The Battle of Long Tan

by David W. Cameron

  Meanwhile, back at the Task Force base, intelligence officer Captain Keep and his superior officer, Major Rowe, had each been evacuated suffering medical ailments – by 16 or 17 August, 1 ATF had lost its intelligence officers. Given that the active patrolling had revealed no evidence of any sizeable force within the Nui Dat 2 or Long Tan plantation area, when the mortar attack occurred on 17 August it was assessed to be a hit-and-run exercise, with no evidence of intent by the Viet Cong to begin operations against the base itself:

  The accepted explanation was that D445 VC Battalion mounted the attack on orders from the Viet Cong provincial headquarters possibly in retaliation for the recent search for the headquarters by 5 RAR [Binh Ba]. Alternatively it could have been in response to A Company patrols engaging three small parties of enemy in the general area of the Nui Dat 2 feature on the afternoon of 16 August. A Viet Cong ground attack on the Task Force was thought to be unlikely.29

  Intelligence to date had indicated that the local D445 VC Battalion was active in the area and it was possible that a North Vietnamese battalion – possibly from 275 VC Regiment – was also present within or adjacent to 1 ATF’s tactical area of responsibility. However, the constant patrolling by 6 RAR of the area to the east and north-east of the base, with no sign of any significant enemy activity (besides the hit-and-run mortar attack), suggested that there was no imminent threat coming from that direction.30 That said, it was known that the enemy regiments could assemble quickly and relocate at short notice anywhere in the province within just 48 hours. 31

  9

  ‘We then proceeded to brief the diggers’

  The mortar attack against Nui Dat during the early hours of 17 August resulted in 23 Australians and one New Zealander being wounded – two seriously. One of these was a 21-year-old postman from Granville, NSW, gunner Philip Norris of 103 Battery. He had been hit in the head with shrapnel and was later listed as having died from his wounds.* Lieutenant Colin Browne of the Royal Australian Engineers was later awarded the Member of the British Empire for his actions in assisting the wounded, ten of whom were from the Engineers.1 Casualties were such that the shelling (combined with the casualties from the Battle of Long Tan, to be fought the next day) had a serious impact on the stocks of medical supplies.2 The enemy barrage had targeted the south and south-east perimeter of the base, where 103 Field Battery, 1 Field Squadron of the Royal Australian Engineers, 3 SAS Squadron and 1 Australian Reinforcement Unit were positioned.

  That morning, as Brigadier Jackson was inspecting the damage to the base, Captain James Townley of 103 Battery came out of a crater with a piece of a mortar fin. He told the Task Force CO that it had come from an 81mm Chicom mortar or perhaps one made in the Soviet Union. Jackson immediately dismissed his assessment, stating that it was clearly from a 60mm mortar, as only the NVA would have such long-range equipment. Townley did not push the point, but many who saw the evidence before them knew that it was from an 81mm mortar round. Lieutenant David Harris of the Armoured Corps, an aide to Brigadier Jackson, later recalled that the brigadier wanted to believe they had only been attacked by local Viet Cong elements.3

  Jackson was not in a position to respond in force to the mortar attack, as one of his two battalions, 5 RAR under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Warr, was still conducting operations in and around Binh Ba, about 7 kilometres to the north, while A Company of 6 RAR was still out on a three-day patrol near Nui Dat 2. This left just three infantry companies to hold and defend the base.4 While 1 ATF was adequately supported with artillery and machine guns for base defence, it was relatively weak in infantry, which impacted significantly on the force’s offensive capabilities. As such, Jackson ordered 5 RAR to complete operations around Binh Ba as soon as possible and return to base.

  Indeed, the clearing and reclamation of Binh Ba had been one of the first priorities for 1 ATF on taking over Phuoc Tuy Province just two months before: it was the most important village under the control of the Viet Cong, located on Route 2 leading north to Long Khanh Province. The men had been involved in Operation Holsworthy (8–18 August) to clear the village of enemy concentrations within and around Binh Ba.

