If They Give You Lined Paper, Write Sideways

by Daniel Quinn

  Elaine. I guess I can take some consolation from that. [They take a short break.]

  Daniel. I’d like to get back to a subject we were discussing this morning. We were talking about tip-offs that set my alarms ringing, and I said you’ve got to keep an ear open for items that come to us from the received wisdom of our culture. For example, any statement that contains the word Nature is suspect — Nature in the sense of that other we see outside the window.

  Elaine. How so?

  Daniel. The received wisdom is that such a thing as Nature exists, that it is a veridical entity out there — as real and substantial as the US Congress or the Roman Catholic Church — enjoying a separate existence from our own. This is the entity people are thinking of when they say that they “love Nature” or would like to be “close to Nature.”

  Elaine. Well, there is a whole world of life out there that isn’t human.

  Daniel. And have we escaped from it?

  Elaine. Escaped from it?

  Daniel. People will often blame our problems on the fact that we have separated ourselves from Nature, that whole other world of life out there. Haven’t you ever encountered this sentiment?

  Elaine. Yes, I guess I have.

  Daniel. So how far away from it are we?

  Elaine. In reality, we’re not far away from it at all.

  Daniel. Then what sense does it make to say that it would be nice to be “close” to it? We can’t stop being close to it. We’re as much a part of that world as crickets or alligators or oak trees.

  Elaine. You need some pretty thick blinders to miss that.

  Daniel. The distinction between “us” and “it” is a cultural construct, and a very old one. It was clearly in place among the Hebrews, who certainly understood that humans belong to an order of being that is entirely separate from the rest of the living community. They knew that God didn’t create the world for palm trees or jellyfish, he created it for humans. He doesn’t concern himself with the doings of lizards or beetles. He concerns himself with the doings of humans. He didn’t promise the dinosaurs a Messiah.

  Elaine. True.

  Daniel. And he didn’t send his only-begotten son to save the wildlife and the rain forests.

  Elaine. No.

  Daniel. Considering your religious upbringing, I assume you’re familiar with the Great Chain of Being concept.

  Elaine. Yes.

  Daniel. What’s at the top of the chain?

  Elaine. God.

  Daniel. And below God?

  Elaine. The angels.

  Daniel. And below the angels?

  Elaine. Humans.

  Daniel. And below humans?

  Elaine. Everything else.

  Daniel. The Great Chain of Being concept is a product of the Middle Ages, but it wasn’t left behind during the Renaissance. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all wrote about it with complete seriousness. In fact, it’s never been left behind, has it? Even people who don’t believe in God or angels still perceive Man to be at the top of the chain of life on this planet. He stands apart and above all the rest — the rest being that which during the Age of Enlightenment came to be known as “Nature.”

  Elaine. Yes.

  Daniel. This is why I’ve always rejected “environmentalist” as a label for myself. In its fundamental vision, the environmentalist movement reinforces the idea that there is an “us” and an “it” — two separate things — when in fact what we have here is a single community.

  Elaine. Yes, I see that. But even accepting all that, there will still be people who rank us as the most important members of that community.

  Daniel. There’s no doubt about that, and their reasons satisfy them. There are still people who rank the white race over all others, and their reasons satisfy them, too. There’s really nothing to be said about this beyond pointing out that the community of life got along just fine without humans for billions of years. In terms of importance to the community as a whole, I would without hesitation rank earthworms above humans.

  Elaine laughs.

  Daniel. Well, let’s see. Where to go next … Here’s a question that should keep us occupied for a while: “Do you support the idea of extending human rights to primates?”

  Elaine. I take it you don’t.

  Daniel. No, don’t do that. You’re not going to learn anything by leaping to what you assume to be my conclusion. Your job is to explore the assumptions of the person who asked this question. You have to understand his frame of reference and figure out why it seems like a sensible question to him.

  Elaine. Okay. “Do you support the idea of extending human rights to primates?” It’s loaded with assumptions.

  Daniel. Let’s hear them.

  Elaine. I suppose the first one is the assumption that extending human rights to primates is something that’s possible to do.

  Daniel. Couldn’t we do it with an act of Congress? Couldn’t we persuade every government on the planet to do the same?

  Elaine. Not as stated. Are we going to give primates — by the way, aren’t we primates?

  Daniel. Yes. Take the question as referring to nonhuman primates.

  Elaine. Okay … Are we going to give them the right to vote, the right to bear arms?

  Daniel. Ask the questioner. What would he say?

  Elaine. He would say … let’s see … “I mean the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The right to enjoy the protections of due process of law.”

  Daniel. So assuming that everyone in the world agreed to accord primates these rights, they’d be subject to eminent domain, the government’s right to appropriate private property for public use. That’s due process of law, isn’t it?

  Elaine. I guess so.

