone where there is a ‘real and present danger’ of jury-tampering, or

  in complex fraud cases where the interests of justice are thought to require

  it, are yet to be brought into effect. Concern continued to be expressed as

  to whether juries – another amateur institution in a professional world –

  were the best instrument of justice, barely mitigated by the abolition of

  various immunities for jury service including counter-intuitively those of

  barristers and judges (in the Criminal Justice Act 2003).

  One major fraud trial (‘the Jubilee trial’) collapsed under its own

  weight in 2006 at a cost to the public purse of £60 million, and the

  prospect of a system straining under the burden of an ever increasing

  number of lengthy terrorist trials (for which a special panel of twentyone judges was created) prompted further anxiety.36 But the civil liberties

  lobby in parliament retained the upper hand (especially in the Upper

  House) to defeat or compel withdrawal of tentative government efforts at

  diminishing the role of juries.

  The subject of ‘Crime and Penal Policy’, the fruit of the criminal justice

  system, is dealt with elsewhere in this volume.37 From the perspective of

  the judiciary, ‘the torrent of criminal legislation’38 posed problems in

  practice as well as of principle, as successive Home Office ministers struggled to give useful meaning to the Blair first mantra ‘tough on crime’.

  Lord Justice Rose spoke for many when in the course of one of his judgments he described the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act as

  ‘labyrinthine’ and ‘astonishingly complex’,39 adding for good measure in

  another case that they were ‘deeply confusing,40 and concluding ‘we find

  little comfort or assistance in the customary canons of construction for

  determining the will of Parliament which were fashioned in a more

  leisurely age and at a time when elegance and clarity of thought and language were to be found in legislation as a matter of course rather than

  exception’.

  Judges remained concerned at the end as at the outset of the Blair

  administration that their purpose to make the punishment fit the crime

  36 See the account of the experience of one juror in the bomb plot trial, The Times, 3 May

  2007, p. 6.

  37 See chapter 15, p. 318.

  38 Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’, p. 9.

  39 R v . Lang (2005) EWCA Crim 2864 2006 1 WLR 2509, para. 16.

  40 R (Crown Prosecution Service) v. South East Surrey Youth Court (2005) EWHC 2929

  (Admin) 2006 1 WLR para. 14.

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  was being impaired by legislative incoherence, political pressure and lack

  of prison space.

  Civil justice system

  Auld followed Woolf. The Civil Procedure
Act 1997 (providing a statutory foundation for the Report of Lord Woolf into ‘Access to Justice’)

  received the Royal Assent in February 1997, just before the demise of the

  Major administration. It was enacted against a background of continuous change in civil justice: judicial case management, alternative dispute

  resolution (ADR), conditional fees for personal injury and insolvency

  cases were already part of the legal landscape.

  But if the Conservative government was the midwife, the Blair government was the nurse of the new civil procedure rules (CPR) which came

  into effect on 26 April 1999 and were described as ‘a new product code

  with the overriding objective of enabling the Courts to deal with cases

  justly’. They were infused with the concepts of proportionality – the

  devotion of time and money not in excess of that required by the issues at

  stake41 and equality of arms – that, so far as practicable, parties should be

  on an equal footing – and designed to eliminate delay, expense and complexity. There were provisions to promote settlement42 and to mitigate

  the traditional adversarial culture. Judges were to manage cases both pretrial and at the trial; and were no longer to allow parties (and their

  lawyers) to dictate the pace of legislation. Under the rules there were

  developments of group litigation orders (GLO) and the representative

  action, stopping short, however, of full-blown class actions, US-style.43

  Archaic phrases were removed from the vocabulary of the rules, although

  not all changes clarified, and traditionalists regretted the replacement of

  pithy Latinisms with more ponderous Anglo-Saxon prose.

  Before 1997 appeals in civil cases from the County Court and the High

  Court were generally heard by the Court of Appeal. Sir Jeffrey Bowman

  identified the work load of that court as excessive.44 Part IV of the Access

  to Justice 1999 Act (AJA 99) reformed the system. In civil and family cases

  41 Small claims were allocated to a fast track and there was a multi-track for more complex

  litigation.

  42 Simon Roberts ‘Settlement as Civil Justice’, Modern Law Review, 63, 2000: 739, a step not

  far enough according to some. Rachel Smithson, ‘Some Difficulties with Group Litigation

  Orders – and Why the Class Action is Superior’, Civil Justice Quarterly, 2005: 40 (see also

  212).

  43 Smithson, ‘Some Difficulties’.

  44 Report to the Lord Chancellor by the Review of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 1997.

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  permission is normally required to appeal any first-instance decision and

  more appeals are dealt with at a lower level than before.