  Operation Holsworthy not only successfully cleared the Viet Cong from the immediate area but opened up Route 2 for the locals, including those further north at the Catholic village of Binh Gia, who up until then had been isolated from other villages. The ability to renew contact with other townships greatly improved the economic and social fabric of these villages and the surrounding hinterland. Major Bruce McQualter, who would die on 5 March 1967 from wounds suffered during Operation Renmark, wrote in his after-action report how the soldiers were soon playing soccer with the local kids and volunteered to join the villagers in their religious services. He also wrote that when the Australians tried to pay for bananas the villagers refused to sell them – rather, they gave them away for nothing. Many Australians found themselves being invited into homes for ‘tea and, in some cases, whisky’.5

  The battalion medical officer, Captain Tony White, was also happy that he could set about doing some humanitarian work treating the locals, who suffered from a great variety of ailments. Around 1200 patients were treated in just nine days, with malnutrition being the main concern; this was soon remedied with the opening-up of Route 2, which allowed increased quantities and varying food types to be delivered to the villages from nearby townships. Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel Warr remarked that the effect of opening Route 2‘on the morale of the villagers was “remarkable”. . . In the first two days 500 people travelling on Lambrettas, ox carts, bicycles, tractors and army transport moved south to Ba Ria’.6 Captain Robert O’Neill recalled that ‘one felt that the environment was growing more friendly towards us. Certainly we no longer sensed the presence of immediate hostility moving about amongst the rubber and banana trees.’7 Even so, when any intelligence report suggested an attack against the base was likely, it was sufficient merely to pass the word that the ‘Binh Ba Ten Thousand is on tonight’.8

  Meanwhile, back at Nui Dat, Brigadier Jackson was still keen to consolidate his force in case of an attack against the base, and anxiously awaited the arrival of 5 RAR. He needed intelligence of possible locations of any nearby enemy force. A few hours after the mortar attack, at 4.50 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend, commander of 6 RAR, instructed Major Noel Ford, commanding B Company, to prepare to take his company out on patrol. In all he had a strength of 80 men, including the forward artillery observers. They were to pinpoint the enemy firing positions to the east, somewhere close to the cleared and now deserted village of Long Tan and not far from the elongated hill of Nui Dat 2.9 After finding the enemy firing positions, which were likely already evacuated, Ford was to establish which routes the Viet Cong had taken to escape.

  Lance Corporal Phil Buttigieg recalled his OC as a rather cool and aloof character who wore his pistol more like a ‘badge of office rather than as a weapon’.10 The next day, while in battle, Ford was found to have no ammunition for it. ‘Fordie’, as his men called him (but not to his face), was well respected because a few weeks earlier he had calmly led the ‘repulse of numerous company attacks against our company just east of the Long Tan rubber [plantation] where we experienced the terror of bugle attacks and witnessed the close-up devastating effect of our own artillery for the first time’.11

  Corporal Robin Jones, also of B Company, recalled being issued with his orders for the patrol. Dress was to be basic webbing, with first-line ammo of 60 rounds per man and 200 rounds per machine gun. They were to take a meal and enough for a brew as they were scheduled to be back sometime after midday, or mid-afternoon at the latest. He and the other NCOs went about briefing their men and completing preparations for the day patrol.12 The men of B Company departed from the base for Long Tan plantation at 6.30 a.m. Corporal Jones recalled:

  As first light broke we left silently into the grey shadows and undergrowth. The going was slow and even at that early hour it was hot and humid, and the chance of runn
ing into Viet Cong even close to the wire was a real possibility in those days. We didn’t use any tracks in the area, and scrub bashed, so that by mid morning in the heavy scrub we had only covered about 1,500 metres. We were also slowed down by having to stop frequently and send out recce parties to try to find any enemy sign, or any sign of use on any of the known tracks in the area.13