  Daniel. And, under this assumption, if a gorilla killed a poacher, he wouldn’t just be shot to death, he’d receive a fair trial.

  Elaine. Well … he wouldn’t be considered fit to participate in his own defense.

  Daniel. True enough. So, in effect, all primates would have an irrevocable “Get out of jail free” card. Primates would have rights even humans don’t have.

  Elaine [after some thought]. I guess we’ll have to settle for the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

  Daniel. Okay. You said the question was loaded with assumptions. What are the others?

  Elaine. Well … I guess one of them is the assumption that it makes sense to stop with primates. Is it because they’re very intelligent? If you’re going to extend human rights to intelligent creatures, then why not dolphins and elephants? Or if it’s because they’re endangered, then why not blue whales and bald eagles?

  Daniel. So you’re saying that the idea is unsupportable because of its arbitrary limitation of human rights to primates.

  Elaine. No, not exactly. I guess I’m saying it’s impractical, because no one is going to accept the extension of human rights to nonhuman primates as a stopping point. Maybe I shouldn’t say no one. I mean that animal rights advocates aren’t going to accept it. Why not minks and ermines, along with all the others I’ve mentioned? Vegetarians might want to extend human rights to chickens and cattle.

  Daniel. True.

  Elaine waits for Daniel to continue.

  Daniel [after a minute or so]. You said the question was loaded with assumptions.

  Elaine. Yes …

  Daniel. You haven’t touched on the most fundamental of these assumptions.

  Elaine. Which one is that?

  Daniel. Look for it.

  Elaine. “Do you support the idea of extending human rights to primates?” Was that the question?

  Daniel nods.

  Elaine. I suppose there’s an assumption that it’s even possible to do such a thing. I mean, even with a worldwide agreement.

  Daniel. Meaning what?

  Elaine. Human rights are by definition human. How can you say that a lemur has human rights?

  Daniel. It’s a good point. But there’s a much deeper one waiting to be fo
und.

  Elaine [after some thought]. I don’t see what you’re looking for.

  Daniel. I’m not looking for it, you are … You’re going to have to pull way, way back to see it.

  Elaine thinks for a while, then shakes her head.

  Daniel. Okay. I’m probably rushing things a bit here. What is meant by “human rights”? I’m not asking you to enumerate them. I’m asking you for a general definition: What are human rights?

  Elaine. I guess I’d say that these are the rights people have by virtue of being human.

  Daniel. In other words, to be human is to have these rights.

  Elaine. That’s right.

  Daniel. Hold on a minute. [Brings Elaine a copy of Key Ideas in Human Thought, edited by Kenneth McLeish and published by Facts on File.] See how the term human rights is defined in this book.

  Elaine [reading]. “Human rights are rights which all humans should possess because they are human beings irrespective of their citizenship, nationality, race, ethnicity, language, sex, sexuality, or abilities.”

  Daniel. Very similar to your own definition.

  Elaine. Except for the word should. It says all humans should possess these rights, not that they do.

  Daniel. What do you make of that?

  Elaine. I’m not sure what to make of it.

  Daniel. Suppose I were to define a college degree as a degree that all humans should possess. How would you react to that?

  Elaine. I’d guess I’d ask, who says so?

  Daniel. So does the author of this article ever explain who says that human rights are rights that all humans should possess simply because they’re human beings?

  Elaine [some minutes later, after reading the article]. The author describes it as a “doctrine,” and the doctrine is a “lineal descendant of the doctrine of natural rights proposed by the founders of liberal political thought, notably John Locke.”

  Daniel. So the notion that there is such a thing as human rights is only about 350 years old.

  Elaine. Yes. At least according to this source.

  Daniel. I can run off a copy of the Hammurabi Code of Laws for you, but you can take my word for it that it contains no mention of “human rights.” It lays out things that may and may not be done. One can say, though Hammurabi doesn’t, that one has a right to do the things that he says may be done, but there’s no implication that this right exists simply because one is human. This right exists because Hammurabi says it exists. He describes himself as “The king of righteousness, on whom Shamash has conferred right (or law).” “Or law” is in parentheses. I assume the translator is making the point that the word Hammurabi uses here can mean either right or law.

  Elaine. What about the Bible? I assume you’ve checked that.

  Daniel. Yes, of course. The word right appears many times, but most often in connection with the rights of the firstborn, which are just a matter of custom; in American society, for example, the firstborn has no special rights. There’s nothing in the Bible like the concept of “human rights,” rights that people have just because they’re human. As with the Code of Hammurabi, the laws set down in the Bible can be seen as conferring rights — for example, the right to kill a witch — but these are exactly rights that are divinely conferred, not rights that are somehow innately human.

  Elaine. Yes, that’s true. Then there’s the … I can’t think of the name … the Magna Carta.

  Daniel. Oh yes. This was a charter of rights granted by the English king to his barons in 1215.

  Elaine. Certainly not human rights.