  The consistent themes in the reorganisation of court business in the

  civil and in the criminal field during the Blair years were flexibility in

  deployment of judicial resources, the allocation of cases to the lowest

  appropriate level, and the increasing involvement of judges in administration at the expense of judging. Beneath the surface of formal adjudication by judges there developed an emphasis on ADR,45 encouraged by

  the Lord Chancellor’s Department (LCD) (subsequently renamed the

  Department of Constitutional Affairs and latterly the Department of

  Justice) and indeed blessed by the courts themselves,46 not only arbitration but mediation, conciliation and negotiation.47

  Only Coroner’s Courts survived the tide of the reform and a Bill is proposed for the next session of parliament to modernise the last relic of a

  medieval legal system whose peculiarities were exposed in contentious

  litigation over the format of the inquest into the death of Diana Princess

  of Wales.48

  Legal aid

  The AJA 1999 provided for two new schemes to replace the existing legal

  aid scheme whose origins lay, like the National Health Service, in the

  post-war Atlee administration, and which was similarly subject to

  increasing strains as demand outweighed capacity. A Legal Services

  Commission (LSC) was established to create, maintain and develop a

  Community Legal Service for civil and family cases. It has a duty to use its

  resources reflecting the priorities set by the Lord Chancellor to secure the

  best possible value for money and to liaise with other funders of legal services. The Commission was also to be responsible for a Criminal Defence

  Service (for the first time in England) providing a Public Defender

  Service (PDS).49

  45 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR 1999).

  46 Cowl v. Plymouth CC [2002] 1 WLR 803, Dunnett v. Railtrack Plc [2002] 1 WLR 2434.

  47 See Henry Brown and Arthur Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice, 2nd edn (London:

  Sweet and Maxwell, 1999).

  48 R (on the application of Paul and others) v. Deputy Coroner of the Queen’s Household and

  Assistant Deputy Coroner for Surrey; R (on the application of Al Fayed) v. Deputy Coroner of

  the Queen’s Household and Assistant Deputy Coroner for Surrey [2007] 2 All ER 509.

  49 Derek O’Brien and John Arnold, ‘Salaried Defenders and the Administration of Justice

  Act 1999’, Modern Law Review, 63, 2000: 394.

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  Publicly funded legal services could only be provided by those who

  held Legal Service Commission contracts (building on a franchising

  system in place since 1994) to those who survived both a merits and

  means test. Previously lawyers were paid after the event, calculated by reference to time expended on the case; thenceforth they were to be paid by

  block contracts with prices fixed in advance. But the contract system necessarily limited suppliers and inevitably imposed regulatory and administrative burdens on solicitors.

  From 1 April 2005 there was a mandatory system of fixed fees covering

  all types of controlled civil work, except immigration. When graduated

  fixed fees were introduced for family and criminal work, barristers took

  the view that they were being denied ‘proper remuneration’ and voted to

  abandon the cab-rank rule for cases subject to the system. There was even

  a brief strike.50

  A letter to The Times on 30 November 2006 from a Law Society Council

  member suggested that the rise in legal aid spending was not the result of

  professional inefficiency but ‘bureaucracy imposed upon solicitors by the

  Legal Services Commission; more and more legislation, policies and initiatives; sloth and incompetence in the manner that cases are investigated and

  considered for charge; poor listing practices in the Magistrates Courts and

  the Crown Courts; incompetent management of the Courts along with too

  many managers and not enough people processing the work’. Fixed fees, it

  was suggested, led to fixed amounts of time and effort devoted to the work.

  But whatever its cause, the fact of the rise was undisputed and in July

  2006 Lord Carter presented a Review of the Legal Aid Programme at the

  invitation of the Lord Chancellor, which made sixty-two recommendations for a move to a market-based approach (a characteristic Blairite

  concept). Among the key ones were: best value tendering for legal aid

  contracts based on quality, capacity and price from 2009; new responsibilities for the Law Society and the Bar Council to enhance the quality of

  the legal aid supplier market; fixed fees for solicitors carrying out legal aid<
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  work in police stations to encourage more efficient practices, including

  cutting costs related to waiting and travelling times; revised graduated

  fees for Crown Court advocates and a new graduated fee scheme for

  Crown Court litigators to reward earlier preparation and resolution of

  cases; tighter control of very high cost criminal legal aid cases; standard

  fees for civil and family legal help, and new graduated fees for solicitors in

  private law family and childcare proceedings.

  50 See further restrictions contemplated by the Criminal Defence and Services Act 2006.

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  The Law Society criticised the complexity of the LSC’s draft contract

  terms. The Bar applauded the revised advocacy graduated fee scheme

  (RAGFS) in place in April 2007, which ended a decade of diminution (in

  real terms) of the value of fees for defence work, and a redistribution from

  long cases (which enabled a few barristers to earn enviable sums from the

  public purse) to 1–10 day cases, but objected to proposed rates for long

  complex cases, and price competitive tendering (PCT). Both branches of

  the profession were united in their concerns about the future of publicly

  funded legal provision. ‘We are facing’, the president of the Law Society

  recently wrote, ‘the long term under-funding of an impoverished legal aid

  system and the additional threats posed by the government’s foolhardy

  timetable for changes in the legal system’.51 Both the professions anchored

  their criticism in the needs for the vulnerable (those accused of crimes,52 in

  family disputes, or seeking welfare benefits) to be properly represented.

  The government, while careful not to suggest that the criticism was

  fuelled by professional self-interest, contended that the ever growing

  demands for legal services were putting intense pressure on the national

  economy, but like Harpagon in Molière’s L’Avare, who aspired to a better

  table at a lower cost, claimed less convincingly that better justice could be

  provided at less expense. A variety of judicial review challenges, claiming

  in particular that the reforms will put small firms servicing minority

  communications out of business, are in the pipeline.53

 

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