  Within two hours of leaving the base they came across a mortar-base plate, east of the Suoi Da Bang stream, approximately halfway between the base and Long Tan plantation. It was relayed back to base at 8.10 a.m. that ‘we are checking area to try to establish the number of people involved. A heavy track leading NE [north-east] from the area. Base plate mark seems [to] confirm 81mm Mor[tar] used.’14 As they checked the area, they found another six base-plate positions, each represented by holes lined with rocks at the bottom to support the mortars. The positions had apparently been quickly abandoned, as small personal items, including a tobacco pouch and rice, had been left behind. It was estimated that around 25 Viet Cong had occupied the positions during the mortar attack.15

  After reporting the information, B Company was ordered to break into three platoon patrols and push on further towards the western edge of Long Tan plantation. One of these patrols came across some Vietnamese women picking fruit; each had an identification card, and the troops moved on. For the rest of the day they swept the area following a number of tracks, but found nothing to indicate any other significant enemy activity. It was determined by 1 ATF command that they would spend the night out beyond the perimeter and set up a harbour position on a fresh track heading south. The men of Lieutenant Eric Andrews, 8 Platoon, C Company, 6 RAR were sent out to provide the men of B Company with rations for their unintended overnight stay in the bush, and the next morning the men of B Company were to continue their sweep of the area.16

  About two-thirds of B Company had been due for leave the next day in Vung Tau, and it was agreed that at first light these men would make their way back to the Task Force base. The men of 5 RAR and 6 RAR were utterly exhausted – physically and mentally – after two months of constant patrolling day and night with no rest from base-defence duties. They were operating in platoons and companies that were under strength due to casualties and sickness, and despite the combat circumstance, it was imperative that they be given leave to recover. As recalled by Corporal John Robbins, ‘You’re working all day in that heat, plus patrolling, and at night you had to have all-night ambushes. They’d tell you to sleep, because you’re going out on an all-night ambush. Well you couldn’t bloody sleep. You can’t sleep during the day, in that sort of heat, particularly if artillery are putting rounds off all the time. It was bloody hard. And the morale was probably at a low point, because of the rain and the mud. The mud was bloody awful.’17

  The remaining composite platoon, B Company, numbering 32 men and made up of a section from each platoon from men who had already had leave, were the next morning to carry on the search under the command of national service officer Lieutenant John O’Halloran, who commanded 5 Platoon, and Sergeant Harry Keen. Major Ford would stay behind to command the operation. They took up a harbour position for the night about halfway between Task Force base at Nui Dat and the main track leading into Long Tan plantation from Route 52.18

  Earlier, A Company, north of B Company, under the command of Captain Charles Mollison, was patrolling the area north, north-east and west of the Task Force base. They radioed in that they had come across a track that had been used recently, probably within the last 48 hours. Just after 2 p.m., A Company made contact with a single Viet Cong fighter who quickly disappeared. They too were slated to return to base by mid-afternoon the next day.19

  Back at Nui Dat, the men of D Company, 6 RAR were apparently the lucky ones of the battalion – it was their day off. They were assigned to maintain base security and like everyone at 1 ATF were anxiously awaiting the arrival of Little Pattie (Patricia Amphlett) and Col Joye, who were to play a number of concerts for the troops the next day (18 August) – the first such event to be staged at the ‘sharp end’ of the combat area of Nui Dat. That night, C and D companies split up to cover their own forward defence positions, along with those of A and B companies, who had with darkness taken up harbour positions well beyond the Task Force perimeter.20

  While 1 ATF base was being shelled during the early hours of 17 August, a number of Australian SAS field operations were being conducted within the province. In Vietnam the men of the Australian SAS had become recognised as masters of stealth and battle-hardened warriors. Their main job was to provide intelligence, which required ongoing patrols deep within enemy territory. They built a fearsome reputation with Australian soldiers, who called them ‘super grunts’, and with the Viet Cong, who placed a price on the head of any SAS ‘phantom of the jungle’ who was brought in.21