  Daniel. No. Let me see that article on human rights … It says, “Unless human rights are specifically embodied in constitutional provisions, they are not legal rights.” What do you suppose that means?

  Elaine. I think it means … unless the country you’re living in has a constitution that confers these rights on you, you don’t really have them. You can’t go to court and claim that your human rights have been violated unless the constitution says you have them.

  Daniel. So, practically speaking, you don’t have human rights just by being human after all. If you have them, it’s because the constitution says you have them.

  Elaine. I’d say so. But doesn’t the US Constitution say that these rights are God-given?

  Daniel. No. You’re thinking of the Declaration of Independence, though it doesn’t use that particular expression. It says that all men are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

  Elaine. Unalienable being what?

  Daniel. Unalienable being “incapable of being taken away from or given away by the possessor.” It’s a curious word. Its sole application seems to be to rights. Its first such application was made in 1611.

  Elaine. Okay. But this is just an assertion, isn’t it? That all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.

  Daniel. Certainly. I have a quote about this. Hold on a second … Here’s what Thomas Jefferson,* the principal author, wrote in support of what’s said in the declaration: “Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, et cetera.” Of course he wasn’t referring specifically to the expression we’re considering.

  Elaine. Wasn’t he a Deist?

  Daniel. Jefferson’s religious beliefs are the subject of endless debate. He certainly never specifically claimed to be a Deist, though there’s little doubt that he was influenced by and sympathetic with Deistic views. His reference in the declaration to “Nature’s God” certainly has a Deistic flavor. Why do you ask?

  Elaine. I’m looking for his grounds for saying that the Creator endowed us with inalienable rights. They weren’t scriptural.

  Daniel. No. “Nature’s God” isn’t the God of the Bible. He — or it — is the “uncaused cause” of the cosmological argument. Roughly speaking, it goes like this: “Since the universe exists, it must have had a cause, and since a causal chain can’t stretch infinitely backward in time, there must be a first cause that was not itself caused; this uncaused first cause is God.” This argument speaks only to the existence of God and posits nothing about his character.

  Elaine. But it was this God who endowed us with inalienable rights. It’s still just an assertion.

  Daniel. Rights can only be asserted or denied. In the end, they’re just something to be argued about. One side asserts the right and the other side denies it, but there’s no final authority — final in the sense that it’s an authority accepted by both sides — that can be appealed to in order to end the argument. Even the law can’t be appealed to, because almost any law can be changed if enough people want it changed.

  Elaine [after some thought]. But the argument over slavery was eventually settled, wasn’t it? I mean, even in the South, I doubt if you could find many slavery advocates nowadays.

  Daniel. Arguments aren’t necessarily settled just because no one is around to make them. There’s no one around today — at least in the United States — to make the arguments that were put forward in support of slavery as a moral option in the 1860s, but the arguments are still there. The Pelagian argument is still there, even though the church finally pronounced against it. The argument over abortion has been won in the United States, but it obviously hasn’t been settled.

  Elaine. Yes, I see your point.

  Daniel. By contrast, the argument over the famous cold-fusion results of the late 1980s* was eventually settled, because both sides of the argument accept the scientific method as a final authority. The results of that particular experiment couldn’t be reproduced, and that was that.

 
Elaine [after some thought]. I’m feeling a bit lost. Where are we here?

  Daniel. We’re still looking at assumptions in the question “Do you support the idea of extending human rights to primates?” What have we concluded so far?

  Elaine. I’d say that we’ve concluded that “human rights” is another cultural construct.

  Daniel. By implication, the author of the article in Key Ideas in Human Thought seems to agree with us, since he says that these are rights that people should have, not that they do have.

  Elaine. He also indicates that it’s not at all universally agreed that such things exist.

  Daniel. While you’re at it, look up the entry on rights.

  Elaine [after finding her place in the book]. There isn’t one.

  Daniel. Odd, isn’t it? The concept of rights seems even more fundamental than the concept of human rights, and has a longer history. What is a right, anyway?

  Elaine. I’d say it’s an entitlement. An entitlement to have or do something.

  Daniel. I’ve searched many dictionaries of aboriginal languages, and very few of them seem to have a word for right in this sense. In all the reading I’ve done about aboriginal peoples, I’ve never come across any instance of them arguing about rights or asserting a right to do the things they do.

  Elaine. It would surprise me if you had. But that’s just an intuitive reaction.

  Daniel. Why do we have to assert rights to do the things we want to do?

  Elaine. That’s an interesting question.

  Daniel. A hundred years ago homosexual acts were almost universally outlawed in the West, France and Poland being two exceptions I know of. The situation is entirely different today.

  Elaine. And you’re going to ask why.

  Daniel. Of course.

  Elaine. It’s different because homosexuals asserted their right to have sex with people of the same gender and eventually gained enough support to win it.