  One of the SAS patrols being conducted that day was about 16 kilometres east of Nui Dat, along the Song Rai River. These men had been flown in by Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin during the late afternoon of 16 August.22 Sergeant Ashley Urquhart, who commanded the patrol, noted signs of recent enemy activity and assessed that the Viet Cong, up to a company strong, had become aware of their presence in the area and were out looking for them. This information was not reported until after they had been extracted by helicopter on 19 August, a day after the Battle of Long Tan, due to radio interference and a faulty set. Regardless, there was no indication that a strong enemy force was within the area, and nothing to suggest that any attack against the Task Force was in the offing – although they would have been too far east to identify the presence of 275 VC Regiment and D445 Battalion, which by then were likely just a few kilometres east of the rubber plantation.23

  Meanwhile, on the same day, another SAS patrol, under the command of Sergeant Max Aitkin, had been inserted about 16 kilometres north of the Task Force base, beyond the township of Binh Gia. The patrol identified four individuals dressed in army greens speedily heading south. Like Urquhart’s, Aitkin’s radio was out of action but this sighting alone did not indicate anything of significance. Another SAS patrol just east of Aitkin’s, commanded by Sergeant Alan Kirwan, identified ten Viet Cong heading west of Binh Gia, and later identified another group moving east, quickly followed by a third group he could hear moving east; he radioed this information back to the Task Force.

  This area was known to be populated with Viet Cong and there was nothing to indicate that the enemy was massing for an attack.24 Indeed, a number of SAS patrols had been conducted since mid-July in Phuoc Tuy Province; their key objective as described by Brigadier Jackson was to ‘search for [the] VC main forces and give early warning of any major enemy movement through areas where the infantry battalions were not operating’.25 Like the infantry patrols, those of the SAS came across no evidence of any significant enemy activity near or approaching 1 ATF base.

  A few days before the mortar attack against the Task Force base, a number of Australians from 12 Platoon, D Company, 6 RAR were in the make-do canteen having a drink when the mail arrived. Among them was Private David Beahan from Armidale, NSW. He recalled: ‘We were all reading our mail, and the next minute this bloke yelled, “You beauty – she’s accepted!” We all looked at him. “She’s agreed to marry me,” he said. “She’s agreed to marry me!”’

  The men carried on reading their mail, and soon after Private Beahan got a pat on the shoulder and Private Paul Large asked if he could see him for a minute. ‘He said, “Mate, I want you to be my best man at the wedding.” I said, “Don’t be bloody silly, Paul. You’ve got your school friends and your mates from Coolah.” And he said, “No, no, read this paragraph here of the letter” and it said, “Paul, please pick an army friend for your best man, rather than a school friend or a Coolah boy”.’ Beahan said they had known each other for less than 12 months, but even so had become great mates, and Private Large said, ‘“I want you to be best man” and that was it.’26

  In the early morning of 18 August, Private Mick
Levin of A Company had recovered from his case of pyrexia and had returned to his tent. There he found an old mate from D Company, 6 RAR, a 21-year-old army regular from Bendigo, Private David J. Thomas, who had been staffing A Company’s base area while the company was out on patrol. Private Levin recalled that when he got back to his tent he came across Private Thomas, who was sleeping there. Both had been in the same platoon at the training camp in Ingleburn, NSW. They sat on the cots and ‘chewed the fat’ and before leaving to go back to D Company, Thomas left two cans of Swan Lager for his mate. Thomas would be killed in action that afternoon.27

  Sergeant Bob Buick had a similar experience. He recalled the previous afternoon picking up two reinforcements for D Company: privates Colin Whiston and Frank Topp. He was not to know that within 24 hours both would be killed in action.28

  * In a remarkable story it was not until 2005 that his army mates learnt that Philip had survived his injuries and had been living in a number of repatriation hospitals since his wounding in 1966. He was later reunited with his daughter, and died in August 2010 (see Missing presumed dead, www.103fieldbatteryraa.net).